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Abstract 
 
The supportive environments which sustain armed groups are arguably an understudied 
aspect of political violence; it is widely acknowledged that all armed groups necessitate a 
degree of popular support if they are to be successful but the relationship between armed 
movements and their supporters is often underdeveloped or considered self-explanatory. 
This project puts forth the argument that the relationship between armed groups and their 
supporters is of fundamental importance to how and where armed groups mobilise and the 
repertoire of contention they adopt. Making use of Malthaner’s concept of “constituency” 
(2011a), the PKK’s armed struggle from its foundation in the 1970s until 1999 will be 
analysed. The particular manner in which the PKK actively constructed and maintained 
extensive support networks across contrasting socio-spatial contexts ensured its ongoing 
legitimacy and the material resources necessary for its survival. Although a noted power 
disparity exists between armed and unarmed actors, the relationship between them is 
always characterised by degrees of reciprocal influence; influence that is often expressed in 
a variety of subtle and contextually specific fashions. The project will therefore examine the 
dialectic between the PKK and its communities of support and how this has evolved over 
time and space from rural Kurdistan to the urban centres of western Turkey, and consider 
how it has impacted on the nature of violence deployed by the PKK in the course of its 
insurgency.
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Introduction 
 
The PKK was formally established in 1978 in the aftermath of the successful third 
world national liberation struggles, which witnessed the emancipation of most of the 
world’s remaining colonies. The PKK’s insurgent contemporaries of the time were amongst 
others, movements such the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front 
in Ethiopia1 and the IRA in Ireland all of which are long since ensconced in the halls of 
institutional power in their respective states and statelets. That is, of course, not to 
mention, all of the insurgent movements which have since been crushed and no longer even 
exist in any substantial terms, most notably the PKK’s Kurdish and Turkish left counterparts. 
Furthermore, its birth came about in a period of dramatic regional change which would have 
seemed likely to disfavour a movement such as the PKK; it has been argued that in 1979, 
“the Middle East broadly speaking entered a new historical cycle determined by the 
extreme weakening of left-wing movements and an almost hegemonic domination of 
Islamism” (Bozarslan, 2014:5). Yet the PKK in 2014 remains one of the most significant 
actors, not only in Turkey but across the Middle East; bridging the chasm stretching from 
the Cold War period to the contemporary uni-polar epoch. The PKK retains significant armed 
capacity and its guerrilla forces were sufficiently potent to render 2011 and 20122 the 
conflict’s bloodiest years since the 1990s. It has not become a parliamentary party but it 
boasts the strongest social movement in Turkey with the capacity to mobilise tens of 
thousands for demonstrations and celebrations.  
 
The PKK neatly fits Goodwin’s definition of a persistent insurgent group3 as one of 
“those that persist for many years or even decades without seizing power, but which 
maintain significant popular support” (2001:219). It also meets his quantitative qualification 
by fielding at “least one thousand armed guerrillas for at least a decade” (ibid: 220). The PKK 
has persevered in the grey area between success and failure, co-optation and annihilation 
                                                        
1 Eritrea obtained its independence in 1991. 
2
See UCDP casualty statistics, available at: 
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=158&regionSelect=10-Middle_East# 
3
 The term is also used by O’Leary and Silke (2004) but they do not precisely distinguish persistent from other 
forms of insurgency or conflict. 
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for almost forty years in the course of which it has undergone numerous ideological and 
political transformations. It was founded as a Marxist movement to liberate the colony of 
Kurdistan from the yolk of Imperialism, evolved into an autonomist movement limited to 
only Kurds in Turkey, and has subsequently reinvented itself as a post-nationalist social 
libertarian movement tranversing Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian state borders; all the 
while, with the exception of a five year period from 1999-2004, engaging the Turkish army 
in armed confrontation. 
 
This project has not examined the long durée of the PKK until 2014, it has restricted 
itself to the period of the PKK’s emergence and the first and most intense phase of conflict 
which stretched from 1984-1999. One could argue ad infinitum about the political 
achievements of the PKK and whether or not it has maximised the political opportunities 
available to it or not, but one cannot easily dismiss its notable military accomplishments. 
Turkey boasts NATO’s second largest army which is extremely well equipped and 
experienced; while the PKK albeit bolstered by thousands of guerrillas has never had access 
to heavy weaponry or substantial external backing. Nonetheless, the PKK has inflicted 
grievous casualties on the Turkish armed forces, police and paramilitaries and has 
successfully absorbed the bloody exactions inflicted on it in return. This project sustains that 
the only explicable reason why the PKK has succeeded in resisting the Turkish state for as 
long as it has done, is because it has never lost the support of a large portion of the Kurdish 
people; this is the very aspect of the PKK that will be analysed throughout this thesis. The 
PKK has an extremely disciplined professional nucleus of guerrillas, urban cadre and full time 
activists which have varied in number from the thousands to the ten(s) of thousands. 
However, I argue that the real strength of the PKK is derived not from its core but its 
periphery. As Mitchell has discussed regarding the distinction between state and society; 
“the distinction must be taken not as the boundary between two discrete entities, but as a 
line drawn internally within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a social 
and political order is maintained” (1991:78). Accordingly, the boundary between the PKK 
and its supporters must not be considered as dividing two hermetic entities but rather like a 
tide, ebbing and flowing over time and space, but remaining ever present, in one form or 
another. It is precisely this ebb and flow of support that will be analysed in the subsequent 
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chapters; how the PKK harnessed this collective energy and where and against whom it was 
deployed.  
 
Research Design  
 
 This project is based on a single case study, the PKK. Projects focusing on single case 
studies have been criticised for their lack of generalisability and it has been suggested that 
“little can be learned” from them (Rueschemeyer, 2003:307). An affirmation Rueschemeyer 
has himself categorically dismissed, by citing the ground breaking works of E.P. Thompson, 
Robert Michels and Theda Skocpol’s (ibid). When working on a single case study, “the 
challenge is to acknowledge and uncover its specific meaning, while extracting generalisable 
knowledge, actually or potentially related to other cases” (Vennesson, 2008: 226). Case 
studies are used “to develop and evaluate theories as well as to formulate hypotheses or 
explain particular phenomena by using theories and causal mechanisms” (ibid: 227). Given 
the hitherto patchy academic focus on the Kurds in general and even more acutely in 
relation to the PKK, this project has necessarily entailed a “configurative-ideographic” (ibid) 
component in order to clarify the empirical basis on which the subsequent theoretical 
hypotheses have been elaborated. Thereby reflecting Wickham-Crowley’s warning that 
“facts should be firmly established before attempts are made to theorise about facts” 
(1993:19).  Nonetheless, due care has been employed to avoid a historical or more 
journalistic approach by the conversion of “historical information into a suitable analytical 
vocabulary that can be applied to other cases” (Vennesson, 2008: 230).  
 
The project utilises a heuristic approach involving the generation and refinement of 
hypotheses in conjunction with an evaluation of the prevailing social science theories, in 
light of the case studies empirical findings (see ibid: 227-228). The project has made ample 
use of process tracing as a research method, which examines “the decision processes by 
which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes” (George and McKeown in 
Tarrow, 2004:173). It is a “procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the 
outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context” 
(George and Bennett in Vennesson, 2008:231). Process tracing is of particular value for 
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historical cases as it results in a step by step narrative reconstruction of particular 
phenomena. 
 
Research Question 
 
The central research question is: in what fashion did the PKK’s relationship with its 
constituency influence the patterns of violence and mobilisation it advanced from its 
foundation in the mid 1970s until 1999? This principal question is contingent on two sub-
questions; firstly how did the PKK develop its constituency? Secondly, how and to what 
extent was this constituency maintained across space and time? The core objective of this 
thesis is not to describe the PKK and its support networks per se but rather to consider if 
and how the relationship between the two impacted on the PKK’s repertoire of contention. 
It has detailed this relationship, the manner in which it was forged and how it evolved in the 
various socio-spatial environments in which it was present. The concept of constituency has 
been used as per Malthaner’s definition as “the real social groups in a society, whom the 
militants address and to whom they refer, with whom they are actually involved in some 
form of relationship, and who – at least to a certain degree – actually sympathise with and 
support the militant groups” (2011:29). Although this relationship between movement and 
supporters is the principle focus of the project, all social actors are inevitably engaged in 
multiple and overlapping relationships with a whole host of other actors be they individuals, 
institutions - in particular with the state - or other movements. This multitude of 
relationships varies dramatically over time and space and the relative importance afforded 
to specific interlocutors differs accordingly.  
 
The diachronic focus of the project is of importance because as Goodwin has noted 
“the conditions that foster strong revolutionary movements by no means guarantee that 
such movements will actually seize state power” (2001:210); highlighting that changes in 
structural context over time can facilitate or inhibit revolutionary efforts. To give an 
example, the PKK’s interaction with other Kurdish movements was of huge importance prior 
to the 1980 coup but much less so afterwards. As an example of spatial differentiation, the 
PKK was obliged to interact with other leftist organisation in certain neighbourhoods of 
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Istanbul in the 1990s but was to a large extent, with the exception of Dersim, the sole 
revolutionary force in the rest of Kurdistan. In addition, PKK sympathisers’ engagement with 
the repressive apparatuses of the state underwent varying periods of intensity according to 
time and location. Therefore, the main theoretical focus of the book will not disregard the 
socio-cultural, political and personal context in which this relationship was articulated and 
rearticulated. The approach of this project will be relational (Bosi, Demetriou & Malthaner, 
2014) but also constructivist as it recognises the “social construction of their experiential 
reality by the various actors participating in the social and political conflict” (della Porta, 
2013:5).  
 
Note on Terminology 
 
The practises of naming and labelling in the social sciences are often controversial, 
especially in cases of long running armed conflict (see McAdam et al, 2001:125). The two 
most glaring examples in the case of the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state are 
the terms Kurdistan (see Pérouse, 1998) and terrorism. These terms are not merely 
descriptive, but are often used as a means to identify their users’ political sympathies or in 
this case possible academic biases. Kurdistan is not usually found on standard maps because 
it is, in simple terms, not an internationally recognised country. It lingers in the category of 
stateless nations alongside Kabylie, Azawad and the nations of the indigenous populations 
of the Americas and Australia. As “all maps are abstractions of reality” (O’Shea, 1994:179) 
they merely reflect prevailing power relations. The borders of a putative independent 
Kurdistan were outlined at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference as: 
 
"begin[ing] in the north at Ziven, on the Caucasian frontier, and continue westwards to 
Erzurum, Erzincan, Kemah, Arapgir, Besni and Divick. In the south they follow the line from 
Harran, the Sinjihar Hills, Tel Asfar, Erbil, Süleymaniye, Akk-el-man, Sinne; in the east, 
Ravandiz, Başkale, Vezirkale, that is to say the frontier of Persia as far as Mount Ararat  (in 
Özoğlu, 2004:39). 
 
6 
 
In Turkey, the region populated by Kurds was referred to as the East (see Zana 
Gündoğan, 2011) and latterly as the South East following the 1980 coup (Jongerden, 2007: 
29). Such appellations only make sense according to the territorial confines marked out by 
the Turkish state. The state borders which have divided the Kurdish nation between Iran, 
Iraq, Syria and Turkey did not heed the natural confines of the Kurdish people, which were 
linked by tribal and familial solidarities. Although, Kurds in the borders areas were obliged to 
encounter the material realities of such boundaries in their daily lives, it has not necessarily 
led to a comprehensive internalisation of their validity. Trading patterns which crossed the 
borders - now classified as smuggling - continued and neither did the border completely 
alter their collective political imagination as Kurds. Kurds living along the border between 
Syria and Turkey did not refer to it as such, commonly describing themselves as either being 
binxet or serxet, (i.e. as above or below the line) and not as citizens of one state or the other 
(Interview 37, 2013). To give a concrete example, the city of Ceylanpınar (Serêkaniyê in 
Kurdish) is simply referred to by residents of the other half of the urban conglomeration 
that lies across the border in Syria, as Serêkaniyê Serxet. As Jongerden explained those of a 
Kurdish nationalist inclination would not view themselves as being in the South East of 
Turkey but rather in the North or North West of Kurdistan (2007: 30). As this project focuses 
on the PKK and its supporters, the term Kurdistan has been used to refer to the Kurd’s 
homeland. However, as the PKK was active for the timeframe of this project almost 
exclusively in Turkish Kurdistan4, the use of Kurdistan will be limited to this and not the 
wider understanding of Kurdistan. On occasions where reference is made to events in the 
Kurdish regions outside of Turkey’s borders, this will be specified.  
 
If the external delineation of Kurdistan in this project is clear, the borders of 
Kurdistan within Turkey are much more ambiguous. Many maps put forth by certain Kurds 
“depict a wish-fulfilment of extreme Kurdish Nationalism” (O’Shea, 1994:180) while the 
Turkish state has obviously never delineated a territory whose very existence it has always 
denied. Furthermore, territorial delineation is a fraught process at the best of times and 
notwithstanding projections of immutability, borders are always in a constant process of 
slow evolution. As the peoples who inhabit Kurdistan have been heretofore denied the 
                                                        
4 In recent years the PKK’s Syrian wing the PYD has come to the fore in Syrian Kurdistan or Rojava and its 
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possibility to agree upon its precise political extent, it remains best understood as a 
homeland. Homeland as a concept is “a blend of political discourses and individual wishes, 
conceptions, longings and experiences” (Alinia, 2004:219). It therefore drifts between the 
individual and the collective level. Some residents of cities such as Maraş and or Antep 
would define their place of origin as Kurdistan while others might not.  It remains the 
prerogative of each individual to define their own social reality and not for external 
academic observers to ascribe one for them. In terms of a practical guide, when Kurdistan is 
mentioned in this thesis it refers roughly to the eastern and south-eastern corner of the 
Turkish state, ranging from Kars in the North-east passing westwards through Erzurum, on 
towards Sivas before turning south passing by Malatya and 
Antep.
http://www.ezilon.com/maps/europe/turkey-maps.html  
 
 In addition to the macro-debate regarding whether to use the term Kurdistan or 
not, there is the further issue of whether to use the Turkish or Kurdish names of cities, 
towns and villages. As well as large scale demographic engineering in the early decades of 
the Republic, the Turkish state launched an extensive campaign of “toponymical 
engineering” (Öktem, 2008:8). It has been suggested that “such toponymic strategies aim to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Iranian wing, PJAK was active for a period in Eastern Kurdistan or Iranian Kurdistan.  
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construct a new relationship between culture and space, and either subordinate or 
annihilate them from topographic representations” (Jongerden, 2007: 31). In a campaign of 
supreme symbolic violence (Žižek, 2008) thousands of places with non-Turkish names were 
assigned Turkish sounding ones (ibid: 9). This has led to immense confusion amongst Kurds, 
whereby the names of villages outside of one’s immediate environs are known only in 
Turkish or especially with the elderly only in Kurdish, generating huge geographical 
disorientation and confusion (Interview 2, 2012). In general, this project will use the place 
names most widely used for reasons of clarity. It will refer to cities which have been recently 
renamed like Urfa (Şanlıurfa) and Maraş (Kahramanmaraş) by their original names as that is 
how they are most commonly recognised (at least by Kurds). It will mention both the 
Kurdish and Turkish names of smaller villages and towns – when possible - to limit any 
ambiguity. The best known example is the case of Dersim which was renamed Tunceli in the 
1930s (see van Bruinessen, 1995). The name change was a means to eradicate any memory 
of Dersim and the mass killing carried out there by the ‘nation building’ Turkish state. Yet, 
given the symbolic importance of the Dersim rebellion to Kurds and Alevis, the original 
name has taken on even greater significance and even its utterance is an act of counter 
hegemonic opposition. 
 
As a sub field within the wider discipline of political violence, the study of terrorism 
has flourished in the wake of the September 11th attacks in 2001. There are countless 
journals dedicated to the topic most notably Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism and the Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter-terrorism. It has 
been suggested that in terrorism literature “the brandishing of stark facts goes hand in hand 
with great leaps into discursive fantasy" (Aretxaga, Zulaika & Douglass in Aretxaga, 
2003:402) and that the “construct of ‘terror’ employed by terroristologists was not 
developed in response to honest puzzlement about the real world, but rather in response to 
ideological pressure” (George in della Porta & Haupt, 2012: 312).  As della Porta has 
commented, the scientific merit of much of terrorism studies is contestable with a large 
amount lacking originality (Silke, 2009), based on scarce evidence (Schmid and Jongman 
1988) and is often ahistorical in nature (Breen & Smyth 2007: 260) (in della Porta, 2013 and 
see Goodwin, 2004). There are well grounded concerns that counter-terrorism studies are 
overly reliant on one-sided data provided by state agencies and are insufficiently critical in 
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how they use them (della Porta, 2013). Furthermore, the concept itself has proved rather 
elusive to define; Jenkins has suggested that it “is a generalized construct derived from our 
concepts of morality, law, and the rules of war, whereas actual terrorists are shaped by 
culture, ideology and politics – specific, inchoate factors and notions that motivate diverse 
actions” (in della Porta, 2013). As with a number of social science concepts, innumerable 
definitions of terrorism exist (Laqueur, 1986). An effort to fuse the seventy three definitions 
of it to its lowest common denominator resulted in a definition so bland as to be 
meaningless and applicable to almost all acts of violence “terrorism is a politically motivated 
tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a 
significant role” (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler in della Porta, 2013). 
  
The use of the term terrorism always reflects power relations and disparities and 
most often serves as a tool of obfuscation and, as Tilly pithily stated, “terror always refers to 
someone else’s behaviour” (2003:19). It also bears mentioning that the charge of terrorism 
is most often levelled at non-state actors and is rarely used in the context of state violence 
(see Aras, 2014a: 23-26, Aretxaga, 2000, Asad, 2007 and Sluka, 2000). The strategic 
deployment of the term is best described by Kapitan: 
  
“it is part and parcel of the war of ideas and language that accompanies overt hostilities; 
‘terrorism’ is simply the current vogue for discrediting one’s opponents before the risky 
business of inquiry into their complaints can even begin. If individuals and groups are 
portrayed as irrational, barbaric, and beyond the pale of negotiation and compromise, then 
asking why they resort to terrorism is viewed as pointless, needlessly accommodating, or, at 
best, mere pathological curiosity” (2003:52).  
 
Therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I shall avoid using the term to describe any of the 
warring parties. I will refer to the relevant actors as they call themselves, be that guerrilla or 
village guard, and I will not make use of politically loaded definitions such as terrorist or 
freedom fighter. I will describe the relevant PKK members variously as militia, militants, 
fighters, guerrillas and insurgents. Those fighting on the part of the Turkish state will be 
additionally described as members of the security forces or paramilitaries. Nonetheless, due 
to the pervasive presence of terms such as terror, terrorism and so forth in much of the 
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literature, they will on occasion appear in direct quotations in the text, but its use in such 
cases will reflect the choice of the original author. 
 
Methodology 
 
This project was based primarily on a series of fifty one qualitative interviews of sixty 
interviewees that were carried out between 2011 and 2013 and took place in a number of 
cities in Kurdistan, Istanbul and Ankara and in Western Europe in Germany, Belgium, and 
England. I also had countless numbers of informal discussions and attended several Kurdish 
cultural and political events in Denmark, Sweden and Italy, as well as in the other 
mentioned locations. The interviews took place on a number of different fieldwork trips to 
Turkey. I made four trips to Istanbul from 2011 to 2013 which altogether amounted to two 
months, plus another trip to Kurdistan in September 2012 of a month. My interviews in 
Europe took place on a regular basis over three years, the majority of which were in 
Germany where I spent a lot of time due to personal commitments. The interviews were, 
therefore, quite spread out in terms of time. Twenty eight of the interviews were digitally 
recorded and subsequently transcribed and the others were detailed in hand written notes. 
They lasted, on average, between two and three hours – due to the time consumed by 
contemporary translation – with the longest taking upwards of six hours over two days 
(Interview 24, 2012). The interviewees were mostly contacted by a process of snowball 
sampling along a number of networks. My very first contact was with a personal friend in 
Germany who is close to PKK circles; from this initial contact I established a number of 
different networks of friends and acquaintances who introduced me to further relevant 
people.  
 
 I conducted only qualitative interviews as it simply would not have been feasible to 
attempt any quantitative analysis. The data I was interested in centres on the PKK and its 
supporters, and how practises of insurgent violence and mobilisation were influenced by 
this relationship. The Turkish state remains highly authoritarian and repression of its Kurdish 
population remains significant. Accordingly, interviews could only take place, once sufficient 
trust in me and my research team had been established. In this context, the distribution of 
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surveys or other formal questionnaires would likely have unnerved interviewees concerned 
about repercussions from the state and provided data of a lower quality. There were further 
barriers to any quantitative research related to the linguistic diversity and low literacy rates 
of a number of my interviewees. The majority of them spoke Turkish, some were 
polylingual, others spoke Kurdish – either Kurmanji or Zazaki – and little or no Turkish and 
many were illiterate.  
 
As the timeframe of the project dates from the foundation of the PKK in the mid 
1970s until 1999, it is essentially a historical project; therefore all of the interviews were 
retrospective in nature. It was thereby impossible to conduct another mainstay of the 
qualitative research repertoire, participant observation. I spent much time with Kurdish 
activists and attended numerous commemorative ceremonies and demonstrations from 
which I learned much about how the earlier stage of the conflict is currently interpreted but 
this cannot be considered participant observation as I am not studying the contemporary 
PKK. As a non Turkish speaker, I was unable to make use of another prominent qualitative 
method, discourse analysis but I did make substantial recourse to the emerging secondary 
literature by a number of scholars who have made use of it (Jongerden & Akkaya 2011, 
Özcan, 2005 & 2006, Gunes 2012 and Ercan 2010 inter alios). 
 
 The interviews were all semi-structured and combined elements of oral histories, life 
histories and key informant interviews. The great advantage of such interviews is that “they 
provide great[er] breadth and depth of information, the opportunity to discover the 
respondent’s experience and interpretation of reality and access to people’s ideas, thoughts 
and memories in their own words rather than in the words of the researcher” but such 
richness of information comes at the risk of a “of a reduced ability to make systematic 
comparisons between interview responses” (Blee and Taylor, 2002: 93). Blee and Taylor 
further explain that interviews of this type facilitate “access to the motivations and 
perspectives of a broader and more diverse group of social movement participants than 
would be represented in most documentary sources” (ibid). As the objective of this research 
project was to identify the nature of the relationship between the PKK and its constituency, 
their capacity to delve beyond documented sources from either the PKK itself or secondary 
data was vital. Thereby, providing a relatively cost efficient remedy to one of the most 
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common critiques of political violence literature, that it is insufficiently committed to 
obtaining original primary source data (see Bosi, 2012:353; O’Leary & Silke, 2007:393; White 
2000).  
 
Qualitative research strongly overlaps with some of the philosophical underpinnings 
of ethnography. Ethnography’s goal is “to understand behaviour in its habitual context, as 
opposed to abstract or laboratory setting” (Bray, 2010:300).Bray suggests that by “studying 
a phenomenon in its own dynamic context, more can be intrinsically understood about it 
than by simply examining it in isolation” (ibid:302). However, due to the mass population 
displacement and forced exile that the war has brought about, the interviewees own 
“dynamic context”, is of itself, entirely unnatural. Whether it means interviewing a seventy 
year old displaced farmer in an office block in Mardin or a PKK militant in exile in his 
apartment in Germany, it is already a context long distant from what could be described as 
the interviewees’ “own” context.  
 
Della Porta has remarked that life histories are extremely time consuming and costly 
to carry out. She suggests that the collection of a life history be spread over a number of 
meetings with each interview no longer than two hours and that the interview transcript 
could typically run up to a hundred pages (1992: 184-185); conditions which were neither 
feasible for my research in Europe nor in Turkey. Nonetheless, I incorporated aspects of life 
histories into my interviews by suggesting that interviewees describe their childhood and 
family background. This served a dual purpose; it got interviewees talking and usually made 
them more at ease before approaching more sensitive issues. It also ascertained some 
family history which is crucial in determining political engagement (Bosi & della Porta, 2012 
and Viterna, 2006). I made use of oral histories by focusing on the matters of greatest 
interest to me, primarily those within the timeframe of the project and more specifically 
their periods of political activism. As the PKK is an understudied phenomenon, especially 
when compared with other armed groups such as the IRA or ETA, the use of key informant 
interviews was extremely useful. Blee and Taylor have outlined the advantages of such 
interviews, explaining that they can result in “descriptive information that might be too 
difficult and time-consuming to uncover through more structured data-gathering 
techniques, such as surveys, or through conducting multiple semi-structured individual 
13 
 
interviews” (2002: 105). My interviews combined elements of all three interview techniques 
when circumstances permitted. In interviews with guerrillas or senior PKK cadres I 
undoubtedly focused more on the militant phase of their life than on earlier or later periods. 
Yet I also utilised life and oral history approaches as a means to contextualise their political 
trajectories.  
 
In-depth interviews are a peculiar form of social interaction and vary dramatically 
from other methods of data collection. Interviews are “social encounter[s] in which 
knowledge is constructed” [...] and “the interview is not merely a neutral conduit or source 
of distortion, but is instead a site of, and occasion for, producing reportable knowledge 
itself” (Holstein and Gubrium, 1997: 112). It must be acknowledged that they are 
collaborative processes in which “both parties to the interview are necessarily and 
ineluctably active. Meaning is not merely elicited by apt questioning, not simply transported 
through respondent replies; it is actively and communicatively assembled in the interview 
encounter” (ibid: 113). If interviews are to be productive they “develop and build on 
intimacy” (Johnson & Rowlands, 2012:100).Yet, they are far different from conversation 
between intimates in that the “interviewer seeks to use the information obtained in the 
interaction for some other purpose” (ibid: 101). Although preparation for interviews is 
advisable, on some occasions it is next to impossible.  I was introduced to interviewees by 
my “gate keepers” about whom I had absolutely no prior information and had to learn 
about them simply by listening and gently guiding them toward material relevant to my 
research questions. Some interviews of course proved to be a waste of time in terms of 
gathering material relevant to my project; but some were enriched by shared moments of 
interpersonal solidarity, where one person simply listens to another. Such encounters can 
lead to a researcher gaining a local reputation as empathetic or striking up friendships, 
which in the long term can have positive impacts on one’s ability to access people. I would 
argue that an overly structured mindset prior to an interview can on occasion be a negative 
factor. It can lead one to focus on obtaining data for one’s rigid categories and excluding 
potentially much richer information outside of these precise areas.  
 
It is important for the researcher to try to remain as self-reflective as possible and 
cognisant of divergences in social capital which might lead interviewees to attempt to give 
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the answers that they think the researcher desires. The importance of self reflexivity is often 
easier to recall in certain situations; it is the least to be expected that a male researcher 
should recognise that his gender would have an impact on any discussion of sexual violence 
with a woman. It is more likely that as women are often the most common targets of sexual 
violence, that it is ignored when discussing or not discussing, such issues with male 
interviewees5. In the course of my interviews, particularly regarding the mass incarceration 
of the post-coup period, male rape was often hinted at but never expanded upon. Female 
respondents on the other hand discussed sexual violence, not personal experiences, but in a 
general fashion much more openly (Aras, 2014a: 104-105). It is thus important to 
concentrate on what is excluded as well as included in interviews and ponder the impact 
one’s own presence as an insider/outsider or as a male/female might have had on it. 
Interviewing is a learning curve and it becomes clear that “race, age, gender, social class, 
appearance and even achieved statuses make one kind of differences with some informants 
and another kind of difference with other informants” (Johnson & Rowlands:103-104). It is 
important to treat one’s interviewees with due respect and to empathise with their life 
experiences while at the same time not allowing the interview become a uni-directional 
monologue (see della  Porta, forthcoming: 20).  
 
Translated Interviews 
 
 As I do not speak Turkish or Kurdish, the majority of my interviews were translated. 
Relying on translated interviews is undoubtedly challenging. It presents a number of distinct 
disadvantages but also bears a number of positive aspects. In the first instance, there is the 
issue of time and financial resources. As I could not afford a professional translator, a 
number of Turkish friends and Kurdish friends involved in the Kurdish political movements 
assisted me on a voluntary basis. All of them could translate to English competently but, as 
they were not word-for-word translations I have avoided directly quoting my interviewees 
and have instead paraphrased them instead. I have included a few direct quotations from 
the interviews that were conducted in English or short quotes that I subsequently verified 
                                                        
5
 The topic of males as victims of sexual violence is largely neglected in the literature on political violence. 
Viterna reports that 53% of all victims of sexual violence in El Salvador were male (2013:113). 
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with my translators from the Turkish and Kurdish interviews. There is of course the 
possibility that the interviewees’ words have been distorted in course of the translation but 
if this occurred at any stage, it was the product of unintentional miscommunication and not 
any design to distort the views of any interviewee. It is also possible that certain 
interviewees felt overwhelmed by speaking with two people rather than one.  
 
Conversely, there are a number of distinct positive aspects of a translated interview. 
Firstly, I was able to discuss the interviews with the translators afterwards. I typed up my 
notes as soon as possible after the interview and then discussed any points of confusion 
with the translator, thus acting as an ulterior validity check. Aside from the actual interview, 
working in a pair rendered the social aspects surrounding doing an interview much easier. 
The social formalities which accompany such interviews like the drinking of çay and the 
small talk with others present at the interview location are all less pressured if one is not 
alone. Given the often emotionally difficult material covered in the interviews, the presence 
of the translator anticipated some of the negative potential emotional consequences for the 
researcher (Wood, 2006: 384 and Romano, 2006b). In addition, in several cases my 
translators were friends and acquaintances of the interviewees and had in fact served as the 
“gate keepers” to bring me into contact with them. As they had the full trust of the 
interviewees and they vouched for me, I believe that I was able to discuss sensitive material 
which might not otherwise have been possible (see Malthaner, forthcoming: 7). On a few 
occasions however, close family members of my translators refused to be interviewed 
because of their familial links with the translators as they did not feel comfortable or were 
not willing to discuss certain issues in front of their relatives.  
 
There is also the issue of insider participant research or that of an external 
perspective6. As an outsider it is probably easier to gain insights on “the taken for granted 
assumptions of social movement participants” which might be more difficult for insiders to 
question (Blee & Taylor, 2002: 97-98). Plus, outsiders are perhaps “better able than [...] 
participants to elicit full rationales of and extensive interpretive accounts” from movement 
activists. Outsiders especially to movements that operate in a clandestine or semi-
                                                        
6 See Aras regarding the methodological advantages of an insider perspective (2014a:4-5). 
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clandestine fashion could be viewed suspiciously as potential state agents or as persons 
interested in exploiting the movement for their own ends, as happened on occasion in my 
own experiences. It is worth remembering though that “obstruction, evasion, refusals and 
other troubles can in themselves be significant sources of data” (Fielding in Malthaner, 
2011a:34). However, as an Irish researcher with a left wing background and political 
orientation, I was almost always immediately welcomed as a “comrade” and asked about 
the ongoing situation in the North of my own country. It is difficult to say if I had been 
British or American if such an easy rapport could have been so easily established. 
Interestingly, two Turkish of friends of mine translated more than half of my interviews. At 
no point was their Turkishness ever considered a problem. It should be acknowledged that 
one has a past history of left wing activism and grew up among Kurds in Istanbul while the 
other is of possible Kurdish heritage and also of a pronounced leftist orientation. It is 
undoubtedly also a tribute to their interpersonal skills that they as Turks effectively 
navigated the often opaque cultural waters when discussing sensitive issues with Kurds.  
 
One would also have to question why people would give up hours of their busy lives 
to facilitate a research project in a language they do not speak and will likely never read. 
Many thanked me effusively for taking an interest in the struggle of the Kurdish people and 
were convinced that if only more Europeans were to know the details of the question that 
international pressure would be exerted on the Turkish state. Others were undoubtedly 
flattered by the attention and enjoyed the ‘prestige’ of engaging with foreign visitors. 
Certain interviewees viewed the interviews as an opportunity to discuss matters which they 
could not speak about in the local environment. As one of Wood’s interviewees in El 
Salvador said “the people here are suffocating from the cries and shouts that we cannot 
speak. It suffocates. It does me good to talk to someone—I can’t speak to people here about 
these things” (2006:377). In this way the interviews served as a form of catharsis and a 
socially acceptable means to vent about issues that would, perhaps, not be possible in their 
daily lives. Malthaner also suggests that although “violent conflict can induce overwhelming 
distrust and closure in some places, it also can create openings and make people willing or 
even enthusiastic to ‘tell their story’” (forthcoming). 
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Interviews focusing on material, which in my case, dated back thirty or forty years 
present certain challenges. It has been said that “vocabularies of motive are often furnished 
‘after the act’” and that it is thus “problematic to take at face value a respondent’s 
articulated reasons for joining a social movement” (drawing on Mills, Blee & Taylor, 2002: 
105 and see Kalyvas, 2006: 408-410;  Passy, 2003:29 and Viterna, 2006:6). Social movement 
or party militants often tend “to look for justifications for their behaviour which are in line 
with their political and ideological beliefs, and to link their own individual choices to an 
historical – class or generational destiny” and downplay non political factors in their 
decision-making (della Porta, 1992: 182 and see Polletta, 2006:142). As Bosi suggests this 
inherent tendency in historical qualitative interviews can be limited by rigorous 
triangulation with alternative data sources (2012: 353). Furthermore, Robert White’s 
decision to re-interview his IRA respondents on the same issues after ten years, led him to 
conclude that the “accounts in general were consistent across time” (2007:302). As he 
explained, although personal accounts are clearly subjective, they are centred “around 
documented political events and memorable social relationships that help make them 
consistent across time” (ibid: 301). Accordingly, in my own interviews I attempted to focus 
my questions on events which would have been particularly memorable. I typically asked 
interviewees, when they had first heard about or encountered the PKK? I asked specific 
questions about major and often traumatic events such as the 1980 coup, or when their 
village was evacuated/destroyed or events of huge familial import such as the arrest of a 
family member or events in the immediate lead-up to joining the guerrillas. On occasion, 
especially with younger interviewees, I suspected that some of their responses were less the 
fruit of their own memory rather than the family narrative surrounding particular events. 
However, the construction of such narratives is of massive social scientific relevance as the 
interpretation of political events is as important as any purportedly objective presentation 
of them as pure facts. In the course of my interviews, I encountered certain inconsistencies 
which, I can only presume, are derived from mistaken recollections. One respondent 
explained that he had as a teenager, in 1984, first heard about the PKK in a particular 
magazine 2000'e Doğru, when in fact it was only first published in 1987 (interview 40, 2013). 
On another occasion, an interviewee explained that a prison cellmate of his was martyred at 
the battle of Bagok mountain before the start of the insurgency in 1984, when in fact the 
battle took place four years later in 1988 (Interview 36, 2013). Such small inconsistencies did 
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not detract from the overall worthiness of the data provided by them and were easily 
identified by triangulating the data with alternative sources.  
 
Sampling 
 
The issue of whom to interview and how many people to interview, is perceived to 
be of critical importance as regards a project’s validity. In quantitative analysis the process 
of sampling is much clearer as it must be representative of the entire universe of cases in a 
proportionate fashion. In the study of social movements or insurgent organisations the 
universe of cases is rarely known, accordingly it is impossible to be representative of an 
unknown universe (della Porta, 1992: 182). There has been a shift “from a clearly defined, 
predetermined number of participants to a focus on the research process as informing the 
ultimate number of participants” (Beitin, 2012: 243). A general guideline as to how many 
interviews are enough has emerged around the principle of saturation. “You stop when you 
encounter diminishing returns, when the information you obtain is redundant or peripheral, 
when what you learn that is new adds too little to what you already know to justify the time 
and cost of interviewing” (Weiss in della Porta, forthcoming). Especially in subjects which 
are understudied, initial interviews can result in new insights which lead to a reassessment 
of previously held theoretical hypotheses thus requiring one to reconsider prospective 
interviewees. This “type of sampling is iterative: it involves moving backwards and forwards 
between sampling and theoretical reflection” (della Porta, forthcoming (a)).  
 
My sampling method was very much of the ‘snowball’ variety, the downside of 
which, is of course that the researcher has only partial “control over the selection of 
respondents, and samples drawn in this way are obviously never statistically representative” 
(Malthaner, forthcoming: 9 and see Romano, 2006b:441). In practice, one’s interview 
sample in qualitative research projects on contentious movements is heavily dependent on 
happenstance and macro-level developments completely outside of one’s personal control. 
My intention was to select interviewees who I hoped had relevant information relating to 
my theoretical questions. My analytical focus was on how the key relationship between the 
movement and sympathisers changed across its different geo-spatial configurations 
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between Kurdistan and western Turkey; I therefore necessitated data from all of these 
different contexts. Within those broad parameters, I sought to interview a roughly even 
number of active PKK members (guerrillas, cadres, party activists) and supporters and 
sympathisers on the margins of the movement. As a further consideration, I wished to 
interview members of religio-cultural groups such as Alevis, Yezidis and Zaza speakers to 
ascertain the processes utilised by the PKK as it expanded its influence beyond the majority 
Sunni Kurdish population, as well as to non Kurds. I also strived to interview as many 
females as possible which regrettably was not entirely successful. I also attempted to 
interview non PKK supporting Kurds from other Kurdish organisations to discover the 
motivations underlying their political choice not to support the PKK.7  
 
Field research is subject to the vagaries of political developments beyond individual 
control (see Malthaner, 2011: 34-35). Even though this project is retrospective in nature, 
contemporary conditions impinge heavily on potential interviewees’ willingness to do 
interviews or share other forms of data. My second trip to Istanbul in March 2012 came 
unknowingly in the midst of an intimidatory state clampdown on the legal end of the 
Kurdish movement in western Turkey. Following sound practise (Weiss in della Porta, 
forthcoming (a)), I had intended to do work my way slowly into my interviews by starting 
with the less controversial and more easily available interviewees before subsequently 
engaging with the more radical elements of the movement. It was also intended that these 
interviews would facilitate further networks for more interviews. However, as soon as I had 
arrived in Istanbul, pre-arranged interviews with human rights agencies and politicians were 
all cancelled as many on the fringes of the Kurdish movement in Istanbul ‘battened down 
the hatches’ until the wave of arrests had ceased. It should also be acknowledged that 
several of my putative interviewees were heavily engaged in assisting their comrades who 
had been arrested so there were also logistical impediments to them taking an afternoon off 
to talk to me. In another instance, I had agreed to interview a PKK veteran of more than 
thirty years in Europe, but before we could confirm a date he had been arrested on 
terrorism charges, reinforcing researchers’ powerlessness in the face of the unpredictable 
quotidian reality of radical movement activists.  
                                                        
7 See Wood on the challenges of sampling in conflict zones or authoritarian environments, (2006:375).  
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One is also dependent on “gate keepers” to organise interviews (see Bosi, 2012: 
354). I explained my criteria as outlined above to a number of trusted people who, in turn, 
selected people who they believed would correspond to my interests. There is of course a 
real danger of having a biased sample because they could only provide interviewees of a 
certain perspective. This is countered by having a number of different ‘gate keepers’. It 
should be added that none of my “gate keepers” were senior PKK members but rather 
people with connections to the movement and thus not obliged to stick to any particular 
party line. My approach to the movement was not a top down approach but rather an 
outside-in one. I knew and got to know even more contacts on the margins on the 
movement and worked my way inwards rather than from an “institutional entry point” 
(Malthaner, forthcoming). Finally, one cannot underestimate the importance of luck (Wood, 
2006: 377). While sitting in a café in Diyarbakir with my local contact - who was the cousin 
of my friend in Germany, so a person in whom I had a significant degree of  trust – 
discussing which type of people I would like to meet, a noted PKK former prisoner and 
author entered. My contact then spontaneously explained my project to him and we 
organised an interview for the following morning (Interview 21, 2012). On another occasion 
in the neighbourhood of Gaziosmanpaşa in Istanbul, while waiting at a little restaurant for 
our contact there to collect me, a man who turned out to be a friend of our contact 
approached us in the knowledge of what we were doing there and proposed that we 
interview him. His awareness of who we were and what we were doing also highlights the 
strong presence of informal networks around contentious movements. He was simply in the 
area and thought that we might have been interested in his story so he stopped by and we 
ended up having a most worthwhile interview (Interview 40, 2013).  
 
Authoritarian Research Environment and Ethics 
 
 The principle underlying all social science research is to “do no harm”. This is 
unambiguous in most cases, if understood as limited to “do no harm” to your interviewees. 
It is a little less clear when interviewees are exploiting people (Bourgois, 1991) or expound 
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racist or violent political views (Blee, 1996). There is an added onus to be cautious when 
interviews are conducted, as in this case, in an authoritarian state and are focused on a 
clandestine armed movement. Even PKK activists in the European diaspora have faced 
repression in their countries of residence. Therefore, all of my interviews with the exception 
of notable public figures and interviewees whose contribution to my research project is 
already available in published material will be cited anonymously. I have assigned 
pseudonyms to all of those interviewees. Interestingly, several of my interviewees laughed 
off my attempts to explain the principle of consent and the security measures I was taking 
to preserve their anonymity. As many of my interviewees had already served prison 
sentences and were known to the authorities they could have been re-arrested at any stage 
on spurious grounds, if elements within the Turkish state so desired. Their blasé view is 
likely rooted in the fact that they felt that their behaviour was detached from state 
repression and that an academic interview will do little to alter the state’s perception of 
them. To give an example, my main contact in Diyarbakir was on trial for terrorism charges 
primarily because the police had photographic evidence of him dancing at a political 
demonstration. Another had similar charges against him which stemmed from his 
participation in a campaign for Kurdish language rights (Interview 25, 2012); both were 
completely uninvolved in any possible “terrorist” activities. Others, especially those who 
worked in the public service were appreciative of the measures taken as unlike the ex-
prisoners they had more to lose if they were to encounter difficulties with the state.  
 
  I recorded the interviews when possible and made hand written notes8. I typed up 
the interview scripts as soon as was possible and saved them and the recordings in my 
university e-mail account. I then destroyed the handwritten notes and deleted the recording 
from my recording device. I never recorded their real names. I have also avoided excessive 
detail which could be cumulatively used to identify interviewees either in Turkey or in 
Europe and within the movement itself (Wood, 2007 139 & Malthaner, forthcoming). I 
deleted all interview transcripts and recordings from my laptop before returning on 
subsequent trips to Turkey. A number of the interviewees who we telephoned advised us 
                                                        
8
 See Aras (2014a:6) in relation to the ongoing practical difficulties of conducting academic research on the 
conflict in Turkey. 
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that the calls could have been monitored and to be cautious in what we said and we 
remained cognisant of this when contacting potential interviewees.  
 
I found that the procedure of obtaining consent was relatively unproblematic; it was 
agreed orally. I believe that many of them, particularly the more rural and older 
interviewees, had absolutely no understanding of what a PhD is and even lesser interest in 
it. I was presented to them by people whom they trusted, as someone who was working on 
the Kurdish conflict and in search of people’s personal experiences of the conflict and they 
willingly co-operated on that basis. Co-operation on the basis of a mistaken understanding 
of what I was actually doing at the macro-level, does lead to some ethical concerns (see 
Wood, 2006:379). I am, however, satisfied that even if they were not entirely clear on the 
long term outcomes of my research that they were well aware of the possible short term 
consequences and the efforts I was taking to reduce them. I feel that it would be a form of 
patronising reverse “Orientalism” to second guess their decision to co-operate with the 
project. Many of them were veterans of many years of political struggle and much better 
informed of its risks than I was, and they agreement  to participate in the research was 
subsequent to an informed calculation of the inherent risks.  
 
The longest period I stayed in Turkey was from late August to October 2012. The 
period immediately preceded the mass hunger strike launched by PKK prisoners in 
November of that year. It was a tense period in Kurdistan and there were large scale clashes 
at that time in Hakkari and areas north of Diyarbakir. However, apart from the heavy 
deployment of police and soldiers and the tense calm which descended upon Diyarbakir at 
night, especially when fallen guerrillas were being returned to the city for burial I did not 
observe any direct clashes or signs of violence. My field research cannot, therefore, be 
considered in the same category as research conducted in actual conflict zones (Wood, 2006 
and Bourgois 1991 inter alios). But there were a number of minor obstacles inherent in 
conducting interviews in such an atmosphere. We could only hold interviews in 
environments which were relatively private such as offices or private homes. In Istanbul it is 
relatively unproblematic to conduct interviews with a bit of discretion in cafes and 
restaurants. However, the presence of two ‘foreigners’ intently taking notes in a public 
place in Kurdistan could have attracted attention and would not have been a conducive 
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environment for an interview. With the exception of one interviewee in Diyarbakir it was 
not possible to record any of the interviews in Kurdistan whereas in western Turkey almost 
all of the interviews were recorded. This, of course, presents subsequent difficulties when 
analysing the data and deprives one off the possibility of cross checking the notes with the 
recording. 
 
To return to the aforementioned insider/outsider dynamic, there is one notable 
advantage to researching conflict as a foreigner. Generally speaking in Turkey, outsiders are 
free to write what they wish about the conflict upon the pain of having one’s visa revoked 
or being denied re-entry to the state9.  There have been some cases of foreign academics 
and journalists being tried on ludicrous charges, the most notable being the trial of Reuters 
correspondent and academic, Aliza Marcus on the charge of incitement of racial hatred in 
1995. More recently the Italian social scientist Thomas Benedikter was charged in absentia 
with promoting pro-PKK propaganda because of the recent publication of a book on regional 
autonomies in Europe (Sticcotti, 2013). Citizens of Turkey encounter far graver 
consequences for expressing dissent. Even writers of global renown such as Orhan Pamuk 
(BBC, 2005) and Yaşar Kemal (Onaran, 2013) have fallen foul of Turkey’s limitations on the 
freedom of speech. Turkish academics of a lesser international profile have suffered 
immensely, the Kurdologist Ibrahim Besikçi has served seventeen years in prison on various 
counts of anti-national and pro-Kurdish propaganda long before the founding of the PKK 
(van Bruinessen, 2005 & Amnesty International, 1990). The atmosphere in Turkey is 
therefore highly restrictive on academics working on the Kurdish issue in general and the 
PKK in particular. I was advised by a number of more established Turkish and Kurdish 
scholars to be careful and to consider studying something less controversial. On one 
occasion, I contacted a Kurdish scholar who has written extensively and authoritatively on 
the PKK and he curtly responded that he could not offer me any suggestions for my research 
because “he did not know anyone in the PKK”. A justifiable atmosphere of paranoia reigns in 
Turkish and Kurdish academic circles which, notwithstanding extremely courageous work 
done by academics working inside Turkey and those based abroad, has led to a degree of 
self-censorship which has restricted Kurdish studies. As a foreigner I am relatively immune 
                                                        
9 See Malthaner (forthcoming) regarding a similar situation in Egypt. 
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to any personal pressures exerted by the state but the fact that such an inauspicious 
academic environment exists in Turkey, renders the PKK a challenging subject matter. 
 
Other Sources 
 
This project’s principal primary data sources are the qualitative interviews as 
outlined above. It also makes use of primary documents provided by the PKK that have been 
translated into English. The PKK has a number of websites10 for its various branches. I have 
also made use of the websites of the various radical left and Kurdish groups which moved in 
the PKK’s political milieu as a means to balance the PKK’s perspective11 and to obtain 
external perspectives of the PKK. I have also utilized some of the thousands of testimonies 
submitted by Kurdish plaintiffs to the ECHR as a source of primary documentation. 
Naturally, these sources have ulterior biases but their validity can be confirmed or 
disavowed by cross reference with each other and the vast secondary literature.  
 
Until relatively recently the Kurds were completely understudied. In the 1970s, the 
early Kurdish leftist movements put forth a “thesis of colonialism” as a means of 
conceptualising the status of Kurdistan (see Gunes, 2012 and Ercan, 2010). This paradigm 
has now been long discarded politically but it remains a valid argument if one considers 
Kurdish historiography (see Bozarslan, 2003a). As a non-state nation, the Kurds lacked any 
autochthonous institutions which could write the history of the Kurds or study its ongoing 
socio-political developments in a similar fashion to all colonial peoples. Aside from certain 
Orientalist research conducted by Western European and Russian scholars, Kurdish history 
was written by or rather denied by the Turkish state. As Fanon explained, “Colonialism is not 
satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form 
and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and 
distorts, disfigures, and destroys it” (2004: 211).  All through the early decades of the 
Turkish Republic such a situation prevailed and the rich and particular history of Kurdistan 
was ignored or misrepresented. By the 1950s, a Kurdish intellectual awakening slowly began 
                                                        
10
 http://www.pkkonline.com/en/ 
11
 http://www.mlkp.info/index.php?kategori=1012&Who_we_are? and  http://kd.komkar.eu/  
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to stir and by the 1970s had become a full blown wave of associations and publications 
engaging with Kurdish history and the ongoing political repression. Yet in academic terms, 
critical analysis of Kurdistan and all facets of its society, language and history was limited. 
The PKK’s insurgency and the atmosphere of paranoia and Turkish nationalism in Turkey 
also hindered the consolidation of Kurdish Studies as a recognised academic field. 
Paradoxically, it was the violence of the coup and the forced exile of many Kurdish 
intellectuals in Europe, which begat the structural context which boosted Kurdish studies. 
Kurdish institutes were established by Kurdish émigrés in France in 1983 and Sweden, huge 
amounts of work was done on the Kurdish language in terms of standardising it and the 
publication of instructive manuals and so forth, all of which was financed either by the 
Kurdish diaspora itself or with European government support.  
 
Currently, Kurdish studies are enjoying a veritable boon; the Kurdish Studies 
Association established in Sweden in 2009 now boasts over eight hundred scholars and 
academics. Even since I have begun my PhD in 2010 there has been an exponential increase 
in publications dealing with all aspects of Kurdish studies12. Accordingly, there is an ever 
expanding mass of secondary literature which I have utilised in the realisation of this 
project. Naturally, much of the Kurdish studies literature is cross disciplinary and does not 
lend itself to my project. More of it, especially with the growth of the university sector in 
South Kurdistan is focused on the other constituent parts of wider Kurdistan. Additionally 
some of it is of a mixed quality; parts of it bear an ingrained Turkish nationalist or Kemalist 
perspective and more of it is blindly indebted to a Kurdish nationalist position13, neither of 
which facilitates their academic rigour or validity. The PKK is the most controversial of the 
subjects of Kurdish studies.  A large body of counter-terrorism literature exist which is, of 
course, intent less on studying the movement as a sociological phenomenon than serving as 
the ideological legitimation for the forces of the Turkish state which militarily and judicially 
combat the PKK. There are a number of rich descriptive works on the PKK (Imset, 1992, 
White, 2000, Marcus, 2007 and Gunter 1997 inter alios) while others advance a more 
theoretical analysis (Özcan, 2006, Jongerden, 2007, Romano 2006a and Gunes 2012 inter 
                                                        
12
 See the KSN online bibliography http://kurdishstudiesnetwork.wordpress.com/bibliography/ 
13
 See O’Shea’s (1994:169) trenchant criticism of Mehrdad Izady’s book (1992) as representative of this type of 
research. 
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alios). There are also a number of young academics who have produced marvellous works 
on the PKK and the wider Kurdish movement utilising previously untapped primary data, 
much of this remains in the form of unpublished Masters Theses or PhDs (see Ercan, 2010, 
Aydin, 2005, and Baser, 2012 inter alios). This project draws extensively on these various 
strands of the literature as a means to complement and triangulate my own personal 
primary sources because as Tarrow argues “triangulation is particularly appropriate in cases 
in which quantitative data are partial and qualitative investigation is obstructed by political 
conditions” (2004:178). 
  
The third form of data I have utilised is the vast array of documentation generated 
by both Kurdish and Turkish NGOs and Human rights organisations and international ones, 
such as the Kurdish Human Rights Project14, the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey15, Göç-
Der16 Human Rights Watch17 (previously Helsinki Watch), and Amnesty International18. 
Many of these reports include first hand testimonies and analysis, importantly recorded 
during the course of the conflict and contemporary to many of the violent events of the 
period. They are of course limited in the fact that they mostly focus on events of violence 
and human rights violations and have a lesser focus on the quotidian realities of life in a 
conflict zone and the wider organisational structures of movements. They are nonetheless 
rich in empirical detail and complement the other sources. I have also made use of 
journalistic sources both contemporary to the period under study and retrospective articles. 
I have gone through the English language Turkish Daily News agency for reports of events 
mentioned in the thesis and also referred to other contemporary and latter sources in 
English and Italian such as the Guardian, Independent, Internazionale, New York Times and 
many others. Due to ongoing trials related to conflict in the 1990s, there is a constant drip 
feed of articles focusing on the period in the Turkish, English language media which has 
greatly expanded in recent years. I have accordingly also referenced articles from the now 
defunct Briefing, Today’s Zaman and Hurriyet Daily News plus the pan-Middle Eastern 
online newspaper Al-Monitor. As a final source, I have accessed the flourishing film and 
                                                        
14 http://www.khrp.org/ 
15 http://www.tihv.org.tr/ 
16 Its website seems to have been taken down but the organisation still exists. 
17 http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/turkey 
18 http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/turkey 
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documentary sector in Turkey which has a notable tradition of political documentary film 
making (Demirel, 2006 & 2009, and Arslan, 2012). 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is comprised of six chapters; a theoretical one and a historically 
descriptive one, followed by four empirical chapters. Although the empirical chapters follow 
a roughly chronological order, with the exception of Chapter III, they are structured around 
a socio-spatial dynamic; one located in rural Kurdistan, another in the Kurdish urban centres 
and the final one in western Turkey. Therefore, time periods overlap in the chapters and it 
cannot be read as a year by year evolution of the PKK. The theoretical chapter deals in an 
abstract fashion with the existing literature on political violence and social movements with 
a precise focus on the relationship between armed groups and their support networks. It 
explains and expands upon certain theoretical concepts and attempts to explain how this 
project locates itself in the wider literature. The historical chapter is somewhat briefer and 
gives a rudimentary description of Kurdish history with a greater focus on the twentieth 
century to give a degree of immediate background to the PKK mobilisation. It details the 
socio-economic upheaval of the post World War II period and the unprecedented rural to 
urban migration patterns. Chapter III spans a period of around fifteen years and discusses 
the Kurdish political awakening and the deep seated right-left polarisation in the 1970s. It 
details the early emergence of the PKK and its relocation from Ankara to Kurdistan. It also 
spans the immediate pre and post-coup period. It goes through the repression of the 1980 
coup d’état and its impact on politics in the state of Turkey. Chapter IV recounts the return 
of the PKK to rural Kurdistan and the launching of the insurgency. It also delves into how the 
PKK established its support networks in the countryside. It also describes the establishment 
of the Village Guards and their clashes with the PKK. Chapter V analyses the urban-rural 
overlap of the conflict and goes into detail about how the forced evacuations from the rural 
areas not only completely re-configured rural life but also led to a complete re-formulation 
of urban society. It discusses the manner in which the PKK constructed and utilised its urban 
support networks. The final chapter VI, is focused on Kurds in what I have termed, the 
“internal diaspora”; the millions of Kurds that have migrated – or were forced to migrate - 
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to the urban centres of western and to a lesser extent southern Turkey in search of 
economic prosperity or refuge from the conflict. It necessarily elaborates on the socio-
economic challenges inherent in mass migration and details the heterogeneous qualities of 
the Kurdish internal diaspora. It then expands upon political participation of Kurds in 
western Turkey and in particular how the PKK took root in the urban centres it had 
abandoned twenty five years previously. Finally, the conclusion will summarise the empirical 
findings of the project before offering certain theoretical reflection on the nature and 
evolution of the PKK’s relationship with its support networks and how they have impacted 
on the strategies adopted by the PKK. 
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Chapter I: Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
 
The study of political violence integrates a number of academic traditions and 
approaches. It is also an element of academia that resolutely maintains the wider attention 
of the general public, policy makers and practitioners of violence, alike. Precisely because of 
its general relevance, it is a highly fragmented research area. It traverses studies of 
terrorism and criminality, international relations, nationalism, social movements, modern 
and ancient history, war studies and even psychological efforts to understand it at the 
individual level, before its further disaggregation into various, oftentimes hermetic area 
studies. It also varies in scale from focusing on incidences of civil or interstate wars featuring 
tens of thousands of militants to studying clandestine armed groups numbering no more 
than a handful of actors, with concomitant levels of casualties and injuries. It can 
accordingly prove difficult to remain academically focused with such a host of often 
contradictory explanations and understandings.  
 
This project is decidedly influenced by the pioneering synthesising works of the 
Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam, who have attempted to forge a common 
conceptual language mutually comprehensible to all who work in the field of political 
violence. It is deeply beholden to the efforts of a variety of scholars too numerous to list, 
who make use of social movement approaches and concepts to the study of political 
violence. It is an approach that “emphasizes the emergent quality of political violence by 
locating it within broader political processes, relational fields, and repertoires of action” 
(Bosi, Demetriou & Malthaner, 2014:2). This project also reflects the distinct socio-spatial 
turn which has promoted the relevance of space as a concept and demands a rigorous 
attention to contextualisation in territorial and socio-cultural senses (see Gündoğan, 
2011:393). All the while, it does not neglect wider rationalist and structuralist 
understandings which place varying ontological and methodological emphases on individual 
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agency and structural concerns. This research has sought to limit broad generalisations by 
focusing on the mechanisms and processes inherent to the practice of political violence and 
thus facilitate their comparative analysis both across different case studies and within the 
broad confines of the principal theoretical focus of this study: the relationship between 
armed groups and their communities of support. This chapter will begin by outlining the 
dependence of armed groups on civilian support before elaborating upon the conceptual 
organisation of this support in the form of a relationally defined constituency. It will 
continue by discussing the structuralising impact of the state on armed movements. The 
importance of space and how it conditions and is conditioned by armed actors will be 
discussed in detail. Finally, the minute workings of armed group – constituency relationships 
will be explained by focusing on the roles of networks, recruitment patterns and 
movements’ sensibility and flexibility in relation to the norms and expectations of their 
constituencies. Thereby providing the analytical framework upon which the empirical 
content of the Kurdish conflict will be constructed in the following chapters. 
 
Armed Groups and Civilians 
 
 This project focuses on the importance of armed groups’ immediate social 
environments. It concentrates on the reciprocal, dialectic networks of relations between 
insurgents and their communities of support. The central theoretical premise of this work 
suggests that the oftentimes strained but nonetheless enduring dialogue between armed 
groups and their communities of support can be of crucial importance to the forms of 
resistance observed in insurgent groups. However, apart from some notable exceptions 
(Malthaner, 2011; Neidhardt, 2011 and Waldmann 2005 & 2008), this is an aspect of the 
field which has been for the most part neglected or oversimplified. The importance of 
armed groups’ social embedding and their wider relations with their immediate social 
environments has been recognised in the extensive field of counter-insurgency. The doyen 
of French counter-insurgency Roger Trinquier described popular support as the “sin qua non 
of victory in modern warfare” (1964:8). A core tenet of the logic of counter-insurgency has 
been the deployment of bloody reprisals with the objective of discouraging civilian support 
for armed rebels. During the Nazi occupation of the Balkans in 1941 Field Marshall von 
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Weichs “instructed German troops in Yugoslavia that they were to shoot male civilians in 
any area of armed resistance, even in the absence of specific evidence against them. Guilt 
was to be assumed, unless innocence could be proven” (Mazower, 1993: 173). Kalyvas 
summed up the rationale of such practises by observing that “if the "guilty" cannot be 
identified and arrested, then violence ought to target innocent people somehow associated 
with them. The underlying assumption is that the "innocent" will either force the "guilty" to 
alter their behaviour or the "guilty" will change their course of action when they realize its 
impact upon the "innocent" - or both” (2003:112). This logic is of course predicated on an 
implicit recognition of the relationship between armed groups and their supporters and 
sympathisers. It is this very relationship that this project will proceed to analyse in its 
positive articulation and not simply as an insurgent weakness to be exploited by occupying 
forces. A focus on this relationship does not of course preclude engagement with the vast 
array of other features of political violence; it should be seen as supplementary rather than 
dismissive of alternative, more established approaches.  
 
It must be recognised that armed groups are in a position of power relative to 
unarmed civilians in situations of political instability or armed conflict. As a Greek schoolboy 
quoted by Mazower bluntly put it “there was no question of refusing to provide food for the 
partisans; you do not argue when you are faced with men with guns” (in Mazower, 1993: 
132). Nonetheless, unarmed populations are also holders of certain, if more subtle, forms of 
power. Non-combatants, as Weinstein suggests, are “able to shift their support from one 
side to another, to provide or withhold resources necessary for the group’s operation and to 
offer information to combatants about who is supporting the opposition” (2007:203). It 
echoes Malthaner’s suggestion that “in relationships, the actors are always interdependent 
and dispose of some degree of control over the other’s behaviour, which may vary in 
degree, can be symmetrical or asymmetrical, and may rely on different kinds of resources” 
(2011a:28).  
It is a well-established fact that “the pursuit of irregular war relies on the ongoing 
support of at least some civilians” (Wood, 2008; 543, see Humphrey & Weinstein, 2006: 
429; Wickham-Crowley, 1993:52; Kalyvas, 2006:92 and White & Falkenberg White, 
1991:102). The importance of civilian support has also been acknowledged by practitioners 
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of revolutionary violence: “the guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area. 
This is an indispensable condition” (Guevara, 2006: 68). This necessity has also been 
recognised in the counter-insurgency literature; Trinquier observed that “the enemy 
consists not of a few armed bands fighting on the ground, but of an organization that feeds 
him, informs him, and sustains his morale” (1964: 28). This dependence on a wider 
community beyond the armed units can result in the establishment of normative 
parameters regarding the nature of violence that armed groups can potentially deploy. In 
their discussion of IRA and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)’s armed campaigns, de la Calle and 
Sanchez-Cuenca observed that “terrorist organizations have to adjust their level of violence 
to the preferences for violence of their supporters. It is often the case that the community 
of support has more moderate preferences than terrorists themselves” and that if the 
armed groups wish to “conserve the support of less radical supporters, they will have to 
avoid some forms of violence” (2007: 7-8 and see della Porta, 2013: 175). These normative 
confines were articulated by a former senior IRA militant, Eamon Collins when he stated 
that when formulating its armed strategy, the IRA “knew  they were operating within a 
powerful set of informal restrictions on  their behaviour, no less powerful for being largely 
unspoken” (1997:295). It is therefore clear that the extensive range of relationships 
between armed groups and their communities of support is comprised of both material 
interactions and normative obligations.  
 
Armed Movements and their Communities of Support 
 
Modern asymmetrical warfare usually takes the form of insurgency, which has been 
described as a “technology of military conflict characterised by small, lightly armed bands 
practising guerrilla warfare from rural bases” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003:75) against the more 
ponderous, better-armed and numerous forces of the state. Most modern insurgent groups 
have aspired to emulate Mao Zedong’s axiom that “the guerrilla must move amongst the 
people as the fish swims in the sea” (in Keane, 2005: 91). The relevant literature 
conceptualises this “insurgent sea” in a number of fashions. It has been suggested that “the 
expectations of supporters and sympathisers define incentives and restrict conditions” 
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(Neidhardt, 2011: 431) that delimit how insurgent groups can act; thus the composition of 
an armed group’s support community and their respective expectations plays a decisive role 
in limiting or expanding the group’s potential repertoire of contention.19 
 
  Waldmann proposes the notion of a radical community, which he describes as “a 
territorially rooted ethnic or religious group which share a common past and identity and 
are under attack without protection by a state or some other potential entity” (2005:254).  
His concept stresses the importance of territory because it “lends continuity and stability to 
armed resistance and legitimates it much more than any ideology can” (ibid: 243). It holds 
that insurgent communities regress from a form of Gesellschaft solidarity to one rooted in 
bonds of Gemeinschaft20 “as it helps them not only preserve their identity and social 
cohesion, but endure the sufferings and persecutions awaiting them as they are labelled 
supporters of terrorism” (ibid:240). This regression can result in the revival of “tribal or clan 
like forms of life” (ibid: 244) in the place of more individualised modern societal structures. 
The pseudo-primordial societal structures in those communities where ascribed rather than 
acquired identities prevail facilitate a situation where “a number of radicals skilfully 
manipulate the mechanisms of social control to dominate the numerically superior group of 
moderates by intimidating and marginalising them” (Waldmann, 2008:139 & see ibid, 
2004:100). 
Waldmann’s theory’s main merits lie in his important recognition of the symbiotic 
nature of relations between armed vanguards and their supporters (2005:249) and that the 
support offered is “limited both politically and temporally” (2005:250 & 2008:27). He also 
emphasises the spatially contingent nature of this relationship. However, it is conceptually 
vague and engages in sweeping generalities that even his own empirical case studies, the 
IRA, ETA and Hezbollah21, confirm to be weak and overstretched. The core weakness is that 
at no stage does he attempt to rigorously delineate the contours of the radical community, 
                                                        
19
 A concept defined by Tilly as “not only what people do when they make a claim; it is what they know how to 
do and what society has come to expect them to choose to do from within a culturally sanctioned and 
empirically limited set of options” (in Tarrow, 1993:283). 
20
 Gemeinschaft is generally understood as relations of personal and immediate interactions and is often 
translated as ‘community’; while Gesellschaft is taken to mean impersonal or formal interactions and 
translated to mean ‘society’. 
21
 There are numerous ways to spell Hezbollah. It will be spelled as such in this thesis aside from when it is 
spelled differently in direct quotations. 
34 
 
or radical milieu as he inconsistently refers to it in a 2008 article. A definition such as “the 
segment of a population which sympathises with terrorists and supports them morally and 
logistically” (2008:25) is ambiguous as it fails to detail what constitutes moral and logistical 
support. Furthermore, the confines of such radical communities are never clearly 
demarcated, neither between the armed vanguard and the radical community nor between 
it and the wider public. 
 Waldmann’s radical communities have been conceptualised in a number of 
less static and more nuanced fashions by a range of other scholars. The term “reference 
groups” derived from the school of Symbolic Interactionalism has been used by Malthaner 
and Neidhardt. They have been defined by Malthaner as “groups with whom the militants 
identify, for whom they claim to fight, and whose attitude is crucial for the sustaining the 
militants’ self concept as well as their claim to legitimacy” (Malthaner, 2011: 39).  Neidhardt 
demands that armed groups be distinguished “from the supporters who make terrorism 
materially possible and the sympathisers who symbolically affirm it, and both of them from 
the interested observers (bystanders)” (2011:439), thus confirming the need to draw 
distinctions between the composite elements of which Waldmann’s original radical 
communities are composed.  Neidhardt further suggests that “if it is to succeed politically in 
the long term, terrorism must be able to generate a belief in the legitimacy of its struggle, 
and it can expect this to pay off in the currencies of material and symbolic support” 
(2011:437).  
Such an understanding of reference communities is further developed in 
Malthaner’s work where he introduces the term constituency, described as “the real social 
groups in a society, whom the militants address and to whom they refer, with whom they 
are actually involved in some form of relationship, and who – at least to a certain degree – 
actually sympathise with and support the militant groups” (2011a: 29). The pointed use of 
“actually involved in some form of a relationship” clearly denotes a contraction of the 
concept of reference communities. It implies an existing relationship that must entail some 
form of material or political commitment or interaction between an armed group and its 
supporters and therefore, a more tangible relationship than one merely rooted in a shared 
symbolic universe. Malthaner drew up a taxonomy of four types of relations that 
predominate in such a relationship: relations of utilitarian social exchange; bonds of 
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solidarity endogenous to the processes of mobilisation itself; relations derived from pre-
existing kin and family relations; and bonds rooted in a shared identitarian discourse. 
(2011a:46-51). He stresses that these “constituencies are entities constituted through their 
relationship with the militant group rather than predefined actors in their own right” 
(2011a:29). They are thus not hermetically distinct formations but rather better defined as 
an amorphous series of relations between actors. One can therefore, without reifying them, 
identify two distinct units of analysis - the armed groups and the elements of their 
immediate social environment that are sympathetically disposed towards them and engage 
in some or all of the listed forms of interaction with them, i.e. the constituency. To reiterate 
the central theoretical premise of this current paper, as proposed by Malthaner “[b]eyond 
repressive intervention by security forces and economic limitations, it is this relationship 
with their constituencies which may influence and constrain the violent campaign of 
militant groups” (2011a:14). 
Unlike the territorialised “radical community” (Waldmann, 2005), this thesis 
proposes that the constituency exists within space but is not dictated by it. The constituency 
is defined by its relationship to the armed group and is not necessarily bound to any specific 
territory. This is not to dismiss the importance of geo-spatial settings to armed groups and 
their supporters. Interactions between armed groups and their constituencies are heavily 
conditioned by territorial concerns such as urban or rural settings and mountainous or 
desert landscapes. The advantage of a de-territorialised concept of constituency is that it 
facilitates an understanding of armed group and civilian relations across space. Population 
displacement, emigration, tactical withdrawals by insurgents and the destruction wrought 
by large scale campaigns of violence often result in supporters and sympathisers of armed 
groups becoming physically disconnected from the locations of their habitual interaction. 
Armed groups’ relations with their constituency are thus radically reconfigured, for instance, 
public rural visits by armed insurgents are transformed into clandestine urban encounters 
with unarmed militants, even taking place perhaps in a foreign country. Interactions can 
also be temporarily interrupted. The notion of constituency is sufficiently pliable to allow 
one to conceptualise the transformation of these relations over time and space.   
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The State 
 
An oft cited shortcoming of more orthodox social movement approaches is their 
marginalisation of the role of the state (McAdam et al, 2001:74). Events of recent times 
across North Africa and the Middle East such as the Arab Spring and its aftermath have 
brought into question a significant portion of existing theories of the state and have 
highlighted the dangers of reifying a static unitary understanding of it. Numerous definitions 
of the state have enjoyed periods of dominance in political thought, ranging from the classic 
Weberian understanding to the state as a Gramscian hegemonic complex (see Ayubi, 1995, 
Migdal 2009, Tripp 2001 and Anderson, 1987). However, the state has in recent times 
become increasingly disaggregated as a concept and has become more commonly 
understood as a “contradictory ensemble of practises or processes” (Aretxaga, 2003:395) or 
as a “site of conflict and contestation” (Tripp, 2001:213 and see Johnston, 2011:16). The 
state is a problematic concept and one which continues to be vigorously debated in the 
wider literature; a debate which largely lies beyond the confines of this project’s theoretical 
concerns. Nonetheless, it is impossible to study armed groups and their communities of 
support without reference to its overarching presence because, as Lenin observed, “the 
basic question of every revolution is state power” (in Goodwin, 2001:42). As Goodwin pithily 
put it, “there could be no revolutions, in the modern sense of the word, before there were 
states” (2001: 40-41) and logically neither could there be revolutionary movements – 
successful or otherwise – outside of the context of the modern state. It plays a significant 
role in the shaping of armed groups, the timing of their emergence and the strategies they 
adopt, as well as civilian perspectives toward them. Accordingly, in order to avoid a de-
contextualised analysis of the subject matter, the state will herein be discussed in two main 
ways. Firstly, in regard to how the state and its political opportunity structures influence the 
emergence of armed groups; secondly, the manner in which the state conducts counter-
insurgency, with a particular focus on how state violence and repression impacts insurgent 
support.  
 
It has been argued that the success or failure of revolutionary movements is not 
limited to their own efforts or prevailing social conditions but rather the nature of the 
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regimes they attempt to overthrow. As Trotsky succinctly summed up, “in reality the mere 
existence of privations is not enough to cause an insurrection; if it were, the masses would 
be always in revolt” (2008:353). A structuralist perspective holds that the “structures of 
states and armies, as well as the political relations between states and various sectors of 
society, provide the keys to explaining revolutions in the Third World” (Goodwin & Skocpol, 
1989:505). Numerous taxonomies have been drawn up regarding the forms of states and 
varying permutations of factors such as their openness, loyalty of the military and reliance 
on foreign aid, which offer explanations for the resilience of certain regimes in the face of 
revolutionary contention. For instance, Wickham-Crowley explains that collective military 
regimes “have shown a consistent ability to face down regimes” (1989:514), while 
patrimonial praetorian states which exclude large swathes of the upper classes from the 
spoils of governance are more vulnerable to revolutionary upheaval, such as in Nicaragua 
(ibid:529). In Latin America, with the exception of the military coup in Bolivia in 1952, all 
other cases of successful revolutions deposed personalistic dictators in Mexico, Cuba and 
Nicaragua (McClintock, 1992: 226).  
 
It has also been acknowledged that states which operate even rather imperfect 
forms of democratic electoral procedures tend to be more resilient in the face of armed 
opposition (Goodwin & Skocpol, 1989:495). Others have focused on the importance of 
particular state institutions, most pertinently the military. It has been suggested that 
“loyalty to the government is the most critical qualitative characteristic of armed forces, for 
the outcomes of rebellions and revolutionary wars hinge on that loyalty” (Wickham-
Crowley, 1992:64). In his later works Goodwin has condensed the larger structuralist debate 
into five key factors which facilitate revolution. He contends that revolutions are most likely 
if the culpability for popular grievances is assigned to government, if the government 
excludes mobilised groups from state power, engages in indiscriminate repression, has 
insufficient policing capacity or if it takes a Sultanistic or patrimonial form (2001: 45-49).  
 
This wider structuralist approach has much to recommend it, in particular its focus 
on deep contextualisation. Its broad strokes explain rather well those instances where 
revolutions are successfully repressed or when they succeed in seizing state power but it is 
less convincing in cases of “persistent insurgency” (ibid:220). In cases of insurgencies which 
38 
 
endure for many years, the dialectic between the state and the forces which oppose it 
becomes of greater importance than in briefer confrontations. If one is to accept Goodwin’s 
self-criticism of the statist approach that insurgency and counter-insurgency are reciprocally 
formative forces (ibid: 51); it becomes clear that closer attention needs to be paid to the 
agency of insurgent forces and how they adapt to and impact upon the structures of the 
state which can neither defeat them nor be defeated by them. This point is also relevant in 
relation to revolutionary situations with multiple insurgent actors. It is often the case that 
one particular group engages in insurgent contention much longer than other groups who 
either turn to practises of unarmed contention or are simply defeated. For the purposes of 
this project, it is this mutually formative aspect of armed groups and the state’s interactions 
with them which will be considered at greatest length, with particular focus on the role 
state repression has on insurgent mobilisation. 
 
State Repression 
 
 It is well established that the relationship between repression and rebellion is much 
more nuanced than a uni-directional causual factor whereby the repressed rise up in 
rebellion (Hafez, 2003:71). Yet state violence in response to non-violent contention is in the 
majority of cases a precondition for insurgent mobilisation. In relation to an array of Central 
American states, Goodwin explains that various revolutionary groups were: 
 
“effective mobilizers because the brutal and indiscriminate violence with which exclusionary 
and infrastructurally weak states greeted attempts to bring about change through electoral 
and other nonviolent means backfired, unintentionally convincing substantial numbers of 
groups and individuals that armed struggle aimed at overthrowing the state was legitimate 
and even necessary” (168-169). 
 
Indiscriminate state repression in response to non-violent contention facilitates 
insurgent mobilisation in a number of ways (Kalyvas, 2006), including by rendering armed 
insurgency the only remaining method to contest a de-legitimised state. Furthermore, state 
terror triggers emotions of anger and fear and a desire for revenge, which generates the 
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momentum necessary to fuel insurgencies. It is often the decisive turning point in individual 
insurgent trajectories wherein acts of violence directed against themselves, loved ones or in 
their vicinity transform latent sympathies to active participation in armed groups (Viterna, 
2006 & 2013; Bosi 2012; Bosi & della Porta, 2012; della Porta 2013 and Wood 2001 inter 
alios). The most tangible example of such processes is the use of torture, which links the 
corporeal and individual realms with those of the abstract and the collective. In relation to 
torture in Northern Ireland Feldman explained that “the practise of torture [...] was a 
production that detached the body from the self in order to transform the body into a 
sectarian artefact, an abstraction of ethnicity” (1991:64). The corpses of victims of state 
violence “mediate [...] between the state and the people in a process that seems intrinsic to 
the materialisation of the state” (Aretxaga drawing on Taussig & Siegel, 2003: 403). This 
phenomenon will be discussed in the subsequent chapters in relation to the Kurdish case 
and how specific instances of state brutality led to individual radicalisation and 
consequently wider collective mobilisation. 
 
Mitchell’s (1991) rejection of the previously dominant state-society distinction and 
Abrams’ (1988) suggestion that the state be considered as an illusion are useful in 
conceptualising how the state utilises the ‘no man’s land’ between its own institutions and 
civil society as means to advance repression. Aretxaga described the state as resembling “an 
all-pervasive ghostly presence, a threatening force shaped by the collective experience of 
being overshadowed by an unfathomable power which can shape social life as a dangerous 
universe of surfaces and disguises” (2000:43). The state appears to be simultaneously 
everywhere and nowhere and exists as “a surreptitious power that uses certain apparatuses 
to penetrate subjects’ very bodies, memories and forms of life” (Aras, 2014a:24). A climate 
of fear is generalised by the unpredictability of the behaviour of the state; an 
unpredictability that takes the structural form of the “perpetual state of emergency” 
(Agamben in Aras, 2014:25). Therefore, when considering the dynamic between the state 
and opposition forces, it is not sufficient to limit oneself to the dialectic between recognised 
institutions of state power (such as the judicial system and the police), but rather to 
acknowledge the more comprehensive nexus between them and more tenebrous informal 
ones such as clandestine security forces and supposedly forbidden practises like torture  and 
the impact they have on generating an atmosphere of fear and generalised insecurity.  
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It has been affirmed that “no simple distinction between ’insurgents’ and ‘forces of 
order’ can possibly capture the complex social interactions that generate collective 
violence” (Tilly, 2003:40). In this regard, Goodwin’s views on state constructivism are rather 
relevant. He defines it as “the ways in which states help to construct or constitute various 
social forces and institutions that are (falsely) conceptualised as wholly exterior to states” 
(2001:39). However, while it is undeniable that the state, in possession of much greater 
cultural, military and political resources is at a distinct advantage vis-á-vis insurgent 
movements, the decisions and agency of armed groups also impact upon the state and its 
strategic decisions. As Johnston explained “popular protest and the structure of the state 
are in a dynamic and mutually influencing relationship, each pushing and constraining the 
other” (2011:16). McAdam et al have contended that the state and the forces of opposition 
reciprocally define “threats and opportunities, mobilise[s] existent and newly created 
resources, undertake[s] innovative collective action in response to other actors’ 
manoeuvres and in some cases transform[s] the course of interaction” (2001:74).  The 
impacts of government initiatives on insurgent groups are in many cases easily identifiable. 
It is well documented in the literature that closure or opening of political access or 
introduction of limited democratic reforms can trigger mobilisation or de-mobilisation in 
insurgent ranks (Wickham-Crowley, 1989).  
 
However, beyond such reaction and counter-reaction there are more subtle and less 
immediately evident processes of interaction at work. Aretxaga identified the process of 
“organised mimesis” (2000: 48) in the account of the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación 
(GAL) established by elements within the Spanish state ostensibly to combat (ETA). GAL 
operated from 1983 to 1987 murdering up to 30 people and injuring as many more; the 
extra-judicial targeting of state enemies is not unusual but the noteworthy aspect of GAL 
was its wholesale adoption of the symbolic practises of ETA. In direct juxtaposition to the 
“sign-things such as an acronym, a seal, [and] communiqués” which endowed ETA’s 
campaign “with the materiality of a political subject by providing a permanence and 
continuity”, (ibid: 47) GAL adopted mirror image ‘sign things’. They chose an acronym, 
released communiqués in the same fashion and even forged a seal which was an inverted 
replica of the ETA one (ibid), all of which were superfluous to the strategic goals of their 
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stated goal of destroying ETA. It is therefore clear that the state and its opponents are 
mutually constitutive forces, undeniably at the strategic level of action and counter-action, 
but also in a less conscious fashion where mutual morbid fascination leads both to 
internalise elements of one another.  
 
Space and Territory  
 
 As Ó Dochartaigh has explained, “there is a radical spatial unevenness to violence 
that defies explanation at the national level” and that most “violent conflicts extend across 
less than one quarter of the area of the states in which they take place” (2013:120); 
accordingly one cannot therefore generalise at the level of the state in terms of the 
diffusion of insurgency. It can be added that generalisations at the sub-state level can be 
equally misplaced as the intensity of violence differs across often very geographically similar 
areas and changes drastically over time. In recent times, the conceptualisation of space as 
“quantitative, to be measured in square metres, and as isotropic, essentially everywhere the 
same and conceptualized as a residual of time” (Gambetti & Jongerden, 2011: 375) has 
become viewed as redundant. As Bosi has explained “space is not a ‘natural’ unit to which 
individuals adjust but a social artifact, structured through the interactions of people, groups, 
and institutions that are embedded in specific social relations” (2013:82 and see Gambetti & 
Jongerden, 2011:376, Jongerden, 2007:10, Martin & Miller, 2003 and Sewell, 2001). 
Although physical geographic elements remain integral to understanding space, emphasis 
has shifted to the ‘spatial agency’ of social actors and the manner in which they shape their 
socio-spatial environments. Focus lies on the “fashion in which spatial constraints are 
turned to advantage in political and social struggles and the ways that such struggles can 
restructure the meanings, uses and strategic valence of space” (Sewell, 2001:55).  
Arguments have been put forth that insurgencies thrive in areas with particular 
geographical features such as high mountains, islands, forests, proximity to roads and 
particular natural resources (Cederman, 2008; Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; O’Sullivan, 1983; 
Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Buhaug & Gates, 2002; Zhukov, 2012; Kalyvas, 2006:316 and Hendrix, 
2011). Yet there are numerous states such as Switzerland, Sweden or Canada which boast 
these geographical characteristics but have negligible levels of political conflict; so clearly 
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geographically deterministic explanations of conflict are unsatisfactory. It has also been 
suggested that “the availability of cover to fade into is the principal guerrilla requirement” 
(O’Sullivan, 1983:148); but it must be acknowledged that some form of cover is to be found 
in most environments, including urban ones. Therefore it is more relevant to consider the 
social appropriation of space by armed groups, which Gambetti defines as “the potential of 
social movements to alter power structures in a given polity” (2009:44), rather than the 
physical qualities of these spaces. 
 
The distinction between urban and rural environments is an issue of continuing 
interest for academics and military practitioners alike. Fidel Castro asserted that the “city is 
the grave of the guerrilla” (in de la Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2012:581). Yet the dichotomy 
between urban and rural movements is a false one. Developments in the countryside impact 
on the cities and vice versa. Even the most referenced and arguably paradigmatic rural 
insurgent victory in Cuba in 1959 was dependent on the massive contribution of the urban-
based elements of the July 26th Movement. Conversely the Tupamaros rebellion in Uruguay 
is put forth as the most striking example of an urban insurgency, yet its roots were in the 
rural trade union struggle of Movimiento de Apoyo al Campesino/Peasant Support 
Movement in Northern Uruguay (see Porzecanski, 1973). The noted theorists of rural 
guerrilla warfare Guevara and Debray, both profoundly influenced by its success in Cuba, 
appear to be unwilling to “place[d] primary emphasis on the vital importance of close 
linkages between rural and urban guerrilla elements” (Russell, Miller & Hildner, 1974:36), 
thereby contributing to the sacralisation of this “mountain mystique” (Petras in Russell et al, 
1974:35).  
 
It has long been held that “insurgents tend to be universally weak in cities” due to 
the ease with which incumbent forces can “police and monitor the population” (Kalyvas, 
2006:133). Yet, as Staniland has identified, there have been numerous prolonged urban 
insurgent campaigns across the globe (2010:1627), most recently the ongoing civil war in 
Syria. He identified two necessary conditions for urban insurgency, namely a constrained 
state limited not by its armed capacity but in the extent that it can deploy that capacity, and 
the presence of an insurgent group that has deep social roots and legitimacy (ibid:1626). Le 
Blanc has provided a thorough examination of the advantages and disadvantages of urban 
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insurgency at a more tactical level. He has noted that urban environments guarantee an 
attractive list of proximate targets and that transport infrastructure facilitates easy access to 
them (2013:804). It is also easier to consolidate resources for insurgents in cities by means 
of ‘appropriations’ or criminality, (ibid: 805) thus rendering urban armed groups less 
dependent on their constituencies than their rural counterparts (ibid: 799). However, there 
are also considerable downsides to urban insurgency; it involves targeting the state where it 
is strongest (ibid: 806), and it almost totally precludes the establishment of a ‘safe territory’ 
and the operation of a counter-state (ibid and see Bosi, 2013). In addition urban insurgency 
hastens the intensity of interactions with the state, thereby limiting the time available to 
insurgents and exposing armed groups to better state surveillance (ibid: 805). Also, given 
the heightened population density, any insurgent action is likely to result in civilian 
casualties with the attendant consequences for maintaining popular support (ibid: 801). It is 
thus incumbent upon students of political violence to consider spatial and geographic 
conditions as enabling or disabling factors but not as the determinative factor in insurgent 
mobilisations. 
 
Spatiality is the key concept underpinning territorial control, which in turn is deemed 
critical to insurgent success or failure. Kalyvas defined control as “obtaining the exclusive 
collaboration of civilians and eliminating defection” (2006:196); however he has seemingly 
not elaborated on the distinction between territorial control and other forms of social, 
political or less tangible forms of control. As Malthaner has convincingly highlighted in the 
case of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, its considerable influence is less a “function of 
military control [...] but rather the result of support relationships with local communities 
and the enforcement of norms of loyalty and non betrayal through mechanisms of social 
control” (2011a:253). Territorial control on behalf of the state is strongly correlated to state 
capacity; regimes which boast comprehensive state capacity are considered to have greater 
territorial control. Various indices have been utilised to measure state capacity (Hendrix, 
2001; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; McAdam et  al, 2001:78-81; Tilly, 2003: 41-53 and Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003), and yet in the wider literature state territorial control itself is considered self-
explanatory and left largely undefined.  
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On the other hand insurgent territorial control has been described as the capacity of 
insurgents to set up camps and bases within the borders of the state, interrupt the flow of 
goods by forming semi-permanent road blocks, rule and be recognised as rulers by civilian 
populations, and permitted to extract rents from and administer justice to the communities 
over which they reign (de la Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2012: 597). Kalyvas is of the view that 
control “spawns collaboration independently of pre-war patterns of support” (2006:118) 
but that “control and collaboration are self-reinforcing” (ibid: 112), leading to a degree of 
chicken and egg logic regarding which comes first - control or collaboration. Nevertheless 
his control-collaboration model is commonly used as the measure by which insurgent 
influence or control is assessed. In brief, his appealingly coherent model divides territory 
into five different zones of varying control by insurgents and incumbents (ibid: 196). Zones 
two and four are defined as being primarily controlled by incumbents and insurgents 
respectively but remain contested areas with incursions from opposing forces. Kalyvas’ 
model is somewhat undermined by his categorisation of zones two and four as areas of 
comparable regimes of control (ibid), simply under opposite banners. Insurgent areas of 
partial control (zone four) are neither fully comparable nor the symmetrical opposite to 
those of incumbent control (zone two).  Some state institutions almost always, to one 
degree or another, continue to function often even in areas of full insurgent control (zone 5) 
and certainly in areas of incomplete control (zone 4). Schools, banks, hospitals and other 
state institutions usually do not simply shut down upon the onset of violence, but instead 
remain a lingering, structural presence across the insurgent front line of which there is 
absolutely no parallel example in zones of incumbent control in zone two (Bosi & Malthaner, 
2013)22. Accordingly, if one utilises a territorial approach to assess insurgent control, and 
thereby also its influence, particularly in relation to urban contexts with an existing 
preponderance of state institutions, one could arrive at a mistaken understanding of the 
extent of insurgent power.  
 
Although territorial aspects of control are necessarily central to any consideration of 
political violence, over-emphasising them at the expense of less tangible manifestations of 
control or collaboration is problematic. Armed conflict has historically been one of the 
                                                        
22 These insights are drawn from a forthcoming paper presented at the Typologies of Violence Conference at 
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principal stimuli for mass migration; populations typically flee to temporarily or 
permanently escape warzones, and forced migration has been commonly utilised as a 
counter-insurgency tactic or as a punitive measure against suspect communities.23 Bearing 
that in mind, it seems prudent to also focus on the social aspects of control, as populations 
in the course of armed conflict often become divorced from their habitual territories. 
Indeed the very process of this dislocation can result in them becoming more supportive of 
insurgent groups or lead to greater engagement with armed groups.  
 
Social control is tightly bound to legitimacy and in fact cannot exist in its absence. 
Legitimacy is – similarly to charisma – not an innate quality but rather an interactive and 
incessant process (see Demetriou, 2007:174). Malthaner explains that legitimacy is a form 
of “social relationship that translates into particular forms of social interactions, with 
tangible effects. Legitimacy enables – or is enacted in – forms of social control and it 
represents a symbolic resource that both sides can use to influence the other” (2014). 
Armed groups enjoy popular legitimacy when there is recognition that they represent a 
particular community with the concomitant understanding that they are also responsive to 
said community. Legitimacy can emerge because of armed groups’ behaviour or attitude 
toward civilians, ranging from the micro-level of insurgents’ manners to the macro-level of 
organisational demands on civilians or practises of violence toward them. It can be derived 
from the provision of services and relations of utilitarian social exchange (Malthaner, 2014). 
It can also be facilitated by the presence of social capital (Demetriou, 2007: 177), shared 
communal background and past histories of social contention and when armed groups’ 
“demands for political change or the values they propagate resonate with the population’s 
grievances, experiences, or religious beliefs” (Malthaner, 2014).  The fundamental 
distinction between territorial control and social control is that the former is largely 
perpetrated by armed actors themselves while social control for the most part pre-empts 
the necessity of coercive measures. In other words, compliance is derived from “subjects’ 
individual belief in their own duty to obey [insurgent commands]” (Malthaner, 2014). 
Compliance is maintained by the collective imposition of mechanisms of social sanction 
                                                                                                                                                                            
the European University Institute, 13-14 May, 2013.  
23
 For e.g. the Briggs Plan employed by the British Army in Malaya in the 1950s relocated 500,000 ethnic 
Chinese into villages as a part of its counter-insurgency strategy; it became a model emulated in multiple 
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upon those which stray from the orientation of the community. Such mechanisms of control 
are founded on “mutual surveillance by community members” and include “forms of social 
ostracism, public shaming, and exclusion and isolation” (Malthaner, 2014). It bears recalling 
that these social sanctions are in the context of the implicit threat of imminent or future 
insurgent violence, should they be ignored. Behaviour is conditioned by the threat of 
insurgent punishment but over time the internalisation of norms expounded by insurgent 
organisations leads to even greater compliance. It should be added that social and territorial 
control are not mutually exclusive concepts, in areas of territorial control there is likely to 
also be social control, especially if the situation endures over time. Importantly, territorial 
control is not a pre-requisite of social control thus explaining cases where insurgent groups 
maintain the support of communities in the absence of the capacity to coerce civilian 
compliance.  
 
The concept of safe territories neatly weds aspects of social and territorial control in 
areas of insurgent presence. Bosi defines a safe territory as a “physical space, whether 
concentrated or extended, in which social networks develop over time and shape formal 
and informal infrastructures of support that maintain dense affective, familial, and personal 
relations between armed activists and their local constituencies” (2013: 81). The concept of 
a safe territory complements Polletta’s works on “free spaces” which she defined as “small-
scale settings within a community or movement that are removed from the direct control of 
dominant groups, are voluntarily participated in, and generate the cultural challenge that 
precedes or accompanies political mobilization” (1999:1). Within safe territories, armed 
groups “first confront the legitimacy of the state; they challenge the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”, yet short term territorial control  
understood as having a monopoly on violence in the area is not necessarily a primary 
insurgent objective. Insurgent organisations instead strive to legitimate their presence 
within a safe territory “in terms of common identity and/or implicit and explicit coercion” 
(Bosi, 2013:81). They consolidate their presence by forging a “constituency indoctrinated 
with counter-hegemonic attitudes but also bound to the organization via formal and 
informal infrastructures of support that maintain relations between armed activists and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
instances in following decades (see Goodwin, 2001:115 and Kalyvas, 2006:122). 
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their local constituency” (ibid).  Although these safe territories are facilitated in many 
instances by their geographic location, such as being found in remote or inaccessible areas 
or protected by their immersion in densely populated disadvantaged neighbourhoods, it is 
the socially constructed element of these safe territories that ensures their resilience. 
Notwithstanding that their territorial bases can be eradicated by physical destruction or 
forced migration, many armed groups have simply re-adapted to their new found spatial 
circumstances to re-organise their constituencies and continue the struggle in a different, 
often far distant, spatial context.  
 
Criticisms of the prioritisation of territorial control should not however be 
interpreted as a dismissal of territory as a relevant aspect of the study of political violence. 
“Protest does not just take place in territories, structured and shaped by the territorial 
context within which it operates; it also seeks to challenge those territories and make ‘new’ 
territories, redefining the relations of power in the process” (Ó Dochartaigh & Bosi, 
2010:406). This project shares the contention that “space and place are not physical entities 
with pre-established identities, but are socially produced, not only through relations, but 
also through power geometries” (Gambetti & Jongerden, 2011: 381). Accordingly, an 
awareness of the mutually constitutive impact of the physical and social environment and 
the actors with which it is populated will be maintained throughout the subsequent 
chapters. The evolution of armed groups in terms of their repertoire, strategies and 
discourse will be considered in respect of their immediate socio-spatial environments. 
 
Forms of Interaction between Armed Groups and their Supporters 
 
It has been suggested that “micro-level processes of mobilization are often ignored 
in the social movement literature in favour of more macro- and meso-level analyses” 
(Viterna, 2013:40 and see Arjona & Kalyvas, 2012 and Gates, 2002). This contextualised 
micro-level mobilisation and interactive processes will be discussed in this section, with a 
focus on the question of timing and networks.  
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Interactions between armed groups and wider civilian communities, whether they 
are sympathetic toward them or not, are multi-faceted and characterised by layers of social, 
political and cultural subtleties much more nuanced than the simple logic of the barrel of an 
insurgent rifle. A fact often neglected in the study of armed conflict is that guerrillas and 
armed insurgents have not fallen from the sky in an alien land, but are instead sons and 
daughters of its very soil. In addition, although relations and responsibilities within armed 
movements often predominate and become insurgents’ primary fields of socialisation and 
reference (see della Porta, 1995:129 and Wasmund, 1986). Many armed actors, and even 
more so the non-combat units of armed organisations which do not require as complete a  
commitment, maintain pre-existing or generate new social networks external to the armed 
movement (see della Porta & Diani, 2006:127-131). Armed actors and civilians physically 
come together in what have been termed as “moments of encounter” (O Connor and 
Oikonomakis, forthcoming); these moments occur in real concrete social environments, 
which although characterised by inevitable power discrepancies are laden with an array of 
reciprocal social and political obligations.  
 
Wickham-Crowley has outlined a taxonomy of attachments that link civilians to 
armed movements. They include common membership in formal and informal social 
organisations such as political parties or religious fraternities. These linkages are cut across 
by vertical relations such as “pre-existing hierarchical attachments between guerrillas and 
peasants” or horizontal “patterns of lateral friendships” (1993:139-140). It is the contention 
of this paper that the nature and timing of these moments of encounter, particularly initial 
ones, are of critical relevance to the consolidation of civilian support. Interactions between 
insurgents and others in their immediate social environments can be ordered across a 
spectrum, ranging from active participation in insurgent ranks through unsolicited support, 
denial of support to opponents, periodic solicited material support, begrudging tolerance, 
and all the way to active opposition. It should be kept in mind however that although 
popular support is massively important, “it is not the be-all and end-all of a guerrilla failure 
or triumph, and it cannot be the sole focus of our analysis” (ibid: 86). Patterns of popular 
support or disaffection must be contextualised in the specifics of local settings and in 
respect of other actors in the immediate social environment. 
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Insurgent Dependence  
 
The logistical challenges and practicalities of maintaining an insurgency are in most 
cases enormous and heavily dependent on local popular support. It has been estimated that 
“it takes ten rural supporters to maintain one guerrilla fighter” (ibid: 55). In order to be 
successful, movements need to coherently organise these supporters so as to best meet the 
needs of movement. In El Salvador, the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación 
Nacional’s (FMLN) support committee were tasked with the provision of: 
 
“[...] clothing, shoes, medicines, materials for explosives, and other needed supplies for the 
combatants. They were encouraged to form small workshops where they could make mines 
and other explosives. They were provided with typewriters and mimeograph machines to 
create and disseminate propaganda. They were to keep a careful eye on the movements of 
the enemy, not only for the security of their own village but also to provide that information 
to the FMLN guerrillas. They were to take advantage of their legal status to run mail 
between FMLN camps, linking each base into a national network.” (Viterna, 2013:73 and see 
Wickham Crowley, 1993:52-55) 
 
Insurgents’ dependence on civilian support renders relations between them of 
central importance to understanding the nature of the insurgency itself. Insurgents are 
obliged to recognise that there are limits to what they can demand from supporters before 
they become disillusioned and defect to state or other forces, or by simply fleeing. It has 
been suggested that FARC’s dislodgement from its former strongholds in the 1980s like 
Puerto Boyacá was a result of its over-taxation of locals in order to fulfil quotas determined 
by upper ranks of the hierarchy located elsewhere and thus unaware of local realities 
(Guitérrez Sanín, 2008:224). Similar processes occurred in what had been Islamist 
strongholds in urban centres in Algeria (Martinez, 2000:94). In Peru, the over-exacting 
demands of the Sendero Luminoso led to the formation of pro-state paramilitaries, the 
Rondas Campesinos (Degregori, 1998). Insurgent dependence thus grants a degree of 
leverage to those on whom they depend, re-emphasising the interactive and reciprocally 
formative nature of relations between armed groups and civilians.  
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Timing 
 
It is undeniable that “different logics of participation may co-exist in a single civil 
war” (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008:437 and see Arjona & Kalyvas, 2012:159, Kalyvas, 
2006:95). One way in which it differs is according to timing (Bosi, 2007 and Bosi et al, 2014); 
participation varies drastically over time and across generations of recruits. Time in this 
sense is less a question of the “abstract historical processes” critiqued by Sewell (1996:247) 
but rather relates to particular events in time. Sewell has put forth the concept of 
transformative events, which he has described as “the relatively rare subclass of happenings 
that significantly transform structures” (ibid: 262). Furthermore, “events not only mark, but 
to a significant degree constitute, the emergence of new possibilities for the conduct of 
contentious politics” (McAdam & Sewell, 2001: 120). An “eventful conception of 
temporality” (Sewell, 1996:262) will therefore be utilised in the following chapters.  
 
Aside from large-scale structural events such as coup d’états or restoration of 
democratic procedures, in the case of insurgent groups a significant temporal change is 
marked also by the adoption of violent, or perhaps more precisely, more violent repertoires 
of contention.24 This does not necessarily occur in as dramatic a fashion as the Ejército 
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional’s (EZLN) surprise uprising in 1994 (see Marcos, 2001), 
because there are always continuities with previous patterns of activism which are 
maintained contemporarily with more violent practises. Yet in most cases there are 
significant turning points where a marked strategic radicalisation can be observed in 
movements’ repertoires of contention. It should of course be recalled that such 
developments do not usually occur autonomously but rather as a result of interaction with 
opposition forces and potential allies, and are dependent on regime type and a large degree 
of happenstance (Tilly, 2003: 44-50 and McAdam et al, 2001:49 & 140-141).  
 
Initial phases of mobilisation are of critical importance because this is when incipient 
                                                        
24McAdam et al’s understanding of repertoire of contention will be used in this work. They defined them as 
“the culturally encoded ways in which people interact in contentious politics. They are invariably narrower 
than all the hypothetical forms they might use or those that others in different circumstances or periods of 
history employ” (2001:16). 
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insurgent forces are at their weakest and most vulnerable to dismantlement by the state. It 
is also the period when core movement structures are elaborated and a form of “movement 
habitus is clarified […] which delineates how subsequent militants behave in ritual and 
discursive practices” (O Connor and Oikonomakis, forthcoming). It is also during this stage in 
mobilisation when leadership patterns are established, ones which often endure 
irrespective of the leaders’ subsequent political or military achievements, as in the cases of 
Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK, Guzman and the Sendero Luminoso, Pirabakaran and the 
Tamil Tigers and arguably also Subcommandante Marcos and the EZLN (ibid). While one 
needs to remain cognisant of overly path-determinant explanations (Tarrow, 2007), 
Weinstein’s observation that “differences in how rebel groups employ violence are a 
consequence of variation in the initial conditions that leaders confront” highlights the 
importance of the phase of initial mobilisation (2007:7). At the risk of over-simplification, 
insurgent mobilisation patterns are characterised by the drastic variance between 
mobilisation prior to the adoption of violent insurgent practices and afterwards, wherein 
numerous endogenous aspects such as “territorial control, polarization and the restriction 
of non-violent political alternatives” impinge on mobilisation (O Connor and Oikonomakis, 
forthcoming). 
 
The generational differences in movements are often significant. Moyano draws a 
distinction between movement founders and followers, with the former defined as “those 
who actually launch the organisation but also [...] those who join the group in its formative 
stages” (1992:111). Founders establish an organisation at considerable personal risk, 
arguably at greater risk than followers because by the time the latter join, a variety of 
questions regarding the likelihood and nature of the state’s response have been resolved. 
Founders are also likely to have a greater “emotional involvement” with the movement and 
to be motivated by political convictions not always present in subsequent generations of 
recruits (ibid: 111-112). Politically motivated recruits predominate in earlier phases of 
mobilisation; in the case of the FMLN its first recruits had been generally active in non-
violent political associations prior to the war and had gradually slipped into clandestine 
politics and ultimately armed contention (Viterna, 2013: 82 & 89). As made clear by della 
Porta in the case of Italian leftist radicals, “the threshold of clandestinity was often passed 
involuntarily and sometimes even unconsciously” (1988:165). 
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This drift into armed contention is often derived from the necessity of self-defence from 
either political rivals or the security forces (ibid, 2013:80; and Alper, 2014). The recourse to 
violence usually arises upon the closure of conventional means of political contention and 
wider processes of political opportunity structures (see McAdam, 1982: 40-43; Alimi, 2009; 
Goodwin, 2001; Kriesi, 2004 and Goodwin, Jasper & Khattra, 1999), although this is not 
always the case, as evidenced by the Sendero Luminoso’s uprising which coincided not with 
an increase in state repression but rather with the return of democracy in Peru in 1980 
(Goodwin, 2001:233-234). Accordingly, many first generation activists in armed groups tend 
to bear a degree of uneasiness about the use of violence; a reluctance that is absent in 
subsequent waves of recruits socialised in a milieu where violence has become normalised 
(della Porta, 2013: 123). As in the case of the FMLN, it was also noted in regard to the Irish 
Republican movement that those whose militancy pre-dated the re-eruption of the conflict 
in 1969 tended to come from strongly politicised backgrounds and family networks 
previously immersed in the struggle (White, 1993:38). It is also a tendency confirmed by 
those who took an ideological path to armed groups, as outlined by della Porta and Bosi in 
their taxonomy of paths to mobilisation, such as for instance in the case of the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Red Brigades (2012:362).  
 
Finally, it is worth recalling the class dynamics of early movers in insurgent 
organisations. Wickham-Crowley observed in the Latin American context that “the 
leadership [usually the founding generation] of guerrilla movements was, with few 
exceptions, drawn from the urban middle and upper classes and from rural elites” 
(1993:23). This has been rejected by Waldmann, who holds that ethnically motivated groups 
such as the IRA or ETA enjoy greater cross-class support and that their leaders did not come 
from the upper strata of their respective societies (1992). In sum, the early movers of armed 
groups are generally motivated by strong political convictions; a personal history of activism 
often bolstered by familial roots in radical politicised milieus, and have a certain reluctance 
when it comes to the use of violence. 
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Networks 
 
 Networks are a nebulous concept and varying definitions of them abound (see Diani, 
2003:4-7). At the most basic level they can be viewed “as sets of nodes, linked by some form 
of relationship, and delimited by some specific criteria” (ibid: 6). For the purposes of this 
project, a minimalist understanding of networks will be used which considers them as series 
of socio-spatially contingent relationships between groups or individuals. They will 
accordingly be understood as relational practises rather than categories in themselves and 
considered as the ties which bind armed groups to their constituencies.  
 
It is well established in the literature that collective action is “significantly shaped by 
social ties between participants” (Diani, 2003: 1; and see Passy 2003: 22, della Porta, 1988, 
2013, & 1995; Diani, 2004; Gould, 2003:236; McAdam, 2003; Viterna, 2013; Kalyvas, 
2006:95 and Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). It behoves academics then to focus on the 
question of how they matter, rather than if they matter (Passy, 2003). Passy suggests that 
networks impact on mobilisation in a diachronic fashion, “at the beginning by building or 
reinforcing individual identities that create potential for participation, and at the very end 
when individual preference and perceptions (e.g. individual costs of action, chances of 
success, the risk involved) eventually prompt people to take action” (ibid: 22). Belonging to 
networks facilitates the elaboration of “systems of meaning that render collective action 
both a meaningful and a feasible undertaking, to perceive certain issues as socially relevant 
and worthy of collective efforts” (della Porta & Diani, 2006: 119). In a similar understanding 
Kitts breaks down the importance of networks into three forms of mechanisms: 
information, identity and exchange (2000). Accordingly, networks serve as reservoirs of 
meaning and as instrumental mechanisms through which political sympathies are translated 
into active engagement.  
 
Networks also serve as a conceptual bridge between structuralist and rationalist 
accounts of individual participation (Passy, 2003: 26). One must be wary of acquiring a 
reified conceptualisation of networks, because once individuals become embedded in them 
“they find themselves in an interactive structure that enables them to define and redefine 
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their interpretive frames”, as well as one which “facilitates the process of identity-building 
and identity strengthening” (ibid: 24). This evolution and constant processes of articulation 
and re-articulation are generated by interaction with other networks and overlapping 
membership with them (della Porta & Diani, 2006:127 and Diani 2004: 348). However, it is 
also a result of macro-structural developments, the impact of which is best grasped “by 
examining how a particular event or action may reshape the meanings of individuals’ 
identities and the memberships of individuals’ networks” (Viterna, 2013: 43). The 
importance of networks is contingent on the type of political regime or civil society in which 
they are present (Passy, 2003: 27) and of course on the type of network and its political – if 
any – objectives. 
 
 A distinction is commonly drawn between formal and informal networks. Informal 
networks range from friends, family and sub-cultural milieus (Diani, 2003: 7) to 
neighbourhood associations (Gould, 1995). It should be recalled that the distinction 
between formal and informal is not always rigid. A tribe for instance can be no more than an 
informal and inactive network, however on occasions of political or inter-tribal conflict in 
what has been referred to as “network based escalation” (Tilly,2003:119), such a network 
can be called upon to entail a more comprehensive commitment. A convincing example of 
network based mobilisation is to be found in the case of Hezbollah’s emergence in the 
Beqaa’ valley in Lebanon; wherein early militant leaders made use of their family and clan 
connections (Malthaner, 2014). Sporting or other cultural associations are more often than 
not mere facilitators of innocuous pastimes but on occasion they can be mobilised for 
political ends such as the use of Basque cooking circles and hiking groups as recruitment 
networks for ETA (Waldman, 1992:241). A further function of networks is how they facilitate 
the diffusion of repertoires and ideas. Diffusion can occur directly or indirectly and networks 
are key to the former as “ideas diffuse most rapidly when individuals are in direct and 
frequent contact” (Soule, 2004: 295).  
 
 The role of networks in clandestine groups or insurgent organisations is even more 
critical. Recruitment to radical groups entails great risk to the recruit and recruiter, as well 
as to the integrity of the wider organisation. Accordingly, in such movements recruitment is 
generally through close networks of friends and families. As della Porta has noted, “the 
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presence of reciprocal affective ties is therefore essential for the reducing of risks a 
clandestine organization takes in contacting a potential militant” (1988:160 and Viterna, 
2006:5). Numerous studies have highlighted the role of family and kin relations and the 
attendant presence of dense emotional bonds in militant trajectories (White, 1993:42; Bosi 
& della Porta, 2012; Bosi, 2012:349; Viterna, 2006:15; Wasmund, 1986:204 and della Porta, 
1988: 158). Although pre-existing networks greatly facilitate recruitment, their absence 
does not necessarily exclude militant recruitment. As useful as kin networks were to 
Hezbollah in the Beqaa’ valley their absence in South Lebanon did not prevent the 
movement’s consolidation in the area. Hezbollah established local legitimacy as a result of 
the repressive actions of the occupying Israeli forces. In the wake of successful Hezbollah 
military operations, local youths tended to join the movement. It also utilised nascent 
Islamist networks to also attract recruits. The fact that the conflict was between an external 
force of occupation, Israel, and the local Shia’ population undoubtedly also enhanced 
communal identification and solidarity (Malthaner, 2014). Therefore, networks can also be 
created and expanded endogenously to militant mobilisation.  
 
 A crucial aspect of networks’ role in insurgent recruitment is the emotional 
imbrication of the self in the collective. Contrary to wider rationalist approaches, individuals 
do not simply act according to selfish, individually oriented interests but also as their beliefs, 
which are collectively stabilised within certain structural limits and norms. Beliefs “are 
socially or inter-subjectively constituted” (Ross, 2006: 200-201) in what is an inherently 
emotional process. The inclusion of an “emotional dimension” to the analysis of political 
mobilisation can explain “activists’ determination in the face of high risk and their 
willingness to endure suffering and self sacrifice, including torture and death” (Aminzade & 
McAdam, 2001:21). The emotional intensity of belonging to armed movements or even 
indeed circulating in their milieus was cogently expressed by an unnamed Montonero 
militant. He explained that “... life was lived to the fullest because you could die tomorrow. 
Besides you had people around you whom you knew would be ready to die in order to save 
you. All our emotions were very intense because there was not time” (in Moyano, 
1992:121).  
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Emotions are difficult phenomena to analyse due to their “ambivalent, unstable and 
processual character” (Aminzade & McAdam, 2001: 16); they are generally held from a 
constructivist approach to be “cognitive beliefs rather than bodily states” (Ross, 
2006:200)25. It has been suggested that “many emotions can exist only in the reciprocal 
exchanges of a social encounter” (Harré in Ross, 2006:201), thus rendering them a subject of 
sociological analysis rather than merely one of psychological interest. Ross suggests that 
“interests are primarily governed by beliefs about appropriate goals” (2006:205) and the 
appropriateness of such goals are always collectively defined. It is a point reinforced by 
Polletta’s critique of the conventional tendency “to picture activists juggling commitments 
to ideological consistency and strategic effectiveness, thus missing the role that ideology 
plays in activists’ very definitions of what counts as strategic” (2006:29). 
 
Wood discusses the emotional benefits inherent in mobilisation, described as 
“emotion-laden consequences of action experienced only by those participating in that 
action” (2001:268). These benefits sustain mobilisation in periods of repression and 
displacement and when the likelihood of any success seems remote. Peasant participation 
in the FMLN rebellion was derived from a variety of motivations, including the relative 
safety of belonging to an armed group with its specific resources for avoiding incumbent 
security forces (Wood, 2000:47 and Viterna, 2006:24 & 2013:99). However, many adhered 
because “participation per se expressed moral outrage, asserted a claim to dignity, and gave 
grounds for pride” (Wood, 2001:268 & 2009:120). Thus, mobilisation far from serving as the 
means to realise a rational interest was in fact an affirmation of dignity, which was an 
objective in itself.  
 
Interestingly, the contradictory emotion of shame was also a catalyst for 
mobilisation. FMLN male “guerrillas overwhelmingly reported that they ‘felt forced’ to join 
the rebel army” (Viterna, 2013: 108) rather than being actually forced. Although a subtle 
distinction, the collective values shared by the communities broadly sympathetic to the 
FMLN demanded that men take up arms, and those who failed to do so would have been 
classed as cowardly - especially in light of so much female participation (see Viterna, 
                                                        
25 See Jasper (2011) for an extensive debate and categorisation of emotions. 
57 
 
2006:6). The manipulation of gender identities and masculine insecurities was a tactic 
specifically adopted by the FMLN, evident in its sending of generally young and beautiful 
female recruiters to the villages with the specific intention of eliciting male recruits (Viterna, 
2013 & 2006).  
 
Other emotions such as a desire for revenge and rage are commonly provided as 
explanations for commitment to militant groups. Feelings which were often triggered by 
personal experiences such as the death of loved ones or violence against co-militants 
(Malthaner, 2011: 135-6, della Porta, 2013:188 and Viterna, 2013:110). Fear (Green, 1994; 
Aras, 2014a and Johnston, 2014) can, contrary to the reaction anticipated by the purveyors 
of violence, often lead to further mobilisation rather than discourage it. It has also been 
observed that one’s emotional commitments to others outside of insurgent ranks can play a 
major role in insurgent outcomes. Goodwin observed that “certain effectual relationships 
can corrode the strong solidarity and strict discipline that some collective endeavours 
demand” (1997:55). In the case of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, guerrillas’ onerous 
obligations to their families rendered them reluctant to remain away from them for long 
periods (ibid: 58). The engagement by married guerrillas in extra-marital affairs in the 
insurgent camps provoked such disquiet amongst their families that the Huk leadership was 
forced to initiate revolutionary marriages which could only occur with the consent of their 
original wives (ibid:61). It is therefore clear that emotions such as jealousy and adherence to 
prevailing social norms can also impact on the relationship between constituencies and 
insurgent movements. 
 
Contrary to explanations which incorporate the social aspects of mobilisation and 
identity construction, the fundamental premise of rationalist explanations for participation 
is rooted in an “ontological individualism” (McAdam et al, 2001:22). According to this 
approach, collective behaviour is primarily considered as an expression of the sum of 
individual interests. Although Kalyvas recognises that combatants are “usually motivated to 
fight not by ideology or hate or fear but by peer pressure and processes involving regard for 
their comrades, respect for their leaders, concern for their own reputation with both, and 
an urge to contribute to their success of the group – in short, what is known as ‘primary 
group cohesion’” (2006: 46), he seems to subsequently disregard the interactive collective 
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stabilisation of these motivations. He suggests that “people caught in the whirlwind of 
violence and war are, more often than not, less than heroic: they seek to save one’s job, 
house, family, and, above all, life” (ibid: 45). In his treatment of the processes of control or 
collaboration, he provides a grotesquely memorable example of a Norwegian woman in the 
village of Telavaag, who denounced contacts between the Norwegian resistance and the 
Allies to the Nazis because she believed that goods brought in by the British agents had 
been unfairly divided amongst the villagers (ibid:179). It serves as an example to reinforce 
his hypothesis of individual rationality prevailing over collective solidarity; however, the 
minimalisation of collective solidarity as a relevant factor in the calculation of mobilisation 
or defection is undermined by an inevitable bias in the selection of confirmative evidence.26 
It is likely that other villagers may have felt similarly in relation to the goods’ distribution but 
chose not to act on that emotion but rather according to their collective bonds of solidarity. 
It has been observed that “explaining a non-event is, by nature, more complicated that 
trying to account for something that occurred” (Gupta, 2014:160). Consequently, rational, 
individualised motivations are arguably more easily observed than their ideologically 
informed counterparts, thus resulting in an over-representation of rationalist motivations in 
the literature. 
 
Recruitment 
 
Notwithstanding the density of emotional ties within social networks, their 
socialisation capacity (Hedstrom, 1994:1176) and ability to concretely link a propensity for 
mobilisation with actual participation differs. The vast majority of individuals in mobilising 
networks do not in fact mobilise (Viterna, 2013:44). Although certain networks facilitate 
participation, inclusion in other overlapping networks can actually inhibit it. The issue of 
biographical availability is a key determinant in insurgent mobilisation; one’s “education, 
gender, income, age, marital status, and occupation affects participations decisions” (ibid, 
2006:6).  
                                                        
26
 It is ironically a tendency he critiques in others work but fails to observe in his own work (Kalyvas, 2006, 48). 
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Viterna highlights a number of factors which impacted upon female guerrilla 
recruitment in El Salvador. Age was a primary consideration. “The FMLN argued that all 
youth had an obligation to join the guerrillas because they were not burdened with family 
responsibilities” (2013: 91). A further disincentive to mobilisation was if families were intact 
as units. Complete families replete with inherent reciprocal obligations lessened the 
possibility of insurgent participation. On the other hand, youths who had already moved 
away from the family home, were orphaned or had lost family members in the course of the 
conflict were less likely to encounter obstacles in joining (ibid, 2006:17). Mothers with 
young children to care for, while not completely absent in guerrilla ranks, were less 
prevalent and indeed female insurgents who fell pregnant often used their impending 
maternal responsibilities as a reason to leave guerrilla life (ibid: 2006:27). However, though 
less frequently, having children in the guerrilla ranks can also be a mobilising factor for 
mothers (ibid: 8).  
 
Gender is also an issue in relation to the contestation between insurgent forces and 
state armies for young males as conscripts and guerrillas. It is common that male youths of a 
certain age are forced to accept enrolment in the military or join insurgent forces who also 
on occasion impose practises of forced recruitment (Viterna, 2013:71 and Aras, 2014a: 86-
87). One can be thereby biographically available to more than one side, thus forcing one to 
actively choose sides (see Viterna, 2013:109). A further aspect related to biographical 
availability is the collective fears surrounding the vulnerability of young women to sexual 
predation by armed groups. Paradoxically, perceived female sexual vulnerability is often a 
motivation for women to avoid over-ground supportive activities typically associated with 
women and join armed units instead as a form of protection. In El Salvador, the FMLN 
camps were seen as one of the few places where women’s “sexual integrity would be 
protected” (Viterna, 2013: 91). Similarly in Kurdistan, some families tolerated young women 
joining guerrilla units rather than participating in legal activities where issues of 
unsupervised gender interactions could impugn family reputations, with the additional 
benefit of forestalling the sexual abuse doled out to female detainees by the police (Darıcı, 
2011).  
A final consideration is that one’s ‘biographical availability’ is not determined on an 
individual basis but is rather a decision taken by or in conjunction with the wider family. 
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Particularly in rural contexts where sufficient manpower is required to harvest crops and 
work the land, decisions are reached whereby one son or daughter is permitted to join the 
guerrillas while the others remain at home. Or on occasion, enrolment is delayed until after 
crops are harvested or seasonally specific practises are completed. The danger of an overly 
structurally determinist understanding of networks (see Passy, 2003: 22-23) can be avoided 
by recognising the agency of those immersed in networks and thus also explain the non-
mobilisation of others in the same networks. It should be kept in mind though that agency is 
rarely expressed at the purely individual level but rather in conjunction with one’s place in a 
variety of other formal and informal networks. 
 
A number of notable efforts have been made to comprehensively combine the 
impact of structural aspects, the effect of time and networks, and ideological considerations 
as a means to understand militant trajectories. Bosi & della Porta have identified three 
specific routes: ideological, instrumental and solidaristic paths (2012:362), while Viterna has 
highlighted three categories of guerrillas: politicised, reluctant and recruited (2006 & 2013). 
Ideologically motivated and politicised guerrillas bear much in common. In the cases 
examined by Bosi and della Porta, ideological militants generally come from politicised 
families firmly located in “local traditions of counter-hegemonic consciousness that made 
the passage to armed struggle appear as a normal evolution” (2012: 371). In Viterna’s case, 
the issue of timing is also relevant in how she defines politicised guerrillas as “those whose 
path into the FMLN began in pre-war, peaceful political activism” (2013: 87). As mentioned 
above, the drift into more radical or violent politics was often gradual. The importance of 
past histories of rebellion impinges on such militants, many of whom have a self-identity as 
bearers of a millenarian responsibility as the most recent of generations of insurgents or 
resistance fighters. The role of kin networks is highly important in these cases; as White 
explained they were “the dominant conduit through which this message [of Irish 
republicanism] was passed” (White, 1993: 42). Family networks do not only reproduce 
narratives of opposition but also serve as the most reliable means to acquire trustworthy 
recruits (della Porta, 1988:158 and Bosi & della Porta, 2012:372). 
 
The second categories of reluctant and instrumental militants are heavily impacted 
by factors endogenous to processes of conflict and need not necessarily have been 
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previously very politicised. Instrumentally minded recruits are generally triggered into more 
radical contention because of first-hand experiences of repression, such as internment in 
Northern Ireland (Bosi & della Porta, 2012:373). A cognitive transformation occurs which 
leads one to lose hope in the conventional means of politics and to seek a more efficient 
strategy in more militant methods (ibid: 374). There is also a strong presence of spatiality in 
the recruitment processes, whereby due to the ongoing conflict one almost casually 
encounters territorially rooted militant networks, such as local defence groups or local 
demonstrations which are generated by the conflict itself. In the case of reluctant guerrillas, 
the spatial aspects are even more pronounced. Reluctant recruitment derives from a “crisis 
as a result of living in a war zone, and guerrilla participation seemed their only option for 
survival” (Viterna, 2013: 82). As a former FMLN guerrilla named Lulu explained, “the Armed 
Forces would always accuse you of being a terrorist, just for living in the village where you 
had always lived. And you had to join [the guerrillas] because you didn’t have any other 
alternative” (ibid: 97). Both instrumental and reluctant categories are processes of 
recruitment generated purely from the circumstantial context generated by the conduct of 
the conflict itself. 
 
The final types of militant trajectories found in later stages of armed conflict are 
those motivated by emotions of solidarity (Bosi & della Porta, 2012) or recruited guerrillas 
(Viterna, 2013 2006). The former militants are motivated by developments in their 
immediate social environments. In a rather politically unmediated fashion, they become 
mobilised to protect their neighbourhoods or to avenge wrongs, personal or familial, 
committed against them. Little consideration is given as to which group to join or its 
ideological underpinnings but rather to whichever is best suited to achieving the recruit’s 
particular ends (Bosi & della Porta, 2012: 375). Given the generally high degree of losses 
suffered by insurgent forces to death, prison and injury, there is a constant need for new 
recruits. Ergo, they seek recruits, preferably according to the characteristics required for 
insurgent life. In the case of female FMLN recruits “recruiters sought (1) young, (2) 
victimized, and (3) skilled women for recruitment, and worked to mobilize them with 
narratives appealing to their youthful need for adventure, their victimised need for revenge, 
and their ability to contribute needed skills to the movement” (2006: 101). The spatial 
dimensions of such processes are paramount. The presence of refugee camps or prisons can 
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serve as abundant reservoirs for such recruits. In the Salvadorean case, the residents in 
refugee camps grew up “in tight-knit, physically confined communities where solidarity was 
built on shared victimisation stories” (ibid, 2013: 103) and in the later stages of the conflict 
their youths flocked to the FMLN ranks. In Northern Ireland similar trajectories of 
radicalisation in prison or internment and subsequent insurgent mobilisation have been 
widely observed (Bosi & della Porta, 2012: 376).  
 
Periods of armed conflict are not only characterised by social upheaval and tragedy 
but also present opportunities for social mobility, especially for youths (Wood, 2008:545). 
As has been highlighted in the previous paragraphs, war and political violence are 
predominantly the preserve of the youth. Generational social orders27 are recalibrated and 
unimaginable power and prestige can befall young militants in very short periods of times. 
Notwithstanding the grave risks, joining armed groups can also be seen as an attractive 
proposition to younger generations. For refugees and displaced persons, joining a guerrilla 
army is a viable means of escaping the frustration and monotony of daily life. As Weinstein 
has pointed out, “studies of participation in high-risk collective action in diverse contexts 
point to nonmaterial benefits as well, such as prestige, acceptance, and the opportunity to 
exercise agency” (Weinstein, 2007:40). These non-material benefits go a long way to explain 
why people not immediately involved in conflicts, such as spatially distant communities like 
diasporas or those living in areas unmarked with violence, choose to participate. Although 
Kalyvas has suggested that survival is the primary concern in conflict areas (2006: 138-139), 
one could argue that such critical life and death moments are not always abiding and that 
the wider spectrum of emotional factors, material and non-material social benefits, 
ideological and collective solidarities need to also be factored into questions of mobilisation. 
Viterna manages to combine this wide array of factors in her identity theory of mobilisation. 
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, identities are generated in the context of an 
individual’s multiple and overlapping networks. She explains that “identities become salient 
when a significant number of important social ties with others depend on that identity, 
when cultural norms give one identity more status than another, or when enacting an 
identity brings especially positive feelings of self evaluation” (2013: 51). Her view of salient 
                                                        
27 See McAdam et al regarding the relevance of the reconfiguration of generational hierarchies in the case of 
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identities echoes McAdam et al’s discussion of embedded and detached identities 
(2001:135). A salient participant or insurgent identity is what ultimately leads to 
participation. Viterna’s understanding of identities supports the constitutive relations of 
communal solidarity and interpersonal networks identified by Malthaner in the formation of 
insurgent constituencies (2011a). Yet a salient participant identity is of little relevance if it 
remains untapped. Participation only occurs when an individual with such an identity is 
actually “recruited for activism” (Viterna, 2013: 57).  
 
A lot of academic attention is rightly focused on processes of individual agency but 
one should be wary of dedicating insufficient attention to the collective agency of armed 
groups. A central priority of insurgent movements is the replenishment of their ranks given 
the high rates of attrition in armed conflict. Recruitment strategies are heavily influenced by 
wider structural developments and the dialectic processes of violence between them and 
their opponents. Nonetheless, it is ultimately the movements themselves that select which 
strategies to employ in order to facilitate recruitment. In the early phases of mobilisation, its 
dimensions are usually restricted in numbers and tend to contain a large number of 
politicised recruits. Che Guevara described the guerrilla fighter as someone who “must have 
a moral conduct that shows him to be a true priest of the reform which he aspires” 
(1997:73). Armed groups usually have a list of criteria for potential recruits. The IRA listed 
physical dexterity, adaptability and political awareness as desirable characteristics. 
Interestingly, it also considered aspects beyond individual features such as a candidate’s 
interpersonal support networks and support for him/her amongst the local population 
(White and Falkenberg White, 1991:107). The FMLN for example preferred ideologically 
aware recruits but accepted those who were not politically motivated in the knowledge that 
they would become ideologically committed in the course of the conflict (Viterna, 2013: 68). 
In the case of the French resistance, Kedward observed that “far more maquisards became 
communist through maquis experience than were communist by motivation at the outset” 
(in Kalyvas, 2006:45). The intensity and extent of recruitment varies over time but also 
according to movement structures. When the IRA altered its structure in the mid-1970s, it 
led to greater compartmentalisation and thus rendered it less vulnerable to infiltration and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
the Mau Mau in Kenya (2001:95). 
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arrests. As a result it had a lesser demand for recruits and was able to select them more 
discerningly. 
 
Unless immediate successes are realised, insurgent numbers inevitably start to 
decline due to a high attrition rate and new methods are required to replenish insurgent 
ranks. Weinstein suggests that armed groups rich in economic endowments are capable of 
paying participants to enlist (2007:47). This is not without inherent problems though, 
because the payment of fighters generates distributional conflicts and it discourages 
combativity as fighters concentrate on maintaining their economic interests (Gutiérrez 
Sanín, 2008b: 229). Other insurgent movements have tried to coercively recruit civilians. 
However, such an approach is rather risky and usually detrimental to armed groups’ long 
term prospects, as it runs the risk of provoking the ire of the wider civilian population upon 
which armed groups are dependent on for a range of other forms of material, political and 
moral support (see Aras, 2014a: 86-87; Viterna, 2013:72 & Marcus, 2007). Forced recruits 
generally make poor fighters, lacking in motivation, oftentimes even the physical 
characteristics required for guerrilla life and they are prone to defection. Accordingly most 
armed groups, particularly those that have proven to be relatively successful, strive to avoid 
patterns of coercive recruitment. 
 
As has been discussed, recruitment particularly in early phases occurs through pre-
existing formal and informal networks imbued with strong affective ties and mutual trust. 
While these initial networks are sufficient to launch an armed campaign, they are not 
sufficient to maintain an extended one. Groups therefore need to generate and extend 
further networks. This is a difficult task given than many groups have limited material 
resources and are thus unable to construct patronage structures. Armed groups have two 
principal means available to win over popular support: by offering services (not necessarily 
material ones), which are lacking amongst their target communities, and by a careful 
crafting of their discourse to render it resonant with local cultural norms. Put in other terms, 
armed groups organise “moments of encounter” which over time facilitate the forging of 
affective bonds of respect, trust and even friendship between them and their putative 
supporters and potential future recruits. These include the provision of specific skills lacking 
in local contexts, like organisational experience and literacy. However, groups’ sincerity is 
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also evident in their willingness to participate in tasks of a more humble nature, such as 
when the EZLN partook in the collective harvesting of the milpas (corn fields) and 
constructed houses and basketball courts (O Connor & Oikonomakis, forthcoming). Another 
low-cost means of consolidating local consensus is the provision of security against criminal 
elements (Guitérrez Sanín, 2008b:233 and Gomez, 2005). The incorporation of issues of 
local importance, even if not directly related to the long term objectives of the armed group 
is another well trodden path for insurgent movements seeking to expand; ETA’s campaign 
against the construction of a nuclear plant in Lemoniz is an illustrative example (della Porta, 
2013:191). It reflects Kalyvas’ understanding of the complex overlap between master and 
local cleavages (2003, 477-480). However, this is also a strategy not without risks because 
coming down on one side or another in a local conflict inevitably results in triggering the 
enmity of another segment of the community. Engagement of such a fashion can also 
facilitate bloc recruitment (see della Porta & Diani, 2006:120). 
 
 Revolutionary movements typically launch their insurgencies from the most 
disadvantaged areas of society, be they areas of regional neglect or urban peripheries. In 
many cases their targeted recruits are from communities with limited literacy capabilities28, 
low social capital and often bearing very traditional outlooks on life Accordingly, urban 
intellectuals may find that an overly academic and abstract, particularly leftist or socialist 
approach can often arouse the suspicions if not outright hostility of targeted communities. It 
has been argued that “Marxist groups in the third world have generally been more 
successful when they have de-emphasised class struggle and stressed the goal of national 
liberation instead – or at least, when they have tried to mobilise different types of people 
through the selective use of both nationalist and class appeals” (Goodwin and Skocpol, 
1989:493). In order to avoid ideological dogmatism insurgent groups need to present their 
political message to potential supporters in a comprehensible fashion, in what has been 
referred to in the social movement literature as the framing process (Benford & Snow, 2000 
and McAdam et al, 2001:16-18). Frames have been described as “interpretative schemata 
that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events” 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004:15). They are utilised by movements to “fashion shared understandings 
                                                        
28 The question of literacy is of lesser relevance to insurgencies in more developed countries such as in the 
66 
 
of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam, 
McCarthy & Zald, 1996:6). In order for a movement to succeed its frames “must resonate 
with the salient beliefs of potential recruits” (Goodwin & Jasper, 2003:52). In the cases 
where a group’s frames do not resonate with their target audience they have the option of 
persevering regardless and falling into the trap of dogmatism, or to reassess and re-
articulate them in light of prevailing local norms by engaging in frame bridging, which is 
defined as “the conscious effort to merge the ideology of the movement with an existing 
cultural framework” (McAdam et al, 2001:118-119). However, an orthodox understanding 
of framing is arguably somewhat overly uni-directional. As movements present their frames 
to particular communities or networks of people, they are inevitably influenced themselves 
by the process of communicating them; there is thus a degree of reciprocal influence in the 
framing process (McAdam et al, 2001:44). 
 
The EZLN provides a sterling example of such a development. As a group of Marxist 
intellectuals, they strove repeatedly in the 1970s and early 1980s to gather support amongst 
the indigenous population of Chiapas but it was only subsequent to the re-framing of their 
political discourse that they managed to gain a foothold amongst the locals (O Connor and 
Oikonomakis, forthcoming). The EZLN Subcommandante Marcos calls the process of 
realising that the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric the FLN/EZLN29 had prepared for all other sectors 
of the Mexican society did not work for the indigenous the “first defeat” of the EZLN (O 
Connor and Oikonomakis, forthcoming). Over time, the non-indigenous founding members 
had become indigenised to the extent that “the EZLN was no longer what we had conceived 
when we arrived. By then we had been defeated by the indigenous communities, and as a 
product of that defeat, the EZLN started to grow exponentially and to become “very otherly 
[…]”(Le Bot and Marcos 1997). Therefore, in order to expand beyond their initial networks 
and establish a broader constituency armed groups must be flexible about the form and 
nature of their ideological arguments. This flexibility and careful consideration of which 
ideological emphasis to apply and to which people, is not limited to the national or macro 
level but also down to the individual community and neighbourhood, and even to the single 
                                                                                                                                                                            
cases of the PIRA and ETA. 
29
 The EZLN was a regional branch of the FLN which later became largely autonomous and overshadowed its 
mother organisation. 
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person whom they tried to mobilise. It should be recalled when reflecting upon the agentive 
capacity of armed groups that there is a strong spatial element. These interactions occur in 
specific geo-spatial contexts, most commonly within the bounds of a safe territory. It is 
within these safe territories that armed groups “exploit the services they provide to create a 
constituency indoctrinated with counter hegemonic attitudes but also bound to the 
organization via formal and informal infrastructures of support that maintain relations 
between armed activists and their local constituency” (Bosi, 2013:81). Armed groups make 
use of the emergent networks surrounding practises of utilitarian social exchange and 
subsequently generate bonds of communal solidarity endogenous to the mobilisation itself, 
altering the practises, discourse, and identities of both armed actors and their 
constituencies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The main theoretical arguments of the thesis have been outlined in this first chapter; 
its principal focus is on the relationship between armed groups and their supporters, which 
is conceptualised as a constituency. It argues that this relationship is relational and mutually 
constitutive. Armed groups pay heed to demands and normative limits of the constituency, 
while the constituency in turn actively supports insurgent organisations and by so doing 
legitimises it to wider audiences and inevitably internalises certain insurgent political values, 
particularly if they resonate to some degree with prevailing cultural norms. However, this 
relationship does not exist in a vacuum; it is conditioned by its immediate social 
environment which is populated by a varying array of other actors and institutions. The 
armed movement – constituency relationship is also subject to spatial vagaries and changes 
over time. Within this broad horizon, on occasions certain features are of greater relevance 
than others. The state always looms in the background but its presence is felt inconsistently; 
state institutions are intensely present in the city and but can be felt only intermittently in 
marginal rural areas. At times, there can be a number of different armed groups which can 
lead to processes of escalation. On other occasions insurgent movements are confronted by 
conventional state forces while on others, paramilitary and pseudo-state groups are also 
involved. Armed groups’ own repertoires of contention varying according to chronological 
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and spatial contexts. Jasper has explained “strategic choices are made within a complex set 
of cultural and institutional contexts that shape the players themselves, the options 
perceived, the choices made from among them, and the outcomes” (2004:5). The capacity 
and processes of choosing which strategy to adopt can be understood as movement agency. 
Oftentimes, strategic decisions are undertaken under duress or intense state pressure while 
other times movements are have the possibility to choose from a number of potential 
options thereby reflecting movement agency. Naturally, their agency is restricted by the 
relative strength of their adversaries but it is also conditioned by their dependency - be it 
symbolic or material - on its constituency. Movement agency is also circumscribed by its 
access to and construction of robust support networks and the availability of resources. 
Such environmental factors led to situations where armed group – constituency relations 
take on different forms, in terms of recruitment patterns, provision of services, and 
practises of violence. All of which are also subject to endogenous developments such as 
external conflicts, acquisition and loss of allies and large scale happenings such as the end of 
the Cold War. In the case of the PKK, these factors have all on occasion had greater or lesser 
impacts and will be developed accordingly in the following chapters.  
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Chapter II: Historical Context 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to facilitate an informed understanding of the PKK, this chapter will outline 
the social, ethnic and political contours of the Kurdish people. Even a brief description of the 
tortured history of the broader Kurdish nation is beyond the remit of this paper and it will, 
accordingly, concentrate on the Kurdish community in Turkey and make reference to the 
vicissitudes of their fellow Kurds only when it is of specific importance to the focus of the 
project. In light of the overall analytical interest of this project, this chapter will emphasise 
the socio-cultural and historical features which are more relevant to the modern day 
struggle of the PKK. It will predominantly concentrate on the Kurdish rebellions of the early 
Republican period and the Kurdish revival of the 1950s and 1960s, which served as the 
foundation upon which subsequent Kurdish movements were established. However, prior to 
engaging with these historical processes it will concisely summarise the ethno-religious and 
linguistic characteristics of the peoples of Kurdistan.  
 
Brief History 
 
The Kurdish people were divided following the battle of Chaldiran in 1514 between 
the Ottoman and Saffavid empires (see McDowall, 2004: 26-29), a division that engendered 
new and accentuated existing religious and linguistic divergences. Notwithstanding, their 
partition by the neighbouring powers Van Bruinessen remarked that “long before the age of 
nationalism there already was a sense of common identity among tribes whose cultures 
were ‘objectively’ quite diverse” (1994:6). A sense of Kurdish identity was reflected in a 
written history of the Kurds, Sharafname completed by Serafettin Bitlisi in 1597 and the epic 
poem Mem û Zîn written by Ahmad-e Xhani in 1692 (Imset, 1996). It was an arrangement 
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that persisted until the nineteenth century when Ottoman Tanzimat30 reforms undermined 
the prevailing balance of power in the region and destroyed the hitherto, de facto 
independence of the “area under Kurdish rule (Kurt hukumeti)” (Gürbey, 2000:58, & see Van 
Bruinessen, 2003: 168-169). 
 
A Kurdish ethnie, as per Smith’s understanding (1989), can be seen to have existed, 
even if it was one riven by intra-religious and intra-ethnic cleavages, divisions that were cut 
across by a rigid, tribal “‘aşiret or simply Kurd” and  non tribal “ra’yat” social divide (Van 
Bruinessen, 1994: 13 & 2003). A Kurdish tribe can be understood as “a socio-political and 
generally also territorial (and therefore economic) unit based on descent and kinship, real or 
putative, with a characteristic internal structure (van Bruinessen, 1992:51 & 1989:617 and 
Andrews, 1989: 113). It is then composed of a number of hierarchical ordered sub-
categories ranging from clan, lineage and sub-lineage to the household (ibid: 52). However, 
van Bruinessen notes that “actual political allegiance to a lineage becomes more important 
than real kinship (ibid). Tribal structure although bearing some ascriptive characteristics is in 
fact socially produced and maintained and “the fictive and real boundaries of tribes have 
become harder to assess” (Yalçın-Heckmann, 1989:625). Van Bruinessen further suggests 
that “the degree of complexity and internal stratification of the tribes seems to have 
depended primarily on two external factors: the available resource base and the extent of 
state interference in the region” (2003: 167).  
A combination of the experiences of tribal resistance to the ‘modernising’ state of the late 
Ottoman period and the early Turkish republic and the impact of competing local 
nationalisms, most notably that of the Young Turks and the Armenians (Bozarslan, 2004:25), 
shaped the emergence of Kurdish nationalism in its modern form. The Kurdish national 
awakening was a gradual and uneven process, one that was dramatically undermined by the 
delimitation of artificially conceived state boundaries by the Allied powers in the wake of 
World War I. Although pan-Kurdish nationalism has, until recently, been impeccably 
respected at the rhetorical level, in the political arena it has fallen by the wayside of the 
irrepressible prerogative of the nation state which has enveloped into its embrace even the 
most ardent of Kurdish nationalists. It has thus disaggregated the Kurdish national struggle 
                                                        
30
 For an extensive treatment of the Tanzimat period see Mardin (2000). 
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into a number of distinct units defined by state borders and not by the confines of the 
Kurdish nation.  
 
Kurdish Ethnic and Religious Heterogeneity 
 
It has been estimated that the Kurdish population within the borders of Turkey is 
around thirteen million (McDowall, 2004:3) while Gunter suggests a figure of twelve to 
fifteen million or 18-23% of the Turkey’s population (2003: xxix)31. As a result of its central 
location which for centuries bridged historic empires and the fact that Kurdish lands give 
rise to numerous religions which pre-dated the monotheism of Islam and Christianity; it has 
always boasted an ancient, and extremely mixed ethno-religious profile.  In order to 
understand contemporary historical and political developments the heterogeneous nature 
of Kurdistan’s ethno-religious composition needs to be briefly mapped. Firstly, there is no 
unanimity regarding Kurdish identity and its boundaries (van Bruinessen, 1989:613). In 
addition, to being informed by the Turkish-Kurdish dichotomy, Kurdish identity draws upon 
the variety of ethnic and religious communities that have historically resided in the Kurdish 
region. The history of the region, as has been pointed out, “is a history of cultural 
encounters; each community preserves in its cultural heritage a memory of encounters with 
other cultures, other religions, other languages” (van Bruinessen, 2011).  
 
Externally formulated ethno-religious categories often fail to coincide or represent 
the nuanced inter-communal relations of the region, whereby communities maintained 
collective historic memories of having adhered to other religions (ibid). Additionally, 
practises such as kirvelik – upon circumcision each young Yezidi or Muslim male obtains a 
kirîv or in Christian terms, a form of godfather – which have immense social importance in 
terms of establishing non familial ties of social obligation, often crossed religious and ethnic 
divisions wherein Christians often took on the role of kirîv for Yezidis or Muslims (Van 
Bruinessen 2011; Kudat Sertel 1971 and Magnarella & Türkdoğan, 1973).  Notwithstanding 
the epistemological caveats of communal categorisation and its pitfalls in the region, it can 
                                                        
31 Andrews provides a list of various estimates from 1949 to 1984 (1989:111). 
72 
 
be said that the majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi’ite madh’hab32 in contrast 
to the neighbouring Sunni Turks and Arabs who adhere to the Hanafi tradition 
(Kreyenbroek, 1996:93 and van Bruinessen, 1989:615). The Kurds regional singularity in 
adhering to the Shafi’ite madhab is a “testimony, presumably to the independence their 
amirs enjoyed vis-à-vis the sultan” (McDowall, 2004:11), thus even if of a limited theological 
importance, it attests to a period of historic Kurdish autonomy. There are also a number of 
strongly rooted Sufi confraternities, most prominently the Qadiriyya and the Naqshbandiya 
(McDowall, 2004:50-53) that in spite of the heavy repression they endured in the early 
period of the Turkish Republic, continue to exert significant political and cultural influence.   
 
There is also a small community of Yezidis that practises a syncretic form of Islam 
that draws heavily from the pre-Islamic religions that were once dominant in the region (see 
Kreyenbroek, 1996; Andrews, 1989:119; Langer 2010 and Van Bruinessen, 1994). Of greater 
significance is the large Kurdish Alevi community, to be found on the western margins of the 
Kurdish region (see Shankland, 2003; Jongerden, 2003; Soekefled, 2008; van Bruinessen, 
1996a; Bumke, 1989 and Olsson, Özdalga & Raudvere 1998). The Alevi are widely 
understood to be Shia Muslims, however, their practises differ greatly from orthodox 
understandings of Shia Islam, and they are considered by some Islamic scholars as  “an 
extremist split from Shia Islam, which is heretical in its attribution of divine powers to 
certain humans” (White, 2000:41). Alevi Kurds, as Van Bruinessen writing in 1994 pointed 
out, “are only a minority among the Alevis of Turkey, and they often feel closer to their 
Turkish-speaking co-religionists than to the Sunni Kurds” (1994:7 & 1989:615, Andrews, 
1989:117 and Shankland, 2003:18). However, the mid to late nineties marked an Alevi 
revival across Turkey, provoked by the Turkish-Islamic synthesis33 advanced by the state and 
state involvement in Alevi massacres, most notably in Sivas in 1993 and in the 
Gaziosmanpaşa quarter of Istanbul in 1995 (see Jongerden, 2003). Alevi alienation from the 
state was compounded by the army’s brutality in its counter-insurgency in the 
                                                        
32 A madh’hab is an Islamic school of jurisprudence or fiqh. There are four principal Sunni madhāhib; Hanafi, 
Shafi’ite, Hanbali and Maliki. 
33 The Turkish-Islamic synthesis has been described by Van Bruinessen as “a confused doctrine combining 
fervent Turkish Nationalism and Muslim sentiment that was first formulated by a small group of right-wing 
intellectuals as an answer to socialism” (1996:4). 
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Dersim/Tunceli34 region; developments which have led to the strengthening of Alevi Kurds’ 
identification with a Kurdish identity (Van Bruinessen, 1999, Nigogosian, 1996 and 
Leezenberg, 2003). There are also a number of Christian communities in Kurdistan, 
particularly in the Mardin district (see van Bruinessen, 2011) which, although “they speak 
non-Kurdish tongues as their first language and generally would not call themselves Kurds, 
most speak Kurdish as a second language and Christian and Kurdish communities have lived 
together in symbiotic relationships for centuries” (Kreyenbroek, 1996: 91-92). 
 
 It has been noted that “ethnic terms generally tend to be applied imprecisely in 
Turkey; people often combine elements of religious and linguistic identification in 
assessments of ethnic identity” (Nyrop et al in White, 2000: 47 and see Andrews, 1989:19). 
Yet, it can be asserted that a considerable ethno-linguistic division exists in the form of the 
Zaza who have historically resided to the west of Diyarbakir, from Elazig in the north to Urfa 
in the south. The Zaza speak a Kurdo-Iranian dialect which is largely mutually unintelligible 
to Kurmanji speakers (Andrews, 1989:122). It is linguistically close to Gurani which is spoken 
for the most part in south east Kurdistan in Iran (Van Bruinessen, 1994:5). White posits that 
the Zaza migrated from the area of Dailam south of the Caspian Sea to Anatolia between 
800 and 1000AD, thus leading him to surmise that “there can be no doubt we are speaking 
about an ethnically distinct people” (2000:43-46). He is of the view that from this original 
Zaza language, two distinct dialects have emerged; Zazaki and Kirmanc which roughly 
correlate to a Sunni – Alevi cleavage. These ethno-religious distinctions have led him to 
conclude that no self perception of the Zaza as Kurds exists (ibid: 48). While it must be 
admitted that no firm consensus exists regarding the linguistic relationship between Zaza 
and Kurmanji or even the regarding the nature and diffusion of the sub-dialects of Zaza, 
within the field White’s position is rather singular. Van Bruinessen has stated that “virtually 
all Zaza speakers consider themselves [...] as Kurds” (1989:613). An interview carried out 
with a male in his fifties involved in the PKK from the Bingöl area directly contradicted 
White’s contention. He pointedly rejected any religious correlation between Kirmanc and 
Dimili speakers and attributed the minor differences to geographical reasons.    He referred 
to his native language as Dimili and claimed that it has a corresponding dialect he named as 
                                                        
34 The Turkish government renamed Dersim province Tunceli in 1934, prior to its military campaign in the area. 
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Kirmanc which is mostly spoken in the Dersim region. In an interview White conducted with 
a Kurdish dissident communist figure Seyfi Cengiz35 in 1996, the latter suggests that 
“Kirmanc people as a whole belong to a faith called the Kizilbaş or Alevi religion, whereas 
the Zazas are Sunni Muslims, adhering to the Şafii school of Islamic law” (in White, 1996:12). 
This paper suggests that Cengiz is being grossly simplistic in this instance or deliberately 
mischievous in his description. Furthermore, White’s position has been convincingly 
criticised as essentialist because it conceptualises Kurdishness in purely linguistic and 
religious terms (Güneş, 2011:262). My own fieldwork amongst Sunni, Zaza Kurds also clearly 
confounds White’s contention. Interviews with Zaza activists of KOMCIWAN36 clearly 
showed that their primary identity was Kurdish (Interview 5, 2011). The interviewees were 
of the view that the Zaza revival was the work of the Turkish security services as a means to 
foster Kurdish disunity (see Leezenberg, 2003: 201 & Neyzi, 2003). This project will follow 
Van Bruinessen’s lead by using the term Zaza to collectively refer to the groups White 
distinguishes as Kirmanc/Kizilbaş and Zaza. It will refer to their precise religious persuasion 
or dialect only if it is of specific relevance to the discussion at hand. However, that is not to 
suggest that tensions between homogenising trends within Kurdish nationalism and the 
Zaza have not existed. A Zaza revival of sorts has occurred since the 1980s which included a 
short lived anti-Turkish and anti-Kurdish journal (Van Bruinessen, 1994: 25). However, it was 
of very marginal importance and failed to resonate with its target community. In conclusion, 
it is from across this, at times, overlapping but occasionally, mutually exclusive, 
smorgasbord of ethno-religious and linguistic identities, in a state context that promotes an 
aggressive Turkish nationalism, that a contemporary Kurdish nationalist identity has 
emerged.  
                                                        
35
 Cengiz was a member a number of radical Communist groups in the 1970s; he set up the Kurdish Communist 
Movement while in exile in 1983 and most recently founded the party Serbestiya Dersimi – The Dersim 
Liberation Party (Mosokofian, 2011). He therefore, has quite specific political views on the distinct identity of 
the Dersim region, the Zaza and Alevi peoples. 
36 KOMCIWAN is the youth wing of KOMKAR and is active exclusively in the diaspora. 
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The War of Independence and the Early Turkish Republic 
 
 The notorious Sykes-Picot agreement reached by France and Britain in 1916 
proposed to divide the remains of the Ottoman Empire into zones of their control with the 
connivance of Czarist Russia. However, such plans were undermined by the Turkish 
resistance led by Mustafa Kemal, initially in conjunction with the Ottoman authorities in 
Istanbul; but his dismay at the supine position adopted by the Sultanate at the Peace 
Conference in 1919, subsequently led Kemal, in September 1919 to repudiate Istanbul’s 
authority (McDowall, 2004:129). He then set about rallying the forces necessary to repel the 
French, British, Italian, Greek and Armenian forces from what was to later become Turkish 
state territory. All the while, the Kurdish position was incoherent and ambiguous, weakened 
by the lack of any legitimate leadership and internal rivalries (see the view of the British 
High Commissioner in McDowall, 2004:132) . Furthermore, the Kurdish people had endured 
enormous depredations during World War I, including up to 300,000 deaths in battle and 
700,000 forced from their homes, as well as multiple foreign occupations (cited in White, 
2000:68). Notwithstanding, that the Sultanate had been politically marginalised by the 
Kemalist forces and the Grand National Assembly, based in Ankara, it signed the Treaty of 
Sevres with the victorious Allied powers in 1920. Article 62 of the Treaty granted autonomy 
to the Kurdish region in the south east with the subsequent possibility of full independence. 
The Treaty was spectacularly divorced from realities on the ground and Kemal ignored its 
provisions and successfully mobilised a significant proportion of the Kurdish population in 
opposition to it.  
 
Kemal’s calculated deployment of Islamic rhetoric; for example, that the Muslims of 
Turkey, the Kurds, Circassians, Laz and the Turks “are genuine brothers who would respect 
each others’ ethnic, local and other rights” (in Yeğen, 2009: 68) gained traction amongst the 
Sunni tribes who were heavily influenced by local Sufi confraternities, particularly the 
Naqshbandiya. In a 1921 missive to some Kurdish tribal leaders, Kemal wrote that the “the 
Kurds have always been a valuable help to the Turks. One can say that the two peoples form 
one” (in McDowall, 2004:188), and that “Turks and Kurds will live as brothers and equals” 
(in Ismet, 1995). The Kurds were particularly fearful of the establishment of an independent 
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Armenian state that would have encompassed large swathes of Kurdish territory and 
necessarily entail subjection to Christian authority, as well as potential retribution for the 
Armenian massacres of the preceding decades (McDowall, 2004: 125).  Kemal’s discourse 
studiously emphasised Pan-Islamic solidarity, as was clear in the ten-point resolution of the 
congress in Erzerum in 1919 (see ibid: 127). The Congress delegates, twenty two of the fifty 
six of whom were Kurdish, “focused on the need to resist Allied efforts to create Armenian 
and Greek states in Anatolia. Islam and Ottoman patriotism constituted an important bond 
between the Kurds and the other delegates” (Kirisci & Winrow, 1997:79).  In short, this 
alliance was militarily and politically successful and managed to repel the occupying forces. 
Kemal signed the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 which overrode the provisions of the Treaty of 
Sevres (see Mango, 2004:387). The new Treaty drew on the Ottoman religiously defined 
millet37 system and at the insistence of the Western powers, recognised and guaranteed 
protection for non-Islamic minorities such as Christians and Jews, but made no such 
provision for largely Islamic minorities like the Kurds. 
   
Following the abolition of the sultanate in 1922, the Turkish republic was established 
in 1923 with its capital in Ankara. Its founding, however, quickly ruptured the “multicultural 
sense of solidarity [that had] fuelled the national liberation movement and carried it to 
victory” (Ergil, 2000b:124). It became readily apparent that the envisaged Turkish state was 
to be modelled on an ethno-culturally defined nationalism, heavily influenced by the 
precepts of thinkers like Ziya Gokalp38, Nihal Astiz and the wider Turanist movement; and it 
was to be one which did not concede space to any contending expressions of ethno-cultural 
identity. The first portents of the massive Kurdish resistance to the state emerged in 1920 
when an Alevi tribe of Western Dersim, the Koçgiri rose against Kemal’s troops demanding 
the implementation of autonomy as stipulated in the Treaty of Sevres. Its demands were 
thus thoroughly nationalist in character (see McDowall, 2004: 184 and Mango, 2004:330), 
but the rebellion proceeded to develop along tribal and religious fractures. It was not 
supported by the wider population of Sunni Kurds, reflecting their suspicions and hostility to 
the Alevi community. It was not even backed by most of its Alevi brethren; many cautiously 
                                                        
37
 The Ottoman millet system permitted the various confessional minorities to adhere, in terms of personal 
law, to their own judicial systems. 
38
 Gokalp’s origins have never been clarified but it is widely believed he was a Zaza. Olson unambiguously 
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refrained from moving against the Kemalists until the balance of military forces became 
clearer (White, 2000:71). 
 
 Sentiments of Kurdish nationalism gradually emerged in the latter stages of the 
Ottoman decline but had largely been confined to the notable Kurdish class resident in 
Istanbul. However, once the exclusively Turkish and secular nature of the newly founded 
Kemalist state began to become apparent, Kurdish nationalism started to take root in 
Kurdistan itself.  Kurdish intellectuals “gained a separatist character, gradually, as a reaction 
to Turkish nationalism and the nationalist, secular and severe assimilationist policies of the 
new Turkish state” (Aras, 2014a:44). A nationalist organisation Azadi set about launching 
the first major uprising against the Turkish state. The movement gained rapid support 
through the dismayed Sufi orders, former Hamidiye39 regiments and even within the ranks 
of Kurdish battalions in the army (McDowall, 2004:192 and see van Bruinessen, 1992:279-
281, Strohmeier, 2003:86 and Mango, 2004:425). In order to consolidate its support base it 
appointed a prominent Naqshbandiya, Sheikh Said as its leader, thus it was a modern 
nationalist movement headed by an unmistakeably traditional leader. It rose in widespread 
rebellion in the spring of 1925 and it was eventually quelled only by the deployment of 
aerial bombardment and after Sheikh Said was hung40. The rebellion foundered once again 
on ethno-linguistic and religious divisions. Sheikh Said was a Sunni but significantly Zaza, and 
as a consequence, the Alevi tribes (mindful of distrust which existed between the two 
communities and, in particular, with the Naqshbandiya) did not mobilise in his favour; 
neither, for the most part, did the Kurmanji speaking Sunni tribes. The historic tensions 
between the tribal confederations and the non tribal urban dwellers also led the latter to 
not participate, thereby, highlighting the social, ethnic and religious disunity of the Kurds in 
the early stages of the Turkish republic (see Van Bruinessen, 2003 and Aras, 2013: 50-51). 
                                                                                                                                                                            
describes him as a Kurd from Diyarbakir (1991:398). 
39
 The Hamidiye were Kurdish cavalry units formed by Sultan Abdul Hamid II in the 1890s to defend the border 
area from Czarist Russia (McDowall, 1996:60). 
40 The continuing symbolic importance of the rebellions of this period is evident in Öcalan’s contention that the 
date of his arrest  had been selected to coincide with the starting of Sheikh Said’s uprising, as a an additional 
humiliation for the Kurdish people (Öcalan, 2011:163). 
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 It is unclear how one should conceptualise these revolts; as the early incarnations of 
a nationalist conscience or as the futile efforts of a pre-modern society to fend off the tide 
of modernity. The religious fraternities and Sufi orders, according to Bozarslan, “refused to 
legitimise the Turkish state not because it was Turkish but because it was state. Still their 
“massif (sic) refusal reinforced the position of the Kurdish nationalist intellectuals and 
military officers, who rejected the state not because it was state but because it was Turkish” 
(2000:17). A report on the situation in Kurdistan, drawn up by a member of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly, Abdulhalik Renda on the other hand, asserted that the Sheikh 
Said rebellion “was a national movement under the cover of religion and reaction” (in 
Mango, 1994: 982); even the then Prime Minister, Fethi Okyar acknowledged that the 
political purpose of the rebellion was Kurdish separatism or Kürtçülük (in Mango, 2004:423). 
Jwaideh has concluded that “...the Kurdish rebellion of 1925 was the outcome of both 
nationalistic and religious causes” (2006:209). He further suggested that “it was quite 
obviously in the Turkish government’s interest to emphasise the reactionary and religious 
rather than the national aspects of the rebellion” (ibid: 207). It is arguably impossible given 
the variegated nature and objectives of the involved parties to retrospectively classify 
specific rebellions as either religiously or nationalistically motivated. However, oppositional 
awareness to the Kemalist state was clearly emerging and was consolidated by the state 
practises of repression and assimilation advanced from the mid 1920s.  
 
The nationalism of the state underwent dramatic re-configuration after the 
stabilisation of the country’s external frontiers. “...it switched rapidly from a cultural 
nationalism toward a social-Darwinist one that explained the relations between Turkishness 
and Kurdishness as an eternal fight between a positive, progressive, and civilised culture and 
a negative, reactionary and barbarian atavism” (Bozarslan, 2004:29). A vast array of 
government legislation was enacted with the objective of first pacifying the region and then 
turkifying it. Article 88 of the Turkish Constitution stated that the “inhabitants of Turkey 
shall be deemed to be Turkish irrespective of their religion and race” (in Özcan, 2006:78)41. 
The Turkish political leadership’s volte face was clearly exemplified by the Prime Minister, 
Ismet İnönü who had vaunted the heroic role of the Kurds in the War of Independence at 
                                                        
41  For a more extensive treatment of Government’s legislative policy to the Kurds in that period, see Yegen, 
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the Lausanne negotiations in 1923; to only two years later assert that “in the face of a 
Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. We must Turkify the inhabitants 
of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or ‘le 
Turquisme’” (in Özcan, 2006:81). In September 1930, the Minister for Justice, Mahmud Esad 
Bozkurt, announced that “both friends and enemies must know that the masters of this 
country are the Turks! People who do not have pure Turkish blood in their veins and are 
living in this country only have one right: the right of slavery and service” (in Aras, 2014a: 52 
and Besikçi, 2004: 35). The term Kurd vanished from public discourse and “the Kurdish 
question became in the eyes of the Republic, no longer an ethno-political question, but a 
question of reactionary politics, tribal resistance, and regional backwardness” (Yeğen, 
2009:599). As a means to the end of bringing modernisation and the remit of state control 
over the Kurds, the Settlement Act No. 2150 was passed in 1934 which entailed mass 
deportation of Kurds to the West and their exchange with Turkish peasants from central 
Anatolia, and the settlement of Turks in the vacant properties of the former Armenian 
population. It should be noted that this law was not solely applied to the Kurds and that it 
“was equally concerned with the settlement and assimilation of Muslim migrants from 
former Ottoman territories” (Jongerden, 2007:177). However, it was applied with greater 
rigour in the Kurdish region. The Kurdish language was banned in public (see Zeydanlioğlu, 
2014), positions in the civil service were to be reserved for Turks and the Kurdish region was 
to remain closed to foreigners and under military rule (see Mango, 1994: 981-984 and 
Yeğen, 2009: 605). It should be noted though, that the repression of the Kurdish people was 
implemented at the collective level, and those many individual Kurds who chose to 
renounce their Kurdish heritage and identity were permitted to assimilate into Turkish 
society. Indeed, İsmet İnönü, Kemal’s right hand man and his successor as President of the 
Republic was himself of Kurdish descent (see Mango, 1994:986). 
 
Kurdish resistance persisted until it was inevitably quelled in a definitive fashion by 
the superior forces of the Turkish army. The last great revolt was amongst the Alevi, Zaza 
speakers in the Dersim region from 1936-1938. After the crushing of the 1930 Xoybun 
rebellion; Dersim was the last remaining outpost resisting state authority. In a 1936 speech, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(2009) and Oran (2000) specifically for its policies of linguistic assimilation. 
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Atatürk42 declared that “our most important interior problem is the problem of Dersim. We 
have to remove and cleanse this wound, this terrifying abscess from its roots. In order to 
remove it from its roots everything should be provided whatever it will cost” (in Aras, 1914: 
58). The Dersimlis ethno-linguistic particularism proved to be their undoing as none of the 
(admittedly at that point) militarily enfeebled Sunni Kurds rose in solidarity with them and 
the Kemalist forces crushed them with massive brutality. (White, 2000:88). The women of 
the Kureysan and Bahtiyar reportedly threw themselves from cliffs into the Munzur and 
Parcik ravines to avoid being raped by the Turkish army (in Aras, 2014a: 60). The extent and 
intensity of the violence is clear from the statistic that, in the course of only seventeen days 
in 1938, 7,954 Dersimlis were massacred (Besikçi in White, 1995: 82). The unwarranted 
nature of this brutality is reinforced by the fact that the rebel forces numbered only around 
4,200 fighters and that the phase of active resistance had been quelled by November 1937 
with the hanging of the revolt’s leader Seyt Riza (Watts, 2000: 18-23). The final death toll is 
estimated at up to 40,000 deaths (White, 2000:88). 
 
 There were a total of twenty seven Kurdish rebellions in the first two decades of the 
Republic (Kiliç, 1998:97). This paper has dedicated a significant amount of space to this 
period of history because one can clearly observe the progressive consolidation of a sense 
of shared Kurdish conscience and identity provoked by alienation from the state (Donmez, 
2007:51). It was also in this period that the structural weakness of the formerly dominant 
ethno-religious and tribal formations in respect of the state was confirmed. The Dersim 
revolt was “a prime example of a Kurdish identity being assumed by these non Kurmanji 
(Kizilbaş and Zaza) minorities” (White, 2000:81) and is thus perhaps evidence of the slow 
consolidation of a Kurdish national identity. In the case of Dersim, “a familial and collective 
memory of this central event in the history of the province was passed down; a narrative 
distinct from (and opposed to) the national narrative” (Neyzi, 1999:9); thereby the lived 
collective memory of Dersimlis contradicts the state narrative. Furthermore, although two 
decades of political quiescence ensued from 1938 until the 1960s, state brutality had led to 
“armed struggle” becoming “an ingrained part of individual and collective memories” and 
“the very high casualties [...] linked this memory of rebellion to the duty for revenge” 
                                                        
42 In 1934 Mustapha Kemal took the honorific name Atatürk which meant ‘father of the Turks’. 
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(Bozarslan, 2004:32). It was these experiences of political failure that inspired the next 
generation of Kurdish nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s, to avoid the errors of their 
forefathers and stress the necessity of Kurdish unity. A unity rendered easier by 
marginalising the importance of religious and tribal affiliations and by endorsing an 
egalitarian leftist ideology. 
 
Kurdish Revival 
 
The Kurdish revival was brought about by a number of structural developments. The 
Turkish state underwent extensive industrialisation and concomitant mass migration from 
rural areas to the rapidly expanding urban centres (Landau, 1974:20). It was a tendency 
arguably more noted in the predominantly rural Kurdish region where a series of land 
reforms led to a rupture of the moral economy which had bound Kurdish Aghas to the 
Kurdish small holders and agricultural labourers together in a nexus of relations of mutual 
dependence for centuries (see Natali, 2005:100). This rupture was facilitated by the 
mechanisation of agriculture and particularly the spread of labour saving tractors,43 
compelling hundreds of thousands of Kurds to abandon the land (McDowall, 2004:403, see 
Zürcher, 2004: 224 & Natali, 2005:94). Furthermore, the application of compulsory military 
service and the presence of boarding schools (see Alış, 2009) which proliferated in the 
Kurdish region as a means of assimilating promising young Kurdish scholars led to the 
consolidation of an urbanised class with the linguistic and intellectual resources to question 
the prevailing social hierarchies and the official denial of Kurdish identity.  
 
The second major development was the abolition of one party Kemalist rule and the 
introduction of multi-party politics in Turkey in 1946. A proposed land reform in 1945 
dismayed the landed element within the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/Republican People’s party 
(CHP) and it was these dissenters who went on to form the Democrat Party - Demokrat Parti 
(DP). They “presented themselves as the party of private property, and made agriculture the 
cornerstone of their electoral appeal” (McDowall, 2004:400 and see Romano, 2006:39 & 
                                                        
43
Between 1948 and 1953, government distribution of tractors rose from 1,750 units to 30,000 (Natali, 
2005:94). 
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Zürcher, 2004: 222). They considered the Kurdish aghas and tribal leaders as a crucial “bulk 
vote generators” (Barkey & Fuller, 1998: 77). The Kurdish peasantry which remained “deeply 
subservient to their landlords” (McDowall, 2004:400) represented hundreds of thousands of 
votes. They also opposed much of the secular reforms by “openly advocat[ing] religious 
freedom” and making use of the Qadiriyya and Naqshbandiya confraternities to consolidate 
their vote (ibid: 398). Thus, the Kurds became an electoral resource for the principal political 
parties and were crucial to the Demokrat Partisi electoral victory in 1950.  
 
 The late 1950s marked the return of Kurdish nationalist agitation. Musa Anter, an 
exemplary case of the unintended consequences of mass education, and others of a similar 
ilk, founded the journal Illeri Yurt in 1958 that included “snatches of Kurdish” in its articles 
and “dealt largely with the poverty of local people” (Mango, 1994:979). The journal was 
promptly shut down and Anter and his colleagues were imprisoned. The military coup d’état 
of 1960 and the new constitution of 1961 “significantly enhanced civil liberties and allowed 
for a greater freedom of expression, association and publication” (Taspinar, 2005:89 and 
Zürcher, 2004:246). It ushered in a political environment which permitted the first stirrings 
of Kurdish self-awareness and nationalism. The constitution guaranteed “a greater degree 
of freedom than ever before. People had more civil rights, the universities greater 
autonomy, and the students the freedom to organise their own associations“(Ahmad, 
1993:136, Landau, 1974:9 and Mello, 2007: 218). However, the institutional openings also 
corresponded with periodic state brutality toward the Kurdish people; demonstrations in 
May 1961, organised in response to President Gursel’s denial of the Kurds’ existence in the 
foreword of a book were viciously suppressed44. Gursel’s oft cited declaration “there are no 
Kurds in this country. Whoever says he is a Kurd, I will spit in his face” (Kiliç, 1998:97).  He 
further threatened in November 1960 that “if the Mountain Turks [Kurds] give us no peace, 
the army will not hesitate to bombard and destroy their cities and villages. There will be a 
bloodbath of such dimensions that they and their country will no longer exist” (in 
Jongerden, 2007:58), exemplifying the continuing hostility to any deviation from the 
prevailing Nationalist discourse.  
                                                        
44
 The book was M. Sherif Firat’s Dogu Illeri ve Varto Tarihi (McDowall, (2004:406). 
83 
 
The early 1960s witnessed an unprecedented political resurgence with the establishment of 
eleven new parties (see Zürcher, 2004:245, Landau, 1974:14-21 and Giritli, 1969). The most 
important development for the focus of this project was the founding of the Türkiye İşçi 
Partisi / Workers Party of Turkey (TIP) in 1961. It was led by 1962 by the veteran Marxist, Ali 
Mehmet Aybar (see Karpat, 1967; Alış, 2009; Lipovsky, 1992 and Giritli, 1969).  TIP was 
“heterogeneous to the point of populism, campaigning openly and energetically, and for a 
short time capable of linking socialist arguments to the concrete problems of the masses” 
(Samim, 1980:67). It fared reasonably well in the 1965 elections winning fifteen seats in 
parliament and over 300,000 votes (Harris, 198:25); four of which were won by Kurds45 
(Bozarslan, 2012:3) but its vote declined in the 1969 election (Lipovsky, 1992:67).  TIP was 
remarkably open by the standards of the time; while it did not endorse the Kurdish struggle, 
it at least acknowledged that a Kurdish issue existed. In a 1963 speech, Aybar remarked that 
“there are millions of people in the Eastern and Southeastern region of Turkey speaking 
Kurdish, Arabic and/or belonging to Alevi sect […] This issue has different dimensions on 
historical, ethnic, judicial grounds, in addition to interests of Turkey and humanity which 
prevail over these dimensions” (in Ercan, 2010:86). Mehdi Zana explained that “we decided 
to join the movement [TIP] because it was the only one that was not hostile in principle 
toward the Kurds” (1997:5). 
 
TIP was not the only prominent leftist actor at that time. Trade Union membership 
had rocketed from around 250,000 members in 1960 to 2,000,000 in 1970 (Samim, 
1980:69). An influential Marxist journal Yön founded in 1961 embraced leftist Kemalists and 
noted Kurdish actors such as Sait Kırmızıtoprak wrote for it (Bozarslan, 2012:3, Landau, 
1974:50 and Zürcher, 2004:254). The Turkish Communist party/Türkiye Komünist Partisi 
(TKP), although still illegal, also commanded limited support in certain circles. In addition to 
these groups, socialist students formed the Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu/Federation of 
Debating Societies. Student activism46 rapidly expanded in parallel to the wider student 
activism in Europe and the United States focusing on the presence of the American Sixth 
Fleet which periodically docked in Istanbul (Alper, 2014:260). As clashes with the police and 
opposing fascist opposition movements intensified, the student left gradually fell under the 
                                                        
45 In the provinces of Diyarbakır, Kars, Şanlıurfa and Malatya (Ercan, 2010: 101). 
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influence of a broad tendency centred on a former TKP member Mihri Belli and Yön 
magazine, which called for a National Democratic Revolution/ Milli Demokratik Devrim 
(NDR) (see Samim, 1980:70; Alper, 2014:270; Landau, 1992:110 and Zürcher, 2004: 255). A 
majority of students in the debating societies broke away from TIP’s approach, aligned 
themselves with the NDR tendency and formed Dev-Genç (Revolutionary Youth) in 1969, 
which Samim described as a “hybrid organisation, which was part student movement, part 
revolutionary association” (1980:71).    The NDR sought to trigger sufficient popular unrest 
to force presumed revolutionary allies within the military to seize power and establish a 
Marxist regime. It was in direct contradiction to the policy of incremental mass participation 
and parliamentary politics endorsed by TIP (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2012:4). Changes to 
electoral legislation in 1969 (Samim, 1980:71 and Orlow, 1982:63), factionalism, student 
radicalisation (Alış, 2009: 141) and the concerted pressure by the government to curtail 
leftist activism (Zürcher, 2004:251) undermined TIP even before it was banned in 1970 
because of a declaration it made recognising the Kurdish people at its Fourth Party Congress 
in 197047 (Bozarslan, 2012:3; Landau, 1992:78 and Olson, 1973: 202). The harsh repression 
of a 1970 trade union demonstration by the military after the demonstrators had 
overwhelmed the police and the imposition of martial law in April 1970 in a number of 
urban centres and Kurdish provinces exposed the fallacy of any proposed student-military 
alliance. With the brutal clampdown on leftist activists after the 1971 coup any hope of the 
realisation of the NDR were finally extinguished. Dev Genç had in any case begun to splinter 
by 1970, with the foundation in 1970 of two clandestine militant groups the People’s 
Liberation Army of Turkey/Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (THKO) led by Deniz Gezmiş and the 
Turkish People’s Liberation Front/Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi - Cephesi (THKP-C) headed by 
Mahir Çayan. They were inspired by urban guerrilla groups like the Tupamaros in Uruguay 
and the various Palestinian movements and many of them had undergone military training 
in Palestinian camps in Jordan and Lebanon (Olson, 1973: 198 and see Candar, 2000). 
 
The Kurdish movement – in the broader sense of the term – was not, however, 
simply a product of the Turkish left (Bozarslan, 2012:2). Around fifty young Kurds, 
subsequently known as the 49ers including Musa Anter had been imprisoned in 1959 
                                                                                                                                                                            
46 For a broad discussion on the role of student activism in the Turkish Republic see Szyliowicz (1970). 
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accused of Communism and Kurdist activities (Gunes & Zeydanlioğlu, 2014:10; Gundogan, 
2011: 406; Zana, 1997: 6 and Alış, 2009: 56) and many more Kurds had been deported from 
Kurdistan to Western Turkey after the 1960 coup (ibid). Efforts by Kurdish intellectuals led 
to the spread of an array of journals dealing with the Kurdish issue including Dicle-Firat, 
Deng and Anter’s Doğu amongst others (see Alış, 2009: 76). The 1959 rebellion by Mustafa 
Barzani in Southern Kurdistan in Iraq also led to an awakening of Kurdish consciousness 
(Gundogan, 2011: 391) and many Kurds within the borders of the Turkish state were firm 
supporters of it with some even participating in the fight. Kurdish underground political 
party the Turkey Kurdistan Democratic Party (TKDP) was founded in 1965 which operated 
on a clandestine basis as the Turkish constitution prohibited ethnic based parties. And it was 
directly modelled on Mustafa Barzani’s conservative KDP in Southern Kurdistan in Iraq 
(McDowall, 2004: 408).  
 
With the exception of the TKDP, emerging popular Kurdish nationalism was of a very 
red hue. Turkish leftist organisations ranging from TIP, to the trade unions and student 
groups quickly attracted large numbers of Kurdish supporters (McDowall, 2004:409 & 
Zürcher, 2004:246). TIP included a number of Kurds who were subsequently to the forefront 
of the Kurdish struggle such as Kemal Burkay and Mehdi Zana (Alış, 2009: 101). The leftist 
opening according to Bozarslan generated massive political opportunities for young Kurds 
such that “the Kurdish movement [...] [became] a part of a wider Turkish leftwing contest, 
which [...] [recognised] the autonomy of the Kurdish Issue. So from 1961-1969/70 the 
Kurdish movement can by and large be considered a part of or an extension of the Turkish 
Left” (2012:2). It was Kurds such as Kemal Burkay and Mehdi Zana in TIP, who were to the 
forefront of the Kurdish mobilisation of the late 1960s, known as the Eastern Meetings 
(Ercan, 2010: 101). They were a series of mass rallies organised between 1967 and 1969 in a 
number of Kurdish cities to “protest the backwardness of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia 
(Gundogan, 2011: 390 and see Alış, 2009:135) and in response to articles in two right wing 
journals, Milli Yol and Ötüken, threatening Kurds with deportation like the Greeks and the 
Armenians (Gundogan, 2011: 409-410; Gunes, 2012:62 and Ercan, 2010:102). McDowall 
reported massive figures of 10,000 in Silwan and 25,000 in Diyarbakir (ibid: 410) at their 
                                                                                                                                                                            
47 The full declaration is cited in Alış (2009: 141-142) 
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rallies. The rallies also introduced innovative mobilisation strategies such as public rallies, 
poster campaigns, radio broadcasts and pamphleteering (Ercan, 2010: 100). 
 
 In 1969, taking advantage of the momentum generated by the Eastern meetings, 
Kurdish activists established as legal organisations until they were banned in 1971 following 
the coup, the Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları /Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the East 
(DDKO). It was a loosely bound network of students and youths which sought “to raise 
Kurdish consciousness” (Yavuz, 2001:10) and offered a class based analysis of the problems 
of the day (Gunes, 2013:252) in seminars and discussions.  The DDKO was “profoundly 
pacifist” and “extremely reformist” and membership and participation overlapped with 
other groups like Dev Genç and TIP (Bozarslan, 2012: 6). The establishment of the DDKO 
marked an important turning point in the emergent Kurdish movement as it was “a new 
stage in the separation of Kurdish socialists from the Turkish socialist movement” (Gunes, 
2012:43).  
  
The state had become increasingly concerned with the murmurings of discontent in 
Kurdistan and reacted accordingly. Leading organisers of the Eastern meetings were 
imprisoned in 1968 in relation to a pamphlet they had published (Zana, 1997:6) and the 
discovery of a cache of weapons along the border with Iraq was used as a pretext to deploy 
troops in rural Kurdish areas (Olson, 1973:202). The weapons had, however, not been 
intended for use in Turkey but across the border in Iraq by Barzani’s forces. Commando 
units were sent to the Kurdish region in 1970 and engaged in mass violence that involved 
the torture, sexual humiliation and rape of Kurdish villagers. (McDowall, 2004: 411, and 
Ercan, 2010: 101). Repeated efforts to quell the growing political upheaval (Zürcher, 2004: 
257-258) had failed and, as a consequence, the military decided to launch another coup 
d’état on March 12th 1971. The official motivations proffered by the military for its 
intervention were the need to counter militant left and right groups, those who favoured a 
dictatorship and Kurdish secessionists (Olson, 1973:202). Martial law was declared and 
hitherto legal leftist and Kurdish movements such as DDKO and Dev-Genç were outlawed 
and trade unions were heavily restricted. The Demirel government was deposed and 
legislation limiting civil liberties and granting further powers to the military, was enacted 
(Zürcher, 2004: 261). In practise, “the restoration of law and order was equated with the 
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repression of any group viewed as leftist” (Ahmad, 1993:148); hundreds of leftist activists 
were imprisoned and tortured. Furthermore, the regime turned a blind eye to the activities 
of right wing militants in their harassment of people identified with the left, notably school 
teachers and TIP member (ibid:149 and Zürcher, 2004:259). In the short term, the coup 
succeeded in restoring a semblance of order, especially following the capture and deaths of 
Çayan and Gezmiş in 1972. The period of martial law and military rule – admittedly by 
civilian proxy (Narlı, 2000:113 & Erim, 1972) – effectively “marked the temporary end of an 
organized left” (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2012: 5). However, in the long term it served only to 
highlight the illegitimacy of the state amongst leftists and Kurds. There was a widespread 
belief in the promise of the 1961 constitution which had granted such unprecedented 
political rights but the coup served to confirm the futility of any reformist strategy 
(Bozarslan, 2012: 6). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter is relatively brief in comparison to the others; it does not purport to 
offer even a minimalist summary of twentieth century Kurdish history. It rather provides a 
degree of background information and historical context for the emergence of the Kurdish 
movement in the 1960 and 1970s which subsequently begat the generation of radical Kurds 
and the PKK under analysis in this project. The Kurdish mobilisation in Turkey has also been 
formed and influenced by its interactions with the Turkish state and its oftentimes brutal 
assimilationist policies. It has been forged in conjunction with, and opposition to an array of 
right and left wing Turkish political actors. The contemporary Kurdish movement, in 
contradistinction to earlier examples of tribal and religious vertical leadership patterns, 
came about as a direct consequence of broader structural developments such as the 
diffusion of education, the mechanisation of agriculture and urbanisation. The political 
openings of the 1960s and the willingness of the Turkish left, to remain open to considering 
Kurdish issues and not a priori dismissing them, provided a pioneering generation of Kurdish 
activists and intellectuals the platform from which the Kurdish movement emerged. 
However, the Turkish state’s unwillingness to tolerate the claim making practises of 
institutional political parties such as TIP and moderate organisations like the DDKO ensured 
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that subsequent Kurdish movements would be of a much more radical and violent 
disposition. The following chapters will deal with these more radical organisations - the PKK 
in particular - which emerged from the marginalisation and repression of more 
institutionalist and non-violent Kurdish and leftist movements.  
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Chapter III: Pre-conflict Mobilisation (1974-1984) 
 
Introduction 
 
 Although armed groups often only come to popular attention once they launch 
campaigns of violence, the preceding non-violent, or perhaps more aptly less violent periods 
of mobilisation are of formative importance. Periods of pre-conflict mobilisation are crucial 
because it is often in this incipient phase that armed groups’ structures are determined, 
leadership patterns are established and a form of movement habitus is clarified which often 
informs the behaviour of subsequent generations of recruits by the formalisation of a 
particular “recruitment narrative” (Viterna, 2013: 42 and see O’Connor and Oikonomakis, 
forthcoming).  
 
The founding generations of armed movements have been conceptualised in various 
ways in the relevant literature. Distinctions have been drawn between founders and 
followers (Moyano, 1992), initiators and spin-off movements (McAdam, 1995) or classified 
as early risers (Tarrow, 2011). The differing qualities of early mobilisers and their militant 
trajectories have also been analysed extensively (Bosi & della Porta, 2012; Bosi, 2012 & 
2007 and Viterna 2006). There is a general consensus that activists which mobilise in the 
earlier phases do so in a distinct fashion to those in subsequent stages, who are conditioned 
by a series of endogenous factors to the conflict. Pioneering early risers “can expose 
opponents’ points of weakness that may not be evident until they have been challenged. 
Their actions can also reveal unsuspected or formerly passive allies both within and outside 
the system” (Tarrow, 2011: 167). They therefore often operate under unclear sets of 
constraints and opportunities which have become more evident by the time subsequent 
recruits become involved. It is also the period when the initial core of founding members 
are obliged to expand and obtain recruits and support amongst the wider population. In 
short, it is when militant groups begin to establish their constituency. It is also worth 
mentioning that this is a period when armed groups are most vulnerable to repression due 
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to their inexperience, small numbers and limited support and logistic networks.  
 
There is also however a danger of over-emphasising the importance of the period; 
Weinstein has argued that the “differences in how rebel groups employ violence are a 
consequence of variation in the initial conditions that leaders confront” (2007: 7). An overly 
structurally determinist view runs the risk of dismissing endogenous aspects of conflict 
mobilisation (see Tarrow, 2007) and of dedicating insufficient attention to other actors 
present and broader structural changes through the course of conflict. Nonetheless the 
initial phase of mobilisation is worthy of careful attention and so this chapter will detail the 
early period of the PKK’s mobilisation, dating from the mid-1970s to the launch of its 
insurgency in 1984. 
 
 The chapter will be roughly broken into two chronological periods: the phase 
prior to the 1980 military coup and the subsequent period leading up to the PKK’s 
insurgency in 1984. The period of mass social and political conflict which predated the 1980 
coup remains remarkably understudied; a significant portion of this chapter will therefore 
be dedicated to empirically laying out the broader socio-political context and the 
smorgasbord of various actors which populated it along with the PKK. It will then consider 
the PKK’s emergence in detail, outlining their recruitment strategies and interactions with 
rival movements and the state prior to the coup and in its aftermath. Following the relative 
calm of the early 1970s in the wake of the 1971 military coup, there was a notable spike in 
violence between 1975 and 1980. In that time there were around 5,000 casualties and 
innumerable injuries as a result of armed political clashes in Turkey (see Sayari 2010 & 1985; 
Gunter, 1989; Harris, 1980; Zürcher, 2004:263; Mardin 1978; Ercan, 2010 and Orlow, 1982). 
To put that in a comparative context, this five year period claimed a larger number of deaths 
than those accrued from almost forty years of violence in the struggles in Northern Ireland 
and the Basque country combined.48 Accordingly, the period can be best understood as a 
cycle of contention. Tarrow defines a cycle of contention as:  
 
“a phase of heightened conflict across the social system, with rapid diffusion of collective 
                                                        
48 The figures usually cited vary from 3,500 for Ireland to 1,100 deaths in Euskal Herria and Spain. 
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action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors, a rapid pace of innovation in the forms 
of contention employed, the creation of new or transformed collective action frames, a 
combination of organized and unorganized participation, and sequences of intensified 
information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities” (2011: 221). 
 
Cycles of contention are characterised by an array of interactive escalatory 
mechanisms and processes of mobilisation that have been ably analysed by a variety of 
authors (McAdam et al, 2001; Tilly, 2003; della Porta 2013 inter alios). This chapter will 
discuss the manner in which competitive escalation and violent outbidding within the 
contending forces of the radical Kurdish movement led to intra-Kurdish violence as they 
competed with one another for recruits, resources and recognition. It will also focus on the 
processes of interaction between the Kurdish and leftist movements, their right-wing 
opponents and with the forces of the state. This intense series of actions and counter-
actions led to collective polarisation and radicalisation. However, this multi-actor political 
environment was abruptly ended by the military’s seizure of power, thus radically 
reconfiguring the broader political opportunity structure. The second part of this chapter 
will accordingly detail how this impacted on the various movements and how the PKK, 
unlike both its allies and its rivals, managed to re-organise and to launch its insurgency in 
1984. It will show how the PKK utilised the opportunities afforded by the partially 
democratic structures of the pre-coup period and how it re-constructed its repertoire of 
contention in light of the impossibility of unarmed contention after 1980.  
 
The Rise of Violence in the Late 1970s 
 
 The political violence of the late 1970s can be categorised in three sections: clashes 
between left and right-wing militants; communal clashes which culminated in wholesale 
campaigns against the Alevi minority in central and eastern regions of the country; and the 
initial phase of armed Kurdish mobilisation from 1978. However, all three were reciprocally 
formative and interlinked in various ways, most notably by the reaction of the state to the 
violence.  
 
92 
 
The underlying reasons for this return to violence are multifarious. They can be 
surmised as deriving from, in the terms of McAdam et al (2001), environmental, cognitive 
and relational mechanisms. Environmental mechanisms are “externally generated 
influences on conditions affecting social life” (ibid: 25). The political environment was 
altered by Prime Minister Ecevit’s decision to release almost all political prisoners in a 
general amnesty in 1974 and by the far right’s institutional implantation in positions of 
coercive power following the coming to power of a right-wing coalition in 197549 (Samim, 
1981:75 and  Gunter, 1989:66). In addition, the broader political context was conditioned by 
persistent parliamentary instability and a succession of volatile coalition governments 
throughout the 1970s (Gunter, 1989:64 and Zurcher, 2004: 261) and the worsening financial 
crisis of the 1970s when Turkey endured “crippling shortages of important consumer items, 
raging inflation, and rising unemployment” (Gunter, 1989:65 and Tonge, 1979). There was a 
dramatic dearth of oil imports leading to factories running on 30% capacity, the absence of 
fuel for central-heating and even general transportation (Birand, 1987:45). All of which was 
exacerbated by a rapidly growing population, ceaseless rural to urban migration and 
universities that were overcrowded, insufficient and served merely to provide thousands of 
graduates with little employment prospects (Mardin, 1978 and Birand, 1987:51).  
 
Cognitive mechanisms can be understood as “alterations of individual or collective 
perception” (McAdam et al, 2001:26). The left had undergone a widespread cognitive 
transformation in the wake of the 1971 coup. Although the armed campaigns of the first 
generation of leftist radicals had utterly failed, their ideological mainstay, the necessity of 
overthrowing the state by military means, emerged reinforced by the conduct of the state 
during the coup. The legalist institutional strategies of the TIP had not borne any fruit and 
had resulted in its dismemberment as a party (see Lipovsky, 1992: Chapter 9). The radical 
left milieu had recognised the infeasibility of realising their objectives within the prevailing 
institutional framework and had broadly accepted that the status quo could only be altered 
by seizing power either through another coup d’état or through armed struggle (Jongerden 
& Akkaya, 2012:4).  
                                                        
49
 This coalition was composed of the Adalet Partisi/Justice Party (AP) whose leader Demirel served as Prime 
Minister, the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi/National Action Party (MHP) and the Millî Selâmet Partisi/ National 
Salvation Party (MSP). 
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Finally, there were the relational mechanisms between the Turkish left, the Kurdish 
movement, the right and the forces of the state, which were embroiled in an ever escalating 
series of actions and reactions. The contours of the main groupings of the period will be 
briefly outlined in the following paragraphs in order to facilitate a more substantial 
empirical picture of the most relevant movements. 
 
The Left 
 
In the wake of the 1971 coup a period of stability was established, albeit a stability 
facilitated by an onslaught of state violence which resulted in widespread imprisonments, 
torture and executions. However, in 1974 the Ecevit government50, bolstered by what was 
popularly viewed as its successful handling of the Cyprus crisis (Zürcher, 2004:261), in the 
wake of a judgement of the Constitutional Court released all remaining political prisoners 
detained in the aftermath of the 1971 putsch (Samim, 1981:75). The government was 
convinced that following the deaths of many of the senior members of the armed leftist 
groups of the early 1970s THKO, THKP-C and TKP-ML51 the danger presented by the radical 
left had dissipated. Accordingly, thousands of leftist prisoners were released. These former 
prisoners promptly reassumed the gauntlet of the struggle initiated by their comrades in the 
late 1960s. These released militants emerged “into a situation where the mass youth 
following of the left had grown enormously” (ibid: 73). A plethora of legal and extra-legal 
leftist movements competed with each other to take up Çayan and Gezmiş’ revolutionary 
mantle. Sayari estimates that there were three dozen leftist groups (2010: 202) while one 
newspaper listed forty nine different left wing party manifestoes including around a dozen 
Kurdish ones in 1979 (Birand, 1987:50). 
 
The radical left was hopelessly fragmented but aligned in two major tendencies: a 
Maoist one exemplified by the (TKP-ML) and its armed wing Türkiye İşci ve Köylü Kurtuluş 
                                                        
50 A coalition composed of the CHP and the MSP. 
51
 Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu/ People's Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO), Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi – 
Cephesi /Turkey People's Liberation Party - Front (THKP-C) and Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-
Leninist/Turkish Communist Party Marxist-Leninist (TKP-ML) 
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Ordusu/ Workers’/Peasants' Liberation Army of Turkey (TIKKO)52; and a larger Marxist 
spectrum containing groups of varying radicalness, most notably represented by DEV-YOL53, 
DEV-SOL54 and Kurtuluş. The start of the academic year 1974-75 witnessed a return to left-
right violence on university campuses. However, unlike the relatively contained clashes of 
the 1969-71 period, the violence spread beyond the university campuses, first to the larger 
cities before reaching by 1980 even small towns and villages (Sayari, 2010: 202 & 1985:9). 
The organisations of the left had huge numbers of followers in this period, as evidenced by 
the famous May Day demonstration in Taksim in 1977.55 200,000 protesters attended, of 
which Dev Yol alone boasted 40,000 supporters, while the smaller Kurtuluş had up to 10,000 
adherents (Samim, 1981:61). There was also a marked transition from the almost exclusively 
middle class groups of the earlier generation to ones which encompassed all social classes 
(Bozarslan, 2012:7). According to the statistics of the Turkish Armed Forces cited in Sayari, 
only one fifth of those detained on terrorism charges in the aftermath of the coup, were 
either university students or university dropouts (1985:10).  
 
The Right 
 
The rise in the violence of the right in the 1970s was correlated to the political 
fortunes of the MHP56 founded in 1969 by Alparslan Türkeş, a former senior military officer 
who played a prominent role in the 1960 coup d’état. Although it enjoyed relatively limited 
electoral success in the 1970s, polling only 3.4% in 1973 and 6.4% in 1977 (Arikan, 
1998:121), it garnered massive political influence by its participation in the right-wing 
government coalition headed by Demirel and the conservative Justice Party from 1975. 
Sayari suggests that the MHP’s “ideological orientation and strategies bore a striking 
resemblance to the neo-fascist parties which emerged in several European democracies in 
the post-World War II era” (2010: 203). It was remarked that “the MHP always defined itself 
by evoking ‘fear’ in opposition to either real or imagined ‘enemies’”, and that in 1973-80, 
                                                        
52 Türkiye İşci ve Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu/ Workers’ and Peasants' Liberation Army of Turkey (TIKKO) 
53
 Devrimci Yol Hareketi/Revolutionary Path 
54
 Devrimci Sol/Revolutionary Left 
55 It ended in violence when gunmen opened fire from nearby rooftops and resulted in 39 deaths. 
56  The MHP was essentially the former Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi/Republican Farmers Nation Party 
(CKMP) renamed and repackaged in 1969. 
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“the MHP saw the Turkish state as having a clear enemy: the Soviet Union and its local 
extension, the Turkish Left and the Left-leaning Alevi community” (Yavuz, 2002:206).  
 
Aside from its parliamentary party, the MHP had an organic relationship with an 
array of right-wing ‘Idealist’ associations which had been involved in the campus clashes of 
the late 1960s; principal among these were the Idealist Clubs Association (Ulku Ocaklari 
Derneği), the Idealist Path Organization (Ulku Yolu Birliği), and the Idealist Youth 
Organization (Ulku Genç Derneği), generically known as the Grey Wolves (Sayari, 2010:203). 
Although in absolute terms the extreme right boasted smaller numbers than their 
counterparts on the left, “under the leadership of Türkes, [it] was a unified movement with 
a single command, that […] successfully combined legal and illegal methods” (Samim, 
1981:80).  
 
 The situation of the late 1970s has been repeatedly described as a period of anarchy; 
this is however a misleading simplification expounded by the military regime, determined to 
retrospectively legitimise its 1980 coup as an unpalatable necessity to restore a semblance 
of order. The endorsement of such an understanding denies the decisive roles played by 
elements within the wider parliamentary right and nefarious groupings within the military in 
strategically fomenting the violence and instability (Sinclair-Webb, 2003:220, Kara & Kum, 
1984:24 and Bovenkerk & Yeşilgöz 2005:590). It would be equally mistaken to contend that 
in the absence of these sinister manoeuvrings of the right no social unrest would have 
occurred. The radical left contained a significant core that was ideologically convinced of the 
necessity of an armed struggle and would have most likely advanced projects of violence 
regardless of the presence of right-wing forces. Nonetheless, the coming to power of the 
‘Nationalist Front’ government between 1975 and 1978 triggered a quantitative and 
qualitative escalation of the violence.  
 
After Demirel assumed the position of Prime Minister, his government “set about 
colonizing ‘their’ ministries in an unprecedented way: thousands of civil servants were 
discharged or demoted and replaced with party loyalists” (Zürcher, 2004: 261), thus 
ensuring that not only was government in the hands of the right, but that significant 
branches of the state’s bureaucratic and repressive apparatus were under the control of 
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individuals ideologically aligned to the right as well. Türkes, as one of two deputy prime 
ministers from 1975 to 1977, was in charge of internal security and secret services (Gunter, 
1989: 66 and Patmore, 1979). Samim described the changeover not as a taking of power but 
as the plundering of the state and concluded that “the main beneficiaries of this official 
piracy were the fascists, whose Grey Wolves commandoes now acquired state protection 
and official sinecures”(1981: 75 & see Ahmad, 1993: 166 and Birand, 1987:50). Therefore, 
notwithstanding the disparity in numbers, “the struggle between left and right was an 
unequal one. […] the police and the security forces had become the exclusivist preserve of 
Türkes’[MHP], and even under Ecevit’s government of  1978-79, they had remained heavily 
infiltrated by fascists who shielded and protected the Grey Wolves” (Zürcher, 2004: 263 and 
Patmore, 1979: 478). 
 
Communal clashes 
 
The left-right polarisation took on sectarian undertones upon the alignment of the 
Alevi minority with the wider left and the large segments of the Sunni Turkish and Kurdish 
populations with the right. A central ideological tenet of the far right as developed in the 
early 1970s was the forging of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Türk-Islam sentezi), which 
essentially held that “a good Turk must be a good Sunni Muslim and a good Sunni Muslim 
must be a good  Turk” (Jongerden, 2003:79). The implicit exclusion in such a view was that 
as Alevis were not Sunni Muslims, they could not therefore be proper Turks. This polarised 
understanding reinforced a longstanding perception that Alevis had an inherent sympathy 
for the left, initially as strong exponents of Kemalist secularism and later through the forces 
of the radical left (Vorhoff, 2003: 94, Bozarslan, 2003, Shankland 2003 & White, 2003). This 
viewpoint is evidenced in the common saying, “We are Alevi, that is we are leftists” (Biz 
Aleviyiz, yani solcuyuz) (Sinclair-Webb, 2003:217). These sectarian tensions were an ulterior 
schism along which the state’s destabilisation progressed. Violence initially followed the 
similar pattern of tit for tat killings between members or perceived sympathisers of opposed 
political groups but rapidly escalated into mass killings, most notably in the case of 
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Kahramanmaraş57 in December 1978 where 111 people, the vast majority of whom were 
Alevi were massacred by the Grey Wolves (ibid, 2003 and Birand, 1987:59-61). There were 
also other sizeable massacres of Alevis in the towns of Sivas and Çorum in the period 
preceding the coup (Jongerden, 2003:83 and Birand, 1987:147). The violence was of such an 
extent that it led Ecevit, then in opposition, to admit that “civil war has broken out in several 
provinces”58 (in Briefing59, June 9 1980). In the trial which followed the Maraş killings, the 
perpetrators of the violence explicitly stated that the victims were selected on the basis that 
they were allegedly communist and Alevi and not on the alternative division between 
Kurdish and Turkish (ibid: 231). This however has not inhibited the hagiographers of the PKK 
and the wider Kurdish movement from including the massacre as an ulterior incident of 
Turkish state fascism against the Kurdish people. In a discussion with a member of the 
Kurdish National Congress/Kongra Netewiya Kurdistan (KNK),60 it was earnestly explained to 
me that the massacre was a direct state response to the formal establishment of the PKK a 
month earlier. It is a dramatically skewed opinion because the PKK did not have any 
significant presence in the area prior to the attack it was a Kurdish group of arguably lesser 
importance in contrast to more established groups at that time (see Özcan, 2006:88), and it 
is highly probable that the state was not even aware of the formal establishment of the 
group.61 
 
A precise breakdown of the motivations underpinning the violence and the selection 
of ‘legitimate’ targets of the period is clearly unfeasible. The brutal nonchalance of the 
violence of the period is chillingly captured in the testimony of a sixteen year old Grey Wolf 
named Ferhat Tüysüz (in Birand, 1987: 54-56). In his account he explained that he strafed a 
cafe with bullets because he felt the owner had been rude to him, injuring two people. In 
concert with a friend of his, he admitted to murdering a youth called Mustafa Yaşar because 
                                                        
57 Kahramanmaraş is a largely Kurdish city in the south east with a sizeable Alevi community. It is popularly 
referred to as Maraş. 
58 He was referring to Çorum, Sivas and Merzifon in the Black Sea region. 
59 Briefing was a political and economic weekly publication in English from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. It 
was pro-business and Kemalist in outlook, therefore rather sympathetic to the putschist regime.  
60
 The KNK according to Akkaya and Jongerden is “a pan Kurdish umbrella organisation comprising 
representatives from the Kurdish diaspora in the Middle East, Europe, North America, Australia and Asia as 
well as representatives of political parties from all parts of Kurdistan, religious and cultural institutions, 
independent political entities and intellectuals and non-Kurdish ethnic groups” (2011a:159) 
61 Informal conversation 2011. 
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he “turned out to be a member of an association hostile to us” (ibid). Individual acts of 
violence could have been triggered by the fact one was Alevi, a member of a left-wing 
organisation or perceived as having left-wing sympathies, for being Kurdish, or any 
combination of those reasons. Sayari bluntly asserts that the dead of the period were 
mostly left or right-wing militants (2010:204) along with some innocent bystanders. He 
further asserts that both left- and right-wing groups “after igniting religious sectarian 
hostilities, […] sought to position themselves as the ‘protectors’ of the embattled 
communities to gain political support and manpower for their organizations” (ibid). His view 
has an overly organisational focus. It is undeniable that rival organisations targeted each 
other’s members in the classic model of mutual escalation, selecting ever more high profile 
targets such as the prominent trade unionist Kemal Türkler and MHP Vice-President Gün 
Sazak (ibid). However, many of the dead were selected less on the certain basis of their 
formal association with one group or another but rather according to the perception that 
the victims bore left- or right-wing sympathies, thus expanding the parameters of what 
constituted a legitimate target. It is also somewhat contentious to assert that both left and 
right “ignited religious sectarian hostilities” (ibid). My research has not revealed any 
incidences of Sunni massacres by Alevis or collective killings of Turks by Kurdish groups. 
Such expressions of mutual equivalence are a misrepresentation of the patterns of violence 
of the right-wing paramilitary groups.  
 
The patterns of violence adopted by the Grey Wolves inadvertently consolidated 
Alevi support for the radical Turkish and Kurdish left. Abdullah explained that following 
fascist attacks on Alevi neighbourhoods in Bingöl in 1976-1977 all of the Kurdish groups 
active in the town organised joint nightly armed patrols to protect these neighbourhoods 
(Interview 14, 2012). These gatherings served as ideal moments’ of encounter between the 
incipient radical Kurdish associations and potential supporters. Interactions between the 
militant groups and civilians can be regarded as relations of ‘utilitarian social exchange’ and 
engendered personal links and emotional bonds between them, as well as serving as the 
initial steps toward the consolidation of a constituency. Such links would have been more 
difficult to establish in the absence of the fascist threat. Analogous developments were 
observed with leftist radicals assuming the responsibility of protecting the besieged Alevi 
communities in non-Kurdish areas. Samim describes how Dev-Yol in particular, due to its 
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size and organisational capacity, greatly extended its links with the Alevi community by its 
position in the forefront of these defensive campaigns (1981: 77), while TIKKO acted as the 
defensive bulwark of the Alevi communities in the Gazi neighbourhood in Istanbul (Wedel, 
2002:63). 
 
The Kurds 
 
As discussed in Chapter II, until the 1970s most Kurdish political activism took place 
within the framework of Turkish leftist parties, primarily the TIP. However, in the early 
1970s Kurdish leftist activists had become disillusioned with the Turkish left’s commitment 
(or lack thereof) to Kurdish issues and underwent a distinct cognitive transition. They began 
to reinterpret the conditions prevailing in Turkey. A consensus slowly gained traction across 
the Kurdish political spectrum that advanced the notion that Kurdistan was in fact a colony 
of the Turkish state. This marked a significant breach with the Turkish left whose view was 
clearly expressed in a Dev-Yol publication in 1978, which adhered to the view that: 
 
 “Marxist theory of colonialism shows that in the age of imperialism a dependent country 
which is not capitalist by its internal dynamic but has a kind of distorted capitalism (such as 
Turkey) historically cannot establish a colonialist relationship” (in Jongerden & Akkaya, 
2012:8). 
 
Ergo, Turkey as a dependent state itself could never be a colonial state. Unsurprisingly, this 
theoretically blinkered understanding of the socio-political situation in Kurdistan was 
rejected by many politically conscious Kurds.  
 
The logical implication of the paradigm switch to anti-colonialism was that the long-
term objective of the Kurdish movement became the pursuit of national self-determination. 
The majority of Kurdish groups shared the view that “the ‘colonialist’ division of Kurdistan 
was presented as one of the main reasons behind Kurdistan’s fragmentation and lack of 
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national unity” (Gunes, 2012:84). This view first appeared62 in a book in 1973 called 
‘Salvation Struggle of the Kurdish People in the Conditions of Turkey’ penned by Kemal 
Burkay under the pseudonym Hıdır Murat (Ercan, 2010:138). This view has been made 
further explicit in later publications where it was explained that the colonisation of the 
region dated back to the division of the spoils of the former Ottoman Empire in the wake of 
World War I (PSK,63 2001). As Burkay explained in 1974, “force is used to keep Turkish 
Kurdistan under control and to suppress the Kurdish people’s democratic revolution. The 
Turkish bourgeois governments reduced Kurdistan to the status of a colony” (in Gunes, 
2012:72). It subsequently became the paradigmatic understanding of the wider Kurdish 
movement and was advanced by all the major Kurdish socialist groups such as the DDKD, 
TKSP, Rizgarî64, and Kawa and of course the PKK.65  
 
This anti-colonial discourse had implications for intra-Kurdish societal dynamics. 
“Since Kurdistan’s feudal classes were incorporated into the Turkish system and took part in 
the perpetuation of the Kurd’s oppression” (Gunes, 2012: 89), they were considered integral 
to Kurdistan’s exploitation. The struggle for national liberation thereby necessarily 
maintained its radical leftist focus because its successful realisation demanded the 
extirpation of local agents of Turkey’s capitalist yolk, the class of powerful aghas. The 
adoption of a discourse of national self-determination came about in a specific global 
context of successful anti-colonial armed campaigns such as Algeria in 1962 and the ongoing 
struggle in Angola and Mozambique (see Ercan, 2010: 137 and Jongerden & Akkaya, 2012: 
4). National liberation was therefore, seen not only as a desirable political goal but also a 
thoroughly realisable one. By the mid-1970s, the wider Kurdish movement had evolved to 
fuse nationalist and leftist concerns and it was willing to set about achieving these 
objectives with or without the support of their Turkish comrades.  
                                                        
62 Ercan explains that this might not have been the very first time such a hypothesis occurred but that it was 
the first to be widely diffused (2010:138), while Bozarslan (2012:6) attributes the colonial understanding to 
Sait Kırmızıtoprak. He was killed in 1971, so it is plausible that he had advanced the national liberation 
discourse prior to Burkay but his death ensured it became popularly associated with Burkay.  
63
 TKSP was renamed the PSK in 1993. 
64
 See Ercan (2010: 141) for selected extracts on the topic from the first issue of their eponymous publication 
in 1976. 
65
 In the PKK’s party programme of 1998, even after the movement had moderated much of its more radical 
demands, it reiterated the view that Kurdistan was a colony (PKK, 1998).  
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The Kurdish revival of the mid-1970s, taking place after the wider Kurdish movement 
had begun to detach itself from the Turkish left, emerged within a rigidly ideologically 
polarised environment, rendering it almost impossible to remain agnostic on the left-right 
divide. And it firmly located itself amongst the ranks of the left. It found a sort of 
“legitimization in leftist discourses” because “‘Marxism-Leninism’ [...] insist[s] strongly on 
the rights of the oppressed nations to determine their own future” (Bozarslan, 2012: 3). Its 
left-wing orientation was further ensured by the fact that the majority of Kurdish activists 
(who had militated in the Kurdish political resurgence of the late 1960s) had been active in 
left-wing parties, most notably TIP. In addition, some of the more radical Kurdish elements 
such as the PKK had served their political apprenticeships in the movements of the radical 
Turkish left. By the mid-1970s, the Turkish state was increasingly under the sway of the 
Turkish-Islamic synthesis and this informed its approach to the Kurdish question, thereby 
diminishing the possibility of any shared centrist ground or compromise between the 
Kurdish movements and the state. Accordingly, the broader Kurdish movement had limited 
political opportunities to obtain right-wing political allies or supporters, so it was obliged to 
orient itself to the left. In addition, the discourse of national liberation was firmly rooted in 
an international ideological terrain, which was resolutely left-wing. Finally, as Gunes 
suggests the socio-economic “demands of the most populous section of Kurdish society – 
the landless peasantry [...] – could be reflected in a socialist discourse” (2012:77). The 
Kurdish movement by the 1970s can for the most part be characterised as having shed the 
traditional models of political organisation constituted by vertical patrimonial systems 
rooted in tribal, religious and localised identities, in favour of a left-wing, national 
liberationist Kurdish identity. 
 
As discussed in Chapter II, the first Kurdish national movement was the TKDP which 
was an extension of Barzani’s KDP in Turkey. It was established in a “conservative 
ambience” in 1965 and was “purely nationalist and unwilling to examine the inherent 
tensions between ethnic nationalism, social traditionalism and social development” 
(McDowall, 2004:408). It was the first nationalist Kurdish party in Turkey since 1938 and was 
accordingly of great symbolic importance (Marcus, 2007:20). Although Barzani’s KDP 
enjoyed massive support across the region, particularly along the Iraqi-Turkish border, its 
mobilisational potential in Turkish Kurdistan was never realised. The TKDP was limited to 
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acting as a supplementary resource to bolster the struggle south of the border and was 
never seriously engaged beyond the hosting of southern Kurds and the furnishing of 
financial support and aid. Barzani elicited almost reverence amongst the Kurds in Turkey 
and was “viewed as the father of their own nation, thereby challenging the moral and 
historical authority of Mustafa Kemal” (Bozarslan, 2008: 345 & 2012: 4). A Kurdish Islamist 
interviewee from Siirt explained that his family carefully wrapped up a framed portrait of 
Barzani that had hung in their house and buried it in the garden in the wake of the 1980 
coup. When the immediate wave of repression had passed they unearthed it and restored it 
to its original position of honour over the fireplace (Interview 26, 2012). However, the TKDP 
never capitalised on this latent support and disintegrated into internecine violence until 
they were decisively weakened by the breakaway of a leftist fraction led by Sait 
Kirmizitoprak in 1969.66 After 1969, it had for the most part ceased to have any meaningful 
political importance. 
 
Notwithstanding the limited impact of TKDP, many of the activists at the forefront of 
the Kurdish movement after 1974 had experience in the party or became active in 
movements genealogically derived from it. The Siwancilar67 and former DDKO activists 
established the DDKD (Devrimci Demokratik Kultur Dernekleri/Revolutionary Democratic 
Cultural Associations) in 1974, which served as a legal umbrella front for a wide array of 
Kurdish activists. By 1978 it boasted 50,000 members across forty branches (Bishku, 2007: 
85 and Van Bruinessen, 1984:11). Its main purpose was “to include different segments of 
the Kurdish movement actors in terms of nationalists, leftists and patriots who were 
struggling as different political groups” (drawing on Güçlü & İbrahim; Ercan, 2010:117). The 
DDKD was to serve as point of departure for a whole gamut of Kurdish groups which split 
into separate movements according to how they interpreted the vagaries of the Kurdish 
situation and the precise practical strategies to adopt. The Maoist Kawa split from the DDKD 
                                                        
66
 This splinter confusingly bore the same name as the original TKDP, but they were also commonly known as 
the Siwancilar, after Kirmizitoprak’s alias Dr. Siwan. 
67
 For an extensive breakdown of the intra-Kurdish politics of this period, one can consult Imset, 1992, Van 
Bruinessen, 1984, Gunes, 2012, Ercan, 2010, Laizer, 1996 and Jongerden and Akkaya 2011. However, there is 
often contradiction even within these sources on precise dates and origins of groups. 
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in 1976 due to its opposition to the Soviet betrayal of Barzani and adopted a pro-Hoxha68 
line; it in turn later split into a number of sub factions. The core group of Siwancilar formed 
the KIP (Kürdistan Işçi Partisi/Workers Party of Kurdistan) in 1977. The pervasive dominance 
of the leftist discourse across the Kurdish movement was clear when the rump of the more 
conservative TKDP regrouped and founded the KUK (Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari/ 
Kurdistan National Liberators) in November 1977 and also adopted a Marxist stance (Ercan, 
2010: 146). Another Kurdish group, Rizgari, emerged around the publishing house Komal in 
1977, followed by the inevitable formation of a splinter group Ala Rizgari (Van Bruinessen, 
1984:10). The largest Kurdish party of the period was the TKSP (Türkiye Kürdistanı Sosyalist 
Partisi/Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan) which was also widely known by its legal 
journal’s name Özgürlük Yolu. It was founded by Kemal Burkay in 1974 and was initially 
composed of Kurdish members of the TIP.  
 
Jongerden and Akkaya categorised this confusing array of groups in three 
tendencies: those groups such the KIP and KUK with antecedent links to the TKDP, and in 
the case of Kawa and Rizgari, origins in the DDKD; the TKSP which originated in the 
institutional Turkish left, most significantly the TIP; and those such as the PKK whose genesis 
was in the radical clandestine Turkish left (2011:126).  Gunes, on the other hand, 
categorised them according to the strategies they advocated; he suggests that the TKSP and 
KIP/DDKD favoured co-operation with the Turkish socialist movement, while the PKK, 
Rizgari, Ala Rizgari and Kawa were determined to plough their own revolutionary furrow, 
apart from the Turkish socialist groups (2012:82). 
 
The PKK 
 
Although the PKK began to transfer the locus of its activities to Kurdistan in 1975, it 
was viewed by existing Kurdish movements as a newcomer as it did not derive from the 
amalgam of Kurdish movements discussed above. It was accused of being a party without 
                                                        
68Certain Kurdish and Turkish radical leftist groups eulogised the Albanian regime for its independent 
Communist stance. On the Turkish left, the Maoist Halkın Kurtuluş (HK) were noted Hoxha supporters (Samim, 
1981:78) 
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history (citing Güçlü, Jongerden and Akkaya, 2012:3). On the contrary, “it was not a party 
without history, but [one] born from the revolutionary left in Turkey” (Jongerden and 
Akkaya, 2011:126, see Özcan, 2006:88). It should also be borne in mind that the DDKD was 
also first established in Istanbul and Ankara before setting up branches in Kurdistan. 
Nonetheless, as the movement did not contain luminaries of the Kurdish political realm 
present in rival movements, it suffered from a perception of extraneousness. Gupta argues 
that groups lacking a “historical legacy, or favourable reputation are more likely to turn to 
radical claims as a method of distinguishing themselves from their more well known 
competitors” (2014:140), which seems a convincing argument for the PKK’s subsequent 
radical trajectory. 
 
 The PKK emerged from the radical student milieu in Ankara and its origins are 
inextricably linked to the person of Abdullah Öcalan. He first came to the attention of the 
authorities for organising a campus demonstration following the Kızıldere incident in which 
Mahir Çayan and number of THKO and THKP-C cadres was killed. Prior to his arrest in 1972 
he had been active in Dev Genç circles, more particularly with elements sympathetic to 
Çayan’s THKP-C. After his release he launched himself into radical political activism and 
formed a coterie of both Turks and Kurds who engaged in extensive political debate. 
Members of the banned Dev Genç formed a student organisation named ADYÖD (Ankara 
Demokratik Yüksek Öğretim Derneği/ Ankara Democratic Higher Education Association) in 
1973, of which Öcalan and a number of other subsequently leading PKK figures became 
board members (Jongerden and Akkaya, 2012:6). It was banned by the authorities the 
following year in December 1974, but Öcalan’s group declined to re-join its successive 
iteration69 and began to detach themselves from the arena of semi-legal student activism. It 
then engaged in a period of intensive political debate in order to establish a coherent 
ideological stance. It distanced itself from its comrades of the Turkish left by espousing the 
view that Kurdistan was indeed a Turkish colony (as discussed above) but it nonetheless 
considered the “reunification, or better, reestablishment of the left, a reestablishment 
envisaged in both organizational and ideological terms” (ibid:4) as a secondary goal. At a 
                                                        
69
 The confusingly named, AYÖD (Ankara Yüksek Ögretim Derneği/ Association for Higher Education in Ankara).  
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decisive meeting in Dikmen70 in early 1976, the decision was taken – although not fully 
implemented until the following year – to transfer their activities to Kurdistan as it was “the 
most appropriate area to start a political and armed struggle for revolutionary change in 
Turkey” (ibid, 2011:129).  
 
PKK’s Social and Ethnic Composition 
 
It is worth recalling that by 1977 Turkish society was in a state of upheaval and a 
group of political radicals estimated to number at most between 250-300 adherents 
(Marcus, 2007:37) was not of major national import.71 If one further considers that it was a 
group without any wider tribal or institutional support, without a viable support network 
and with limited capacity to protect itself from rival groups in the early stages, the PKK’s 
success in establishing itself in Kurdistan prior to the coup was an extraordinary feat of 
organisation. The group centred on Öcalan remained without an official name until after its 
founding meeting in late 1978, prior to which it was known as the Kurdistan Devrimcileri or 
Kurdish Revolutionaries. However, they were commonly referred to as the Apocular or 
followers of Apo – the name by which Öcalan had come to be known – but to add to the 
confusion they were also known by many as the UKO (Ulusal Kurtuluş Ordusu/ National 
Liberation Army). Although these latter names were officially rejected by senior PKK 
defendants in their 1981 trial (Jongerden and Akkaya, 2011:140), the PKK first attracted 
popular attention (both positive and negative) under these names in Kurdistan from 
1974/1975 onwards (Interview, 2012 & Interview 24, 2012).  
 
It has been suggested by a number of authors that “PKK members were drawn 
almost exclusively from Turkey’s growing proletariat” (McDowall, 2004: 420), while 
contrastingly Metelits’ sustains that their ‘elite’ origins served as a barrier to mobilisation 
amongst the rural peasantry (2010:136). Both interpretations grossly oversimplify the class 
composition of the movement. It is argued that “the most easily mobilised elements are 
                                                        
70 Dikmen is a neighbourhood of Ankara. 
71 It should be noted that many successful revolutionary groups were started by small numbers of militants. 
The movement for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) had only six members in 1956, while 
the Chinese Communist party had but twelve founding members (Chaliand, 1987:46).  
106 
 
often the young city dwellers; semi-intellectual or semi-educated, déclassé or marginalised, 
[which] [...] have no prospects and are seething with latent discontent” (Chaliand, 1987: 47). 
Marcus’ view reflects this tendency and she provides a more accurate interpretation of the 
movement’s early supporters and activists, describing them “as those who had actually 
lifted themselves out of their poverty stricken, uneducated ‘lumpen’ surroundings” 
(2007:37). The PKK closely aligns to Wickham-Crowley’s understanding that “guerrilla 
movements do not begin among peasants in the countryside but among urban based 
intellectuals” (1993:30). However, he elaborates and states that the subsequent “number 
and proportion of peasants acting as combatants” in relation to the initial wave of urban 
intellectuals is indicative of the movements’ support in a region (1993:53). In the case of the 
PKK, the movement steadily gathered local sympathisers and supporters and in the words of 
Perwer, a PKK sympathiser from Mardin, it quickly came to be comprised of both 
‘students’72 and locals who knew the area (Interview 31, 2012).  
 
The PKK launched its insurgency in 1984 with the generation of militants that had 
been mobilised prior to the coup. However, by 1985-1986 it had started to successfully 
mobilise the rural communities in the Botan area73 and due to the brief life expectancy of an 
active guerrilla, some of these local recruits had risen to become commanders by 1988 
(Interview 38, 2013). Thus, according to Moyano’s distinction between movement founders 
and followers (1992:111, see also della Porta, 2011 Chapter 7), the followers - recruits who 
joined after the movement had established itself - had significantly altered the socio-
economic composition of the movement. 
 
 The PKK’s other factor of note in terms of composition was the significant proportion 
of non-Kurds in the movement. After Öcalan’s release from Mamak prison in 1972, he 
moved in with two Black Sea Turks in Ankara, Haki Karer and Kemal Pir who sympathised 
with the THKO and the THKP-C respectively (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011:127). This pair, aside 
from Öcalan himself, occupy the most vaunted of positions in PKK’s historiography (ibid, 
2012). In addition to Pir and Karer, some of the other founding members at the 1978 
                                                        
72
 General label for the non-local recruits of the group but that does not necessarily mean that they were or 
used to be actual students. 
73 Botan is the name given by the PKK to the mountainous provinces of Hakkari, Siirt and Şırnak (Gunes, 
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meeting, Duran Kalkan and Karer’s brother Kemal, were also Turkish (ibid:2011:138). The 
notable presence of non-Kurds in the movement distinguished it from rival Kurdish groups 
which for the most part had exclusively Kurdish members. Interestingly, the non-Kurdish 
portion of the movement did not decrease over time but continued to grow and was 
boosted in the 1990s by the decline of the Turkish radical left.  
 
The ethnic heterogeneity of the movement had a number of consequences in terms 
of discourse and in practise. Even after the decision had been taken to relocate its activities 
to Kurdistan, the Kurdish Revolutionaries first publicly introduced themselves to the parties 
of the radical Turkish left before presenting itself in Kurdistan (ibid:129).74 Although the PKK 
had distanced itself from the radical left milieu over divergent views on the status of 
Kurdistan and castigated it for its social chauvinism, it sought to maintain good relations 
with it. The periodic fruit of such efforts was evident in a number of short-lived armed 
alliances through the 1980s and 1990s (see Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011:133, Marcus, 
2007:65). The PKK’s links with the radical Turkish left were not definitively ruptured when it 
relocated its activities to Kurdistan, with the memory of shared struggles in the 1970s, 
interpersonal bonds of trust and friendship persisting in spite of certain ideological contrasts 
and inter-movement competition (see della Porta & Diani, 2006:127-131). This enabled the 
PKK to continue to frame its liberation discourse in more universal terms that were not 
limited by ethnic boundaries. Its ethnic heterogeneity fostered a degree of cosmopolitanism 
within the movement, which acted as a counter-veiling force to any tendencies to social 
detachment and maintained a broad outward-looking perspective which was often 
sacrificed in the name of military expediency or imperatives of security by other armed 
groups. 
 
Mobilisation and Organisational Repertoires  
 
The painstaking arduous efforts of constructing and expanding a political movement 
                                                                                                                                                                            
2012:106). 
74The meeting took place at the headquarters of the TMMOB (Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and 
Architects /Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği) and was arranged by the Kurtulus organisation (Jongerden 
& Akkaya, 2012:16). 
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are often ill-served by macro-descriptive terms such as mobilisation, networking and 
brokerage. They are terms which fail to explain the micro-context, the interpersonal and 
emotional aspects of such interactions. The first moments of encounter between movement 
activists/insurgents and potential supporters can occur in a number of settings, within 
formal organisations like political parties or trade unions, or in the context of informal 
organisations like cultural associations or university dormitories. As discussed in Chapter 1 
these encounters can emerge in situations of hierarchical or non-hierarchical attachments 
and are bolstered by repeated contact in day to day interactions (Wickham-Crowley, 
1992:139-140). The PKK reached out to potential supporters in formal settings such as trade 
union activism75, in municipal electoral campaigns, and in institutions such as professional 
associations, particularly in teachers’ groups. Although it is a point that the movement has 
not cared to emphasise, it also made use of hierarchical arrangements – notwithstanding its 
opposition to the aşiret system76, it bloc recruited from particular tribes it deemed patriotic 
(Imset, 1992:18).  
 
In a more extensive fashion the PKK recruited horizontally in a non-hierarchical 
fashion, slowly establishing relations with single individuals and constructing a network of 
communal houses, which in a domino effect multiplied these interpersonal linkages; bonds 
reinforced by religious, class and ethno-national bonds of solidarity. A first point regarding 
the PKK’s recruitment in Kurdistan is related to the importance of spatial proximity (drawing 
on Gould, Viterna, 2006:4). It may seem self-evident but the PKK managed to engage in 
mass recruitment because it was physically present in Kurdistan and thus in quotidian 
contact with its potential recruits. After the PKK’s return to Kurdistan, it recruited individuals 
or small groups of people on an incremental basis that often followed lengthy attempts at 
individual persuasion. As Marcus explains “recruitment methods [...] focused on one-on-one 
debates to win people over. Supporters thought nothing of sitting with someone for twenty 
four hours straight to argue for the new group” (2007:35).  
 
The PKK, as befitting a movement of its socio-economic profile, initially focused on 
                                                        
75
 See Margulies & Yildizoğlu (1984), Pfeifer (1984), and Ahmet & Pfeifer (1984) for a brief summary of trade 
union activity in Turkey in the 1970s. 
76
 Tribal system.  
109 
 
expanding the movement via individual networks of personal acquaintances and family links 
before actively recruiting from the wider Kurdish masses. The importance of networks for 
recruitment is incontrovertible, “network ties are critical for how individuals interpret and 
act upon their political and cultural environment” (Viterna, 2013:43). Even more so in the 
case of extra-legal associations, della Porta observed “participation in clandestine groups is 
more likely when it’s strengthened by previous effective ties” (1988:158). To this end, 
professional associations such as TÖB-DER served as a conduit by which personal 
acquaintances were transformed into political loyalties; it was a leftist teachers’ association 
founded in 1971 which was active across the Turkish state and had a strong Kurdish 
presence.77 At its 1978 congress, it passed the radical motion that the initial years of all 
children’s education should be in their mother tongue (Van Bruinessen, 1984: 12). 
Paradoxically, expansion of the state school system in the 1970s to incorporate vast areas of 
Kurdistan which had been hitherto neglected facilitated the diffusion of a radical critique of 
the state rather than fostering sentiments of appreciation or integration. In the early 1970s 
when the wider Kurdish movement was still in a state of disarray, TÖB-DER did much to 
harness and generate radical leftist politics in Kurdistan (Ercan, 2010: 119). In one concrete 
example, TÖB-DER and other educational associations78 played a central role alongside the 
emerging Kurdish groups in the organisation of a protest against Alparslan Türkeş’ attempt 
to make a public speech in Diyarbakir in 1975.79  
 
Leftist associations also engaged in less confrontational activities such as the 
organisation of seminars and conferences on the situation in Kurdistan in high schools, 
cinemas and teacher training colleges. It was via these events that many young Kurds first 
came into contact with revolutionary politics. In the case of Abdullah, as a lise (high school) 
student he had acquired a reputation as a rebel after being expelled from his school in the 
Genç for repeatedly clashing with his teachers over political issues. He moved to a new 
school in the Bingöl area, where his teacher Mehmet Karasungur, who later went on to 
                                                        
77 TÖB-DER was reported by to have had 150,000 members “including village teachers in the remotest corners 
of Turkey” (Briefing, March 23 1981). 
78 The Cultural Higher Education Association of Diyarbakır (DYÖKD) also participated. The peaceful 
demonstration resulted in Türkeş’ speech being cancelled but it was repressed violently by the police, resulting 
in numerous injuries and the death of Mehmet Aytekin (Ercan, 2010: 126). 
79
 See Ercan for greater detail on the preceding mobilisation and the demonstration itself (2010: 124-126). 
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become one of the founders of the PKK, was the head of the local TÖB-DER branch.80 
Karasungur actively sought out Abdullah because of his notoriety; they quickly became 
friends, before moving beyond a student-teacher relationship to becoming comrades 
(Interview 14, 2012). Understandably, given the political and spatial environment they 
occupied and existing interpersonal networks, these teachers’ associations and the wider 
trade union movement became appropriated by the consolidating Kurdish movements 
(Ercan, 2010:167). The overlap between teachers and the PKK was extensive; Faqi, a former 
PKK guerrilla, recounted that immediately prior to the coup his teacher in a village in Dersim 
was a PKK member. On a number of occasions his teacher invited PKK guerrillas to sing PKK 
songs, much to the delight of the pupils (Interview 35: 2013). 
 
 In addition to serving as routes of individual recruitment due to the fact that they 
remained legal, non-clandestine associations also served a mediatory function between the 
rival Kurdish groups. Oftentimes, members of rival Kurdish groups had developed personal 
relationships within these movements and their subsequent membership movements in 
opposition to one another did not preclude continuing participation in association activities. 
Overlapping memberships “facilitate the circulation of information” and “in the absence of 
formal co-operation between organisations, mobilisation becomes possible through 
informal links among activists” (della Porta & Diani, 2006:128-129). Abdullah attributes the 
absence of the fratricidal violence in Bingöl, which characterised inter-Kurdish movement 
competition elsewhere in Kurdistan, to the personal linkages between groups formed within 
TÖB-DER which allowed them to overcome ideological differences (Interview 14, 2012). 
These patterns of recruitment confirm Marcus’ description of PKK’s initial cadres as 
members of the lower middle classes and not of the lumpenproletariat (2007:37). The PKK’s 
patterns of recruitment in the aftermath of its relocation to Kurdistan therefore followed a 
conventional path. The PKK militants relied on kin and pre-existing professional networks 
and recruitment was rooted in affective bonds and acquaintances. The PKK’s new members 
of the period very much coincide with Viterna’s description of ‘politicised recruits’; people 
who derived certain “enjoyment [...] from being politically active, and felt impelled by their 
                                                        
80
 He was not present at the meeting in Lice because he was directing the clashes in the Hilwan and Siverek 
region against the Bucaks. 
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 responsibility as ‘people who understood injustice’ to participate in bettering their 
societies” (2013:88).  
 
PKK Escalation 
  
Until the founding congress on 27-28 November 1978 the PKK was popularly known 
as the Apocular, UKO or the Kurdish Revolutionaries.81 The congress marked the culmination 
of its slow evolution from an ideological group to a political party (Jongerden & Akkaya, 
2012:4). A document entitled “The Way of the Revolution in Kurdistan” was adopted as the 
party programme (ibid: 2011: 136). The long-term objectives of the movement were 
outlined and consisted of achieving Kurdish national self-determination, which would lead 
to a unified socialist Kurdistan and “a reunification, or better, reestablishment of the left [...] 
in both organizational and ideological terms” (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2012: 4). The 
reunification of the left was of course to develop under the leadership of the PKK. In 
addition, the obstacles to the revolution were also outlined: fascists, social–chauvinists 
[Turkish left which did not accept the thesis of Kurdish colonialism], the agents of the state 
and the feudal landlords (Ismet, 1992: 16). 
 
Until this point, the PKK had existed as little more than a form of political debating 
society with certain rhetorical flourishes which promised armed revolution, thus differing 
little from any of the plethora of other Kurdish movements. However, armed violence soon 
became an integral part of the PKK’s repertoire through a variety of escalatory mechanisms. 
As della Porta has pointed out, escalation is a relational process (2013:68) and varies 
chronologically across cycles of contention (2014:94). She further elaborates that 
“competitive escalation” is triggered “during competitive interactions not only with political 
adversaries but also with potential allies” (ibid: 2013:71). Competition with potential allies is 
derived from the scarcity of resources and most importantly, “participation and approval 
from constituencies, supporters and bystander publics” (Bosi et al, 2014:8). Competition is 
more acute in periods when there is an intensification of mobilisation as it demands a 
                                                        
81
 The First Party Congress is covered in detail, in terms of the immediate context and its participants by 
Jongerden & Akkaya (2011 & 2012) and Imset (1992). 
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concomitantly greater share of limited resources (McCarthy & Zald, 1977 and Gupta, 2014: 
142). In such situations, groups engage in political outbidding and adopt increasingly more 
radical positions in order to ‘outbid’ their rivals, thus generating a mutual escalation of 
tactics and repertoires (de Fazio, 2014 and Gupta, 2014). Escalation is also fuelled by 
interactions with the forces of the state; “popular protest and the structure of the state are 
in a dynamic and mutually influencing relationship, each pushing and constraining the 
other” (Johnston, 2011:16). And it also comes about by reciprocal adaptation of opponents’ 
repertoires (Alimi, Bosi & Demetriou, 2012:10), leading to the phenomenon of violence as a 
defensive imperative (della Porta, 2013:81). 
 
 The escalation of the PKK’s repertoire must accordingly not be simply analysed as 
the result of strategic reasoning on its behalf but by understanding it as the outcome of 
relational interactions shaped by developments in the broader political environment. 
“Although the PKK is usually seen as the main advocator of violence as political practise, the 
necessity of armed struggle was part of the general debate that took place within the 
Kurdish national movement” (Gunes, 2012:92). The increasing role of violent contestation in 
the PKK’s repertoire was not without parallel in other Kurdish groups such as KIP, KUK, and 
even elements of the TKSP (ibid, 2012:82). There was, however, one notable distinction: the 
PKK held that violence could be used as a tool of mobilisation and the violent stage of the 
struggle was something which would contemporaneously complement the political 
mobilisation. This closely echoed the Guevarist foco theory which held that “it is not 
necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create 
them” (Guevara, 2006:77). The other Kurdish movements for the most part held the view 
that a broad-based mobilisation would necessarily have to predate armed mobilisation. A 
former KIP/DDKD member Vildan Tanrıkulu explained that only: 
 
“after realizing a really powerful political mobilization relying on alliance of workers and 
peasants and also youth mobilization, an uprising would be possible with civil disobedience 
actions followed by the armed support campaigns from rural to urban areas” (in Ercan, 
2010: 147).  
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It was this sense of urgency related to the immediate deployment for violence that led other 
groups to condemn the PKK’s strategy as adventurist (Gunes, 2012:95), as they feared that 
the premature escalation of the conflict would lead the Turkish state to clamp down on the 
numerous legal political openings which still existed in the late 1970s. The PKK’s deployment 
of violence in the early days was extremely cautious. Öcalan had taken note of the fate of 
Mahir Çayan and his comrades when they overstretched themselves by confronting 
ambitious targets before they were in a military, political or logistical position to do so.82 Of 
the PKK’s listed enemies, violence was rarely used against the ‘agents of the state’, and 
rather deployed defensively or in a way which garnered it further support. In fact, the first 
occasion when PKK’s commitment to using weapons came about after Haki Karer, one of its 
senior militants, had been killed. In circumstances that are still unclear, in May 1977 Alaattin 
Kaplan, a Beş Parçacılar83 militant, executed Karer in a coffee shop in the Düztepe 
neighbourhood of Antep. According to the PKK’s understanding, Kaplan was close to 
elements of the already defunct TKDP (Öcalan, 2011:133, Interview 36 – 2013), but in 1984 
Baki Karer, Haki’s brother and a founding member of the PKK claimed that the killing was 
undertaken on the personal orders of Öcalan  (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2012:14) in order to 
consolidate his grip on the movement. The PKK’s incapacity to protect its own senior 
militants led a number of them to join Têkoşîn84. The killing led the PKK to recognise that “it 
was impossible to do political work without armed protection” (ibid, 2011:130) and in 
cognisance of this weakness resolved to militarily confront its rivals. It subsequently 
assassinated Kaplan, and after a revolutionary tribunal executed two of the deserters to 
Têkoşîn, Mehmet Uzin and Ali Yaylacık (Ismet, 1992:18). The decisive passage from political 
group to armed group was thus taken not necessarily of its own volition but rather in 
response to what can be considered as an effort at “violent outbidding” by a group which 
could ordinarily be understood as a potential Kurdish ally. 
                                                        
82 The PKK’s cautious incremental strategy closely resembles the strategy used by the Viet Minh in the earlier 
stage of its insurgency against the French. It also avoided direct clashes with the French, consolidated local 
support and eliminated rival nationalist organisations (Goodwin, 2001:109). 
83 Beş Parçacılar was a small Kurdish movement with roots in the radical Turkish left. It was Maoist and openly 
opposed to the USSR and it believed that Kurdistan was divided in five parts, the fifth being in Soviet Armenia. 
It was also known as Stêrka Sor. 
84
 Têkoşîn was a Kurdish breakaway of Kurtuluş led by the contemporary Zaza nationalist Seyfi Cengiz.  
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Mobilisational Strategies 
 
In the late 1970s there was a plurality of Kurdish groups all struggling to consolidate 
themselves in terms of number of adherents, political power and prestige. This broad field 
of social mobilisation was characterised by the presence of overlapping legal and extra-legal 
movements. To give an example, the TKSP was illegal but the journal that they published 
Özgürlük Yolu was legal and they used that as a legal front for their activities (Watts, 
2010:43). Many of the other groups had analogous legal structures to complement their 
extralegal networks, apart from the PKK which remained a strictly underground group. In 
order to expand their respective networks of members and supporters the wider Kurdish 
movement focused on increasing the number of interactions it could establish with Kurdish 
society. Ercan (2010, 167-169) highlights a number of non-institutional mobilisation 
strategies advanced by the broader Kurdish movement.85 All of the Kurdish groups including 
the PKK made use of their cultural capital, derived from generally possessing a higher 
educational standard than the local population, to serve as an intermediary between lesser 
educated and non-Turkish speaking Kurds and the Turkish state. Activists wrote petitions 
and assisted in a wide array of bureaucratic interactions with the state. They also mediated 
and attempted to resolve non-political conflicts related to the abduction of women or family 
disputes.  
 
A further non-institutionalised mobilisation strategy was the transformation of social 
rituals into politicised events. Selim Çürükkaya, a PKK member, gave a detailed explanation 
of their attendance at the funeral of a migrant construction worker from the Bingöl region 
that had died in a workplace accident in Ankara:  
 
“It was surprising for them; some of us were teachers and others were students who had 
come [all] [...] of the way for the funeral. Then we gave a speech there. We told [of the] 
reasons [...] why we [the Kurds] could not find jobs in our lands and why we had to work in 
metropolises without job security. [...] In addition to this, we told that we were 
                                                        
85
Ercan included labour activism as part of these non-institutional mechanisms; however, I hold that their 
utilisation of trade union activism is an example of formal and legal activism closer to the institutional 
involvement in electoral politics. 
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revolutionaries and struggling for emancipation of our people” (Çürükkaya, 2008 in Ercan, 
2010:169). 
 
Activities of this nature can be understood as the generation of “moments of 
encounter” which portrayed the various movements in a positive and unthreatening light. 
They served the dual purposes of fostering bonds between the PKK and the wider de-
politicised Kurdish society, and of politicising the understanding of the socio-economic and 
political situation prevailing in Kurdistan. These efforts varied from region to region and 
group to group but they were present all across Kurdistan (Ercan, ibid). These interactions 
neatly coincide with Malthaner’s taxonomy or relations outlined in Chapter 1, ranging from 
bonds of utilitarian social exchange by the provision of intermediary services with the state 
to the emergence of interpersonal and interfamilial bonds with the movement itself, 
thereby, establishing a nascent constituency. 
 
Institutional and Legal Mobilisation 
 
  Notwithstanding Demirel’s Nationalist Front government’s86 reign from 1974 until 
1977 and the increasing political violence, a degree of institutional democratic processes - 
however imperfect - still endured. The wider Kurdish movement sought to take advantage 
of it to varying extents, until such point that all institutionalist opportunities were removed 
(see Ercan, 2010, Dorronsoro & Watts, 2009 and Watts 2010). Although the Kurdish 
movement was too weak to make an impact in the national elections, it made a significant 
breakthrough in the local elections of December 1977. Widespread “social and political 
changes [...] had undercut[...] the power of local notables, who had been an important part 
of the party structure in the southeast and the usual intermediaries for voter mobilization” 
(Dorronsoro & Watts, 2009:463), thus depriving the national parties of their former 
channels of accessing Kurdish votes en masse. Therefore, institutional opportunities that 
had hitherto been inaccessible became available to the wider Kurdish movement.  
 
                                                        
86
 The Milliyetçi Cephe contained the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi), the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet 
Partisi) and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi). 
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There was also an escalatory dynamic to the fashion in which the various groups 
chose to engage with these opportunities. Alimi has pointed out that “since [political] 
opportunities are external to the movement and can be used by other, not necessarily 
friendly, political actors, it is critical for movement activists to seize the moment [...]” 
(2009:216). Accordingly, in order to pre-empt other Kurdish groups obtaining crucial 
supporters and resources, even groups with a more revolutionary agenda such as the PKK 
were compelled to also participate in institutional forms of political contestation, at the risk 
of their rivals consolidating ever broader constituencies at their expense. 
 
The TKSP placed a notable emphasis on participating in municipal elections and 
enjoyed a certain degree of success in this regard with the election of Mehdi Zana as mayor 
of Diyarbakir in 1977. The TKSP was illegal so it could not openly nominate electoral 
candidates, so its candidate formally contested elections as independents. Zana remained a 
member of TIP and active in the DDKD; he was a senior figure in the TKSP but his support 
crossed a number of party and movement lines. Yet tensions within the TKSP regarding the 
leadership style of Kemal Burkay and Zana’s unilateral decision to run in the elections 
ensured there was division within the TKSP itself. Furthermore, TIP and DDKD also ran a 
candidate against him, Yahya Mehmetoğlu (Watts, 2010:47 and Watts & Dorronsoro, 2009), 
thus highlighting that although the various movements were in competition with one 
another, there was still a degree of overlapping memberships and fluid movement 
boundaries. Zana did not enjoy the universal backing of the movements and parties to 
which he belonged; he gained much external support, reinforcing della Porta and Diani’s 
observation that inter-movement networks - personal, formal and informal – “influence 
opportunities for cooperation between organisations” (2006:129). As well as facilitating 
inter-group collaboration, they can also alter intra-movement dynamics. External allies can 
be utilised to re-configure internal power dynamics between rival sub-factions and 
personalities. Zana was backed by KUK and he obtained support from a number of tribes87, 
student groups and hemşehri networks88 (Watts & Dorronsoro, 2009:473). Kurdish 
                                                        
87 He was supported by the Botan and Omeriyan tribes. 
88 Hemşehri networks were associations based on hometown or regional provenance amongst immigrants 
found throughout Turkey. See Chapter VI for an extensive discussion of them.  
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candidates also notably won office in Urfa, and in the 1979 elections in Batman and Ağrı89.  
 
The different movements attributed different importance to participation in these 
electoral context; the TKSP’s view that these municipal centres of power could be used as 
“’castles’ of Kurdish Nationalism,” (Watts, 2010:47) was not shared by all. The TKSP mayor 
of Ağrı, Urfan Alparslan became disillusioned with the limits of democratic contention and 
took to the mountains to found a small guerrilla group called the Ordiya Rizgariya 
Kurdistanê (ORK). They were all killed in mysterious circumstances soon afterwards 
(Interview 24, 2012).  
 
The possibility of extending its networks of supporters through institutional channels 
was also grasped by the PKK. A PKK member Edip Solmaz in fact won mayoral office in 
Batman in 1979 before he was killed, only 29 days after assuming power. Solmaz was a 
former military officer who left the army and only joined the movement in 1978.90 Although 
it may seem somewhat of a paradox that an avowedly revolutionary group such as the PKK 
would participate in elections it provided distinct long-term benefits. Its participation in 
municipal electoral campaigns was a means to expand its network of supporters in 
preparation for its campaign of armed insurrection. Contrary to Mehdi Zana’s accusation 
that “leftist intellectuals, [...] with their dreams of the great revolution, did not want to dirty 
their hands managing the reform of capitalism [taking municipal office]” (Zana, 1997:8), the 
PKK did engage in such political strategies not to “reform capitalism” but to bring about the 
great revolution. However, it should be stressed that in the brief window between the PKK 
sufficiently establishing itself in the region to be able to mount popular political campaigns 
and the shutdown of such institutional openings by the imposition of martial law and 
growing state repression, it succeeded in electing only one of its people to municipal office. 
Electoral participation was thus evidently, just one of many mobilisation strategies adopted 
by the PKK. 
                                                        
89 Ercan states that the PKK also won control of the municipality of Hilwan but does not provide further 
information (2010: 198). I have been however unable to find further corroborating evidence. 
90  Although doubts prevail as to his relationship to the party, it is clear from the entry in the PKK Martyrs 
Album 1978-1984 (PKK, 1984:85) that he was undoubtedly a part of the movement and its candidate in the 
1979 election. 
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Trade Union Activism 
 
 Although the lack of industrialisation in Kurdistan did not provide a structural 
environment that was propitious for labour mobilisation, the PKK actively took advantage of 
the limited possibilities to appropriate supporters by engaging in trade union activities. As 
Serdar, a senior KNK member originally from Urfa explained, the Kurdish ‘proletariat’ was 
employed mostly in the informal sector in construction, carpet making and as agricultural 
labourers (Interview 36, 2013). PKK militants took up positions as labourers in these sectors 
in order to interact with the workers on a daily basis. According to Serdar, Haki Karer - 
notwithstanding alternative job possibilities a person of his education might have 
reasonably expected - worked in construction in Antep. Serdar’s own brother, a PKK activist, 
took a position as a private bus driver that ferried construction workers from Antep to a 
large reservoir that was being built in the area in 1978. The role as driver guaranteed him a 
captive audience for the duration of the trip and proved an ideal platform to mobilise the 
workers.  He quickly rose to become the site representative of DISK91, a national trade 
union, before serving as representative for the wider area of Antep for eighteen months 
between 1978 and 1979. During this time a strike was launched and lasted forty five days 
before the workers’ demands were conceded. In the wake of the strike, the union activists 
were all fired but in a legal fashion and awarded suitable compensation; Serdar explains that 
every one of the activists fired were indeed PKK cadres (Interview 36 - 2013). In a further 
account of PKK labour activism, Berfin - a man involved in legal Kurdish party activism, 
currently active in the BDP, and father of a two guerrillas - recounted how the PKK organised 
what he remembers as the first ever strike in the Mardin area in a local tractor factory in 
1978 (Interview 20 – 2012). In that period the PKK also unsuccessfully put forward a 
candidate in the election of a chairperson for the trade union active in the oil industry in 
Batman.92  
 
As numerous groups adopted this strategy of recruitment, the field of labour 
activism became a locus of tension between rival Kurdish groups. The most egregious 
                                                        
91
(Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu/Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey) 
92
 Email communication with Ahmet Akkaya, 7
th
 of March 2013.  
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example of this inter-movement competition took place at the state-owned Ceylanpınar 
development farm in Mardin, close to the border with Syria. The KUK had widespread 
support in Mardin and as such viewed it as their territory and the PKK’s activities there as an 
encroachment. Deathly clashes broke out between the two groups before escalating to 
encompass the wider Mardin area, with clashes particularly intense in the area around Derik 
and Kiziltepe. The conflict lasted eight months from early 1980 to August of the same year 
and resulted in a number of deaths for both sides (Ercan, 2010: 203, White, 2000: 148). This 
once again highlights the fact that the although the PKK’s had at that stage long committed 
to violence at the rhetorical level, the actual adoption of violent tactics was less a unilateral  
decision but rather the fruit of inter-relational tensions. 
 
Intra-Kurdish Violence 
 
 A significant number of Kurdish groups emerged in Turkey in a very short period of 
time,93 which led to fierce inter-movement competition. There was contestation on an 
ideological basis, as well as an intense rivalry for resources in terms of recruits and material 
needs. All of this was underscored by pre-existing political and personal enmities. These 
tensions resulted in intermittent physical violence and a notable number of killings, up to 
400 that can be attributed to inter-movement violence (Bozarslan 2012:8 and Aras, 
2013:70).94 While hostility existed between several groups, notably the schismatic Kawa and 
Rizgari groupings, the most deadly violence frequently featured the PKK. This was in part 
due to its determination to be the foremost Kurdish group, as Çürükkaya asserted: “[T]he 
1920s were our model, how the Russian Communist Party forbade all other parties and got 
rid of the cliques. We saw this as all positive and we wanted to do the same” (in Marcus, 
2007: 42). However, it would be mistaken to reduce the PKK’s belligerent attitude towards 
rival groups to just ideological factors. The most intense episodes of intra-Kurdish violence 
were in areas of greatest movement contestation, such as in the example from Mardin or in 
                                                        
93 The exact founding dates of the groups are subject to debate and in some cases serve as guideline rather 
than definite fact. The following are some of the estimated founding dates of a number of Kurdish movements: 
PKK 1978, TKSP 1974, KUK 1979, DDKD 1974/1975, Rizagari 1977, Kawa 1976, Denge Kawa 1977, Red Kawa 
1978 and Ala Rizgari 1979.  
94 Similar inter-movement violence was also witnessed amongst the radical Turkish left at the time, for 
example between Halkin Kurtulus and Dev-Yol in Antalya (Interview 47, 2013). 
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Antep. Antep was an interesting case because it was populated by groups of the radical 
Turkish left95 and the Kurdish groups which originated from this environment, the PKK, 
Têkoşîn and Beş Parçacılar.  
 
The necessity of the PKK defending itself and protecting its perceived interests came 
about in a context where “killing was a part of everyday political life” (Interview 36 – 2013). 
Political violence was endemic across Turkey, with a number of shootings occurring on a 
daily basis. The PKK’s recourse to violent means was a result of interaction with rival Kurdish 
groups which also used violence, and it cannot be reduced to the PKK’s alleged Fanonian 
advocacy of violence (Bozarslan, 2004: 48) or simply its ambition to be the largest Kurdish 
movement. Neither can it be asserted that violence against its rivals was a policy uniformly 
adopted by the movement; it very much depended on local conditions and interactions, the 
initiative of specific members and the period when it occurred. Notwithstanding the 
intensity of the wider violence in the Bingöl area, deadly intra-Kurdish violence never 
occurred there (Interview 14, 2012). 
 
 The shared history of political activism of many of the Kurdish militants from 
collaboration in the DDKO, TIP, DDKD or the radical Turkish left, generated personal bonds 
which crossed ideological divides. These relations served as a counter veiling factor to the 
factional violence. As was clear in the case of Mehdi Zana, multiple memberships of 
movements was common and many Kurds saw no inconsistency in organising events and 
even violent attacks on a cross-movement basis. Abdullah explains that as youths with a 
group of friends with mixed political sympathies, they procured dynamite from a local mine 
and used it to improvise bomb attacks against a teachers’ institute and the police barracks 
which housed a despised policeman accused of torturing children (Interview 14, 2012). 
Although group identities became less flexible over time, interpersonal bonds not only 
reduced the possibility of conflict between movements but also permitted the co-
organisation of a wide variety of actions against their shared enemies.  
                                                        
95 According to Serdar the strongest groups were Dev-Yol, Halkin Kurtulus, and Emeğin Birliği (Interview 36, 
2013). 
121 
 
PKK’s Aşiret Campaign 
 
In addition to the PKK’s use of defensive violence in the context of mutual escalation 
with its Kurdish allies, the PKK also proactively conducted armed campaigns against certain 
aşirets. In principle, the PKK viewed them as an enemy because in most cases they 
functioned as the de facto representatives of the state. The aşirets’ economic and political 
interests mostly coincided with those of the state (Van Bruinessen, 2003:174-179), thus 
ensuring that they were viewed by the PKK “to be as much the enemy as the state itself” 
(Marcus, 2007:44). Individual aşiret’s power and reputations varied from area to area, from 
enjoying massive strength in areas like Siverek and Hakkari, to being of little more than 
nominal relevance in Dersim. Opposition to their overbearing economic and political 
influence had been growing, and Kurdish left-wing groups tried to take advantage of this 
popular disaffection.  
 
Clashes between the PKK and the tribal elite first erupted in the Hilvan area in May 
1978 when the prominent PKK militant Halil Cavgun was killed by a member of the locally 
powerful Suleymanlar aşiret. The PKK decided to launch a revenge attack that would 
highlight their “opposition to those wealthy landlords who oppressed the local people” and 
“underscore their commitment to armed struggle” (ibid: 45). They assassinated the tribe’s 
leader Mehmet Baysal. Such actions generated local popularity for the movement. It 
showed that unlike the other groups who pontificated against the exploitative landlords 
without ever taking action, the PKK “had another method of dealing with the enemy class” 
(McDowall, 2004:423).  
 
After its official establishment in November 1978, the PKK decided to announce its 
existence by assassinating the head of the Bucak aşiret in Siverek. In addition to his local 
power, Mehmet Celal Bucak was an MP of the Justice Party and thus an actual 
representative of the state. The Bucaks “symbolised both the Kurdish branch of ‘feudalism 
and collaboration with Turkish ‘colonialism’” (Bozarslan, 1999:12). It “was not only a 
spectacular example of the propaganda-of-the-deed to announce [its] existence, but also 
revealed much about the PKK philosophy and modus operandi” (Jongerden, 2007:55). It also 
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demonstrated to the disaffected but diffident peasantry that there was an effective way to 
deal with the landlords [...], shoot them dead” (ibid). The attack adheres to an established 
mobilisational tactic amongst rural populations used by insurgents across the globe: 
because “peasants have specific local grievances, especially against the landlords […], and 
are willing to join any group that will further the redress of such grievances” (Wickham-
Crowley, 1992:138 and see della Porta, 2013:191). Armed groups which succeed in resolving 
local concerns gain credibility which substantiates their broader, less immediate claims. 
Although the assassination attempt failed, it successfully consolidated the PKK’s reputation 
as the most radical and daring of Kurdish groups. It led to prolonged clashes between the 
PKK and the Bucaks, leading to an unofficial figure of ninety one deaths on the Bucak side. 
As Selahattin Çelik, a PKK militant of the period explained, “Apo believed that if a big fight 
broke out, then support for the PKK would grow. [...] Even if one hundred people were to 
die, then their children would become PKK supporters to take revenge” (in Marcus, 
2007:46). 
 
 The attacks thus served a number of purposes for the PKK. They brought the PKK a 
degree of public notoriety which distinguished it from its rivals (see Gupta, 2014: 139-140) 
and they served as tangible examples of what the realisation of their ideological propaganda 
would bring about: a degree of social justice. In addition, the campaign engendered bonds 
of trust with its newly acquired supporters; the PKK was willing to risk the lives of its 
members for the collective good of the downtrodden Kurdish peasants. With the families 
directly involved in the clashes, it led to the development of emotional ties of gratitude, 
respect and in certain cases a thirst for revenge against the landholding classes. Finally, it 
also served as a training ground to develop armed strategies against a strong but not 
overwhelming military opponent and sated the demand for armed attacks amongst those 
members impatient with the failure to immediately launch the insurgency. 
 
PKK Expansion 
 
The PKK incrementally expanded the numbers of its supporters; from an initial 
position where it mostly recruited amongst a more educated swath of Kurdish society 
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through professional organisations, it spread throughout wider society by participating in 
trade union politics, municipal electoral campaigns and by launching campaigns of armed 
resistance against selected landlords. It began to attract adherents from disadvantaged 
socio-economic groups and its exponential growth began to embrace the hitherto politically 
non-mobilised classes which the other Kurdish groups had failed to successfully mobilise.  
 
The PKK’s communal living experiments that had proved so successful in Ankara in 
strengthening intra-group solidarity were also transplanted back to Kurdistan. They set up 
communal houses where party militants would live together in order to be best able to 
organise party activities. These houses became key nodes in the organisation of solidarity 
networks throughout Kurdistan, public discussion groups were organised there and more 
committed activists took up residence in them. Salih Sezgin, a renowned author and PKK 
prisoner of more than twenty years explained his transition from a non-politicised, self 
loathing Kurd to party activist. He moved as an illiterate non-Turkish speaking teenager from 
a village close to Birecik to one of these communal houses. As he recounted, “I started 
frequenting these houses and the people there started taking care of me. I was not able to 
read, so they were telling me what my language was, where the Kurds came from and about 
their contemporary situation [in Kurdistan]” (Interview 21, 2012). Salih would have 
represented a typical uneducated Kurdish youth, a group which was to become the principal 
fount of PKK recruits in the period. He admits that his involvement with the PKK was not 
ideologically motivated:  
 
“I myself did not have any ideological engagement, I was not able to read and write.” [...] 
“What affected me most, what aroused interest in me towards PKK, what pulled me to the 
movement was their lifestyle. The sharing in the communal houses, love and friendship [...]. 
That environment of friendship attracted me” (ibid). 
 
The PKK developed a tangible organisational structure from which it spread its 
political message; these houses served, in the case of Salih and other like him, as the sites of 
cognitive liberation which McAdam holds to be “the prerequisite for mobilisation” (in 
McAdam et al, 1996:5). Each of these new activists became a bridge to further recruits, 
introducing family members and workmates into these circles. The density and overlap of 
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personal and political connections is of particular note in light of della Porta and Diani’s 
contention that “the more costly and dangerous the collective action, the stronger and 
more numerous ties required for individuals to participate” (2006:117). The development of 
these processes can be clearly indentified in Salih’s case, when he observed that although 
there was a mix of people and professions in the group, young labourers quickly became the 
largest component in Birecik. The PKK was therefore able to tap into a socio-economic 
stratum that rival Kurdish groups had difficulty accessing.  
 
The PKK recognised the “mobilisational potential” (Klandermans & Oegema, 
1987:519) of the disadvantaged swathes of Kurdish society; however it is also true that 
“willingness is a necessary but insufficient condition of participation” (ibid: 520). It is also 
necessary for movements to create durable structure to facilitate recruitment (ibid:  520 
and Viterna, 2013:64). It was by its recruitment networks and the socio-economic 
characteristics of those recruited that the PKK distinguished itself from its rival Kurdish 
groups, becoming popularly renowned as the one which “represent[ed] the most marginal 
sections of society” (Van Bruinessen, 1988:42). 
 
 In summary, from the beginning of its return to Kurdistan the PKK engaged with its 
supporters in a number of different fashions. It defended them from right-wing attacks, 
particularly the Alevi community. It advanced an understanding of Kurdistan’s social and 
political predicament, which in light of the violence which was engulfing the region seemed 
reasonable; according to this view, Kurdistan was a colony of the Turkish state and only an 
armed struggle would bring about self-determination and national liberation. In contrast to 
other groups, it actually organised and effected armed attacks on the tribal elites which 
were held to be a key component of the state’s governing apparatus and guilty of traitorous 
exploitation of their fellow Kurds. It defended itself from the attacks of other groups and 
initiated attacks against its rivals in order to carve out areas of dominance, in specifc 
workplaces and even in certain towns and cities. Contrary to certain erroneous 
understandings of the movement which have suggested that “the PKK had no popular base” 
prior to the 1980 coup d’état (Kocher, 2002:96), the evidence presented above confirms 
that the PKK had successfully mobilised large swathes of Kurdish society. It did so through 
the use of legal and extra-legal strategies to actually encounter potential supporters and to 
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make that decisive break from an insular political group to one with a broad constituency 
strongly rooted in Kurdish society. It advanced an organisational practise of shared living 
spaces which allowed it to consolidate group solidarity and convert shared political 
principles into reciprocal relations of loyalty, trust and friendship amongst its members. And 
unlike other Kurdish movements, or at least to a much greater degree, it breached class 
barriers to create a movement that encompassed all societal groups. Although Özcan 
reckoned that the Sivancilar96, the TKSP and Rizgari had arguably larger support than the 
PKK prior to the coup (2006:102), it was the PKK which emerged as the only credible vehicle 
of Kurdish resistance in its aftermath. In light of the evidence presented, it is clear that the 
foundational work done in the late 1970s in establishing a fledgling constituency was key to 
facilitating its successful re-organisation in the 1980s. 
 
State Repression 
 
 In periods of political instability, the environment in which relationships between 
armed groups and their supporters develop is heavily influenced by the activities, strength 
and cohesion of the state (Goodwin, 2001:133). In the wake of the 1980 coup Imset cites up 
to 650,000 arrests nationwide (1996:60). The massive repression in the Kurdish areas was 
evidently disproportionate if one considers that only 2% of the armed actions between 1978 
and 1980 were carried out by Kurdish separatists (Romano, 2007:47, see Imset, 1992: 5).97  
 
However, concerted state repression in Kurdistan predates the coup. On the 26th of 
December 1978 in the wake of the Maraş massacre, martial law was declared in thirteen 
provinces98 and later extended to twenty including Istanbul, Ankara, Kurdistan and the 
adjoining provinces which had large Alevi populations (Sinclair-Webb, 2003; 223 & Zürcher, 
2004:263). The martial law regime decreed that almost any expression of political activity, 
                                                        
96
 He presumably means the KIP/DDKD grouping. 
97 It is likely that the lesser state capacity in the Kurdish region, especially in the rural areas - could have led to 
a lower rate of detection and investigation of instances of political violence than in the West of the country 
where the majority of the urban left-wing violence occurred, thus skewing these statistics.  
98 Adana, Ankara, Bingöl, Elazığ, Erzincan, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Istanbul, Kahramanmaraş, Kars, Malatya, Sivas 
and Urfa were the initial districts. In April 1979 martial law was extended to the Kurdish districts of Tunceli, 
Diyarbakır, Siirt, Adıyaman, Mardin and Hakkari (Ercan, 2010: 185). 
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including those which had been hitherto legal, were liable to suffice as grounds for arrest. 
All space for contained contention (McAdam et al, 2001:10) was closed off, thus according 
to Ercan marking a turning point whereby institutionalist strategies were perceived as futile 
and the path of armed insurgency became an increasingly credible alternative (2010:184 
and see Dorronsoro & Watts, 2009, Watts 2010).  Martial law severely restricted the wider 
Kurdish movement’s capacity for mobilisation; notable PKK leaders such as Kemal Pir and 
more than a thousand of its activists were arrested.99 The security forces harvested 
extensive intelligence networks in this period which were later used to devastating effect 
after the coup (Zurcher, 2004:279). It was this environment of insecurity which led Öcalan to 
flee to Syria in the summer of 1979 (Marcus, 2007 & see Akkaya, 2005). 
 
The repression was not limited to Kurdish movement activists; politically 
unmobilised civilians in the Kurdish region also bore the brute force of the Turkish state. 
Ahmet, a self-defined second generation PKK supporter, recounted one of the first clashes 
between the PKK and the forces of the state in the hamlet of Şikestûn/Yayıklı,100 close to 
Derik in Mardin. He explained that three PKK activists were intercepted by soldiers after 
receiving a tip off. After a car chase and a gun battle, the three would-be guerrillas101 and 
three soldiers were killed in Şikestun on the 28th of March 1980. In order to avenge their 
fallen colleagues, the soldiers forced a number of the villagers to climb into large pits they 
had been excavating to store hay and pelted them with stones, resulting in a number of 
serious injuries, including to two of Ahmet’s brothers. The following day, some curious 
locals from a neighbouring village came to see for themselves what had actually happened. 
Three of these villagers were then killed by a Turkish army officer who had remained at the 
scene of previous day’s fighting. In light of the killings, Ahmet commented that his village 
                                                        
99 Jongerden suggests that prior to the coup 3,177 Kurds were arrested, 1,790 on the accusation of PKK 
membership, 667 from the PSK and Têkoşîn combined, 459 from Kawa and 1,261 from the remaining Kurdish 
groups (2007:59).  
100
 In a microcosm of the challenges facing students of Kurdish issues, it has been extremely difficult to 
establish the actual name of this village. It was referred to as Şikesun in a Cumhuriyet article on the incident, 
http://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/katalog/192/sayfa/1980/3/29.xhtml and Ahmet spelled it at the time of the 
interview as Cikestin. However, after consulting the Kurdish Studies Network it was suggested that 
Şikestûnê/Şikestun was the most likely spelling. Ahmet Akkaya kindly confirmed for me that the village is called 
Yayıklı in Turkish. 
101
 Ahmet Kurt, Mehmet Kurt and Salman Doğru were the three PKK militants that were killed (Serxwebûn, 
1983)  
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had already experienced September the 12th (date of the 1980 coup) before it had even 
occurred (Interview 18, 2012). Such indiscriminate brutality was merely a precursor for what 
was to come a few months later, only on a much grander scale.  
 
The importance of the timing of state repression has been analysed by Hafez (2003), 
who suggests that if the state clamps down prior to significant opposition mobilisation, the 
successful quelling of insurgent movements is probable. Drawing on Brockett, he contends 
that pre-emptive repression seeks “to strike at the movement before it has had an 
opportunity to gain organisational momentum” (Hafez, 2003:72) and has a reasonable 
possibility of quelling possible dissent. Re-active repression, on the other hand attempts “to 
demobilise an already organised and politically active segment of the population” (ibid) 
rendering it likely to aggravate rather dissipate opposition. The Kurdish case both confirms 
and contradicts such a hypothesis. Turkish state repression was overwhelmingly reactive; 
the groups the state sought to repress had already become large in number and had varying 
degrees of support and popular legitimacy. Nevertheless, the coup successfully demobilised 
or forced into exile all of the Kurdish groups so as to render their continued activities inside 
Turkey of negligible importance for a number of years. The PKK was severely weakened; the 
majority of its cadres who escaped arrest fled into exile, whilst those who could not seek 
refuge abroad retreated into isolated mountainous areas or went underground (Interview 
14, 2012 and Aras, 2014:168). However, within two years the PKK had begun to re-infiltrate 
across the Turkish border and lay the foundations for the upcoming insurgency. In fact “the 
1980 coup and its oppressiveness helped to create a siege mentality among Kurds, 
compelling them to think that their future was constrained and contained by the Turkish 
state” (Yavuz, 2001:12).  
 
Hafez’s hypothesis on timing fails to explain how the same reactive repression 
successfully repressed the majority of Kurdish groups but strengthened the appeal of the 
PKK. His analysis focuses on the dynamic between the state and armed groups, but it does 
not pay sufficient attention to the dynamics between the different armed groups 
themselves and the effect repression had on these sets of relationships. His approach also 
disregards the impact such extensive repression had on the relationship between armed 
groups and their supporters. The state’s humiliation and calculated brutality towards 
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thousands of Kurds lay the emotional foundation of a shared resentment, a longing for 
dignity and in many cases a thirst for revenge which transcended the previous distinction 
between militant and civilian, thus creating a resentful mass of Kurds awaiting a movement 
that would offer the opportunity to vent their personal grievances against the state.  
 
Military Coup – September 12th 1980 
 
If one draws on Sewell’s understanding of events as the “relatively rare subclass of 
happenings that significantly transform structures” (1996:262), the coup d’état as it 
developed in Kurdistan (comparably indiscriminate collective punishments were not 
conducted elsewhere in Turkey) was certainly one such transformative event. The most 
decisive impact of the coup d’état was its transformation of the “emotional landscape” 
(Aminzade & McAdam, 2001:33) of the Kurdish movements and wider Kurdish society. The 
anticipated military intervention occurred on the 12th of September 1980 (Birand, 1987:173-
190). A cabal of military officers led by General Kenan Evren announced that they had seized 
power on the pretext that civilian government was unable to bring the social and political 
unrest under control. In reality, the intervention was motivated less by instability, as it had 
been elements within the state which had been generating this same instability, and more 
by a perception that Kemalism itself was threatened. The military viewed the ongoing social 
tumult “as an attack on the core Kemalist values of national and territorial integrity by 
subversive leftist and Kurdish nationalist movements” (Zeydanlioğlu, 2009:6). Thus, a core 
underlying concern of the intervention was the supposed peril of Kurdish nationalism. A 
state of emergency was declared, the constitution was suspended, Parliament was 
dissolved, all political parties were banned, municipal governments were disbanded, 
newspapers were shut down and a wave of arrests swept the country (Zurcher, 2004: 279-
281, Sayari 1985 & 2010, Zeydanlioğlu, 20009:6-7, McDowall, 2004 415-417, Imset, 1996:60 
and Zana, 1997:9). In the short term, political violence declined by 90%, which is of course 
only a valid statistic if one chooses to ignore the violence committed by the state. The 
unprecedented scale of the state crackdown is quantitatively evident in Imset’s description: 
 
“A total of 650,000 people were detained and most suspects were either beaten or tortured. 
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Over 500 people died while under detention as a result of torture; 85,000 people were placed 
on trial mainly in relation to thought crimes by association; 1,683,000 people were officially 
listed in police files as suspects; 348,000 Turks and Kurds were banned from travelling 
abroad; 15,509 people were fired from their jobs for political reasons; 114,000 books were 
seized and burned; 937 films were banned; 2,729 writers, translators, journalists and actors 
were put on trial for expressing their opinions” (1996:60). 
 
 The cumulative quantification of the state brutality does not do justice to the socio-
psychological trauma of the immediate post-coup period on collective and individual levels 
but neither can it explain the long-term reaction it provoked. Aras has explained that 
“contrary to the aims of a politics of fear, state violence and terror do not necessarily have 
the effects of pacifying and completely controlling a subjugated people. The dynamics of 
fear can operate conversely, producing powerful counter-reactions and diverse forms of 
resistance” (2013:82). Fear is “an emotional state that influences cognitive processes, such 
as perceptions and interpretations of costs, benefits, and their relative weight” (Johnston, 
2014:34) and can lead to cowed quiescence as exemplified in the phenomenon of susto 
present in certain central American societies (Green, 1994), or conversely, determination to 
resist in spite of its inherent dangers (Wood, 2001). Johnston puts forth the notion of “anger 
spiral mechanisms” wherein “long term anger, variously distributed beforehand in the 
quiescent population is the emotional link between structural injustice and the causative 
force of immediate reflexive anger” expressed in militant political mobilisation (2014: 45). 
The presence of fear transformed into anger as a mobilising catalyst can explain the 
anomalous aspect of successful movement re-organisation in authoritarian settings with 
limited to non-existent political opportunities (see Alimi, 2009). 
 
In the case of “ordinary Kurdish subjects”, they have consistently “experienced the 
Turkish nation-state as the most powerful object of fear in their lives” (Aras, 2013:79), 
particularly during the state onslaught after the coup. As Perwer, a PKK sympathiser from a 
village adjacent to the Syrian border in Mardin, observed, after the 12th of September not 
even the leaves on the trees could be heard, such was the terror that gripped Kurdistan 
(Interview 32, 2012). Those Kurds who had been active in the various movements and could 
not escape abroad drifted from one safe house to the next, awaiting their inevitable arrest 
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and torture. Serdar, a fifteen year old PKK activist, awoke on that day in a communal house 
in Nizip and saw tanks on the street. However, the PKK had not arranged any contingency 
plans in anticipation of a military putsch, so Serdar was forced to improvise his own means 
of escaping the dragnet. He moved from one safe house to another in the Urfa district, ever 
more isolated as the PKK’s support network was slowly dismantled, until he was inevitably 
picked up by the army in his home village. Due to the huge number of prisoners, the army 
did not have adequate space to detain him, so Serdar was taken to the cellar of a high 
school in Nizip where he was held with 130-140 other prisoners, the majority of whom were 
PKK sympathisers. Notwithstanding the army’s appropriation of the basement, daily school 
life continued overhead, oblivious to the detainees in the cellar. He was tortured for two 
and a half months, usually in the company of his brother, before he was eventually 
transferred to a permanent detention facility, the 5th Zırhlı Tugay military prison in Antep 
(Interview 36, 2013).  
 
 The military’s ambitions overextended their logistical capacity, so innumerable Kurds 
who had not been identified as particularly perilous were temporarily detained in makeshift 
camps for shorter periods of time. As Perwer’s village was located on the border, it was a 
focus of military attention. The army gathered a large number of suspects – being a young 
man was sufficient to render you a suspect - from the surrounding villages, confiscated their 
weapons and detained them in one central village. All the men were tortured, with 
particular severity meted out to those believed to be politically active and to local religious 
figures. Perwer was tortured to the extent that he fell into a coma. At the insistence of his 
relatives who convinced the soldiers that it would be better for him to die at home rather 
than in their custody, he was released. It took him several weeks to recover from his 
injuries, at which point to escape further police attention he fled to Ankara to work in the 
construction industry. There was no PKK-organised presence in his immediate area and 
during that period Perwer, apart from some latent sympathies for Barzani, was completely 
disengaged from politics and more concerned with living a good Islamic life. However, he 
stated that if there had been contact with the PKK in his area after his torture he would 
have gone immediately to the mountains (Interview 32, 2012), thus highlighting a strong 
correlation between support for the PKK and the desire to seek revenge.  
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Analogous large-scale collective interrogations, torture and ritual humiliation took place 
across the region. Nijdar, a young TKSP supporter in Silwan, recalls how every man over the 
age of sixteen was gathered in the local football stadium and that individuals were chosen at 
random and tortured publicly. Those that confessed to some crime or other were moved to 
a permanent detention centre (Interview 30, 20). Violence was not confined to the male 
Kurdish population; he implied that female members of his family were also tortured, raped 
and subsequently bore children. He observed that “after the rape and pregnancy of young 
girls there was no desire for peace. It was these family assaults that led people to go to the 
mountains. It was a strong emotional reaction” (ibid).  
 
While it would be incorrect to attribute the PKK’s subsequent uprising to the impact 
of the coup d’état, as the PKK had already ideologically committed to armed insurgency and 
began preparations to that end, it is clear that the nature of the indiscriminate repression, 
cruelty and targeting of Kurdish cultural identity, as well as the de-legitimisation of the 
Turkish state and the emotional reactions it triggered, were key to the scale and speed of 
support the PKK subsequently obtained. Furthermore, it bears reconfirming that emotional 
solidarity or positive disposition to the PKK alone cannot explain its resurgence and 
expansion. The PKK’s success must be attributed to its campaigns of resistance in prison and 
the publicity they attracted, its careful use of culturally resonant symbolism and the 
strategic manner in which it framed its political message and recruited militants, as outlined 
in the sections below. 
 
Prison 
 
The detainees perceived as most dangerous to the Turkish state were transferred to 
permanent detention centres, most notoriously Diyarbakir prison102 (see Demirel 2009, Zana 
1997, Zeydanlioğlu 2009, and Whitman & Laber, 1987, Amnesty International 1984, 
amongst others, for a treatment of the conditions there).103 “Diyarbakır cehennemi”, or “the 
                                                        
102Diyarbakir prison has a long renown as a site of brutality and torture of political prisoners dating back to the 
Ottoman period. Nationalists from the Balkans were detained and tortured there in the 19
th
 century.  
103
These websites in Turkish also provide extensive documentation of the period: 
http://www.diyarbakirzindani.com/  http://www.78liler.org/78web/default.asp  
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torture of Diyarbakir” (Zeydanlioğlu 2009:7) as the period has become known, lasted until 
1984 when conditions improved with the return of civilian government. Torture was a 
certainty in the prison and death a strong likelihood; unofficial sources cite sixty seven 
deaths in the prison (Whitman & Leber, 1987:96). The torture took an incredible variety of 
forms; in Mehdi Zana’s book he refers to thirty two different types to which he was 
personally subjected or of which he had first-hand evidence (1997). The types of torture 
most resented by the prisoners were those which, aside from the unimaginable pain, had 
the objective of deliberately humiliating the prisoners. Zana recounted a collective form of 
torture which involved prisoners sodomising fellow prisoners with a baton. Prisoners that 
refused to comply were then brutalised by the guards. Zana detailed one such occasion: 
 
[...]They sodomized him with the club, in front of us, and when they took it out, all covered in 
blood, they shoved it in his mouth to make him suck it. Those who underwent this test were 
broken for months, their virility destroyed. We tried to boost their spirits. In order not to 
undergo this dreaded torture, the prisoners submitted. So they were forced to shout, ‘I am so 
proud to be Turkish... (1997: 18-19) 
 
 The occasional visiting hours that were conceded were heavily supervised and it was 
strictly forbidden to speak Kurdish, even though many of the visiting family members were 
completely unable to converse in Turkish. Mazlum’s mother could only speak Kurdish and 
accordingly could not communicate during visiting hours with her son. These silent visits 
went on for a year or so, when they could only “communicate with their eyes” until one day 
Mazlum said to her in Kurdish “Don’t worry about me, I am fine. How are you?” Visiting 
hours were immediately cancelled and he was tortured for hours for the mere act of 
uttering half a dozen Kurdish words (Interview 24, 2012). Visiting hours were also exploited 
by the prison authorities to play perverse psychological tricks, presumably for their own 
amusement, on the visiting families. As Salih explained: 
 
 “Once, they forced us to say ‘how are the lentils?’ We did not have any lentils in the village. I 
asked my father the question, and my father started crying. I repeated the question over and 
over again ... My father thought I was gone mad (Interview 21 - Salih, 2012). 
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Torture is usually applied as a means to an end: the extracting of information. A 
torture expert, Murat Paker, cited in Zeydanlioğlu, argues that it is more correct to consider 
the Diyarbakir prison as a form of concentration camp (2009:9). The ‘end’ or objective of the 
torture that took place in Diyarbakir was not to gather intelligence and/or dismantle certain 
political organisations. It was rather the mental and on occasion physical destruction of the 
prisoners who were viewed as the leaders of the Kurdish movements and thus the vanguard 
in the burgeoning revival of Kurdish identity. Mazlum pointedly compared the prison to a 
laboratory, with prisoners in the role of laboratory rats (Interview 24, 2012). Human guinea 
pigs in a remorseless Turkification experiment. The physical and psychological devastation 
of these prisoners was viewed as key to the annihilation of the Kurdish identity itself, an 
identity which had of course no place in the Turkey envisaged by the generals. Thus, the 
torture regime in prison was a de-ethnicising project, a grand design of Turkification which 
would extirpate any lingering roots of Kurdish identity (Zeydanlioğlu, 2009: 10). However, 
just as the oppression in the wider region had fostered the favourable environment that 
would nuture the PKK, the brutalisation of the Diyarbakir prison shaped the militants that 
would become its central cadre.  
 
The strong emotional bonds that formed in the bowels of the barbarism of the 
Turkish state proved to be enduring. Salih, while awaiting his execution even though he was 
legally a minor, recounts: 
 
 We were not given bread all the time, and not everybody would get it when it was 
distributed. Mazlum Doğan was given a quarter [piece] of bread, and he did not eat that 
bread. In the night, he struggled to throw the bread tied to a rope, to my cell, which was four 
cells away from his. That was very risky, because after the doors were closed by midnight, 
we were all under surveillance and any contact with other prisoners could result in heavy 
torture and even death. He struggled for one hour and by throwing my pyjamas on the 
bread, I took it. It was not bread that would ease my hunger; it only changed the taste in my 
mouth. I always say that, from the age of 17 until now, 50, my ideology, my politics and 
everything is hidden in that bread or a glass of water that was shared ... Apart from the fear 
and all other feelings, I have got to know the real Turkish state and the real PKK in prison. In 
a way what made me a real PKK sympathizer and what gave me my real identity was the 
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state and its applications in Diyarbakir prison (Interview 21, 2012).  
 
Salih’s experience was far from unusual. Another prisoner, Selim Dindar, observed 
that “they made militants out of people in the Diyarbakır prison. Almost 80 percent of these 
people went to the mountains [took up arms]. It was very difficult for someone to pursue a 
normal life after having experienced such brutality” (in Zeydanlioğlu, 2009: 8). The families 
of the prisoners subjected to this treatment were similarly radicalised, they became 
“resilient and political” (Salih, Interview 21, 2012). It was this nucleus of former prisoners 
and their families that emerged as the key movement actors in the period when the PKK 
was consolidating itself inside Turkey in the late 1980s.  
 
The Post-Coup Period 
 
 As stated, the increased repression in the lead-up to the coup had induced Öcalan to 
flee to Syria in the summer of 1979. By means of the acquaintance of some Lebanon-based 
Kurds, he got in touch with the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and 
they agreed to help train a number of PKK militants in camps in Lebanon. As Mamdoh Nofal, 
a former DFLP commander explained, “we accept[ed] the Marxist-Leninist groups because 
we are Marxist-Leninist” (in Marcus, 2007:56). Thus in early 1980 the PKK joined the 
plethora of other revolutionary groups receiving military instruction from Palestinian groups 
based in Lebanon and Syria. In addition to training in basic warfare techniques, the 
importance of a civil militia was also impressed upon the PKK by the DFLP, advice that the 
former subsequently used to great effect in Kurdistan (ibid: 57). Immediately after the coup, 
Öcalan passed word to the rest of the PKK militants to flee Turkey (ibid: 52) and by 1982, up 
to 300 militants were receiving military instruction in Lebanon. A number of PKK members 
fought the invading Israeli forces in Lebanon in 1982 and a founding member, Abdullah 
Kumral, was killed in these clashes (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011:18). This period after the 
coup was one of a regrouping; “it was a period of reorganisation, extensive political and 
military training and preparation in exile” (Imset, 1992:33). Most importantly, almost all PKK 
activities inside Kurdistan ceased and the movement was forced to bide its time abroad 
before re-starting its initiatives inside Turkish borders.  
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There is however, some debate as to whether all of its active militants fled abroad. 
Abdullah explained that in the Bingöl area a small contingent of militants withdrew to an 
inaccessible mountainous zone where they studiously avoided contact with the forces of the 
state but had intermittent contact with surrounding sympathetic villages (Interview 14, 
2012). Nonetheless, the coup successfully, if but for a short period, destroyed the PKK’s 
operational activities within Turkish borders. The climate of state terror even led many 
politically active Kurds to actively distance themselves publicly from their previous 
allegiances. Ahmet explained that in his village Cikestin, certain Kurds began ostentatiously 
drinking alcohol in public to show their distance from the PKK; prior to that the PKK had 
banned the consumption of alcohol as it was viewed as a distraction from the revolution 
(Interview 18, 2012).  
 
 In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Kurdish activists from all the groups that 
escaped immediate arrest fled abroad, mainly to Syria because of its proximity and long and 
relatively porous border. In the previous years of frenetic mobilisation the main groups 
within the wider Kurdish struggle gained a degree of public profile, even those clandestine 
groups who operated through front organisations. Although this public presence was 
necessary to recruit members and succeed in municipal elections and trade union politics, it 
had a downside: it brought the movement actors to the knowledge of the authorities (Ercan, 
2010:165-166). Although the PKK had engaged in legal mobilisation, it did so to a lesser 
extent than its Kurdish rivals, as it was primarily concerned with preparing for the 
anticipated insurgency and thus largely remained within the extra-legal realm of 
mobilisation. Rival groups such as the TKSP and KIP’s activities were located somewhere in 
the grey area between legal and extra-legal and their more public presence ensured that 
their activists were easier tracked down by the authorities after the coup. Accordingly, 
although the PKK suffered enormous personnel loss in the period, it maintained a degree of 
structural cohesion which allowed it to re-group fairly rapidly in Syria, unlike the other 
groups which rapidly fragmented (Ercan, 2010: 207-208). However, the PKK was sufficiently 
aware of its weakness to reach out to its erstwhile Kurdish rivals and the radical Turkish left. 
Through the mediation of Jalal Talalbani, Kemal Burkay agreed to meet with Öcalan 
regarding a potential détente and future co-operation. Burkay demanded that Öcalan 
publicly denounce the PKK’s past attacks on fellow Kurdish groups (Marcus, 2007:65). At a 
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PKK party conference in 1981 in Lebanon, Öcalan offered such a public apology for the PKK’s 
past mistakes (ibid) but nonetheless failed to convince any Kurdish groups of its good 
intentions and so no alliance was ever formed. This period of negotiations remains unclear, 
and it has been suggested that Öcalan even offered the leadership of any future alliance to 
Burkay (Interview 24, 2012). The TKSP has since represented its refusal to co-operate in an 
alliance as rooted in a principled stance against violence, which is contradicted in its own 
party programme that conceded the possible necessity of armed struggle (in Gunes, 
2012:93). It is much more probable that the mistrust generated in the period of inter-
movement violence made any such alliance at that time unthinkable for the TKSP and other 
Kurdish groups.  
 
 The radical Turkish left, which had not suffered from a similarly intense rivalry with 
the PKK like the other Kurdish movements, agreed to form an alliance with the PKK, the 
FKBDC (Unified Resistance Front Against Fascism/ Faşizme Karşı Birleşik Direniş Cephesi) 
(Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011:133 and Marcus, 2007:65).104 The most important and only 
other group with significant military capacity was Dev-Yol. In 1981 the PKK sent a number of 
senior cadres to Germany, subsequent to which Dev-Yol and the PKK established a coalition 
called Bir-Kom (Common Committee/Birlik Komitesi) in order to mobilise the waves of 
politicised Turks and Kurds fleeing Turkey. Germany also had the additional advantage of a 
large pre-existing migrant community of gastarbeiter who provided an ulterior pool of 
potential recruits (Van Bruinessen, 1998:45). Zar from Dersim was one such non-politicised 
gastarbeiter who moved to the Frankfurt area in Germany in the late 1970s, a time when he 
still self-identified as a Turk. He frequented socialist circles organised by the TKP and TIP, 
however his political awakening as a Kurd was triggered at a Bir-Kom seminar organised at 
the University of Frankfurt in 1982. A panel discussion of a wide array of groups was 
present, representing KOMKAR, Dev-Yol and the PKK, amongst others. He recalls that the 
PKK speaker referred to Kurdistan, and it was the first time Zar had ever heard anyone make 
public reference to Kurdistan; he describes the moment as a turning point in his life. From 
that point forth, he considered himself a Kurd and began frequenting Kurdish community 
centres that were rapidly springing up all over Germany wherever Kurdish migrants were to 
                                                        
104 For a full list of participating organisations see Jongerden and Akkaya (2011:65). 
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be found. He subsequently discovered that the community centre in his nearby town – a 
town with a large refugee camp thus ensuring the presence of a sizeable politicised cohort 
from Turkey - had been actively recruiting for the upcoming insurgency, and the PKK 
speaker which had triggered his political awakening took part in the 15th of August attacks in 
Şemdinli in 1984 (Interview 34, 2013). The PKK thus rapidly took root in the Kurdish 
diaspora, which served as a form of “free space” (Polletta, 1999) or a “safe territory” (Bosi, 
2013) whence the PKK obtained financial support and recruits. Europe was a secure 
organisational environment when mobilisation on the ground in Turkey proved impossible. 
In addition to the diaspora mobilisation in Europe, it also gathered strong support amongst 
Kurdish migrant workers in Libya, a number of whom travelled directly to Lebanon for 
military training (Imset, 1996 & Interview 37, 2013). 
 The other significant development of the interim period between the coup and the 
launch of the uprising was the Second Party Congress in August 1982, held on the Syrian-
Jordanian border. It marked a point where the PKK had regrouped sufficiently to begin plans 
to resume the struggle inside Turkey (McDowall, 2004:422) and the three anticipated 
phases of the struggle were laid out: strategic defence, strategic balance and strategic 
offence (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011:136, Imset, 1996 & 1992:33). The HRK (Kurdistan 
Freedom Brigades/Hêzên Rizgariya Kürdistan) was also established as a distinct formation 
within the PKK solely concerned with the military campaign (Gunter, 1997:47). The 
structural realignment of Turkey’s domestic political environment under the generals, as 
predicted by realms of literature related to political opportunity structure, rendered 
guerrilla warfare the only plausible option for the PKK. Thereafter all of the PKK’s activities 
were focused on realising the armed struggle and side projects such as labour activism and 
municipal politics, which could have had a moderating influence on the movement, were 
discarded.  
Somewhat ambitiously, the launch of the insurgency was set for autumn 1983, but 
was subsequently postponed to the following summer for logistical reasons. The civil war in 
Lebanon had rendered it too unstable a location to maintain as the PKK’s primary base. An 
accord was struck with Barzani and the KDP in 1982 which allowed the PKK to set up 
permanent camps in KDP territory in the mountainous area of southern Kurdistan along the 
border with Turkey (Marcus, 2007:68-71). It was the perfect geographical base from which 
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to launch attacks across the border inside Turkey, and from 1983 onwards PKK fighters 
began to slowly infiltrate Turkey. According to Sari Baran, a former PKK militant, the 
purpose of these infiltrations was to “learn the geography, figure out where the guerrillas 
could hide, find out the views of the people to the PKK struggle and learn where the Turkish 
soldiers were based” (in Marcus, 2007:76).  
 
 The profile of the PKK was inadvertently boosted by the ongoing show trials of PKK 
prisoners in 1981 which were truly Kafkaesque in nature (Demirel, 2009). Judicial protocol 
was applied on an ad hoc basis and the evident signs of torture on many of the defendants 
were ignored. However, the PKK unlike other Kurdish groups used the trials to their 
advantage by converting them into political platforms. The prisoners who realistically knew 
that they had little or no chance of release launched impassioned defences of the PKK. 
Mehmet Hayri Durmuş announced from the dock in 1981 that “by making a prolonged 
people’s war [we] will be able to liberate our country” (in Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011:131), 
while Kemal Pir declared that “the revolution in Kurdistan is a revolution of national 
liberation”. He defiantly continued “our aim is to do it. We will do it. After ten years, after 
twenty years [...]” (ibid). Aside from some Kawa members, the other Kurdish groups on trial 
such as the TKSP, KUK, Rizgari or the KIP/DDKD “either short-circuited the political 
dimensions of the trials by presenting their groups as only a periodical [...] or not defending 
the movement at all” (Gunes, 2012:99). The PKK was also strategic in its manipulation of the 
courts, and not all prisoners blindly defended the movement to their individual 
detriment.105 As Serdar explained, he was tried with 515 other PKK prisoners in April 1982, 
and prior to the trial a strategy had been adopted according to which prisoners with the 
strong likelihood of release did not offer a political defence, while those almost certain of 
condemnation proffered eloquent political discourses intent on inspiring the Kurdish masses 
(Interview 36, 2013). The movement took a pragmatic approach to principled defence as it 
needed the manpower outside to prepare for the insurgency.  
                                                        
105 The PKK’s calculated use of its court appearances is in contrast to a number of other ideologically blinkered 
left wing movements. To give but one example, the Greek Communist Party (KKE) preferred its imprisoned 
members to condemn themselves to years of torture and prison rather than make use of a strategic 
denouncement of the party, under the Metaxas dictatorship of the late 1930s (Charitopoulos, 2012). 
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The PKK’s court appearances thus compounded the popular belief that the PKK was the only 
Kurdish movement still actively engaged in resisting the Turkish state.  
 
Although PKK guerrillas began to organise on a systematic basis from 1983 inside 
Turkey’s borders, it began to reassert itself in Kurdistan in subtle ways prior to that date. 
Ahmet explains that in his village in Mardin smugglers started to bring PKK publications 
across the border from Syria in late 1981. PKK supporters then clandestinely distributed 
them amongst families known to be sympathetic to the movement. As he was a car owner, 
he describes himself as living at night in this period as he was regularly called upon to ferry 
people from the mountains to the border and vice versa. It was also at this time that he first 
encountered a uniformed guerrilla. He claims that by 1982 the fear was over (Interview 18 – 
2012). The PKK’s presence was ever more substantial along the border, and only seven days 
after his release in April 1982 Serdar was approached in his village Çiftlik in Urfa by three 
armed guerrillas who asked him to prepare reports about Kurdish prisoners who had been 
released, the general political atmosphere in the area and which families they should or 
should not approach (Interview 36, 2013). It should be noted however that Çiftlik had been 
an area of notable PKK support prior to the coup.  
 
 In preparation for the armed campaign, the PKK necessarily needed to go beyond its 
former networks of supporters and engage with elements of Kurdish society with which it 
had previously enjoyed little or no contact, particularly in the rural areas. It concentrated its 
efforts on the small villages close to the Syrian border and in the Botan area, where the first 
clashes were to later occur. At this point the guerrillas avoided any military clashes and their 
only concern was in organising reliable networks of contacts in the villages. The PKK was 
extremely cautious about the topics it broached with potential supporters. In the villages 
around Bingöl, it spoke of the past Kurdish heroes of the area such as Seyt Riza106 and of the 
natural rights that the Kurds deserved to have comparable to those of the Turks, but they 
never spoke of Marxism or ideologically convoluted theories (Interview 14, 2012). According 
to Sari Baran in that period: 
                                                        
106
 Leader of the Dersim resistance in 1936-1938. 
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“if we met someone who was interested we would talk about Marxism-Leninism, otherwise, 
we would speak of the national struggle. That is what people were interested in. Either they 
really were not able to understand anything about socialism, or else they opposed the 
socialism because they saw it as anti-Islamic” (in Marcus, 2007:77). 
 
Perwer, who also lived close to the Syrian border, remarked that in spite of the fact 
that he was very religious, he had sympathy for them just because he saw them as a way to 
overcome the state reprisals and the depression of the period. He explained that people 
“did not know about Lenin and Marx, socialism or communism. They just knew that these 
people are fighting for me, a poor ordinary Kurd that wants freedom” (Interview 32, 2012).  
This marked a divergence in PKK strategy from the pre-coup period where it delivered 
eighteen books on communism to Ahmet’s village in 1979 and demanded that whoever was 
educated read them (Interview 18, 2012). Consider the Marxist rhetoric in the leaflet that 
the PKK distributed after the initial attack on the Bucak family in 1979: 
 
Forward to an independent, united democratic Kurdistan! 
Down with Imperialism and Colonialism! 
Long live Independence and proletariat Internationalism! 
Long live the PKK! (in Marcus, 2007:46). 
 
It is clear that the PKK had adopted a more nuanced ideological approach to win 
over the vast swathes of the population that was Islamic and unfamiliar with or opposed to 
left-wing ideals. It used a dual framing strategy according to its target audience. The PKK 
continued to use official Marxist discourse in its publications until the mid-1980s but after 
1986 it almost completely disappeared (Interview 37, 2013). However, as their publications 
in this period had only a restricted distribution – primarily amongst pre-existing networks of 
PKK supporters - the average Kurdish villager’s interaction with the PKK was through their 
face-to-face contact in personal encounters. Therefore, the impression of the PKK rural 
Kurds developed was of Kurdish rebels fighting the state, the latest addition to the 
pantheon of national heroes, and not that of a Marxist group. The PKK for all of its rhetorical 
Marxist flourishes to the Turkish left and the wider international revolutionary community 
such as the Palestinian movements was inherently flexible in the manner in which it 
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presented itself. According to an interviewee, the PKK never attempted to impose 
doctrinaire Marxism on the wider populace (Interview 37, 2013).107 Its cautious use of 
Marxism also distinguished itself from the radical Turkish left, which to this day makes use 
of very orthodox Marxist rhetoric.  
 
Notwithstanding, the PKK’s reluctance to indiscriminately preach the tenets of 
Marxism to wider Kurdish society, it was still Marxist in orientation and all new recruits were 
indoctrinated in the theories of the left.108 The PKK was cognisant of the contrasting cultural 
and political norms of those whose support they sought to obtain. That they actively 
avoided rather than confronted these ideological chasms supports the hypothesis that the 
normative tenets of the populace dictated the PKK’s strategic decision making. That is not 
however to accuse the PKK of duplicity, but rather to recognise that it adopted different 
registers when engaging with different audiences. It addressed the wider revolutionary 
community (national and international) as Marxists and its incipient rural support base as 
national rebels fighting the repressive state. The PKK was not undermined by this apparent 
contradiction but strengthened by having the strategic capacity to emphasise whichever 
aspect of their discourse resonated more with their particular audience in specific socio-
spatial environments.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has detailed the PKK’s ten year pre-conflict gestation period, which 
traversed arguably the most tumultuous period of modern Turkish history, characterised by 
unprecedented social upheaval, violent street politics and the sadistic brutality and radical 
political transformation of the 1980 coup d’état. In the course of this decade the PKK 
evolved from an introspective and rather unremarkable leftist student group in the 
university milieu of Ankara to a rural based guerrilla army. In the pre-coup period its 
                                                        
107 Unlike for example the Sendero Luminoso which hung dogs from electric cables in response to internal 
feuds in the Chinese Communist Party. 
108
 In my own personal experience, even today, twenty years after the hammer and sickle has been removed 
from the PKK’s flag, a large portion of the movement cadre furiously refute any suggestion that the movement 
has drifted from its leftist founding principles, arguing that they have simply evolved in reaction to the 
changing international environment. 
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emergence was in concert with a wide variety of leftist and Kurdish movements with which 
it had inconsistent relationships, ranging from collaborative to hostile. Its bellicose 
transition was accordingly neither the result of a strategic decision nor of a Fanonian 
idealisation of violence but came about due to processes of competitive escalation with its 
allies and reciprocal escalation with its opponents, all conditioned by the changing political 
structural environment. Prior to the coup, its repertoire of contention embraced much of 
the political opportunities available to it by engaging in conventional practises such as 
municipal politics, trade unionism and quotidian interactions of a more mundane quality 
with its putative supporters. Accordingly, it rapidly consolidated a robust constituency, 
bolstered by kin and associational networks, bonds of emotional commitment and a 
network of houses and spaces which facilitated relations of utilitarian exchange and 
moments of encounter with ever-expanding swathes of Kurdish society. 
 
The coup rapidly transformed the political environment and in simple terms the PKK 
reacted better to the altered political opportunities than its erstwhile Kurdish rivals who for 
the most part were relegated to political marginality. Certainly, the PKK had been less 
publicly exposed than some of them due to its lesser engagement with conventional politics 
but it too suffered enormously in terms of losing members and senior cadres to 
imprisonment, death and exile. The PKK distinguished itself by re-assessing its previous 
mobilisation strategies and its hostility towards other Kurdish movements. It adopted a dual 
framing strategy whereby it emphasised its Marxist credentials to better-educated and 
politically mobilised elements of society and its Kurdish nationalism to its largely rural and 
politically less literate audiences. It organised courageous resistance inside the prison 
system and manipulated its court appearances to its advantage. It also benefitted from its 
links with the radical Turkish left to reorganise in the diaspora, as well as a degree of 
external support from the Syrians and the Kurds in Southern Kurdistan. The PKK’s decision 
to remain in the vicinity of the Turkish borders and reject the greater security on offer as 
political exiles in Europe proved a wise choice in the long term.  
 
However, the PKK’s post-coup mobilisation strategies would most likely not have 
come to fruition so quickly were it not for the fact that, in addition to its antecedently 
mobilised constituency, almost the entirety of its “mobilisation potential” (Klandermans & 
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Oegema, 1987) had been emotionally traumatised by the military takeover. Large parts of 
Kurdish society were simmering with sentiments of fear, humiliation, resentment and rage. 
And the PKK successfully presented itself as a vehicle to channel this potent emotional mix 
into a determination to wreak vengeance on the state. Such were the developments that 
ensured that the PKK was the only group in a position to adopt the mantle of Kurdish 
resistance and its attack on the 15th of August transformed, in the words of Ahmet, “the 
darkness into light” (Interview 18, 2012), thereby launching the longest insurgency 
witnessed in modern Turkish and Kurdish history. 
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Chapter IV: PKK and Rural Insurgency 
 
Introduction 
 
 By August 1984, the PKK had infiltrated three units of its armed forces, the HRK into 
Kurdistan, thus exposing itself to the full military wrath of the Turkish state. Armed groups 
are most vulnerable in their early periods of mobilisation. Guerrillas’ inexperience, lack of 
local knowledge, absence of geographically and socially proximate constituencies and the 
unpredictability of state responses renders it the most dangerous phase of an armed 
group’s existence. Innumerable rebellions, those that are never usually lauded in the history 
books or about which songs are never sung, have been dismantled before they actually ever 
really started, from the local example of the Ordiya Rizgariya Kurdistanê led by Urfan 
Alparslan prior to the coup, to more well known examples such as Che Guevara’s failed 
uprising in Bolivia in 1967. The PKK had followed the classic urban to rural trajectory, 
relocating to a drastically different socio-spatial environment. They had shifted to an area 
where they had at best an incipient constituency, and in order to avoid immediate 
dismantlement by the state, obliged to urgently establish a relationship with the residents 
of the rural communities. As Wickham-Crowley observed: 
 
“how could it [an armed group] survive without a peasantry willing to protect guerrillas from 
army patrols with silence and misdirection; without peasants willing to join the band and 
give to the group s familiarity with local conditions and persons otherwise impossible to 
achieve; without peasants willing to provide at least a modicum of food and other 
resources? If the peasantry turns against the guerrillas, there is no way for them to survive 
except as bandits” (1992:52). 
 
The PKK’s first challenge was, therefore, the consolidation of its physical presence in 
the region or the realisation of a safe territory. By the early 1990s, the PKK had undeniably 
achieved such a safe territory and expanded from its initial three armed units to a guerrilla 
army of more than ten thousand fighters spread across eleven distinct geographical regions 
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(see Gunes, 2012: 106-107), mobilised a rural militia or milis, and a Turkey and Europe wide 
popular political front, the ERNK (National Liberation Front of Kurdistan/Eniye Rizgariye 
Navata Kurdistan). This rapid expansion occurred notwithstanding the massive opposition of 
the Turkish armed forces directed against the guerrilla forces themselves and the 
communities which supported them. It was achieved in spite of local armed opposition from 
Kurdish pro-state Village Guard militias, the organisational difficulties posed by the rapid 
expansion of the PKK’s ranks, hierarchical tensions within the movement and destabilising 
regional developments such as the Anfal campaign and the Gulf War.  
 
 In chronological terms, this chapter will detail the PKK’s period of rural insurgency 
from 1984 until its peak in 1993 and will focus spatially on its activities in rural areas. The 
importance of structural factors has been argued to varying degrees by a range of authors 
(Goodwin, 2001:25 and Wickham-Crowley, 1993). However the limitations of the 
structuralist approach are evident when insurgent movements’ successes confound 
structuralist expectations or in cases where structures impact on similar actors in different 
fashions. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on movement agency (Jasper, 2006) and how the 
specific strategies enacted by insurgent movements can reconfigure the broader socio-
political environment to render it more favourable to the realisation their revolutionary 
objectives. The chapter will remain cognisant that movement agency is influenced by its 
cultural and institutional context (ibid: 5). It will also maintain the interactive approach in 
the process oriented perspective as previously outlined (Bosi et al, 2014).  
 
The PKK followed a Guevarist foco strategy (see Guevara, 2006 and Debray, 1967) 
which, in its most basic understanding, held that a small insurgent vanguard could trigger a 
revolution notwithstanding unfavourable structural conditions.  The chapter will discuss the 
manner in which the PKK adopted and adapted this foco strategy for the Kurdish context. It 
will elaborate on the contrasting challenges of immediate survival and the subsequent 
organisational tensions inherent in the movement’s rapid expansion. It will attempt to 
explain the role of figure of Abdullah Öcalan and how he established almost uncontested 
control of the movement. It will then discuss the main theoretical paradigm of this project, 
armed groups’ constituencies and how the PKK managed to forge one in the unpropitious 
environment of rural Kurdistan. Its constituency was facilitated by a form of cognitive 
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liberation that dismantled the popular understanding of the state’s impregnability and was 
bolstered by the PKK’s construction of a form of “state-in-formation” (Goodwin, 2001: 12). It 
will further explain how the PKK’s practises of violence affected this incipient constituency 
and in turn the role its constituency played in enabling the extension of the PKK’s repertoire 
of contention. 
 
Rural Insurgency 
 
The PKK as discussed in Chapter III moved from the urban spaces of Ankara to 
Kurdistan in the mid 1970s. It expanded its presence in Kurdistan by means of political and 
personal networks of acquaintances and it had been most active in urban environments, 
enjoying significant degrees of support in cities like Antep and big towns like Kiziltepe and 
Mardin. However, that is not to say, that it was exclusively an urban organisation, it made 
strenuous efforts to mobilise in the rural areas, most notably in campaigns against the 
aşirets in Urfa and Hilwan, but it remained for the most part an urban oriented movement. 
This changed utterly in the lead up to 1984, and the guerrilla forces henceforth became 
deeply rooted in the countryside with a lesser presence in urban areas. The PKK insurgency 
developed in the rural periphery, in areas with minimal state presence. Its guerrilla units, as 
per the understanding of Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh, represented the revolutionary 
vanguard but were not themselves the centre or guiding force of the revolution, which as 
befitted orthodox Communist dogma remained the preserve of the party itself (drawing on 
Moreno, 2010: 400). The adoption of a strategy of rural insurgency seems to have been 
born of necessity rather than a conviction that “the countryside and the countryside alone, 
can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolution can go forward to final 
victory” (Mao Zedong in Alroy 2010: 257).  
 
The PKK encountered a number of specific challenges in its rural mobilisation, not 
least the lack of resonance its socialist discourse generated in rural areas - as already 
discussed in Chapter III - which they overcame by a calculated framing of the conflict when 
interacting with potential supporters. As Faqi, a former guerrilla from Dersim pithily 
explained, PKK members were very aware which kind of issues should be addressed, in 
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which contexts and to whom (Interview 35, 2013). Nevertheless, the ideological gap 
remained an issue. Karsaz, a religious Kurd active in the Azadi movement remarked that the 
“Marxist jargon” utilised by the PKK and its “ideological structure” was problematic for 
many Kurds. He opined that were it not for this ideological gap, that the Kurds of Turkey by 
this stage would enjoy at least the same degree of autonomy as the Kurds in Southern 
Kurdistan in the contemporary KRG (Interview 26, 2012 and see Aras, 2013:86-87).  
 
Aside from this specific challenge there are a number of other difficulties in 
mobilising peasants. Unlike urban workers, agricultural labour is often carried out on an 
individual basis thus reducing the potential of solidarity derived from collective labour 
(Wolf, 2010:291). “The tyranny of work weighs heavily among the peasants: their life is 
geared to an annual routine and to planning for the year to come” (ibid)109 thus rendering 
them inflexible in terms of commitment. In addition, “peasants’ interests [...] often cross-cut 
class alignments. Rich and poor peasants may be kinfolk [...]” (ibid and Kalyvas, 2003: 478). 
This specific social structure ensures that many poorer elements of rural society bound by 
blood obligations are often reluctant to engage in mobilisation that would oppose their 
kinsmen. In short, horizontal solidarities are often more difficult to forge in rural areas 
because they are inhibited by historic, vertical solidarities.  
 
The more developed “formal and informal infrastructures” and “dense affective 
familial and personal relations” that would have facilitated the construction of a PKK “safe 
territory” (Bosi, 2013:81) were located in urban areas, off limits to the guerrillas. The 
insurgents relocated their theatre of activities to the mountainous Botan region, a 
geographically favourable location because it skirts the Iraqi and Syrian borders.  Although 
space is indeed “a social artifact” (ibid: 82), it necessarily takes shape in a specific 
geographical space.  
                                                        
109
 Zapata and his ‘Army of the South” overcame this issue by alternating its soldiers on a three monthly basis 
between military service and agricultural labour (Milton, 2006:35). 
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And the geographical space in which the insurgent mobilisation occurred was 
characterised by a variety of favourable characteristics, most notably its imposing 
mountains, limited state presence, transport and communications infrastructure (see 
Chaliand, 1987: 53-54, Hendrix, 2011, Cederman, 2008, Collier & Hoeffler, 2000, and 
O’Sullivan, 1983). Indeed, the terrain in Kurdistan provides the three geographic features 
outlined by Clausewitz for a successful guerrilla campaign, it is in the interior of the country; 
it is an extensive area; and is characterised by irregular countryside (in O’Sullivan, 1983: 
140). It also overlaps with a further condition listed by Clausewitz, “a national character [...] 
favourable to war” (ibid). Rural Kurdistan is in this regard, a more favourable location for 
insurgency than its urban centres. In addition the routine physical hardship of rural life, 
perpetual inter-tribal conflicts and the practise of blood feuding (see Van Bruinessen, 1992), 
the widespread possession of arms and the collective historic memory of resistance and 
rebellion of the early Turkish Republic arguably favour an insurgent mentality. 
Notwithstanding these factors in its favour, the decisive aspect of the PKK’s nascent 
insurgency was to hinge on its capacity to win the support of the locals; as Chaliand 
observed “a guerrilla movement can only survive with the support of that part of the 
population on which it depends for information, communications, food and recruits” 
(1987:48). It is to this nexus of relations between the PKK and its immediate social – rather 
than physical – environment that this chapter will focus.  
 
Attacks on Eruh and Şemdinli 
 
 On the night of the 15th of August, two units of between ten and thirty PKK fighters 
launched attacks on the army barracks in Eruh and the gendarmerie base in Şemdinli110. The 
assaults had been meticulously planned; the particular locations were chosen because they 
were deep in mountainous territory thus providing a number of escape routes for the 
guerrillas. They were small villages and accordingly did not host large numbers of soldiers or 
policemen. The sites were not, however, selected for exclusively strategic reasons. The PKK 
shunned targets closer to the border - from which it would have been easier to flee to cross 
                                                        
110
A third attack was planned for Çatak but for some logistical reasons was never carried out. The commander 
responsible for the failed mission, Terzi Cemal was later arrested by the PKK prior to its Third Congress in 1986 
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border safety of Iraq or Syria – “because clashes there might either be blamed on smugglers 
or dismissed by both Kurds and the state as not a serious challenge” (Marcus, 2007:79). Sari 
Baran, a guerrilla commander who participated in the attack explained that the objective of 
the attack as not “to kill a lot of soldiers” (in Marcus, 2007:79) but rather to serve as a 
clarion call for the conflict which was to come; its value was primarily symbolic rather than 
strategic.  
 
The PKK was of the understanding that there would be popular support for the 
armed struggle but that the brutality of the coup period had demoralised large portions of 
the Kurdish population. As Baran asserted “we understand (sic) that if we started the armed 
struggle, and gave the image that we are (sic) growing and strong, then we could win the 
support of the people” (ibid:78). The PKK believed that it was not necessary to have an 
extensive movement to start an armed campaign and that recruitment would derive from 
the practise of violence itself, thus echoing its pre-coup approach whereby violence of a 
lesser intensity had proven to be a successful mobilisational strategy. The structural 
conditions were not opportune for armed struggle; the state had penetrated Kurdish society 
to an unprecedented extent and many of the PKK’s senior cadres were in prison or 
dispersed abroad. Yet, the PKK’s perceptive reading of the long term insurrectionary 
potential of the Kurdish people convinced them to embark on a foco strategy which holds 
that “it is not necessary to wait until all conditions  for making revolution exist; the 
insurrection can create them” (Guevara, 2006:66). Johnston has explained that the initial 
acts of rebellion in authoritarian settings are central to a process that he has called “fear 
abatement”.  The first steps of resistance have as their “primary audiences – and this is 
crucial to the mechanism [fear abatement] – those citizens who were more timid and 
quiescent” thereby “offering affirmation that there are many who are dissatisfied with 
regime and, if you are too, you  are not alone” (2014: 37). The attacks can therefore be 
viewed as directed toward wider Kurdish society rather than as a means of communicating 
with the state. It was thus, the PKK that took the initiative to launch the struggle against the 
Turkish regime, instead of waiting for the perfect storm of structural conditions that would 
have facilitated rebellion.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
and questioned because of the failure (Marcus, 2007:110). 
151 
 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the PKK carried out a number of further attacks with a 
significant degree of success throughout the autumn of 1984 (Marcus, 2007:82), the 
revitalised PKK was not yet viewed as a major concern by the vertices of the Turkish army. 
As Marcus observes “the ban  on Kurdish-related activities was so complete that the ruling 
powers could be forgiven for having forgotten that there was, in fact, a Kurdish problem in 
Turkey” (ibid: 85). The Kurdish question, from a military perspective, was viewed as resolved 
because the militant groups were dissolved or dispersed in exile. The regime’s enactment of 
a series of legislation, such as the notorious Law 2932111 passed in 1983 (see Oran 2000:153 
& Aslan 2009); with the objective of re-configuring the Kurdish cultural landscape was seen 
as the ultimate guarantor of long term re-establishment of Kemalist hegemony in the 
region. Indeed, the regime was more concerned by the daring attacks carried out by 
Armenian radical groups than it was with any nascent Kurdish revival (see Dugan et al, 
2008). Accordingly, the PKK’s attacks consequences were of more immediate relevance to 
PKK supporters and wider Kurdish society than to the Turkish military. The uprising was an 
assertion of resistance, concrete proof that the Kurdish people had absorbed the wrath of 
the regime and had re-emerged scathed, but intact. In the absence of any other channels of 
political expression it was via the weapons of the guerrillas that a modicum of collective 
dignity was restored, redolent of Sartre’s take on Fanon: 
 
When the peasant takes a gun in his hands, the old myths grow dim and the prohibitions are 
one by one forgotten. The rebel's weapon is the proof of his humanity. For in the first days of 
the revolt you must kill: to shoot down a European112 is to kill two birds with one stone, to 
destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time: there remain a dead man, 
and a free man; the survivor, for the first time, feels a national soil under his foot (1963:22). 
 
Although the impact of these initial attacks has undoubtedly undergone a degree of 
retrospective embellishment, they marked a turning point for those sympathetic to Kurdish 
                                                        
111 Law 2932 stated that ‘”No language can be used for the explication, dissemination, and publication of ideas 
other than the first official language of countries, recognized by the Turkish state” (in Aslan, 2009: 6). The law 
was subsequently repealed in 1991. 
112 Fanon’s ‘Wretched of the Earth’ focused on the Algerian War of Independence, hence the reference to 
‘Europeans’. 
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nationalism. Ahmet, a PKK sympathiser from Mardin, eloquently described the attacks as 
comparable to “the rising of the sun”, re-triggering hope for the Kurds after the unremitting 
desperation of the preceding period (Interview 18, 2012).While Mazlum, who had been a 
TKSP activist prior to being imprisoned after the coup, admitted that the attacks excited 
even him and that it had the same effect with all Kurds. People started to believe that they 
could fight the state once again (Interview 24, 2012).  It has been observed that in order “to 
gain the support of the population, [...] insurgents seek to show, [...] that the adversary, 
though usually seen as unbeatable, is in fact vulnerable,” (Chaliand, 1987: 49). Abdullah, a 
PKK activist based in Europe explained that prior to 1984 that Kurds were indeed of the view 
that the army was invulnerable. Prior to the attacks, he claims that the presence of even 
one individual soldier was enough to terrify an entire village but that afterwards Kurds 
started to slowly re-establish their self belief (Interview 14, 2012).   
 
However, communications networks in Kurdistan were underdeveloped and the 
Turkish media would not have recounted the attacks, if they would have reported them at 
all, in a manner flattering of the PKK. Accordingly, the guerrillas engaged in concerted 
campaigns of propagandising across the small villages of the region, as PKK commander 
Baran explained “we told them [the fight] was necessary, that there was no other way 
except through arms” (in Marcus, 2007:81). The publicising of the struggle amongst the 
rural communities was time consuming and geographically inconsistent but it was crucial in 
the establishment of the PKK’s constituency in the area. The PKK’s violence thus directly 
contested the state presence in the region and catapulted the movement into the role of 
the vanguard of the Kurdish struggle. 
 
Short Term Survival 
 
 This thesis has asserted the primary importance of the relationship between armed 
groups and their constituency; however, civilian support for insurgents is not the absolutely 
definitive aspect of armed groups success or failure (Wickham-Crowley, 1992:96). While this 
relationship always remains relevant, its importance varies in relation to other contextual 
factors. The PKK’s initial successes of the late summer and early autumn in 1984 did not 
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continue into winter. The following months were a period of desperate struggle for survival 
in the face of an intense clampdown by the armed forces of the state, severe weather 
conditions, and the overwhelming sense of fear internalised by the local population. Fear of 
the state induced some locals to denounce the PKK presence to the military and a number 
of guerrillas were arrested and killed (Özdağ, 2003:20). Although some of the militants had 
been tempered in battles with the Israeli army in Lebanon, they were for the most part 
inexperienced in any form of guerrilla warfare. This inexperience was compounded by the 
lack of hardiness required to cope with the physical hardship of life in the mountains. The 
Turkish army responded to the attacks by sending in extensive reinforcements to the region 
and military outposts were established in the vicinity of mountain villages “on which the PKK 
relied for food, information and new recruits” (Marcus, 2007:97).  The guerrillas struggled to 
avoid unfavourable encounters with the military and suffered a number of casualties (ibid) 
and many more were arrested including a number of senior militants, most notably 
Mustapha Güneş (Interview 37, 2013). Furthermore, the concentration of soldiers in the 
area, as Baran explained limited the PKK’s ability “to enter villages ... we couldn’t make our 
propaganda very easily, which hurt our ties to the people” (in Marcus, 2007:97).  The PKK 
continued to have difficulty to publicise its activities and its political message in a 
comprehensive fashion for a number of years. A Mazlumder activist from Mazıdağı in 
Mardin explained that in 1988 four years after the insurgency had begun, the PKK had 
kidnapped the wealthy head of a local phosphorous mine. Although this occurred in his 
village’s immediate vicinity, locals believed that he had been kidnapped by some leftist 
revolutionaries rather than the PKK, thus highlighting the information challenges the PKK 
confronted (Interview 28, 2012). The PKK was endangered in a number of ways; the hostility 
of physical environment, local ignorance of their struggle and its motivations, the 
clampdown by the army and the lack of a wider support network to attenuate these factors. 
 
The Turkish state also passed a ‘Repentants Law’ (Pişmanlık Yasası), after the PKK’s 
first attacks in order to draw militants away from the movement before they would become 
battle hardened fighters. The law did not convince a large number of militants to switch 
sides but it did achieve some notable individual successes. After a senior guerrilla 
commander, Abdülkadir Aygan was captured; he betrayed his erstwhile comrades under the 
repentant legislation, and began to work for the JITEM (Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle 
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Mücadele), a notorious branch of the Gendarmerie (Interview 37, 2013). The intelligence 
garnered from defectors and prisoners was used to further weaken the armed units. The 
outlook for the guerrillas was poor, as Selahattin Çelik a guerrilla active at the time 
admitted, “people [guerrillas] were betraying us,  they were giving themselves up” (in 
Marcus, 2007:98). He estimated that around ninety people between guerrillas and 
supporters were killed in this period (ibid). However, the resilience of the PKK fighters 
convinced the locals of their commitment. The fact that the state – given all its advantages 
in manpower, materials and military experience – could not annihilate the scattered fighters 
led to growing support amongst the local population. Çelik explained, “in the end the 
military was unsuccessful because we were able to hang on to the areas where we were” 
(ibid). Although it suffered serious setbacks, the PKK’s continued presence on the mountains 
was in itself a victory. Marcus cites an unnamed guerrilla who observed that “whenever a 
gun exploded, whenever an attack took place, right afterward there would be new recruits” 
(2007:98).The winter of 1984-1985 was a crucial period for the PKK as a guerrilla movement. 
Its sole objective was short term survival and maintaining its tenuous foothold inside 
Kurdistan. The PKK’s success in surviving this period of insecurity laid the necessary 
foundations to realise its long term objectives of consolidating its presence inside Kurdistan 
and broadening its constituency. 
 
Internal Structural Reform – Öcalan as a Charismatic Leader 
 
 The social movement literature due to its systemic focus often overlooks the role of 
leaders and their effects on movements (Erickson Nepstad & Bob, 2006:1). They have been 
considered “as intermediaries, facilitators, and motivators, as tacticians and foci of events, 
rather than as independent shapers of the course and outcome of contention” (Aminzade et 
al, 2001: 127). Structurally determinate approaches often neglect that “between 
environmental pressures and individual responses there lies a good deal of latitude for 
personal ingenuity and agency” (ibid: 138). Models of leadership are often divided into task 
oriented and people oriented styles. Charismatic leaders are associated with the second of 
these styles and have been defined as those which: 
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“evoke emotions that create a community of feeling, revoke emotions by creating affective 
dissidence that leads followers to rethink their worldviews, and reframe emotions by 
introducing new meaning structures that reshape their followers’ interpretations of the 
world and emotional responses to it” (Aminzade et al, 2001: 130). 
 
It must, however, be acknowledged that no consensus has emerged on what 
charisma itself is actually composed of (see Den Hartog, Koopman & van Muijen, 1995:36 
and Popper, 2000:729-730). Innumerable charismatic leaders have been identified (Popper, 
2000:730) but the very nature of that charisma itself has been more difficult to precisely 
define. Erickson Nepstad and Bob have disaggregated the notion of charisma and 
elaborated a concept they refer to as leadership capital; a “broad term that has cultural, 
social and symbolic aspects” (2006:4). Leaders that boast a significant quantity of symbolic 
capital are likely to be viewed as charismatic leaders. However, as they note “the 
designation and acknowledgement of leaders within a movement occurs through a 
dialectical interaction with a mass base” (2006:2). Therefore, even charismatic leaders are 
subject to external validation by their supporters. Drawing on Weber’s ideas, Erickson 
Nepstad and Bob suggest that “without followers’ recognition of their leader’s special ‘gift’, 
charisma does not exist” (2006:5 and O’Gara, 2001:82). As charisma is therefore not an 
innate quality of the leader but rather a socially defined projection of his/her perceived 
leadership qualities, the question which arises is related not to personality but rather one of 
the processes of social recognition within a movement (see Jermier, 1993: 221). 
 The consolidation of a charismatic leader’s role in a movement is thus derived from 
social processes which institutionalise his/her control. Although leaders’ charisma often 
renders their elevated status as self-explanatory, the rather more mundane explanation is 
that it is usually derived from interactions between prominent figures within movements 
and a large degree of historical good fortune and coincidence. Abdullah Öcalan has been 
convincingly considered as a prototype of a charismatic leader (Özcan, 2006:187, 2005 & 
2007b and Kutschera, 1999b). The PKK from its origin as a small clique of young militants 
through its development into a large guerrilla army and social movement numbering its 
supporters in millions has always been inextricably linked to the figure of Öcalan. In the 
early period of the PKK when it was still known as the Apocular or the Kurdish 
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Revolutionaries, Öcalan “was a first among equals”. A group of senior militants debated 
relevant matters before Öcalan would usually have the final word; but importantly there 
was a degree of debate (Interview 37, 2013). However, after 1986 “he became the absolute 
power, no longer the first among equals” (ibid). Many senior figures of the movement had 
been killed by rivals as in the case of Haki Karer and Mahsum Korkmaz, or died at the hands 
of the state such as Kemal Pir and Mehmet Hayri Durmuş in Diyarbakir prison. These deaths 
accordingly, deprived the movement of many of its more respected militants who could 
have potentially presented a leadership challenge to Öcalan.  
 
Party Education and Öcalan’s Consolidation as Leader  
 
 In addition to the deaths of the other prestigious cadres of the PKK, Öcalan benefited 
from the saturation of party literature and education with his own charismatic presence. 
The routinisation of charisma (Weber, 1964) has always proved to be a difficult in 
revolutionary movements - if not an impossible process - as witnessed in the cases of 
Prabhakaran in the Tamil Tigers or Guzman in the Sendero Luminoso.   The PKK is notable 
because Öcalan’s charisma was institutionalised long before his arrest through the party 
education system. Öcalan’s spatial detachment from the actual theatre of the struggle, 
allowed blame for controversial developments in the course of the armed conflict to be 
shifted onto commanders on the ground, thus preserving his projection as a great leader 
(Marcus, 2007: 108-109 & 240-242). This routinisation of charisma was brought about by 
the much vaunted party education system. The PKK has always viewed itself as a “collective 
education movement” (Westrheim, 2014:140); the PKK’s focus on individual self-
improvement and its role in the revival of Kurdish national consciousness has been central 
to the forging of a coherent collective identity (della Porta & Diani, 2006: chapter 4). It has 
also at a more mundane level facilitated the acquisition of basic literacy skills to vast 
swathes of Kurdish society neglected by the Turkish educational system (Westrheim, 
2010:108). Yet, it is this informal educational system which has consolidated the movement 
structure which has entrenched Öcalan’s grip on the movement.  
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 Party education was entirely structured on the copious works of Öcalan, collectively 
known as Önderlik çözümlemeleri
113
. At the core of Öcalan’s understanding of the Kurdish 
question is his firm belief in the collective debasement, düşürülmüş of the Kurdish people; 
“other than the Kurds, no people exist in the world who have become the soldiers of others 
in such a disgraceful way” (Öcalan in Özcan, 2005: 391). Kurds, as per this understanding are 
prone to fratricidal violence and the slavish imitation of others (Özcan, 2005: 392). The 
second pillar of PKK education is a rigorous doctrine of individual self-improvement to 
overcome the self-loathing inherent in recognition of personal debasement, as can be seen 
in the letters written by Kurdish activists who conducted suicide attacks or self-immolated 
(Grojean, 2012). Membership in the PKK is a totalising commitment: 
A party member is one who acknowledges the programme of the party and is responsible for 
its implementation; who takes the will of the party as fundamental and gradually attaches 
himself to the party’s will; who joins in party life and tactical application [daily practical 
activities] all day in an organ of the party; who exuberantly works for the party’s 
fundamental aims in the manner of not making concessions, of not following self-advantage 
and of unlimited self-sacrifice by embracing the party’s demeanour, tempo, and style 
through undoing oneself [analysing/remoulding one’s personality]; and who devotes his/her 
life to the cause of the party. (Öcalan in Özcan, 2005:393) 
Accordingly, the Kurds only hope is their collective reconfiguration by rigid adherence to the 
party programme (see Özcan, 2005:398), into the model of what Öcalan has delineated as 
the ‘New Man’ or ‘Free Woman’ (see Grojean, 2008 & 2012, Çağlayan 2012, Özcan 2005 & 
2006 and Bozarslan, 2004). Therefore, in the educational sphere “Öcalan’s leadership work 
lies in ‘producing’ individuals appropriate to the ‘organizational life’ of the party by an 
education of which he is the primary source” (Özcan, 2005: 394). Education is not viewed 
instrumentally as a means to an end but rather as integral to the end in itself. Party 
education was provided on a smaller scale in urban safe houses and on a larger one in 
guerrilla camps.  
                                                        
113
 Özcan estimates that the sum total of all of these speeches is around 144,000 pages dating from 1979-1999 
(2005: 399). 
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It became more systematic with the foundation of  two party schools based close to 
Damascus, operational from 1994 until they were fully shut down in 2002 (Interview 37, 
2013). There were two schools, one in Kurdish and the other in Turkish, based in austere 
compounds, one of which was an old chicken farm (ibid and see Marcus, 2007: 254-255 and 
Özcan, 2006: 146). In theory the PKK’s curriculum covers a range of material ranging “from 
Zarathustra, to Socrates to Marx and onwards” (female coordinator of PKK school in 
Southern Kurdistan in Westrheim, 2010:110) but in reality it seems that it is limited to a 
synthesis of these materials as interpreted by Öcalan himself. As a teacher cited by 
Westrheim explained “as a starting point for further studies on specific issues we read a 
book or statement written by our leader. [...] Then we read alternative literature” (in 2010: 
110). Özcan - who personally attended these courses in Syria and in Europe - explained that 
an entire subject, “The Fundamental Features of the Party Leadership” is dedicated to the 
person of Öcalan himself and includes an extensive list of his personal qualities (2005:397-
398). Therefore, it is evident that the content of the PKK’s education serves to consolidate 
Öcalan’s exclusive vision of Kurdish society. 
 This, however, does not still explain how Öcalan used the education system to 
completely dominate the movement. The turnover of students was extremely high in the 
Turkish speaking school,  estimated to be up to 1500  between 1994 and 1999 (Interview 37, 
2013). Attendance at the school and personally meeting Öcalan was considered a great 
privilege and used to reward long serving guerrillas and to educate party activists from 
across Turkey and the diaspora
114
. Subsequent to their party training, militants would be 
sent back to their previous roles or dispatched to the mountains (ibid). Prior to fleeing Syria 
in 1998, Öcalan took a very hands-on approach at these schools. He would frequent them 
on an almost daily basis and interact even with low ranking party militants. He would 
question them as to their background, interrogate them regarding their failings and 
admonish them to strive to become better individuals and to display even greater 
determination to the cause (Interview, 37, 2013, Marcus, 2007: 255, Westrheim, 2010:114 
and Özcan, 2005:396).  
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 See Chapter VI 
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The repetitive content of Öcalan’s speeches thus pales in significance in comparison 
to the ritualistic interactions between the leader and the student. The mere act of 
interacting with the Öcalan imbued militants with specific social capital which was then 
subsequently utilised to create an indirect but emotionally vigorous connection back to the 
Öcalan himself; thus linking the centre of the movement – Öcalan  – to the periphery. Upon 
receipt of party education, all militants are obliged to share it within the movement and 
with sympathisers and potential recruits (Interview 9, 2012). Özcan sustains that “the 
organizers of these educational activities make every endeavour to imitate the atmosphere 
of the party central school” (2006: 147) thus ensuring consistency in the party education. 
One interviewee compared the schools to the Ka’aba, in the manner in which it bestowed 
prestige on those fortunate enough to encounter Öcalan (Interview 37, 2013). It is in such a 
fashion that the reverence and exalted status of Öcalan or the routinisation of his charisma 
is maintained, notwithstanding his absence from the battlefield and incarceration after 
1999. In brief reference to the central focus of this project, the PKK’s constituency; Öcalan’s 
charismatic leadership role served as an ulterior consolidating factor in linking its 
constituents to the movement. The four sets of movement-constituent relations as outlined 
by Malthaner (2011) were underpinned by the shared universe of symbolic references 
linked to the person of Öcalan.   
 It should be briefly acknowledged, however, that the party’s education did not 
always function as the movement desired. The PKK demanded not simply recruits, but 
individuals willing to recreate themselves according to the party model. Arguably, the 
party’s education system worked better outside of Kurdistan than within it. Miniature re-
creations of the Damascus schools were created in bland suburbs of European cities and 
across western Turkey thus providing the movement with militants who had at least been 
broached with the fundamentals of PKK thought. However, in Kurdistan itself recruitment 
occurred in a more haphazard fashion as dictated by the ongoing counter-insurgency of the 
Turkish state. Opportunistic recruitment of tribes as discussed in chapter III was most 
unlikely to have furnished the movement with ideologically malleable recruits as desired by 
the PKK. A former guerrilla Aram was determined to join the PKK after he participated and 
witnessed the violence at the funeral of Vedat Aydin in 1991. He eventually joined the 
guerrillas in May 1992 when he was around fifteen years old. He described himself as having 
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forcibly joined the movement which did not want to accept him because of his youth. 
However, his persistence paid off and he took a bus with his cousin to a village close to 
Diyarbakir where he was escorted to the mountains by a detachment of guerrillas. On his 
second day with the guerrillas, they were involved in a clash with the army which left three 
PKK guerrillas dead. He was thus immersed immediately in the armed aspect of the struggle 
with minimal time for military or political training. He was based in an area of heavy combat 
and his unit usually marched for three days with one day of rest. He described the training 
as mostly military and practically oriented (interview 27, 2012). It is thereby clear that, as 
efficient as the PKK’s educational structures actually were, they operated according to the 
vagaries of the armed struggle which oftentimes prevented any form of organised 
education. 
 
Intra-Movement Tensions 
 
  Öcalan also consolidated his grip of the movement by undermining the reputations 
of a number of potential rivals within the movement. Blame was apportioned to certain 
senior figures for military setbacks or failure to reach different objectives. The militants 
accused in such a fashion were often forcibly detained and obliged to engage in humiliating 
public self-criticism which, if falling short of irremediably besmirching their character, at 
least ensured that they suffered a period of opprobrium within the movement. This process 
of marginalisation of key cadres in the lead-up to the Third PKK Congress in October 1986 
has been analysed in detail by Aliza Marcus (2007:89-96 and see Kutschera, 2000). Cetin 
Güngör - codename Semir - had been a militant in the movement since 1975 and was 
dispatched to Germany in 1981 as general co-ordinator of the European Committee. Güngör 
began to broach questions of Öcalan’s increasingly unfettered control of the PKK from 1982 
and by May 1983 felt that he had no option but to leave the movement. His public 
departure unleashed a wave of paranoia in the movement about the danger of an 
impending split, just as it was preparing to start the armed conflict. He was eventually 
tracked down by the PKK and executed in Stockholm at a meeting of Kurdish activists in 
November 1985. According to Marcus the violence did not stop there, she suggests that 
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between 1983 and 1985, “Öcalan ordered or encouraged the murder of at least eleven high 
level former or current PKK members” (2007:94). She bluntly states that “PKK members who 
abandoned the group and publically criticised it [...] should expect to be hunted down” 
(ibid). Taner Akçam, a former Dev-Yol activist and political prisoner has asserted that in this 
period “they kept killing people within their group” as well as targeting members of other 
Turkish and Kurdish groups, such as KUK, PSK and Kurtuluş. He suggests that “they [the PKK] 
committed around 20 political murders in Europe” (2012). This period of internal rivalry 
remains a highly contested and controversial period in the history of the movement. It 
seems likely that some of the deaths were rooted in Öcalan’s paranoia regarding rivals to his 
leadership and control of the movement. It also seems probable that internal divisions 
between those favouring more horizontal decision-making and those who felt that a vertical 
command structure was essential in preparation for the clashes would have likely led to 
internal discord. Furthermore, Marcus’ rather black and white understanding of the 
treatment of dissenters within the movement is not shared by all. One interviewee 
suggested that if you split and tried to form your own group and attack the movement then 
you could become a target” but that if no attempt was made to remain in politics or set up a 
rival movement that it was unlikely that deathly retribution would have been enacted. In 
addition, he explained that it depended on the relative strength of the movement; in 
periods of weakness or disarray any dissenters could potentially face death. On the other 
hand, when the PKK was/is enjoying a period of strength it can afford to allow members to 
quit without the likelihood of violent consequences (Interview 37, 2013).  
 
Third Party Congress 1986 
 
The decisive point in Öcalan’s consolidation of power came about at the Third Party 
Congress in 1986. The PKK had survived two years fraught with danger in Kurdistan as a 
fighting force; it had begun to recruit local supporters and was expanding rapidly. Internal 
rivals in the movement had been marginalised thus allowing Öcalan to receive all the 
plaudits for the success even though he had a limited role in the armed campaign. As 
Jongerden and Akkaya remarked, it was this congress in which “the PKK was transformed 
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from a Leninist organisation into one in which Öcalan gained special status.” He was 
hereafter referred to “as the party Leadership (Önderlik)” (2011:137). It has been very 
common for Marxist movements to adopt authoritarian leadership strategies. In relation to 
the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, Gorriti has opined that “what distinguishes Sendero from 
other Communist Parties is that it had an autocrat at the helm from the very beginning of 
the armed struggle, while the goal of power was very distant in the minds of even the most 
optimistic activists” (1992:150). The PKK developed very similarly to the Sendero Luminoso 
in this regard. A reasoned debate on the role of Öcalan in the PKK, particularly in this early 
period has yet to take place. This is undoubtedly due to the exalted status he has acquired 
during his lengthy incarceration in İmralı since 1999. His every utterance is thoroughly 
analysed and for the most part obeyed by the wider Kurdish movement.
115
 It seems that 
his vaunted status has also had a profound impact on the man himself. He has declared that 
“I never ordered the PKK or the Kurds as a whole to follow me. But [...] they [the Kurdish 
people] assigned to me a duty that was almost impossible to fulfil. Some compared me with 
Kawa
116
, the mythical Kurdish smith, others attributed me with the holiness of the prophet 
Abraham and yet others even regarded me as some kind of new messiah” (Öcalan, 2011:127 
and see White, 2000:137, Kutschera, 1999).  
Aside from the confirmation of Öcalan’s control over the movement, the Third Party 
Congress marked some notable developments in the structure of the party. The HRK were 
transformed into the ARGK (Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan/People's Liberation Army 
of Kurdistan) which worked in coordination with the ERNK (Eniye Rizgariye Navata Kurdistan 
/National Liberation Front of Kurdistan) which had been founded in March 1985 by Mazlum 
Korkmaz as a popular front, in order to systemise and structure its expanding number of 
recruits and supporters. The ERNK’s responsibilities as outlined in a PKK documents seized 
by Turkish police ranged from dealing with the press to generating financial resources. It 
was also charged with more logistical tasks such as: finding and training new recruits; 
general logistic support; providing intelligence; maintaining contact with other armed 
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 A large prisoners’ hunger strike was ended in November 2012 as soon as Öcalan ordered it to be 
abandoned. 
116
 Kawa is a Kurdish mythological hero, who liberated the Kurds from a child eating tyrant Zahok, a feat 
celebrated every year at Newroz. 
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groups and organising in Europe and Syria (in Özdağ, 2003:22). Initially the divisions 
between the ERNK and the military units were not very pronounced but gradually the ERNK 
gathered momentum and served a critical role in mobilising wider Kurdish society. It 
concentrated on “organising the peasantry, the youth, the women’s section, the tradesmen, 
the workers, the people who are abroad, even the old people, the mosques, and developing 
organisations that take the characteristics of different national and religious denominations 
as their basis” (in Gunes, 2012:109). It also served as the legal front of the PKK in Europe and 
replaced the defunct Bir-Kom initiative of the pre-1984 period. It served as an umbrella 
front for a number of sub-organisations founded in 1987; the YKWK (Union of Patriotic 
Workers of Kurdistan/Yekîtiya Karkerên Welatparêzên Kurdistan), the YJWK (Union of 
Patriotic Women of Kurdistan/Yekîtiya Jinên Welatparêzên Kurdistan) and the YCK (The 
Union of Kurdish Youth/Yekîtiya Ciwanên Kurdistan) (see Gunes, 2012:110
117
, Özcan, 2006: 
199 and Gunter, 1997:31-32). The structural apparatus of the ERNK became the practical 
means by which the PKK consolidated itself as a mass movement. It was through this 
network of sub-organisations that the PKK stabilised and expanded its constituency. As 
Gunes noted, it was these multiple organs of the movement that “enabled the PKK to 
articulate their specific demands within its discourse in a chain of equivalence as part of 
Kurdish political demands and transcend the religious and tribal divisions and 
fragmentation” (2012:110).  
It was also decided at the 1986 Congress to implement a military draft whereby all Kurdish 
families were required to send some to participate in the guerrilla forces (Jongerden & 
Akkaya, 2011:137). A further decision of immediate military relevance was also taken, 
whereby the locally levied Village Guards (köy korucuları) re-established by the state in 
1985, were identified as military targets (Gunter, 1997:47, Özdağ, 2003:24 and Imset, 1992: 
47). The Third Party Congress reflected the reality that the PKK had succeeded in gaining a 
foothold inside Kurdistan. The PKK had achieved its first objective of survival inside Turkey 
and it was in a phase of rapid expansion which necessitated the founding of the ERNK in 
1985. Öcalan alone formulated the macro objectives and strategy of the movement. 
However, the application of these strategies on the ground was necessarily far removed 
                                                        
117These sub-organisations continued to expand at an exponential rate, in 1993 a number of religious ones 
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from Öcalan’s idealised plans whose complete lack of experience as a guerrilla fighter led 
him to impose unworkable demands upon his field commanders. Fighting units were, in fact, 
almost completely autonomous in how they went about applying the PKK’s objectives. It has 
been explained that guerrilla commanders left the mountains, and went to Damascus to 
receive instruction from Öcalan and the PKK only on a yearly basis. In the very early stages 
of the conflict it happened even less regularly. One interviewee explained that he was aware 
of one commander who was active for four years without receiving precise instructions 
from the leadership in Syria. Technological improvements did lead to improved 
communication between the guerrillas and the higher vertices of the movement. Walkie-
talkies were introduced in 1991 and satellite phones were used from 1993 (Interview 37, 
2013). Therefore, although Öcalan had cemented a role for himself as the movement’s 
incontrovertible leader, he had a relatively limited concrete impact on relations on the 
ground between the movement and its emerging constituency. Guerrilla units were largely 
autonomous in how they governed relations in their social spatial environments, the 
decision to deploy violence against civilians or specific Village Guard units was usually 
related to decisions taken by field commanders themselves rather than sanctioned from 
above. Interactions between the ERNK and Kurdish society were dictated by the immediate 
realities and necessities of the armed struggle. In short, Öcalan based in Syria, dictated the 
macro-policy of the PKK, and on occasion where he gave more precise orders such as forced 
recruitment or the targeting of Village Guards, they were re-interpreted and applied 
according to local conditions. 
 
Village Guards 
 
 The foundation of pro-state militia or paramilitaries is a long established strategy to 
combat insurgent groups (see Kalyvas, 2006:107). It was used extensively in colonial 
contexts as in the case of the Harki forces in Algeria (Horne, 2006: 254-255) and the pro-
British Kikuyu militia in Kenya (Branch, 2007) and also utilised in more recent civil wars in 
Colombia (Gutíerrez Sanín, 2008) and in Algeria (Martinez, 2000:152 and Kalyvas, 1999). It 
                                                                                                                                                                            
were founded, including ones for Yezidis, Alevis and Muslims.  
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has been and remains a widespread counter-insurgency strategy; Hangzo and Kaur estimate 
that of 2007, there were 373 such groups worldwide (2011).  In Turkey, there is a long 
history of semi-autonomous Kurdish militia. In the late 19th century Sultan Abdul Hamid 
established the Hamidiye regiments to patrol the Sultanate’s frontier with Czarist Russia 
(Özar, Uçarlar & Aytar, 2013: Chapter II and McDowall, 2004:59). The presence of a locally 
recruited militia in Kurdistan was continued in the early period of the Republic and given 
legal standing with the Village Law (No. 442) of 1924 (KHRP, 2011:4 and Özar et al, 2013:9). 
Its function was to combat brigandage in a region where state policing presence was 
minimal, if not inexistent. Given the progressive expansion of state capacity, the 
maintenance of the militia was considered unnecessary until the eruption of the PKK 
insurgency (ibid).  Amendment 3175 to the 7th article of the Village Law, passed on March 26 
1985 (Balta Paker, 2009:3), revived the system that had hitherto fallen into disuse. In 
practice “the Village Guards are irregular militia units, commanded by a local chieftain but 
supervised by the nearest army post, who are paid and armed by the government to keep 
the PKK away from the district” (Van Bruinessen in Jongerden, 2007: xxi). The Village Guards 
can be distinguished into two broad types, temporary and voluntary. The former “acquire[d] 
licensed guns, a monthly salary in which they are obliged to join the guard duties and 
operations in return.” While the latter “do not receive any payment. They own a licensed 
gun provided by the gendarmerie and are charged with the protection of their own villages” 
(Özar et al, 2013:10).  
 
The Village Guards proved to be militarily advantageous to the military for a number 
of reasons. The system “offered the benefits of localization—access to information about 
rebels’ identity and better ability to react quickly to local intelligence—and allowed the 
state to avoid a radical transformation of army’s structure” (Balta 2007: 129), which was 
oriented toward international conflict and a potential conflagration with Greece. It was also 
relatively cost effective – initially at least - as the first generation of recruits were for the 
overwhelming part, voluntary Village Guards and accordingly unpaid. However, the Village 
Guard system as it took shape in Kurdistan developed local characteristics rather different 
to how it had been idealised by the military vertices or even permitted by law. The Village 
Guards became an active armed force in their own right rather than mere guides and 
providers of local intelligence (Balta, 2007: 129-130).  
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Kalyvas has proposed that the presence of such locally recruited forces be viewed as 
what he terms “ethnic defection”. Ethnic defection “is a process whereby individuals join 
organizations explicitly opposed to the national aspirations of the ethnic group with which 
they identify and end up fighting against their coethnics” (2008:1045). However, in the case 
of the Village Guards such an understanding is misplaced. It makes use of what has been 
described as “ethnic common sense” which is “a tendency to partition the social world into 
putatively deeply constituted, quasi-natural intrinsic kinds” (Drawing on Hirschfeld, 
Brubaker, 2002:165). Brubaker suggests that “...ethnicised or ethnically framed conflict [...] 
need not and should not, be understood as conflict between ethnic groups” (ibid: 166). The 
conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state was rooted in a multitude of ever evolving 
dichotomies and local level power cleavages of which ethnic identity was but one example. 
Contrary to Kalyvas’ assertion (2008:1051) the PKK had a large and disproportionately senior 
number of Turkish militants (Çandar, 2012:40). Furthermore, his view that ethnic defection 
is a process wherein the prominent dimension of ethnic identity is bolstered, by another 
dimension which in this case is one’s loyalty or disloyalty to the Turkish state is overly 
simplistic (2008:1051). Kalyvas’ hypothesis privileges ethnic identity as the primary identity 
in Kurdistan which is not necessarily the case. Kurdish society, as discussed in chapter II, was 
riven with ethnic, religious, linguistic and tribal divisions, any number of which could have 
superseded ethnic identification at any particular time. It is indeed correct that the wave of 
oppression that followed the coup had polarised Kurdish and Turkish identity at the macro-
level, but this should be seen as a structuralising rather than a determining feature. It 
created a specific set of environmental conditions which defined the wider arena in which 
Kurdish politics developed but it did not channel all political developments into juxtaposed 
ethnic blocs. The PKK utilised the sense of popular outrage to strengthen its organisation 
while other forces – namely a number of aşirets - in Kurdistan made use of the newly 
available resources associated with participation in the Village Guard system to obtain 
relative political and military advantage at the local level. This was the principal reason for 
the spread of the Village Guard system rather than any notion of ethnic defection or macro 
ethno-political strategising.  
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The Village Guard system118 was established in 1985 and endures to this day but 
according to the period of recruitment, the Village Guards had very different characteristics. 
Broadly speaking - there are of course exceptions in each case - early phase recruitment in 
the 1980s was voluntarily, largely unpaid and effected in tribal blocs. While in latter stages, 
especially from the early 1990s, individual villages were forced by state forces to become 
temporary Village Guards, as a means to polarise the local populace into distinct camps 
supportive of either the PKK or the state. The reasons for joining the Village Guards were 
extremely varied. The first recruits were aşirets based north of the Iraqi-Turkish border in 
the Şırnak and Hakkari area that were heavily involved in the extensive smuggling business 
that dominated the local Kurdish economy. In lieu of payment of the state they were 
permitted to engage in unrestricted smuggling and accumulate wealth (Balta, 2007:130, 
Balta Paker, 2009:4). Others were aşirets that had clashed with the state on previous 
occasions. “One of these tribes was the semi-nomadic Jîrkan119, whose chieftain Tahir 
Adiyaman, a TKDP supporter, had been living for years as an outlaw after killing several 
soldiers in an armed encounter. He was pardoned on condition that he prevented PKK 
fighters from passing through his tribe's territory” (Van Bruinessen, 2003:174 and Balta 
Paker, 2009:4). Accordingly, their motivations and others like them were completely 
unrelated to identity or even politics. However, some tribes did indeed join for political 
reasons but ones far distant from those identified by Kalyvas. In Hakkari a tribe described as 
“not being in good relations with the state” which had been active in the TKDP, joined the 
Village Guards. They choose to take up weapons to protect themselves from the PKK, not 
because they viewed the state favourably but they feared attack due to historic tensions 
between the PKK and the TKDP (Interview DISA researchers, Diyarbakir 2012). In some rare 
examples there is a correlation between Village Guard and association with the MHP, but 
this occurred in Mersin and Hatay long distant from the location of the actual insurgency 
and in areas with small Kurdish populations (Özar et al, 2013: 109). 
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 The information in this section is mostly derived from an interview with two DISA researchers in Diyarbakir 
in 2012. DISA has completed an extensive report on the Village Guard system referenced on numerous 
occasions in the text (Özar et al, 2013). 
119
 These sub-organisations continued to expand at an exponential rate, in 1993 a number of religious ones 
were founded, including ones for Yezidis, Alevis and Muslims. 
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There was also a small but significant presence of minority communities in the 
Village Guards. In a village on the outskirts of Malazgirt, an Arab aşiret, the Malbati who 
were Village Guards in the surrounding area seized the land after its owners were expelled 
for refusing to join the system (Interview 44, 2013). Arab aşirets were also present in the 
Lice district (Özar et al, 2013: 155); yet in other instances Arab tribes refused at great cost to 
join the system, such as in the Samandağ area of Hatay (ibid:109). A number of Kyrgyz 
villages which had been relocated from Afghanistan by General Evren also participated in 
the system (Kaye, 2012). One should not, however, conclude that there was an ethnically 
determinate aspect of minority adhesion to the system, but rather that certain non-Kurdish 
groups utilised the system as a means of obtaining relative power advantage vis-à-vis their 
local rivals. 
 
 Another factor facilitating recruitment was ignorance of its purpose. Abdullah a 
Kurd from Bingöl explained that when the village guard system reached his village in 1988, 
ten individuals joined up because they were under the impression that it was some form of 
local policing initiative. They only realised that it was specifically focused on fighting the PKK 
when they were taken by helicopter into the mountains to confront the guerrillas. 
Immediately upon realising this, they relinquished their weapons (Interview 14, 2012).120 On 
other occasions, it was explained to prospective Village Guards that they would be required 
to protect oil pipelines passing through their areas (Özar et al, 2013: 150). Many Kurds 
joined the Village Guard system on the basis of mistaken information and further refuting 
the ethnic defection hypothesis. 
 
It would be misleading to dismiss any political factors in the rise of the Village 
Guards. The most notorious case of opposition to the PKK came from the previously 
discussed Bucak tribe who were historic participants in the Hamidiye regiments (Özar et al, 
2013:21). In the late 1970s the PKK had identified the land holding aşirets as the de facto 
representatives of the Turkish state and launched an armed campaign against them.  
                                                        
120 This was unusual because it was ordinarily impossible or extremely difficult to leave the Village Guards. In 
one instance, thirty three Village Guards in the village of Tiyzan, Mardin were tortured when they tried to 
return their weapons (Özar et al, 2013:99). They were permitted to do so in this instance only under the 
condition that they did not let this story become known in the wider area. 
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This opposition was not couched in ethnic terms. They were not viewed as less Kurdish or 
more Turkified, but rather seen as agents of the state. Accordingly, the PKK fought a number 
of aşirets prior to the coup, most notably against the Bucak tribe in Urfa. As a consequence 
of their previous hostility with the PKK these tribes were enthusiastic participants in the 
Village Guard scheme, as a way to forestall or discourage any further targeting by the PKK. 
Although the PKK rhetorically opposed the entire aşiret system, viewing it as a key structure 
in the socio-political and economic underdevelopment of Kurdistan, it drew political 
distinctions between them. According to a senior PKK figure later turned repentant Sahin 
Donmez, the PKK even recruited prior to the coup on a tribal basis. “Whenever we managed 
to win one person from a family or a tribe at that times, the whole family or tribe came to 
our side” (in Imset, 1992:18). This is most likely overstating the role of tribes in supporting 
the PKK; it is undeniable that, on an ideological basis, the PKK rejected them but it does 
highlight a strategic denouncement of the tribes on its part. Indeed, many prominent 
Kurdish nationalist figures with some sympathy for the PKK were prominent landlords, 
including the former leader of the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi/Democratic Society 
Party) Ahmet Turk from Mardin. 
 
  The Bucaks were a relatively small tribe numbering around 20,000 people but they 
had close ties with Demirel’s Justice Party and its latter incarnation, the Doğru Yol 
Partisi/True Path Party (DYP). The minor war they fought with the PKK until 1980 resulted in 
ninety one deaths on their side and accordingly left a deep scar on the tribe’s “collective 
memory” (Bozarslan, 1999:12). The Bucaks’ joined the village guard system, ostensibly to 
protect itself from the threat of the PKK (ibid) but participation also brought a number of 
other tangible benefits. Sedat Bucak, once he ascended to the role of tribal head, utilised his 
connections with the Turkish military to strike up a murky network with right-wing criminal 
elements leading the Bucaks to become deeply rooted in the cultivation and sale of drugs 
(ibid: 14)121. However, even a tribe such as the Bucaks’, synonymous with deep rooted 
antagonism toward the PKK, did not always act as political opponents of the PKK might have 
                                                        
121 The extent of the imbrication of the Bucak family, organised crime and the state came to light after the 
Susurluk incident. In November 1996, a car containing Sedat Bucak who had been elected as a deputy for the 
DYP, a right wing militant Abdullah Çatlı and a former Istanbul police Chief Hüseyin Kocadağ killing the latter 
two. Thus revealing the extent of collaboration between right wing criminal elements, the police and national 
politicians (see Bozarslan, 1999, Bovenkerk & Yeşilgöz, 2005, and Turkey Human Rights Watch 2000). 
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been expected to act. In the 1980’s, its leader Hakki Bucak “decided to stop the conflict with 
the PKK, opting for a non-war/non-peace solution” (Bozarslan, 1999:12). It was upon Sedat 
Bucak’s leadership of the tribe in the 1990’s that it realigned itself unambiguously with the 
state against the PKK (van Bruinessen, 2003:171). Although at first glance, the Bucaks 
appear to represent a clear example of politicised opposition to the PKK, it becomes clear 
that their position vis-á-vis the movement is much more nuanced, dependent on internal 
balances within the tribe as well as the allies and resources it acquired endogenously in the 
course of the conflict, again reflecting the multi-level aspect of political opportunities (Alimi, 
2009).  
 
Another factor motivating Village Guard participation was due to the behaviour of 
certain PKK units. Many Village Guards have explained that they voluntarily joined in order 
to forestall the excessive demands of the PKK. A Village Guard from Mardin explained that 
“terrorists would come to the village, pushing people to give food, guns and men and to 
build a shelter. That’s why we became village guards and defended our village” (in Özar et 
al, 2013: 155). In other cases locals joined as a response to PKK attacks (ibid: 154). An 
interviewee gave the example of a village in Kiziltepe which joined the system en masse 
after a brutal and what was understood as unwarranted, massacre in the village (Interview 
22, 2012). It is also probable that self-defence against the unreasonable exactions and 
violence of the PKK is a convenient legitimising pretext for voluntary Village Guards who 
might have had less valorous motivations for joining. As the Village Guards utilised their 
armed capacity to pursue personal matters unrelated to the main conflict between the state 
and the PKK; it is also likely that the PKK fighters or units engaged in similar micro-conflicts. 
Once again, this emphasises the distinction between how conflicts are idealised at the 
centre and realised in the periphery. 
 
An ulterior explanation for the spread of the Village Guard system was that once the 
system had been established it took on a momentum of its own, beyond that envisaged 
initially by the state. Kalyvas (2003) has explained how local political actors can appropriate 
the discourse and opportunities at the macro-level of civil wars to further their own 
distinctly local ends. As Spencer explained in the case of Sri Lanka "villagers did not simply 
have politics thrust upon them; rather they appropriated politics and used them for their 
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own purposes” (in Kalyvas, 2003:479). A similar dynamic of mutual instrumentalisation 
between the actors at the centre and periphery can be observed in this case. If a certain 
tribe or village enrolled in the Village Guards and acquired the weapons and power that 
came along with it, it decisively changed local power relations with other neighbouring 
tribes with which there were inevitable pre-existing tensions and feuds. Accordingly, 
surrounding tribes or village would also need to recruit in order to avoid being 
comparatively disadvantaged (Interview 22 DISA, 2012 and Özar et al, 2013: 89). Village 
Guards “enjoyed virtual immunity and could use their arms for the exercise of private 
violence as well. They revived old feuds and took revenge at old enemies, killed and looted, 
and took by force the land, property and women that they desired” (Van Bruinessen in 
Jongerden, 2007: xxi, Van Bruinessen, 2003:175 and Balta, 2007:149). Therefore, 
participating in the Village Guard system was often triggered by defensive motivations, not 
from attack by the PKK but to protect themselves from predation by other Village Guards.  
 
A further contributing factor was that the Village Guards provided a steady and 
relatively high income in comparison to local alternative or nonexistent employment 
options. The system was described in 1988 by the Olağanüstü hal (OHAL)122 governor Hayri 
Kozakçıoğlu as being “factories without chimneys (Özar et al, 2013:91). Aside from the wider 
structural environment which offers little in the way of steady employment, there are a 
number of disadvantages that applied specifically to Village Guards. Seasonal migration and 
jobs in the transportation sector became no longer viable options due to threats to their 
physical safety if they travelled beyond their protected strongholds. Additionally, many 
were obliged to abandon agriculture upon taking up as Village Guards due to the onerous 
duties inherent in participation often far from their villages. They were thus rendered 
dependent on the Village Guard system (ibid: 180-181). Although the system provided a 
certain degree of paid labour, it mostly benefited powerful tribal figures rather than 
individual members. For example, the salaries of the village guards bloc recruited on a tribal 
basis were paid to the tribal leaders who dispensed the wages to their subordinates as they 
wished, and not directly to the individual village guard. Bozarslan explained that of the 
10,000 Village Guards of the Bucak tribe, only 400 were paid directly by the state with the 
                                                        
122 OHAL was a Regional State of Emergency Governorate established in Kurdistan in 1987 (Yavuz, 2001:13). 
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tribe paying the others from its own resources, greatly enhanced of course by the economic 
and criminal opportunities inherent in participating in the system itself (1999:12).  
 
 The Village Guard system was a result of the inherent weakness of the state and its 
incomplete penetration in Kurdistan. The Village Guards were revived not “so much to the 
fight the PKK’s guerrillas directly, but rather to constrain the PKK’s room to manoeuvre and 
to deprive it of potential allies” (Bozarslan, 2004: 83-84). The state viewed it as a low cost 
means to resolve a military problem which in the mid 1980s was not viewed as particularly 
acute. Lieutenant General Kaya Yazgan who was based in the area at the time remarked that 
“the politicians in Ankara did not believe that this event was the first sign of a big start. It 
was being evaluated as the remnants of what took place before September 12th [the military 
coup]” (in Marcus, 2007:83).  The long term consequences of its revival were not really 
considered by the state (Interview 22, 2012). On the part of the tribes it was perceived as a 
possible means to access resources from the state and to consolidate power locally. Others 
joined as a pre-emptive defensive measure to counteract the growing strength of local rivals 
and often to protect themselves from attack from historic tribal enemies. Many adhered to 
the system as a simple means of acquiring a locally based livelihood in the absence of any 
alternatives, and some were even Kurdish migrants returned from the hardship of life in the 
cities of western Turkey123 to permit them to live in their villages of origin (Özar et al, 
2013:94). The political motivation of certain tribes or villages should not be dismissed, 
however, it is of a much more nuanced and variegated nature than the macro-level cleavage 
of being in favour or opposed to the Turkish state. Much of the political motivation was 
related to local Kurdish politics. In many cases, the mutually beneficial relationships 
between tribes, elements of the army and police, the criminal underworld and politicians 
facilitated by the freedom to engage in projects of criminal accumulation during the period 
acquired an ideological colour over time, but that is not to say that such pre-existing pro-
state convictions triggered the adherence to the Village Guard system. The contingent 
relationship between the Village Guards and the state and its limited ideological 
commitment is clear in declarations such as those by the former mayor of Cizre Kamil 
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  This is a common metaphor used to refer to the tourism industry in Turkey in general. 
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Atak124 of the MHP and Village Guard leader that “if the state abandons us [Village Guards] 
we will serve those who give us weapons” (in Bozarslan, 2004:73). In sum, “it is quite 
possible to see the Village Guards as individuals having many identities and belongings, who 
became Village Guards for different reasons, in different times and continued their duties 
for different time periods” (Özar et al, 2013: 141). 
 
PKK and the Village Guards 
 
The extent of the Village Guards’ expansion completely altered the PKK’s immediate 
social environment. It added an ulterior armed actor, significantly a Kurdish one, to the 
context. It presented the PKK with a number of logistical and symbolic challenges. By 1994, 
in addition to the huge influx of soldiers and police to the region, there were 67,000 Village 
Guards (Balta, 2007:137 and Jongerden, 2007: 65) which was many times larger than the 
biggest number of guerrillas ever mobilised by the PKK. They presented a specific military 
challenge because they knew the local territory well, had abundant intelligence on the 
residents in the region and on occasion were highly motivated to fight the PKK. Some of 
them possessed notable military capacities and were organised into special battalions (Özar 
et al, 2013: 163). A number of these battalions had gained particular notoriety for their 
involvement in criminality and violent excesses in conjunction with JITEM and other security 
forces (ibid: 187). Importantly, the Village Guards also posed a symbolic challenge to the 
PKK. The presence of large numbers of Kurds mobilised against the PKK delegitimised, to 
some extent, the movement’s status as representatives of Kurdish society, thus 
undermining the PKK’s external perception as a national liberation movement. Nonetheless, 
the Village Guard system also was an inadvertent factor in the PKK’s expansion. Balta notes 
that it was “the PKK’s ability to use the village guard system as the basis for selective 
violence resulted in the state’s rapid loss of its monopoly over violence in the region” (2007: 
133).  
                                                        
124 Atak has also run for election for the Refah party, again highlighting the instrumental approach to party 
politics of many Kurdish based politicians. 
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In a similar to fashion to how the state used existing local micro-conflicts to swell the 
ranks of the Village Guards, the PKK expanded its forces in an analogous fashion. When a 
party in some enduring feud joined the Village Guards, it was also common for the other to 
align with the PKK if possible, thereby adding a political luster to a tribal conflict. Although 
many of the Village Guard units were formidable enemies, others were less military capable 
and served as viable targets for the expanding number of PKK militants. The arrival of the 
Village Guards marked an escalation and polarisation of the conflict, rendering it much more 
difficult for any actor, be it tribe or even individual, to remain neutral. At the Third Party 
Congress, the PKK announced that Village Guards would become a primary target of their 
armed units. While in September 1989, General Recai Uğurluoğlu at a meeting of tribal 
chieftains in Van declared that “those who take the guns are on our side. Those who do not 
are on the side of the PKK” (in Imset, 1992:109). The forces of the state obtained 
compliance with the Village Guard system by collective and individual torture and the threat 
of destroying those villages which refused to participate. On the other hand, the PKK 
actively campaigned against the Village Guard system and struck remorselessly against 
those villages which actively participated in it or had declined to discuss joining it 
beforehand with the PKK125. The lines of engagement were thereby drawn, dividing up the 
forces siding with the state, which were Kurdish and Turkish and those which sympathised 
with the PKK which were for the majority Kurdish but with a significant proportion of Turks 
inside the movement.  
 
Growth of the PKK 
 
 The PKK underwent a period of continuous growth in the latter part of the 1980s. It 
expanded its region of activities from Botan across Kurdistan. Its growth was to such an 
extent that the PKK was obliged to rearrange its military structures on a sub-regional 
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 Countless examples of state violence against those who refused to participate in the Village Guard system 
(Amnesty International 1992 and Human Rights Watch 1994 inter alios) or on the other hand by the PKK 
against villages that did participate (Amnesty International, 1992:17 and Human Rights Watch, 1992) are 
discussed in minute detail in the various human rights reports and extensively engaged with throughout the 
relevant academic literature (Jongerden, 2007 and Aras, 2013 inter alios). 
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basis.126 Öcalan claimed that in September 1989 they boasted a military brigade – usually of 
four to five thousand soldiers – in the Botan region alone (Gunes, 2012: 106). It was 
accordingly able to ratchet up the intensity and frequency of its attacks, inflicting significant 
casualties on the Turkish forces.127 The Turkish state imposed Emergency law initially in 
eight provinces of the South East, before expanding it to thirteen. Emergency law, known as 
OHAL was intended to better co-ordinate military strategy in the region and granted the 
state appointed governor, extensive powers (see Gunes, 2012:104; Laber & Whitman, 
1987:107 and Seda Yüksel, 2011:445). The governor had “extraordinary powers to censor 
the press, exile people who were thought to present a danger to law and order, remove 
judges and public prosecutors, limit the right of assembly, and suspended the trade union 
rights” (Balta, 2007: 173). It also provided the overarching legal framework which 
subsequently facilitated the mass expulsion of Kurdish villagers from the countryside. 
Notwithstanding the state’s efforts, the PKK continued to grow and by 1990 controlled vast 
swathes of territory which Jongerden categorised as semi-liberated zones (2007:62)128. 
These were areas that Kalyvas would consider as areas of “secure but incomplete control” 
(2006:211).  
 The PKK’s guerrilla forces were characterised by poly-centricity and consisted of 
“innumerable relatively independent units, clustering with and separating from other units 
whenever deemed necessary” (Jongerden, 2007:50). They were permanently mobile “giving 
the impression of being able to attack at any time and any place” and multi dimensional as 
they overlapped with participation in a wide variety of popular front organisations (ibid). In 
addition to the guerrillas, the ERNK was ever expanding and as Imset observed “it is very 
difficult to distinguish between militants of the ARGK and those of the ERNK, since all are or 
can be involved in armed activities” (Imset, 1992:132).  
                                                        
126 See Gunes (2012:106-107) for a detailed breakdown of these divisions. 
127
 Gunes (2012) has done extensive analysis of the PKK’s publications and how they reported these attacks. 
The figures proffered by the PKK are undoubtedly inflated but they nonetheless mark a dramatic escalation of 
violence (ibid: 104-106). 
128 These zones were referred to as Serhat, Garzan, Botan and Amed and also crossed over the state border 
into Iran and Iraq. 
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In addition to these units which were composed of professional cadres, the PKK 
successfully mobilised a huge militia (milis). The movement cadres were subject to stringent 
party discipline and were dedicated on a full time basis to the movement. The milis on the 
other hand operated secretly on a part-time basis in the “rural settlements and urban 
centres and could shift swiftly between the roles of fighter and civilian” (Jongerden, 
2010:84). The milis according to Azad a former guerrilla from Bismil served a mediatory 
function between the guerrilla and the people; in terms of logistics and by providing 
intelligence reports. Essentially, they dealt with all the things that the guerrillas were unable 
to do themselves (Interview 35, 2012).  As Ayhan Çiftçi, a former guerrilla explained 
“wherever we went, we would inform the milis and they would get us food” (in Marcus, 
2007:160). Herro, the son of a militia member from close to Malazgirt, reported that 
although milis members were not necessarily ERNK/ARGK members that in practice their 
lives were often similar to the guerrillas, requiring long periods away from their families 
(Interview 10, 2012). A guerrilla active in the Garzan area confirmed that on occasion, the 
local milis used to even participate in armed actions in conjunction with the guerrillas 
(Interview 38, 2013). It is difficult to ascertain with any degree of precision how many milis 
members were ever active at any one specific time. White cites a figure of 75,000 part-time 
militia members (2000:143), while Ergil somewhat arbitrarily distinguishes between 10,000 
armed militia and 500,000 active supporters (in Jongerden, 2010:84). The issue of 
quantification is derived from the difficulties of effectuating empirical research during the 
period of the conflict but also from some conceptual ambiguity on the behalf of the militia 
members themselves. Many do not identify as members of the militia, preferring rather 
more ambiguous terms, referring to themselves or others as being “close to the movement” 
or “having a long term relationship with the movement” or simply as “waled pares129”. 
Furthermore, the huge socio-spatial upheaval resulted in the majority of rural PKK 
supporters being forced from their villages of origin; consequently participation was 
contingent on a number of factors outside of the PKK’s control. The milis served as an 
important means to connect with local populations (Gunes, 2012:105), serving as a point of 
contact between the PKK and the local communities.  
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 Waled pares means patriotic in Kurdish, in Turkish the expression used is yurtsever. It usually denotes 
sympathy or support for the Kurdish movement in general and the PKK in particular. 
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One can imagine the relationship between the PKK and its constituency as a series of 
concentric circles emanating outward from the core of the movement. The core can be 
understood as the full time PKK cadre in the ARGK and the ERNK. Their lives were dedicated 
entirely to the movement as discussed above (see Özcan, 2005: 393). Beyond the 
movement cadre, the milis was committed to the movement to an extent which varied 
according to the region and its geographical characteristics, changed over time and the 
intensity of the conflict, and also in line with individual members’ personal circumstances. 
Herro the son of a milis member explained that after his house was burned down and his 
family were forced to flee their village - first to Malazgirt and subsequently to Istanbul - his 
father was entirely focused on the immediate material needs of his family and did not 
engage in any political activism for more than two years, until their economic situation 
stabilised (Interview 10, 2012).  This freedom to engage and disengage is the principal 
difference between cadre and milis members.  
The PKK constituency consisted of the huge numbers of Kurds who not only 
identified with or were positively pre-disposed toward the PKK but also interacted with the 
movement in some fashion or other. Some took part in activities organised by the PKK’s sub-
organisations’ such as student groups or its Alevi association, while others, particularly in 
areas characterised by a strong PKK presence or a degree of insurgent control, interacted on 
a more informal basis. Farhad described how he first began to do little errands for the 
movement. When he was in middle school he was tasked with distributing leaflets under 
businesses shutters during the night which demanded that they remain shut for strikes or 
kepenkler, organised for the following days. As he grew older he clandestinely distributed 
movement newspapers130 to particular people in Bitlis (Interview 44, 2013). Other errands 
were even more mundane. Besna remembers as a young girl taking food prepared in the 
villages up to the guerrillas in the mountains close to Kulp (Interview 49, 2013). While Herro 
remembers being given what he considered to be a hugely important role of minding the 
guerrillas’ weapons, which were left as a matter of respect outside the mosque, when they 
held meetings and resolved local disputes (Interview 10, 2012). At the individual level these 
tasks could be viewed as being of marginal importance. Yet, it was through these 
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 He mentioned delivering Ozgur Gundem, Tiroj and Karamlik. 
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interactions that bonds between the guerrillas and their constituency were consolidated. 
Besna described how much her family enjoyed the guerrillas’ visits to her family home, 
remarking that even now she recalls them with a smile (Interview 49, 2013). While an 
interviewee from Bingöl has fond memories of one good humoured guerrilla who was a 
university student. He used to play with all the children in the village on the occasions he 
passed through it and the children eagerly awaited his return (Interview 22, 2012). In such a 
fashion, insurgent-constituency relations became laden with bonds of affection generated 
endogenously to the conflict (Malthaner, 2011:46-51). Aras observed a pointed shift in 
terminology correlated to the consolidation of these bonds. He argues that “the shift in 
naming of the guerrillas, from telebeyan (students) to hevalan (friends) can be interpreted 
as an indication of achievement and development of a positive relationship between the 
guerrillas among significant strata of the local population” (2013:87).  
 
Mutual Trust 
  
The concept of constituency is not an existing hermetic social category, but rather an 
epistemic concept that serves to clarify the vast range of social interactions that occur 
between armed groups and their networks of support. Constituencies as has been discussed 
should be understood as nexuses of communication and interaction that take place in 
specific chronological and geo-spatial contexts (Malthaner, 2009:29). This relationship 
between armed groups and their constituency is predicated on the basis of mutual trust. 
Trust is intangible, difficult to observe and of course emerges only with time. Accordingly, 
the PKK were extremely cautious about the fashion in which they initially approached 
villages. In the early stages, the guerrillas “intentionally presented themselves as both 
fearsome and approachable” (Aras, 2013:83); fearsome in order to ensure that their 
presence was not immediately betrayed to the authorities and approachable so as to not 
inhibit the longer term objective of winning popular support.  
 
 PKK guerrillas usually approached certain individuals with whom they had pre-
existing relationships, both politicised and non politicised ones. These links were often 
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derived from inter-familial connections, from networks established in prison or simple 
acquaintances. Perwer, a PKK sympathiser from a village in Mardin, explained that the 
guerrillas that secretly infiltrated his village in 1986 first came to his house as one of the 
guerrillas had known him from a period working in construction in Ankara. Initially, they 
used to come only at night and in small numbers. He kept these intermittent contacts with 
the guerrillas secret even from his wife and family (Interview 32, 2012). Farhad described his 
first encounter with the PKK as occurring in a similarly cautious fashion. His father had been 
heavily involved in Rizgari and subsequently Ala Rizgari in the Muş area, but while in prison 
after the coup he had become active in the PKK131. In 1987, two guerrillas approached 
Farhad’s family home in the middle of the night and arranged to meet him and his father a 
little later outside in a field close to their house where they enquired as regards other 
potential recruits, even amongst the then eleven year old Farhad’s friends. Farhad described 
the guerrillas as extremely pragmatic and militaristic in manner, which he recalls as being in 
stark contrast to his father’s Rizgari contacts that would visit the family home and stay for 
days on end. He remembers the PKK at the time had an elusive image and enjoyed local 
admiration because they had managed to obtain weapons even if the wider community was 
not fully aware of its objectives aside from the fact it was fighting the state (Interview 44, 
2013).   
Although the PKK moved tentatively at first, as the insurgency started to spread, the 
PKK managed to successfully map the political sympathies of the various villages and towns 
and were thus able to safely intensify their contacts with the wider civilian population. 
These contacts were usually mediated by the milis. Rojan, a guerrilla that operated in the 
Garzan area, explained that the guerrillas went to villages only if they had a specific purpose 
to go there. Milis based in the village would contact the guerrillas, exchange material 
necessities and pass on intelligence to them. On the basis of the knowledge of the milis, the 
guerrillas would know whether or not it was safe to visit a village and for how long it was 
advisable to stay and so forth (Interview 38, 2013).  The establishment of sufficient trust 
necessary to forge a constituency was a slow process due to the power disparity between 
armed groups and civilians.  
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 His father’s switch of allegiance to the PKK was heavily criticised by his erstwhile comrades in Rizgari and 
Ala Rizgari (Interview 44, 2013). 
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Although this disparity is undeniable, the collective agency of the civilians can be 
underestimated (Masullo Jiménez, 2013). Azad, a guerrilla active in the Amed region, 
explains that after 1993, when many of the PKK supporting villages had been destroyed, the 
guerrillas were obliged to adventure into less sympathetic villages. On occasion, when the 
guerrillas approached these houses and knocked on the door, the residents simply refused 
to open the door. The guerrillas, cognisant of the necessity to avoiding provoking the ire of 
such villages, were thus obliged to leave empty handed (Interview 35, 2013). While it seems 
somewhat incongruous that armed militants could be dissuaded by villagers pretending not 
to be at home, it serves as a concrete example of the types of mundane but effective agency 
possessed by civilian groups (Interview 35, 2013). The above thus provides an empirical 
example of the interdependence between armed actors and their constituencies as 
discussed by Malthaner (2011:17). 
 
 In the case of rural Kurdish society, a perception of non-combatants as defenceless 
would be misleading. Firstly, it was possible to denounce the presence of guerrillas to the 
forces of the state. This could be done by informing on an individual basis to the authorities 
(Kalyvas, 2006:104). Informing or denouncing in such a fashion could be done on a collective 
or an individual basis, secretly or publicly and comported varying degrees of risk of reprisal 
(ibid: 105). A further option was the collective and public establishment of a Village Guard 
unit. This involved much greater risk but also furnished the relevant parties with the means 
with which to defend one’s community.  Secondly, most families possess arms of some kind, 
and are well capable of mounting active resistance to small groups of guerrillas. Although 
many private arms were seized in the wake of the coup, the region remained awash with 
weapons, due to its position as a transit point for smugglers and because of the availability 
of weapons in Southern Kurdistan. To give an example, when a child of a tribal chief was 
kidnapped from his high school in Bitlis by contra-guerrilla forces132, his father appeared at 
the school to demand his return with a large contingent of armed men (Interview 44, 
2013)133.  While a village in Malazgirt due to its access to weapons smugglers actually 
furnished the PKK with arms themselves (Interview 10, 2012). Accordingly, the contrast 
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 See Chapter V. 
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 The child was eventually released by the contra-guerrilla forces but he was so severely tortured in a freezer 
that he was left paralysed. He currently lives in Izmir. 
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between powerful armed insurgent and helpless unarmed civilian is not entirely accurate. 
This situation did not pertain in a similar fashion across Kurdistan. It was contingent on the 
relative strength of tribes, their relationships with the state, the guerrillas and involvement 
in smuggling and differed between urban and rural areas. 
 
Revolutionary Counter State 
 
 Popular legitimacy cannot be maintained exclusively through the barrel of a gun. 
Revolutionary violence needs to be supplemented by a myriad of non-violent relations in 
order to establish solidarity between constituency and armed groups. In the early stages of 
armed conflict when insurgent groups are still consolidating their presence in a given area, 
they are often particularly dependent on the goodwill or at least benign neglect of local 
civilians (see Wickham- Crowley, 1992:54-55). However, once a safe territory has been 
forged, the relationship needs to evolve to one of mutual support. Safe territories often 
facilitate the establishment of putative counter-states which necessarily encompass more 
than an armed dimension. Insurgent counter states have historically proved enormously 
successful at both eroding the legitimacy of existent states and bolstering that of insurgent 
states134. Grynkewich explains that “by providing social services, terrorist or guerrilla 
organizations threaten to supplant the social contract between the population and the 
state, thereby undermining a key source of state legitimacy” (2008: 351). As Wickham-
Crowley has observed the “wedding of power to beneficence is crucial to understanding the 
magnetic power of guerrilla movements” (1990:217). A further advantage for insurgent 
groups’ is that the provision of social services generates moments of encounter which 
portray them in a favourable light in the eyes of previously uncommitted civilians. The 
guerrillas become popularly associated with more than simply armed violence. In areas of 
state neglect, like vast swathes of Kurdistan, the provision of insurgent social services can be 
amongst the first occasions where civilians gain access to such services. Finally, the 
provision of services provides two further advantages. It renders peasants or civilians who 
take advantage of the insurgent services partially complicit in the activities of the armed 
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 See Hopkinson (2002) for the case of the Irish War of Independence and Porzecanksi (1973) for the case of 
the Tupamaros in Uruguay. 
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group and thus gives them an additional incentive to not betray them. It also allows 
insurgent groups to better enmesh themselves into their immediate social environment, 
allowing them to gather local intelligence, usually of a much more extensive and reliable 
quality than that of incumbent forces (see Wickham-Crowley 1990:217), with which to 
police their territory and to both pre-empt and punish defections.  
 
Widespread civilian coercion by the PKK was, for the most part, impractical, if not 
superfluous as they did enjoy widespread support. The PKK could thus concern itself with 
consolidating this support by providing services needed and desired by its constituency. 
Aside from its military campaign which fulfilled an evident political desire – an independent 
Kurdistan – and a collective psycho-social urge for revenge and the restoration of dignity, its 
incipient counter-state also provided many collective goods needed in the area. It should be 
noted though that the PKK’s capacity to operate such a counter-state varied across the 
region. In mountainous areas where the state presence had always been weak if not totally 
absent, they had relative freedom to establish a frequent presence in various villages. Faqi, 
a former guerrilla explained that his village in Dersim was six hours march from the nearest 
military outpost and any military forays would have been recognised far before they would 
pose a danger to the guerrillas. He explains that until the mid 1990s, guerrillas in big groups 
of up to fifty or seventy fighters would come and spend the day in the village. Smaller 
groups of four or five would break up and go and spend time in the different houses 
speaking about politics and giving the guerrillas a chance to recuperate (Interview 35, 2013). 
In a village in Malazgirt which was also in the mountains, the guerrillas used to come on a 
systematic basis and stayed for a number of days at a time (Interview 10, 2012). While 
Besna’s village close to Kulp, the guerrillas would leave in the evenings if they were in a 
large group but if their numbers were less, they would stay overnight (Interview 49, 2013). 
 
The PKK did not possess enough resources, nor did it ever enjoy sufficient control so 
as to be able to invest in the establishment of concrete projects such as schools or medical 
centres. As per Kalyvas’ model of control (2006:211), the PKK apart from some very remote 
rural settlements, could at best only boast of controlling “semi-liberated areas”. Malthaner 
identifies a number of ideal type “relationships” which bind armed groups to their 
supporters. Key amongst these relationships, drawing on Migdal (1974) is “relations of 
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utilitarian social exchange”. They have been defined as “stable and mutually rewarding 
relationships of exchange of benefits and support, and the gradual institutionalisation of 
these exchange relationships which include mutual trust and obligations of reciprocity” 
(Malthaner, 2011:46). These interactions gradually lead to Migdal’s process of 
“internalisation” whereby a certain proportion of the supporters offer more profound 
commitment and they adopt the revolutionary objectives of the armed groups (ibid: 47). 
 
 Similarly, as to how they made use of their social capital, prior to the coup d’état in 
1980, the guerrillas furnished less tangible services to those in their immediate social 
environment. Kurdistan had long been an area of state neglect, lacking any state apparatus 
for the resolution of local disputes. This was especially pertinent in settlements of less than 
150 people, the minimum required for official recognition as a village. These had been 
“administered according to local customs without interference of the state. The PKK was 
able to benefit from this administrative vacuum and establish some kind of administration in 
these settlements” (Jongerden, 2007:145). Conflicts were ordinarily resolved by blood 
feuding or by seeking the judgement of local imams or aghas. The PKK provided an 
extensive judicial apparatus whereby its guerrillas held public popular courts where relevant 
aggrieved parties could advance their cases prior to a definitive judgement being served. 
Disputes ranged from clashes over access to water and marital disputes to common 
criminality such as theft and rape.  
 
The court sittings were usually held in the local mosque which was viewed as 
communal and neutral space. Guerrillas used to leave their weapons at the door as a mark 
of respect for the mosque but also to symbolically reaffirm their ‘soft power’ as dispensers 
of impartial justice rather than imposing it militarily (Interview 10, 2012). Marcus reports 
that in the area skirting the Cudi Mountain in Şırnak the PKK quickly established a reputation 
for honesty and garnered the respect of the people (2007:119). A man who stole money 
from the PKK was forced to pay it back, while four rapists were captured and executed by 
the guerrillas (ibid). In Idil – close to Cudi Mountain- Governor Kasim Esen in 1992 went on 
record as stating that “we have not had a single application to the courts in the past six 
months. The people prefer to go to the popular tribunal instead. Only when they have 
complaints about officials do they apply to the real courts and that is only to have the things 
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on record” (in Imset, 1992: 270).  In areas of more contested control, the actual trials were 
held in the relative security of the guerrilla camps rather than in the villages themselves 
(Interview 38, 2013). Farhad explained that in his area – close to Malazgirt – that the milis 
used to receive the complaints from the locals. They then reported them to the guerrillas 
who passed a judgement which the milis then explained to the involved individuals. 
However, as the milis were often biased in how they summarised the complaints, there was 
popular discontent with some of the judgements. Accordingly, at the Seventh Party 
Congress, the PKK removed these intermediary duties from the milis who were 
subsequently tasked with simply accompanying the complainants to the closest guerrilla 
unit (Interview 44, 2013). The experience of the PKK courts was arguably the first time that 
many Kurds had access to a form of justice that was not heavily biased in favour of powerful 
local tribal figures. The cases were often held in Kurmanji which allowed the relevant parties 
express themselves to the best of their abilities and the trials themselves marked not only 
the actual rejection of the Turkish state but the symbolic validation of a more just Kurdish 
one. 
 
The PKK also provided medical services when possible, often in areas that had never 
seen a medical professional. Imset details the presence of a PKK doctor in the village of 
Işıkveren close to Şırnak (1992:56-57). The PKK also provided rudimentary oral education to 
many rural villages, promoting a Kurdish historical perspective and emphasising themes of 
social justice (Interview 10, 2012). While such politicised education might appear self 
serving, it was nonetheless viewed by many Kurds as the provision of a collective good. It 
also promoted a massive Kurdish cultural revival. The PKK’s cultural organisation Hunerkom 
(Association of Artists), although based in the diaspora, made Kurdish music recordings 
which were widely distributed on cassettes (Gunes, 2012:112 & see Saritaş, 2010). In 
addition to the PKK’s own publications Serxwebûn and Berxwedan, the movement was 
involved to some degree – the extent of which remains hotly debated – in the foundation of 
a number of publications such as Özgür Gündem, a monthly magazine Özgür Halk and even 
a Kurdish language newspaper Azadiya Welat from 1994 (Gunes, 2012:112). Arguably the 
PKK’s cultural contribution of greatest impact was the foundation of Med-tv in 1995 which 
was based in Belgium (see Hassanpour, 1998). These cultural developments although not 
uniformly accessible for linguistic and technological reasons to all Kurds enhanced the 
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credibility of the movement that tide had decisively turned in its favour, bestowing the PKK 
with ever more credibility. 
 
Forced Recruitment 
 
 Notwithstanding the positive ties emerging between the PKK and its constituency, it 
cannot be ignored that the PKK was an armed movement with strategic imperatives which 
did not always coincide with Kurdish society’s immediate interests. At the Third Party 
Congress in 1986, it was specified that the guerrillas were expected to expand territorially 
and in terms of recruits. To this end, a resolution was passed that declared “from now on, 
the recruitment of  peasants into the fighting units needs to take place not on the voluntary 
basis but on the basis of a compulsory conscription law” (in Gunes, 2012:105). It was a 
decree communicated from the externally based leadership and was grossly detached from 
realities on the ground. According to Sari Baran, a PKK commander at the time, “The people 
[who made the decision] at the congress, didn’t really know fighting.  I knew the military 
conscription law would turn people against us, You would take people and then the village 
would react, then the people you took would run away, and then you had to kill them” (in 
Marcus, 2007:117). The PKK was expanding its recruits in any case and the coercive 
character of such a law created many unnecessary difficulties between the PKK and the local 
population (Aras, 2013: 86-87)135. In order to avoid family members being press-ganged into 
the guerrilla forces, many sought protection by joining the Village Guards (Marcus, 2007: 
111). Gunes is of the view that “it is highly unlikely that the PKK would have managed to 
recruit large numbers without compulsory conscription, especially during the critical years 
of its early guerrilla war” (2012:105). Yet, notwithstanding the influx of recruits which it 
guaranteed, it is clear that the PKK calculated that the negative consequences of the system 
in terms of the dissipation of its constituency’s support out-weighed its positive aspects. 
And it recalibrated its recruitment strategy accordingly.  
                                                        
135 The FMLN in El Salvador also experimented with forced recruitment but it quickly abandoned it for reasons 
analogous to the PKK (2013: 71). 
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The application of the PKK leadership’s directive on forced conscription was 
extremely uneven and depended on a variety of local conditions such as the degree of 
support for the PKK or the individual decisions of local commanders. In certain cases it 
merely gave a formalistic gloss to processes already occurring. There was a symbolic 
relevance to young Kurds refusing to do their service in the Turkish military and taking to 
the mountains to join the Kurdish forces. Processes of PKK recruitment bestowed legitimacy 
on the PKK as representatives of the Kurdish people. At the same time, these processes 
served as an act of resistance to and detracted from the legitimacy of the Turkish state. The 
threat of impending military service in the Turkish army was often the immediate 
motivation for many Kurds to leave for the guerrillas. Faqi, a former guerrilla from Dersim, 
explained that he had already decided for about two years to join the guerrillas and he had 
been merely waiting for the most opportune moment. Although his family was extremely 
sympathetic to the PKK, his parents’ natural protective inclinations led them to encourage 
him to stay with his family for as long as possible. However, once the decision had to be 
made to fight in the ranks of the Turkish state or those of the guerrillas, the decision was 
apparent for Faqi, and he left for the mountains (Interview 35, 2013). Furthermore, as the 
existence of the PKK’s military conscription law became known it provided a convenient 
defence for the families of guerrillas when questioned by the military about their 
whereabouts. Accordingly, the “PKK did not necessarily force the local youth to join the 
organisation but gave the impression it was abducting the recruits for their own safety as 
well as that of their families” (Imset, 1992: 85).  
 
Forced conscription in any case soon became unnecessary due to the massive influx 
of recruits from the cities in Kurdistan, from Istanbul and further afield in Europe, to the 
guerrillas by 1989. Rasul from Nusaybin, explains that of twenty four youths that played 
with his football team in 1986-87, only four of them are still alive, all the rest having died as 
PKK guerrillas in the mountains (Interview 33, 2013). Other anecdotal accounts describe 
tens of recruits flocking to the guerrillas. Farhad recalled in the early 1990s that the milis 
arranged for sixty students from his high school in Bitlis to go to the mountains on one 
occasion. While Mehmed was part of a thirty strong contingent of youths in Adiyaman 
which were headed for the mountains close to Malatya before coming under attack from 
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army helicopters136 (Interviews 44 & 48, 2013).  Although these personal accounts are likely 
inflated to some degree, they depict an unambiguously upward curve of PKK support.  Given 
the PKK’s mass popularity and the discontent the compulsory military service directive was 
raising amongst its constituency, it was suspended by the PKK in 1990 at its Fourth Party 
Congress in Lebanon (Marcus, 2007: 119). It is argued here that the PKK’s re-adjustment of 
its recruitment practises in light of pressure from its constituency is a credible example of 
the exertion of constituent influence on an armed movement, notwithstanding the 
discrepancy in power resources. 
 
Violence against Civilians  
 
Given the extent of the PKK’s growth and increasing intensity of the conflict, it 
became inevitable that tensions between the PKK and civilians would ensue. The first killing 
of civilians by the PKK happened in late 1985. A guerrilla had been killed close to a particular 
village and some of the deceased fighter’s comrades went to avenge him, resulting in three 
or four deaths. It was an event that was neither planned nor sanctioned by the movement 
and was simply the emotional response of bereaved armed guerrillas free to act with a 
degree of impunity (Interview 37, 2013). The rise in violence against civilians by the PKK was 
due to a number of developments within the movement. Firstly, the composition of fighters 
in the ARGK had undergone a dramatic change. The first generation of militants had been 
trained in Lebanon and imbued with ideological and political discipline. Many of the 
subsequent recruits from the rural areas of Kurdistan did not receive extensive political or 
military training and by the late 1980’s they had acceded to local command positions. The 
Third Party Congress had made it clear that greater territorial coverage was expected and 
mobile guerrilla units were established in 1987 and 1988 (Interview 37, 2013). They 
accordingly covered more territory and would have had lesser knowledge and inter-
personal connections with the communities with which they inter-acted thus, arguably, 
hastening recourse to violence.  
                                                        
136 The first group of would be recruits were all killed even after they surrendered according to Mehmed and 
the group he was in managed to escape back to the city. He was subsequently moved to Istanbul by his 
parents in order to distance him from the movement. 
189 
 
In more conceptual terms, they were operating in areas where their constituency was less 
consolidated thus the infrastructural networks and emotional solidarity present in other 
areas was lacking137. In addition, the order had been passed to attack the Village Guards but 
without precise indications of how to go about realising such a campaign. The guerrilla units 
implemented the general directions of the PKK leadership but in a manner, they viewed as 
most appropriate for local conditions. On several occasions this resulted in bloody 
massacres which, although latterly repudiated by the movement, were an integral element 
of the movement’s repertoire, which reflected the PKK’s organisational inconsistencies at 
that period. It brings to mind the observation that “the process of violent contest can 
become autonomous from the agenda and will of a political and/or military leadership” 
(Bozarslan, 2000:27).  
 
The year 1987 marked the start of a bloody campaign against Village Guard villages. 
Numerous bloody attacks were launched in order to deter further villages from adhering to 
the system. It was announced in a 1987 edition of Serxwebûn that “collaborationists will be 
completely wiped out” (in Marcus, 2007:115). The brutality of the attacks provoked 
widespread shock as not only were the Village Guards targeted but so too were their 
families. In one notorious instance, PKK fighters surrounded a village called Pinarcik in 
Mardin on the 20th of June 1987 and called on the Village Guards to surrender. The ensuing 
assault resulted in around thirty deaths including a number of women and children138 
(Marcus, 2007:115, Imset, 1992:99, Mango, 2005:36)139. Such attacks continued throughout 
the summer of 1987 across Mardin, Şırnak and Siirt (see Laber & Whitman, 1987: 102-103 
and Özar et al, 2013: 42 & 86) and the massacres were reportedly used by the guerrillas to 
intimidate other villages contemplating becoming Village Guards (Marcus, 2007:116). 
Contrary to how these attacks were represented in the Turkish press, the violence was not 
indiscriminate. Villages were usually warned a number of times about participating in the 
Village Guards – as Pinarcik had been (Marcus, 2007:114) - and then they were attacked. “As 
                                                        
137 See Mkandawire (2002) for a discussion of spatial mobility and its impact on insurgent practises of violence. 
138 The actual numbers of deaths cited varies; Imset refers to only seventeen civilians killed without specifying 
if they were women or children, Marcus references sixteen dead children and six dead women, while Mango 
only speaks of eight women and five children. 
139
 Remarkably, the Village Guards which survived the attack were subsequently arrested by the army on 
suspicion of collaborating with the PKK because they had not used all of their ammunition and no PKK 
guerrillas had been killed (Özar et al, 2013:90). 
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far as the local Kurds were concerned, they knew that PKK attacks were directed not at 
ordinary people but villages with state connections” (Imset, 1995). The PKK’s strategy was 
also successful in that it led many Village Guards to return or attempt to return their 
weapons and opt out of the system (Özar et al, 2013: 92 and Balta Paker, 2009:6). The PKK’s 
offering of amnesties in 1991 and 1998, in addition to informal local compromises with 
Village Guards coerced into participation reduced hostilities between them (Özar et al, 
2013:95 & 120).  
 
The attacks were thus examples of selective violence. Kalyvas has explained that 
“selective violence personalizes threats and endows them with credibility, for if people are 
targeted on the basis of their actions, then refraining from such actions guarantees safety 
(2004:105). The attacks delivered a clear message that villages which refused to comply with 
the PKK were potentially running fatal risks.  The attacks were “primarily proactive in its goal 
to deter a particular action in the future”, and “simultaneously retrospective in its intention 
to punish a similar action that has already taken place” (ibid: 99). Humphreys and Weinstein 
have surmised that the targeting of civilians is often derived from a lack of structural 
coherence within armed movements. They suggested that “factions with tight disciplinary 
structures are likely to be less abusive of civilian populations” (2006:433). Although the PKK 
at the time of the killings was a disciplined movement, its leadership and particularly Öcalan 
in Syria did not have day to day control over its fighting units. Yet, the killings were directly 
in line with the strategy outlined by the movement. Accordingly, the killings cannot be 
attributed to ill-discipline. The brutality of the killings also questions Weinstein’s argument 
that activist rebellions and in particular those which depend on their supporters for material 
sustenance are less violent in their treatment of civilians (2007). 
  
An alternative explanation can be largely categorised under the heading of the 
“brutalisation” hypothesis. Bourgois has argued that those “who confront violence with 
resistance - whether it be cultural or political – do not escape unscathed from the terror and 
oppression they rise against” (2001:30). Brutalisation has been described as a process of 
habituation (Kalyvas, 2006:56), wherein a degree of de-sensitisation sets in and violence is 
almost unthinkingly integrated into quotidian practises. Civil war undermines the 
“psychological mechanisms of self sanction” and it lowers the cost of violent activity (ibid: 
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57). Furthermore, armed conflict usually entails a reconfiguration of generational 
hierarchies. “By transferring power from elders to youth, it eliminates what in many 
traditional societies counts as the most effective informal means of conflict resolution” 
(ibid). It also generates alternative routes of social mobility irrespective of age or status, 
whereby actors with violent skills can obtain power and demand respect (ibid: 58). In the 
case of the PKK, Bozarslan has described the movement’s use of violence in the early stages 
as “a means of construction of a field of socialisation” (2004:57). It was an alternative field 
of meaning that was quickly embraced by large numbers of Kurdish youths who “had been 
raised with the accounts of the sufferings of their elder brothers and sisters in prison, [they] 
welcomed guerrilla action as an honour restoring means of revenge and as an end to their 
silent and largely introverted socialisation” (Bozarslan, 2008: 351). Accordingly, violence was 
a means of personal and collective redemption. It is redolent of Fanon’s view that “violence 
is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and 
inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect” (1963:94).  
 
 The brutality of the violence has been also explained as a by-product of Kurdish 
culture (Marcus, 2007:116). Van Bruinessen has detailed that “in the tribal milieu a murder 
is not primarily an individual affair, but one between groups” (1992:65). Leading revenge to 
be traditionally wrought on a collective basis; consequently the mass killing of women and 
children did not provoke as much outrage as it might have done elsewhere140. This culturally 
reductivist view is interestingly also proffered by elements of the Kurdish society which it 
denigrates. This type of behaviour has been severely critiqued by Öcalan himself on 
numerous occasions (2011 and see Özcan, 2006: 288-289). Ahmet, who comes from a 
relatively wealthy rural family, derided the “rural revenge culture” common amongst Kurds. 
Although, he himself was dismayed by the savagery of the attacks, he claimed that most 
supporters of the PKK were rural and ignorant and pleased that these villages were 
punished (Interview 18, 2012). It would be unwise to wholly attribute the wider Kurdish 
reaction to their cultural habituation to violence. As practises of violence were not 
                                                        
140 Van Bruinessen explained that the practise of collective revenge was much less common amongst Southern 
Kurds, thus highlighting the dangers innate in broad cultural explanations of complex social phenomena 
(1992:65). 
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distributed homogenously across Kurdistan, the differentiation is reducible to factors other 
than an atavistic predisposition to violence.  
 
Adiyaman, which had been a Kawa stronghold prior to the coup, proved to be an 
area where the PKK found it difficult to mobilise significant support. This was likely due to 
the strong presence of the Bucak, the Sabri141 and Firat aşirets in the area. However, as 
Bahoz a school teacher from the area explained, it was also due to the actions of the local 
PKK commander Terzi Cemal. He had executed a number of PKK fighters on spurious 
grounds and after inadequate internal disciplinary procedures. These events were known to 
locals and it played a large part in reinforcing their reservations about the PKK leading to 
lesser support for it in the area and concomitantly less violence. Precisely, because of the 
lesser intensity of the violence in the area, local Village Guards do not bear the same 
negative connotations as they did elsewhere. From Bahoz’s own personal experience, a 
Village Guard is the type of person who drives a sick person to the hospital or who is a 
honey maker (Interview 23, 2012). It should be admitted though that a further interviewee 
from the area suggested that there was less guerrilla activity in the area because there are 
no mountains (Interview 43, 2013). However, the absence of mountains did not prevent it 
from being an area of much violence between Kurdish groups and with the state, prior to 
the 1980 coup (Interview 23, 2012; Interview 44, 2013 & Interview 48, 2013). The evidence 
from Adiyaman also reinforces the fact that certain patterns or instances of violence varied 
according to the initiative of individual senior commanders. Bozarslan suggests that many of 
them “considered the war both as a national duty and as a means of establishing their own 
‘territorial’ zones where they had an absolute autonomy” (2004:53).  
  
Many Kurds were disturbed by the PKK’s violence and apparent disregard for the 
distinction between combatant and civilian and this provoked discontent within the 
movement itself (see Marcus, 2007:149). It led to widespread criticism from other Kurdish 
groups, most notably the KDP.  
                                                        
141 The Sabri tribe were described by Bahoz as being close to the state notwithstanding that one of its 
members Osman Sabri had been a noted Kurdish intellectual and member of the Syrian KDP. 
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The KDP were purportedly so outraged by the killings that it led to the dissolution of the 
‘Memorandum of Understanding’ that had been operative between the two movements 
since 1983. Barzani was reported to have declared that because of the civilian massacres 
“the PKK is earning the hatred and disgust of all the Kurdish people” (in Imset, 1992:49). 
However, any declarations from Barzani, or indeed Talalbani and the PUK (Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan) should be considered carefully. Beneath Barzani’s apparently humanitarian 
concerns for Kurdish civilians it is also likely that the criticism was the product of a more 
instrumental concern about the expansion of the PKK142 support into areas traditionally 
loyal to his family. In addition, many Kurds more distant from the Botan area where most of 
this violence occurred simply did not believe it. It was reported by the Turkish media and 
many in Kurdish society systematically disbelieved any information broadcast by it or else 
presumed it was simply a strategy to besmirch the reputation of the PKK. For others, so 
blinded were they by their hatred of the Turkish state and loyalty to the PKK that, even 
today, they refuse to recognise that the PKK engaged in such practises (Interview 20, 2012). 
The killings in any case did not seem to affect the overall growth trajectory of the PKK 
(Marcus, 2007:119).  
 
There are numerous reasons why the PKK halted - for the most part - these attacks. 
Firstly, it had reached a position of such strength so as to enable them to focus on more 
ambitious military targets and had even begun to raid certain towns in region by 1987143. Its 
efforts at discouraging voluntary participation in the Village Guards had also proven 
successful. After the initial period of growth, new recruitment to the Village Guard system 
did not cease but it slowed significantly. The take-up had trailed off to such an extent that 
the army soon resorted to forcing villages to join at the cost of losing their land and 
immediate expulsion if they refused; thus giving rise to a second wave of, this time, forcible 
recruitment to the Village Guards. It was clear that while violence against some civilians was 
not a practise appreciable to the PKK’s constituency, as long as it remained coherent and 
discriminate that it was tolerable. By the late 1980’s it became evident that the PKK had 
taken root in Kurdish society. It moved beyond being a simple guerrilla organisation to 
                                                        
142
 Barzani has been quoted as saying that “the PKK have a self-righteous regard for themselves as the sole 
representatives of Kurds everywhere. We will not accept the dictatorship of Öcalan. He has not been to 
Kurdistan in years. He has not seen a battle in his life” (in Rugman & Hutchings, 1996:47). 
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become something else (Interview 37, 2013). Öcalan had become a figure of national 
renown, one which attracted the interest of journalists, most notably by Mehmet Ali Birand 
for the Milliyet newspaper in 1988. A further turning point, according to Ahmet was the 
electoral success of the SHP (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti/Social Democratic People’s Party) 
which saw five Kurdish candidates elected in the 1987 general election. The success brought 
a degree of recognition to the Kurdish movement and closer attention to the PKK. In 
particular this ensured that the PKK no longer had to judge the tenor of its violence by its 
constituency in Kurdistan but also its constituency in the wider Kurdish population in 
Western Turkey and the diaspora (Interview 18, 2012).  
 
Therefore, the PKK reined in the excesses of its campaign against civilians to render 
it less controversial amongst its wider supporters. However, that is not to suggest that this 
was a decisive point wherein the PKK adopted a politically oriented path in place of the 
armed struggle. Rather the PKK realised that certain of their tactics were discrediting it 
further afield and potentially discouraging the expansion of its constituency. Accordingly, 
Öcalan distanced the PKK from these killings in his interview with Birand in 1988 (Seçme 
Röportajlar, 1994).It was communicated to the mountain units that “in our attacks on these 
targets [Mukhtars and senior tribal figures], violence will be dominant but methods such as 
punishment, forced exile, neutralisation and forcefully servicing our struggle will be used on 
secondary targets” (PKK internal communication cited in Imset, 1992:52). The strategy of 
violence against civilians was officially repudiated at the Fourth Congress in 1990. As Öcalan 
had apportioned the responsibility for the slow progress of the insurgency on individual field 
commanders prior to the 1986 Party Congress, he also deflected the blame for the violent 
excesses of the campaign on to other leading figures in movement which he declared to be 
out of control or rogue elements. “The style of activities in 87-88 are not approved by the 
PKK and were under the control of doubtful elements” (Öcalan in Imset, 1992:345). Halil 
Kaya – code name Blind Cemal – was executed for his brutality and his role in the failings of 
mandatory conscription (Marcus, 2007:145). Cemil Isik – code name Hogir – was harshly 
criticised for the killings of civilians. Hogir, fearing for his life managed to flee to KDP 
controlled territory in Southern Kurdistan and later Germany where he was executed by the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
143  Tunceli/Dersim, Karakoçan, Uludere and Hozat (Gunes, 2012:106). 
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PKK in 1994144 (Interview 37, 2013 & Marcus, 2007:137). Culpability was thereby limited to 
individual behaviour and the structural weaknesses or the detached leadership of the PKK 
was not identified as the root of the phenomenon. Hussein Topgider, a former PKK militant 
at the time explained how developments were analysed within the party: 
 
“If something was done correctly, then it was because of the party, and if something was 
done wrong, then it was an individual mistake, never the party’s. Of course, sometimes the 
mistakes were because of the strategy [which Öcalan devised], but the strategy was not 
debated. Because if you debated this, it meant you were questioning the party, which meant 
Öcalan, and it was forbidden to question Öcalan” (in Marcus, 2007:145). 
 
However, the flexibility that the movement exhibited in the period prior to the 
launching of the insurgency was again in evidence. The movement recognised that specific 
practises of violence or strategies were having a negative impact on its growth, and they 
reversed these decisions, thus exhibiting self-reflexivity often absent in other insurgent 
groups (O Connor & Oikonomakis, forthcoming). It is clear that the PKK adopted its 
repertoire according to the exigencies and normative objections not just of its constituency 
in Kurdistan but also to its emergent de-territorialised constituency further afield in western 
Turkey and in the diaspora. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The PKK managed not only to establish its military presence inside Kurdistan but to 
expand its support base to the extent that it had a degree of territorial control across the 
region. Its success was of the bounds that by 1990 the “liberation of Kurdistan by the PKK 
had become not at all unthinkable” (Jongerden, 2007:43). The PKK had also become the 
incontrovertible vanguard of the wider Kurdish movement; many figures of other groups 
renounced their efforts at reviving their moribund movements to throw in their lot with the 
PKK (Interview 14, 2012 and Interview 44, 2013). It achieved this, notwithstanding the 
reinforced military presence in the region and the imposition of repressive OHAL rule. The 
                                                        
144 In this interim period he was allegedly recruited by JITEM (Interview 37, 2013). 
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state had also reanimated ghosts of the past by setting Kurds against Kurds, the formation 
of the Village Guards was the embodiment of an age old state strategy to have Kurds kill 
Kurds or Kurdu Kurde Kirdirmak (Imset, 1995), but even that failed to limit the PKK’s growing 
support. The PKK also complicated matters for itself by the consolidation of control of the 
movement in the hands of a single man, Abdullah Öcalan whose detachment from the 
actual conflict often led him to propose unfeasible military strategies and fostered internal 
disunity and far reaching paranoia. 
 
 The PKK’s success was however not reducible to good fortune, external backing, 
Turkish complacency or even favourable structural conditions. The PKK as per the strategy 
of foquismo created the conditions necessary to launch the insurgency. The consolidation of 
the PKK’s presence was obtained by the calculated deployment of brutal violence against 
those who actively opposed the guerrillas and by the active cultivation of relations of 
solidarity between the movement and its constituency. The mutual exchange and ever 
growing interdependency of the guerrillas and their supporters took multiple forms. As PKK 
recruitment expanded, so too did its web of familial connections with wider Kurdish society. 
Innumerable Kurdish families had sons or daughters in the mountains or participating in the 
ERNK, the militia or any of its front organisations, thus cementing the bonds between the 
two. PKK deaths were no longer distant martyrs of a noble cause but rather sons and 
daughters, known by all. The emotional investment of the families of PKK militants and the 
symbolic resonance of local martyrs further melded the PKK to its support networks. The 
strength of its radication across rural Kurdistan thus allowed the PKK to also expand in urban 
centres which will be discussed in Chapter V. 
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Chapter V: Insurgency and the City 
 
Introduction 
 
 The vast majority of the PKK’s military initiatives were conducted in the countryside 
against military targets and what were deemed as state collaborators. Throughout the 
1990s, until the Turkish military began to gain the upper hand following a large-scale 
military reorganisation in 1993 (Özdağ, 2003:52), the PKK was primarily concerned with 
expanding and strengthening its rural guerrilla campaign. Its rural orientation was both 
pragmatically and ideologically informed. The inherent difficulties of armed struggle in 
urban environments were well-known to the PKK, but it was also allegedly “somewhat 
disdainful of the cities” (Marcus, 2007:143). Nonetheless, the PKK did manage to establish a 
constituency in cities across Kurdistan starting from the late 1980s. Urban centres were 
consolidated as centres of recruitment and wider political support but they never became a 
primary theatre of insurgent violence. The growth in the PKK’s urban support was evidenced 
in a number of serhildans or popular uprisings from 1990 onwards, and the mass 
demonstrations on the occasions of Newroz celebrations, funerals of guerrillas and other 
symbolic dates. The PKK’s nascent constituency’s manifestations of support highlighted the 
movement’s expanding strength and popular legitimacy beyond its rural strongholds. 
 
The expansion or diffusion of PKK support from semi-liberated rural territories to 
urban areas is difficult to clarify in a comprehensive empirical fashion. Diffusion is “a 
multidimensional dynamic that involves the strategic spread of tactics, ideas, social and 
cultural practises, and so forth, across time, borders and cultures, engaging different actors, 
networks and mechanisms” (Bosi et al, 2014: 15).  It can occur via “embracing contagion, 
mimicry, social learning, organized dissemination, and [via] other family members” (Strang 
& Soule, 1998:266). In relation to political violence, Schutte and Weidmann have proposed 
that patterns of violence in civil wars can be diffused through re-location and escalation 
(2011:144). Re-location occurs when armed actors move from one territory to another, 
while “escalation diffusion is the expansion of the geographic scope of violence to new 
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locations during the course of the conflict” (ibid: 245). Although there is an element of 
indirect or non-relational diffusion (Soule, 2004: 296) in both re-location and escalation 
diffusion, it is clear that in relation to armed contention, direct or proximal diffusion through 
personal interaction predominates as the main channel of diffusion (ibid). The diffusion of 
patterns of violence is difficult to ascertain in the case of the PKK because it did not channel 
its urban support into campaigns of proximate urban insurgency but rather re-directed it 
into the rural insurgency. Yet episodic public displays of support and intensified recruitment 
from the cities confirm that the PKK did indeed mobilise a constituency in these areas and 
that it then chose to strategically deploy it beyond urban confines.  
 
There are three principal factors which facilitated the formation of the PKK’s 
constituency in the cities. The first reason is the dramatically altered structural environment 
which flooded the cities with masses of displaced rural dwellers with firsthand experiences 
of the conflict. It was thus the huge rural population displacement which re-configured and 
radicalised the urban population and environment. An ulterior reason is a result of the 
agency of the PKK. Mass displacement does not necessarily lead to mass mobilisation – on 
the contrary, the fragmentation of established social structures and geo-spatial residence 
patterns can often lead to disorientation and passivity. The PKK prevented this from 
occurring by utilising its popular front the ERNK and its subsidiary organisations to maintain 
pre-existing mobilisation networks and establish new ones amongst the recent arrivals from 
the countryside. In addition, it consolidated networks in schools and universities, thus 
accessing hitherto politically inactive swathes of society.  
 
Finally, the PKK’s constituency also expanded due to a dynamic of reciprocal 
escalation between the PKK and the counter-insurgency efforts of the Turkish state145. State 
repression and the PKK’s responses to it can be viewed as a mechanism of territorial 
diffusion of violence, wherein practises of violence spread to areas which had hitherto 
remained relatively peaceful.  
                                                        
145 See Malthaner (2011a: 125) for an interesting description of the reciprocal escalation between Islamist 
movements and the police in Cairo. 
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The state organised an extensive deep-state contra-guerrilla network and utilised the radical 
Islamist movement Hezbollah146 to carry out an extra-legal campaign of targeted 
assassinations in the urban centres. Practises of state repression such as forced migration, 
assassination campaigns and mass torture not only generated collective resentment, they 
also forged a form of organic solidarity between the PKK and urban populations. This led to 
a form of urban territorialisation, whereby the PKK was no longer perceived as a group of 
mysterious and fearsome terrorists in the mountains, but rather recognised as one’s 
neighbours and classmates147; a familiarisation necessary to permit the PKK expansion. 
 
 This chapter will analyse developments in the urban contexts during the period of 
the PKK’s greatest strength from roughly 1990 to 1993 and elaborate on the urban 
consequences of rural population displacement. Although much of the state violence was 
inflicted in rural areas, its consequences were subsequently evidenced in urban centres by 
the increase in PKK support. Accordingly, the traumatic impact of internal displacement will 
be detailed in some depth. It will then discuss the nature of the state’s counter-insurgency 
practises in the urban context. The fashion in which the state made use of proxy forces such 
as Hezbollah to conduct gruesome murder campaigns against PKK supporters and wider 
Kurdish civil society figures will be analysed, and the specific impact which such shadowy 
violent actors had on generating opposition to the state will be further considered. In light 
of these findings, it will then proceed to discuss the meso-level organisational initiatives of 
the PKK such as its recruitment strategies, its strategic reluctance to militarily confront the 
state in the cities and its manipulation of events of symbolic importance such as Newroz 
celebrations and guerrilla funerals. The chapter will conclude by summarising the extent and 
importance of the PKK’s constituency in the urban centres of Kurdistan to the wider 
insurgency. 
                                                        
146 The Hezbollah movement referred to here is completely separate from its Lebanese namesake. It will be 
discussed in detail in this chapter. 
147 See Malthaner (2011a:225) for a similar process of territorialisation by Hizbullah in south Lebanon. 
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Urban – Rural Interconnectedness  
 
The logistical advantages for rural insurgency have been sufficiently documented 
elsewhere to not necessitate further elaboration here (inter alios Hendrix, 2011, Gates, 
2002, O’Sullivan 1983, Cederman, 2008 and Collier and Hoeffler 2000). As urban and rural 
are understood as a binary in much of the studies of violence, the advantages of rural 
insurgency implicitly suggest that these factors are for the most part absent in urban 
contexts. It is indeed undeniable that where state presence is stronger, usually in urban 
environments, it is more difficult to engage in legal or clandestine contentious mobilisation. 
Yet it is not impossible to conduct urban insurgencies and the likelihood of their success or 
failure is derived from the strategies adopted by armed movements themselves, as opposed 
to fixed socio-spatial determinants (see Le Blanc, 2013). However, given the well-established 
urban preponderance in the monitoring of civil conflict, from an academic, journalistic, NGO 
or intergovernmental perspective (Kalyvas, 2006: 39), state forces have more liberty – 
arguably to a lesser extent now with technological improvements in communication - to 
engage in practices of violence and brutality in rural areas that would be more difficult to 
realise in better-connected urban environments. From a state perspective there is a form of 
pay-off between rural informational asymmetries and the capacity to conduct repressive 
campaigns far from the national or international spotlight. In short it consists of the fact that 
while the state can better monitor urban dwellers, it is also to a degree more restricted in 
the forms of violence it can deploy against them. 
 
 As has already been discussed in Chapter I, the strict dichotomy between urban and 
rural movements is a false one. Staniland has argued that there are two distinct conditions 
necessary for the realisation of urban insurgency, a constrained state limited not by its 
armed capacity but in the extent that it can deploy that capacity, and the presence of an 
insurgent group that has deep social roots and legitimacy (Staniland, 2010:1626). Both of 
these conditions pertained in the cities of Kurdistan; the Turkish state’s use of violence was 
extensive but constrained in a number of ways and the insurgents had a degree of popular 
legitimacy. Their legitimacy also increased over time in correlation to the violence of the 
state.  
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On the other hand, a key factor militating against urban campaigns of violence is that 
urban dwellers “are often recent arrivals [which] [...], lack a strong sense of attachment to 
the land they occupy” (Toft in Staniland, 2010:1626). However, the Kurdish case is similar to 
the cities in Iraq where processes of migration had essentially ruralised urban settlements, 
especially in their peripheral zones where “village migrants clustered [...] and reproduced 
rural customs and practices” (Marr in Staniland, 2010: 1638). Due to the mass arrival of 
displaced villagers, the PKK could draw upon relocated village and familial networks which 
sufficed to serve as the robust networks necessary for urban insurgency (2010:1628). 
Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons sustained armed insurgency did not develop in the 
Kurdish cities as it did in contemporary Syria, Iraq in the 2000s or Algeria in the 1990s.   
 
 The cities of Kurdistan were historically the most Turkified centres in the region, due 
to a stronger state administrative presence, trading networks with other Turkish cities and 
the stronger police presence which limited any overtly politicised Kurdish initiatives. All of 
the significant Kurdish rebellions of the early Republican period were rurally based. In the 
Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, Diyarbakir-based Kurdish notables did not rise in solidarity 
with Said, notwithstanding the close proximity of his troops and the extent of the revolt 
which succeeded in occupying one third of “Kurdish Anatolia” (Robins, 1993:660). The cities 
and towns therefore lacked the collective memory of revolt so present in many of the rural 
areas of Kurdistan. However, the divisions between the urban and rural realms had begun to 
diminish over time to such an extent that it was said that “in Turkey the peasantization of 
the city had proceeded faster than the urbanisation of the peasant” (Mardin, 1978:243). 
Rural to urban migration had already begun by the 1950s, related to the mechanisation of 
agriculture (Erturk, 1980:73, and Taspinar, 2005:86), the concentration of land ownership 
fostered by agricultural reforms in the hands of a minority of aghas (Natali, 2005:100, and 
Kucukozer, 2010:206) and the wider context of Turkey’s industrialisation (Jongerden & 
Gambetti, 2011: 382, Zürcher, 2004:226 and Betül Çelik, 2005:139). Although much of this 
migration was to Turkish rather than Kurdish cities, it rendered many of these rural 
settlements less insular places than they might have otherwise been. Therefore, the 
confines between the urban and the rural were already disintegrating long before the 
dramatic intensification of rural displacement in the 1990s.  
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As discussed in chapter IV, certain cities had a strong revolutionary heritage such as 
those in the area around Cudi Mountain close to the Syrian border, in the PKK Botan area. 
This area had always strongly identified with Barzani rebellions in Southern Kurdistan and 
had been a stronghold of the earlier TKDP. Many men of the area had even fought as 
peshmergas under Barzani (Interview 1, 2011). Apart from its historic commitment to 
Kurdish – in the wider sense, not simply in the Kurdish region of Turkey - revolutionary 
politics, it was also favoured by the positioning of its towns Şirnak, Cizre, Nusaybin and Silopi 
between the mountains and the Syrian border. Therefore, from a purely strategic 
perspective it was comparatively easier to organise and maintain a trans-generational 
culture of resistance in the area. The population composition of Cizre was one of the first 
cities to undergo radical change by the forced migration of a number of villagers in its 
hinterland already in 1987-88. These newly arrived migrants had organic ties with the 
guerrillas in the mountains as their home villages had been the location of the earliest PKK 
mobilisation after the coup. They thus brought immediate and personalised notice of the 
struggle to urban residents who would have remained otherwise lesser informed (Interview 
37, 2013).  
 
In modern times the use of forced population removal was “pioneered by the British 
and the United States” Republic (Kalyvas, 2006:122). The British used it during the Boer 
War, while the Americans made ample recourse to it the occupation of the Philippines and 
the Dominican Republic. Notwithstanding that it generated “considerable grievances”, the 
tactic appears “to produce collaboration with incumbents” (ibid: 123). It has been widely 
used in counter-insurgency strategies throughout the 20th century in anti-colonial struggles 
and by various regime types across the globe (see ibid). It is however important to note that 
the policy of forced migration had long been a default tactic of the Turkish state. In the early 
period of the Republic, the Turkish state had forcibly expelled tens of thousands of 
rebellious Kurds to Western Anatolia as punishment and as a means to turkify them by 
immersing them in wholly Turkish cultural contexts. In the aftermath of the Sheikh Said 
rebellion in 1925, Jwaideh cites figures of 500,000 deportees to the West and 206 villages 
destroyed (2006:206). This national and nationalist experiment in demographic engineering 
was given institutionalised sanction with the passing of the Settlement Law 2510 in 1934 
(see Ülker, 2008 and Schechla, 1993:249).  
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The Settlement law should not be “understood as an instrument to quell insurrection 
in the Kurdistan region, but must be analysed as part of a larger positive objective of 
creating a homeland of the Turks” (Jongerden, 2007:174). Nevertheless, it was the Kurds 
who bore the most deleterious brunt of its application. The legislation was utilised to 
forcibly relocate innumerable Kurdish families mostly to the Western Anatolia (see chapter 
II). Although, these deportations decreased in frequency after the quelling of the Dersim 
rebellion in 1938, they continued on a periodic basis. The BDP spokesperson for Diyarbakir, 
Zübeyde Zümrüt explained that immediately after the 1980 coup, her family was exiled from 
Genç to the Black Sea region because her father, an imam, used to deliver his sermons in 
Kurmanji or Zazaki, which was illegal (Interview 29, 2012 & see Schechla, 1993:250). 
Accordingly, the practise of forced exile remained an integral if somewhat informal element 
of the Turkish state’s policy when interacting with its Kurdish population (see Whitman & 
Laber, 1987: 117-118). The practise was formally renewed under Decree 285 in 1987 which 
gave the OHAL governor the power to evacuate villages at his discretion (Yildiz, 2005: 17).  
 
Village Evacuations 
 
 As discussed, forcible evacuations and population exchanges had long been a 
common occurrence in Kurdistan. However, the intensified renewal of the practise from 
1990 was unprecedented. Firstly, it was no longer a part of a broader campaign of national 
demographic engineering but as a specific strategy to counter the PKK insurgency (see 
Jongerden, 2007:91). The centrality of the spatial aspect of the Turkish counter-insurgent 
strategy was made evident in the pronouncements of a number of its senior political and 
military figures. General Osman Pamukoğlu went on record as stating “where there is sea 
there are pirates. In this province [Hakkari] are 6674 villages and hamlets. These settlements 
form the spider’s web in which the PKK feeds itself. [...] [W]hy don’t we concentrate all 
[villagers] in two or three settlements” (in Jongerden, 2007: 43). While in 1993 the former 
President Turgut Özal suggested in a private letter to the then Prime Minister Süleyman 
Demirel that, “with the evacuation of mountain settlements, the terrorist organisation (PKK) 
will have been isolated” (ibid).  
204 
 
The strategy did not outline where the displaced villagers should seek refuge. They 
were not obliged to relocate in the west of the country where they would be “Turkified” but 
simply ordered to leave their villages under pain of death. They usually fled to the nearest 
small town before resettling in neighbouring Kurdish cities or fleeing to the large 
metropolises of western Turkey and Europe.148 Thus it was not simply the social landscape 
of rural Kurdistan which was transformed but also that of its cities. The absolute size of the 
rural population in the OHAL provinces plunged by 11.9 per cent from 1990 to 1997, despite 
overall population growth of 14 per cent” (Kocher, 2002:98). Furthermore, the displaced 
tended to settle in larger towns rather than the towns which lay closer to their villages. In 
the province of Diyarbakir, its two largest towns Bismil and Diyarbakir accounted from 83% 
of urban growth from 1990-1997 (ibid: 99). The Turkish census in 2000 reported that 
Kurdish cities such as Van, Şirnak and Hakkari had urban growth rates which outstripped 
those of traditional migration destinations such as Istanbul or Izmir (Sirkeci, 2006: 56-57 and 
see HRW 1994, Jongerden, 2007:88-89 and Kirişci & Winrow, 1997:134), notwithstanding 
the reality that economic opportunities in the former are extremely limited. As Seda Yüksel 
observed, “internal displacement has inevitably imposed a huge burden on not only the 
villagers who were evacuated, but also on the municipalities and inhabitants of cities [...] 
which went through a rapid urbanization” (2011:443).149  
 
The statistics on forced migration vary drastically. It is commonly acknowledged that 
around 3,000 settlements have been depopulated, while the state acknowledges the 
migration of 350,000 villagers. A 2006 University of Haceteppe report cites a figure of 
between 950,000 to 1,200,000 million, while the think tank TESEV declared the figure to be 
closer to 1.5 million and Human Rights Watch cited a figure of up to two million (1994). In 
October 1994 Minister for Human Rights Azimet Köylüoğlu asserted that “in the [Southeast] 
there are two million without a house or a place to call home who live in the open and on 
the street” (in HRW, 1996). Other NGOs suggest even greater figures (in Jongerden, 
2007:223 and see Van Bruinessen, 1995:8).  
                                                        
148 This trajectory of step by step forced migration was reported in every single interview of forcibly displaced 
rural inhabitants. 
149 See Doğan & Yılmaz (2011) for an excellent analysis in this regard on the neighbourhood of Demirtaş in 
Mersin and Darıcı (2011) in the case of a neighbourhood in Adana. 
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There is no consensus as to the precise extent of the phenomenon but it is widely accepted 
that the government figures are vastly underestimated. Accordingly, this was the principal 
transformative factor in the urban environments of the 1990s which naturally impacted on 
the nature of the PKK mobilisation. 
 
 The process of forced migration was tightly correlated to participation in the Village 
Guard system. As discussed in chapter IV, the system functioned as an identificatory means 
of rendering selective violence on behalf of both the army and the PKK. Those who 
participated were understood as being opposed to the PKK, while “local state officials 
considered refusal to participate in the system to be an indication of support - either active 
or passive – for the insurgency” (Balta Paker, 2009:11, Balta, 2007: 133 and Özar et al, 2013: 
99 & 148). Upon the adoption of a new counter-insurgency strategy in 1993, Turkish armed 
forces systematically and forcibly demanded that villagers become Village Guards or face 
imminent evacuation and the destruction of their villages (Van Bruinessen, 1995; 1). 
Accordingly, many of those who refused and were forced to flee their villages were those 
with the strongest PKK convictions. Their forcible relocation to the cities and towns thus 
transformed a hitherto weaker area of PKK mobilisation into an area of potential radicalised 
support. However, that is not to suggest that all recruitment to the Village Guard system in 
the 1990s was of the forced variety. Some of it was also in response to PKK attacks on 
villages and its behaviour toward civilians (Interview 22, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, the extension of the Village Guard system conferred economic 
opportunities on its adherents while further restricting these in non-participating villages. 
For instance, much of the Şirnak and Hakkari border areas were heavily mined by the army, 
thus rendering vast swathes of land unusable for pasture (ibid). An OHAL decree banned 
access to summer mountain pastures, which along with the evacuations led to a “sudden 
drop in animal husbandry and live stock production” (Jongerden, 2007:89). The Society of 
Agricultural Engineers in Diyarbakir suggested that the meat industry in the area underwent 
a contraction of 2.3 billion dollars from 1990-1999 (ibid). Therefore, the traditional means of 
sustenance and employment were denied to the Kurds living in the area. While on the 
contrary, accepting to become a Village Guard, aside from the weapons, prestige and 
salaries involved, also granted a number of additional economic privileges (see HRW, 1994). 
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The military imposed a strict food embargo on upland villages suspected of sharing food 
with the guerrillas. Village Guards were given a monopoly over the transport of goods to 
and from the market towns, thus enriching themselves at the expense of non-Village Guard 
families (Balta, 2007:147). Logistical contracts for food and heating were also assigned by 
the military to the heads of Village Guard units (Özar et al, 2013: 120). On other occasions, 
the military tolerated the sale of Mekab boots – the preferred footwear of the guerrillas – 
by the Village Guards to guerrilla units on the condition of receiving a cut of the profits 
(Interview 38, 2013). Therefore, the diffusion of the system endogenously produced a 
number of inducements which would have encouraged adhesion to the Village Guards by 
the provision of legal and illegal economic incentives, as well as by denying the traditional 
economic livelihoods to non-participants. 
 
 In the 1980s the relationship between the PKK and the Village Guards had been 
relatively clear. The Village Guards were for the most part voluntary and accordingly 
declared enemies of the PKK. However, upon the mass forced participation in the system 
the PKK was obliged to once again reassess its position in relation to them. As Rojan, a 
former guerrilla explained, in the eyes of the PKK there were three types of Village Guards: 
those who were fully committed to the state,150 those who were divided in their allegiance 
and were friendly with both the state and the PKK, and finally those who were coerced by 
the state (Interview 38, 2013). At the PKK’s Third Party Conference in 1994, which followed 
the reconfiguration of the military balance of power in favour of the state, the movement 
reconsidered its military targets. It was announced that “the entire army [...] all the special 
units, special teams and counter guerrilla units and village guards [...] all the internal 
security units, the police force, the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) and civilian 
defence units” (in Gunter 1997:50) were to be considered as legitimate targets. However, it 
was once again clear that directives from the externally-based leadership were interpreted 
according to prevailing local dynamics.  
                                                        
150 In the area between Bitlis and Siirt, Rojan explained that the most committed of the Village Guards were 
members of Arab tribes, most notably the Şêrgoyî (Interview 38, 2013). 
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Aram, a guerrilla in the Amed region, explained that many of the villages forced to 
join the Village Guards went to the local PKK commander to discuss the issue with the 
movement before accepting or rejecting the offer. On many occasions, the PKK accepted 
that under the circumstances it would be best for the village to accept to participate but not 
to take part in any armed initiatives against the guerrillas. Such an arrangement was 
necessary for the guerrillas as they remained dependent on the material support of these 
villages, a dependency ever more acute given the progressive evacuation of their rural 
support base. These villages continued to be viewed by the PKK as yurtsever/waled pares 
because they continued to collaborate with the PKK, providing intelligence and logistical 
support (Interview 27, 2012). The pro-PKK sympathies of certain Village Guards were 
publicly evidenced on innumerable occasions; to give one documented example, Village 
Guards attended the funeral of a slain guerrilla in Siirt in 1996 (Özar et al, 2013: 96). There 
are also countless instances of the collective punishment of Village Guards by the military 
for reportedly collaborating with the PKK in Derik and Bismil (ibid: 107).  It is thereby evident 
that relations between the second wave of Village Guards and the PKK were rather nuanced 
and not consisting of a simple polarised opposition. 
 
In the many instances where the Village Guards put up resistance to the guerrillas or 
actively pursued them, the PKK was capable of deadly violence. Usually it was one or two 
respected individuals in a village such as a Mukhtar or Sheikh who ultimately decided to 
accept or reject the military’s ultimatum to participate in the Village Guards on behalf of the 
entire community. Rojan explained that usually a guerrilla delegation went to meet with 
these figures and attempted to convince them to reverse their decision. If the relevant 
persons were unwilling to bend to the will of the PKK, then a decision would be taken to 
execute them. The objective was not to kill as many state supporters as possible but the 
minimum required to convince the others to desist (Interview 38, 2013). Aram explained 
that once the movement had a degree of certainty that an individual was collaborating with 
the state, they were publicly hung in the village and their mouths stuffed with money to 
emphasise what the guerrillas understood as the greed which underlay their betrayal 
(Interview 27, 2012). This practise of public executions and symbolically desecrating their 
corpses was also reported in Rugman and Hutchings (1996) and Marcus (2007:115). Suran, a 
Kurd from a village near Kulp, described how the neighbouring village of Hamzalı, which had 
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joined the Village militia, lost twenty three men in clashes with the PKK in the course of 
1995 alone (Interview 25, 2012 and see Özar, et al, 2013: 106 and Haberturk, 2013). 
Therefore, it is clear that the PKK was willing to deploy merciless violence against its local 
opponents; however, in light of how the killings of civilians in Village Guard communities 
had been received by wider Kurdish society in 1987-88, the PKK had become much more 
scrupulous in the selection of its targets (see HRW, 1994 for a report on PKK killings).151 
 
The nature of the Village Guard system also varied topographically. Forced 
recruitment to the system in low-lying areas was not organised with the intention of 
depriving the PKK of logistical or military support but rather in an attempt to lead 
communities into explicitly rejecting the PKK, thus further polarising Kurdish society. This 
strategy was not particularly successful. A young female Kurdish activist in Germany 
explained that even though her uncle was a PKK militant based in Europe many of her 
cousins living close to the border with Syria in Mardin joined the Village Guards. As it was 
low-lying territory far from the mountains, there was very little possibility of them having to 
ever confront guerrillas. This apparent internal family schism had no impact on intra-familial 
relations and participation was seen as a distasteful but necessary means to avoid the 
forced evacuation of their villages (Interview 1, 2011).  
 
Even in regards to interactions with committed Village Guards, the conduct of the 
PKK units on the ground differed greatly from the official party line. Aram recounted that 
instead of confronting them as per official movement policy; they simply avoided these 
villages, usually trying to keep at least three kilometres away from them. Although he 
claimed that the PKK possessed the armed means to militarily confront them, they avoided 
it as any such attacks on Kurds that were not strictly necessary would have spread a 
negative impression of the group amongst wider Kurdish society and would have been used 
by the Turkish state to undermine the PKK’s legitimacy (ibid). Rojan explained that they also 
usually limited their interactions with convinced yurtsever/waled pares villages in order to 
avoid attracting the attention of the military to them.  
                                                        
151
 Van Bruinessen (1999) has asserted that the PKK also engaged in the destruction of villages, a claim long put 
forth by the Turkish state but one which remains hitherto largely unsubstantiated. 
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They avoided Village Guard villages to limit confrontations and usually frequented those 
villages which strove to strike a balance between the PKK and the state. They used these 
visits as a chance to engage in political propaganda and as a means to convince the locals of 
the righteousness of their cause. But there was also a coercive aspect to the visits; the 
guerrillas’ very presence there would arouse the suspicions of the Turkish military, so in 
order to pre-empt any open collaboration with the state the guerrillas insisted on taking a 
small portion of their supplies from every family. In so doing, all the villagers were 
implicated in offering support to the PKK, rendering it less likely that anyone would 
denounce the guerrillas’ presence or operations to the state (Interview 38, 2013).  
 
The PKK’s multiple and differentiated interactions with the Village Guards highlight 
the inherent danger of macro-theorising about such conflict dynamics and the fact that 
relations even with avowed enemies proceeded in a fashion that reflected localised 
iterations of the conflict rather than any declared macro-cleavages. It was this myriad of 
overlapping solidarities, alliances and ambiguous loyalties that informed the concerted 
evacuation of much of rural Kurdistan, which in turn irrevocably altered the urban dynamics 
of the conflict. 
 The use of terms such as forced migration, village evacuation and displacement 
arguably confers an almost sterile procedural impression on what were extremely violent 
processes. In addition to their violence, the sheer scale of the phenomenon merits particular 
attention. Van Bruinessen explained that “by the end of 1993 entire districts such as Silopi, 
Şirnak and Eruh all north of the Iraqi border had lost all their villages with the exception of a 
single korucu [Village Guard] village” (1995:8). The slopes of the Ağrı and Tendürek 
mountains were declared forbidden military zones (askeri yasak bölge) in June 1994, leading 
to the evacuation of fifty settlements and the displacement of 10,000 villagers (ibid). In the 
spring of 1994 the PKK launched a concerted military campaign in the Dersim region, which 
had hitherto been an area of comparably lower PKK presence.
152
 In response the military 
launched a concentrated evacuation campaign in the region. It began by igniting huge forest 
fires to denude the hillsides of any potential cover for the guerrillas. It has been reported 
                                                        
152 It remained a centre of mobilisation for the TIKKO, which maintained a number of periodically active 
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that incendiary chemicals were sprayed from helicopters to fuel the fires, thus resulting in 
inestimable environmental damage to the oak forests of the region, which had been  
declared a nature reserve by the state in 1987 (Van Bruinessen, 1995:15). A 1996 report by 
four CHP deputies decried that of 417 villages in the region, 287 had been evacuated 
(Leezenberg, 2003:207). In specific areas such as Ovacik, up to 80% of villages were 
evacuated. The displaced villagers were ordered to leave, given no place to go and not 
offered any form of compensation (ibid). The patterns of village evacuation and destruction 
thereby completely altered the geo-spatial and demographic composition of rural Kurdistan 
and consequently also its cities.  
 The brutality of the evacuations was acknowledged even at governmental level. 
After a visit to the Dersim region in October 1994, the Turkish Minister for Human Rights 
Azimet Köylüoğlu was so appalled by developments there that he condemned them as acts 
of “state terrorism” (in HRW, 1995:23).1153 However, such recognition neither brought a halt 
to the campaign nor led to the urgent needs of the displaced being addressed. It did 
however confirm that, notwithstanding the secretive and almost autonomous behaviour of 
the OHAL regime vis-á-vis the central state, knowledge of atrocities in the region had 
filtered through to the ministerial level.154 The evacuations were carried out by a variety of 
state agents. They were conducted by both regular army units and the gendarmerie. The 
gendarmerie was “a rural police force organised along military lines” and bore a “feared and 
hated reputation” amongst the local population (Jongerden, 2007:65). They were 
complemented by the presence of an array of notorious special operation teams, such as 
the Özel Harekât Timler, who were under the authority of the regular police, and the Özel 
Tim, who were under gendarmerie command. JITEM, the anti-terror and intelligence 
department of the gendarmerie155, generally “operated [...] death-squads, identifying and 
killing alleged PKK cadres” (ibid: 70). The above units were often assisted by local Village 
Guard units who had specific local intelligence on suspected PKK sympathisers. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
guerrilla units there. 
153 Shortly after this declaration he recanted his statement – presumably under political pressure - and claimed 
that it was not state terrorism but rather the PKK that was destroying these villages. 
154 It was reported that the then Prime Minister Tansu Ciller was denied permission by the army to visit areas 
of concentrated military action in Lice and Hozat (Van Bruinessen, 1995:9). 
155
 JITEM is the acronym for Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele or Jandarma İstihbarat Teşkilatı, or in 
English the Gendarmerie Intelligence Unit. 
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As outlined above, the policy of forcible evacuation was elaborated at governmental 
level, stemming from diffuse historical patterns of population exchange and engineering, 
but its local level realisation was delegated to a variety of military and police agents. 
Consequently, patterns of displacement, evacuation and violence differed greatly according 
to individual commanders, local cleavages, geographic location and the intensity of the 
ongoing conflict. The threat of evacuation and the related violence can be viewed as an 
incentive to collaborate with the Turkish state in order to prevent “the threatened harm” 
(Kalyvas, 111:2004). According to Kalyvas’ ontological understanding, “economic 
considerations and survival are usually the main motives” (2006:104) for collaboration or 
non-compliance with locally dominant forces. He understands the psycho-social process 
underlying this decision-making as individualistic and rationally calculating. “Civilians are 
boundedly rational; they are reward-sensitive and seek to maximise a personal or political 
utility subject to their likelihood of survival” (ibid: 196).  
 
Kalyvas’ approach struggles to explain the cases where civilians do not behave in a 
utilitarian fashion, especially if one considers the fortunes of the three villages of Kocadağ, 
Pazarköy and Aksoy, which straddle the administrative division between Şirnak and Mardin 
not far from the Syrian border. They lay in extremely close proximity to one another and in 
the shadow of the mountains. Karan, a former Kocadağ resident, explained that PKK 
guerrillas used to visit the village on a regular basis and even successfully resolved a long-
running feud between two rival clans there. In 1993 the Turkish army demanded that all 
three villages join the Village Guard system. The village of Kocadağ refused, as did 
Pazarköy156, while Aksoy accepted and in so doing, gained access to the property and land of 
the departed villages. Given such a clear set of incentives and knowledge of the certain 
outcome of the decision, why did two of the three villages refuse to co-operate? According 
to Kalyvas’ hypothesis, they should have selected the option which promised the best 
chances of their survival and potential material enrichment; but only one village made such 
a choice. The three villages were closely geographically clustered; there is no suggestion 
that any of them would have been territorially more vulnerable to PKK reprisals (Interview 
1, 2011). Accordingly, one has to consider the likelihood that the villagers of Pazarköy and 
Kocadağ acted according to sentiments of collective political and interpersonal solidarity. 
The villagers of Kocadağ identified with the movement and can be considered as part of the 
PKK’s constituency. Bonds of solidarity and identification fostered by the interaction 
between the guerrillas and the villagers over the course of their numerous encounters, 
strengthened by familial and personal associations with the movement, bound them to the 
PKK. It had therefore become extremely difficult for them to consider betraying the PKK, 
                                                        
156
 Pazarköy was a Yezidi village and it has been suggested that non-Muslim villages and Yezidi ones in 
particular were specifically targeted in a form of coercive religious homogenisation of the region. 
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which had become so deeply intertwined with their daily existence.  
The impact of the displacement and the destructions of Kurdish villages resulted in 
deep collective trauma. The aggregation of these separate instances of violence meant that 
a huge number of deeply aggrieved Kurds were subsequently available to constitute the 
wellspring of the prolonged guerrilla conflict of the 1990s and the wider Kurdish political 
mobilisation that continues to this day. Botan is a gentleman of around seventy years old 
from a small village in Mardin. He had absolutely no political involvement until the 1990s 
when PKK guerrillas and the army struggled to gain control of his village; the guerrillas 
controlled it by night and the military by day. After he refused to join the Village Guards he 
was detained and tortured for two months, which led his eldest son who was still at the lise 
to join the guerrillas in the mountains. Botan’s son was “martyred”- as he described it – 
within seven days of joining the guerrillas and his family was subsequently forced to flee the 
village. The military burned his house to the ground, destroyed his two hundred bee hives, 
shot his two dogs, his turkeys and donkey, thus reducing him and his family to destitution. 
They moved to Mardin, where this previously politically disengaged farmer became active in 
the legal Kurdish party and in a Kurdish martyrs’ foundation - but more pertinently his other 
children also became active in the PKK. Another son was killed as a guerrilla and two of his 
daughters are currently imprisoned for PKK activities (Interview 19, 2012).  
 Suran, an activist for Kurdish language rights from close to Kulp, recalled the process 
of his village’s evacuation. It was located in an area of regular clashes between the PKK and 
the army. As a child he recalls the presence of the guerrillas in the village and how they 
interacted with the villagers. He recounts that the soldiers came on three occasions. They 
first burned a handful of houses, before returning in the winter time for a second time and 
setting the majority of the remaining houses alight. The fact that the houses were burned in 
winter served as a double punishment, exposing the villagers to the harsh winter conditions. 
Eventually, they returned a third time and destroyed the few houses that had been left 
intact, forcing his family to seek refuge in Diyarbakir. He vividly recalls the helicopters 
hovering overhead and the collective belief that they were all about to be killed. He 
witnessed his father being severely beaten and the attempted rape of his neighbour, as well 
as the meagre belongings they had salvaged from the houses being thrown back into the 
burning buildings. As he was only around ten at the time, he was much too young to join the 
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guerrillas as many of the other youngsters in the village did, but he explains that it remains 
even to this day an option which he refuses to discount (Interview 25, 2012).  
Herro was of a similar age when his village close to Malazgirt was destroyed. They 
were woken from their beds at around five in the morning in the dead of winter and forced 
out of their houses by some Özel Tim units; many of the villagers were barefoot even 
though there were sizeable snowdrifts outside. He recalls two aspects of the experience as 
particularly traumatic. One was the bellowing of the cattle chained in their sheds as they 
burned to death. The latter was the sight of his aunt locked into her burning house after she 
had tried to retrieve some personal belongings, although she was rescued before she was 
overcome by the flames (Interview 10, 2012). There are literally thousands of analogous 
accounts, thus generating a trans-generational reservoir of emotionally traumatised Kurds.  
The cases discussed above illustrate the limited efficacy of indiscriminate violence as 
a means of limiting insurgent support. As Lyall has suggested, it triggers “a spiral of action 
and reaction that facilitates insurgent mobilization while widening the war's geographic 
scope and destructiveness” (2009:332). Although there is nearly always a degree of 
discrimination when selecting targets, even if it is simply a question of location (Kalyvas, 
2006: 148), this is not necessarily how it is perceived by its victims. The villages listed above 
were targeted because of their proximity to the mountains and/or suspected PKK 
sympathies. Their residents were punished collectively and not according to individual 
responsibility. Although admittedly in the third instance the interviewee’s father had 
actually been a milis member, his family was targeted in the same way as the others who 
may or may not have had similar inclinations. On occasion indiscriminate incumbent 
reprisals or violence can succeed in demobilising opposition by depleting insurgents’ 
resource base, as in the cases of the Boer War (Lyall, 2009: 336), or by simply convincing 
insurgents of the disproportionate suffering it would cause civilians, as in Norway (Kalyvas, 
2006: 158). But in the vast preponderance of cases it simply results in consolidating and 
legitimising insurgent support, as outlined by Kalyvas (2006: Chapter 6). It has been 
suggested that “fear and anger are not the same emotions, but they are closely related in 
the fight or flight response” (Johnston, 2014: 45). In the cases discussed above, there was an 
overlap between the two; masses of Kurds fled to the cities before re-grouping and resisting 
the state by either joining the guerrillas directly or supporting them in other ways.  
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The Turkish state’s strategy was premised on the belief that the strategic military 
advantage derived from the expulsion of the PKK’s actual and potential supporters and 
sympathisers would outweigh the increased sense of collective grievance generated by such 
an action. The long-term outcome of the strategy remains as yet – more than twenty years 
later - unclear, but in the short term it generated a greater number of committed PKK 
supporters and relocated them to the urban centres of Kurdistan and western Turkey. It has 
been asserted that the fact that the majority of Kurds fled to government-controlled 
territory can be interpreted as an expression of their desire to distance themselves from the 
PKK and that the emotional grievance of the Kurdish masses never transformed into a 
“nationalist explosion” (Kocher, 2002:100). However, such a view is rooted in a simplistic 
understanding of territorial control. It is also dismissive of the material exigencies which 
demanded that the impoverished and stranded masses seek shelter and employment in 
areas free from continued police repression and where there were some limited possibilities 
of finding work. The reality was that the only relatively proximate cities where this was 
possible were in western or southern Anatolia, and this should not be understood as an 
expression of political preference but rather a decision shaped by the immediate imperative 
of survival. The brutality of these expulsions has been integrated into the narrative of 
modern Kurdish resistance, which fuels the continued and expanding success of the 
contemporary PKK and the BDP. 
 
Urban Mobilisation in Kurdistan 
 
The 1990’s witnessed a huge influx of aggrieved rural Kurds, deprived of their land 
and livelihoods, amassing in peripheral gecekondu neighbourhoods157 or sharing 
overcrowded dwellings with extended families. As explained, many of these displaced rural 
inhabitants were those with pre-existing PKK sympathies, while many of those who had 
been agnostic about the PKK became PKK supporters after the ordeal of violent 
displacement. In addition to this mass of internally displaced people, the PKK’s 
organisational efforts had also started to bear fruit amongst the pre-existing urban 
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population. The student networks of the ERNK generated massive flows of university 
students from western Turkey to the PKK’s ranks (Interview 37, 2013) but it also led to 
masses of local recruits from high schools and Dicle University in Diyarbakir. In urban areas 
where there was little or no consistent guerrilla presence, these organisations linked the 
PKK to wider Kurdish society and in so doing further reconfigured the class composition of 
the movement by re-incorporating local middle classes into it.  
In the cities there was a form of Kurdish revival triggered in part by the presence of a 
large number of refugees from Southern Kurdistan who had fled following the Hallabja 
massacre in 1988 and the outbreak of the first Gulf War in 1990. These refugees 
unabashedly spoke Kurdish and brought Kurdish music cassettes which became popular 
amongst the local Kurds (Interview 24, 2012). As a female DISA researcher explained, this 
cultural revival resonated with many more educated Kurds who would have had less direct 
personal experiences of the conflict. She described this creeping politicisation of her 
hitherto politically disinterested friends and classmates at the prestigious Anatolian High 
School in Diyarbakir. On one occasion, she and a group of classmates burned their history 
books in the school yard because they recognised that they [the Kurds] were excluded from 
them, they repeatedly damaged and spat at the portrait of Ataturk and began to wear 
yellow, red and green hair clips. These subtle acts of rebellion, redolent of practises of 
everyday forms of resistance (Scott, 1990) or subaltern politics (Bayat, 1997), escalated and 
by the time she graduated she was one of only four students in her entire class who had not 
gone to join the guerrillas in the mountains or fled the conflict with their families to the 
west of the country.158 According to her, the participation of so many economically well-off 
youths belies any interpretation of the root causes of the conflict as primarily socio-
economic (Interview 22, 2012). The appeal of the PKK’s counter-narrative became cross-
class in nature and its recruitment structure enabled it to harness this latent support. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
157
 See Chapter VI 
158
 See Seda Yüksel regarding the impact the emigration of Diyarbakir’s middle classes had on the local 
economy (2011:445).   
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Bismil is a large town located in the plain between Diyarbakir and Batman. Its 
distance from the mountains rendered it a difficult location for guerrilla activity and PKK 
mobilisation was mostly confined to the presence of milis members rather than actual 
guerrillas. Nonetheless Azad, a former guerrilla from the area, recalls that by 1990 the PKK 
had a tangible presence in the town. As high school students, Azad and his classmates had 
organised a student committee in support of the PKK under the tutelage of PKK supporters 
from Dicle University. They distributed PKK magazines and attended an illegal Newroz 
demonstration organised in the town in 1989 or 1990. Aside from their relations with the 
university-based PKK activists they also established direct links with a guerrilla who used to 
visit Bismil from time to time. He used to give them precise instructions to organise 
demonstrations at specific times or on occasion, to gather material support such as 
medicine or food (Interview 35, 2013). Azad explains that during one of the guerrilla’s forays 
into town, he was arrested with members of Azad’s high school committee. Azad was 
immediately forced into clandestinity and his family house was raided repeatedly by the 
police. After a period of hiding at a family member’s house he fled to the relative safety of 
the guerrillas in the mountains and his family, under intense pressure from the police, 
relocated to Istanbul. Faqi, another former guerrilla, described a similar process of 
interaction with the movement; at his high school in Bitlis, their committee was guided by 
more experienced university students from the movement (Interview 35, 2013). 
The pace with which relatively constrained student activism could be rapidly 
transformed to such an extent that joining the guerrillas was viewed as a safer option, 
highlights the importance of endogenous escalatory and radicalising trajectories within 
conflicts. These escalatory mechanisms exist at the individual level and at the broader 
movement level. At the individual level the final step from above-ground activism to full-
time clandestinity or becoming a ‘professional’ guerrilla often comes about through 
happenstance or coincidence, as in the case of Azad (see Viterna, 2013:82; Lyall, 2009: 335  
and della Porta, 2013: Chapter III). It has been suggested that radicalisation is a result of the 
combination of state-movement interactions, intra-movement competition, meaning 
formation and transnational diffusion (Bosi, Demetriou & Malthaner, 2014: 5). Della Porta 
suggests that “radicalisation is in fact activated by competition between movement activists 
and opponents, especially in the form of escalating policing” (2014:94). In the PKK’s case in 
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the 1990s, the radicalisation of its repertoire was primarily due to hostile interactions with 
the state in the form of escalating counter-insurgency. Bjørgo highlights the importance of 
radicalisation over an extended period of time by explaining that “terrorism tends to be the 
product of a long process of radicalisation that prepares a group of people for such extreme 
action” (2005:3; see also della Porta, 2013:73 and Smelser, 2007:52). It is therefore of little 
surprise that this radicalised mobilisation of PKK supporters emerged in urban contexts up 
to ten years after the launch of the rural uprising.  
Yet it is worth recalling that “radicalisation is not a process of infinite regress. Once 
set in motion, it does not continue in perpetuity” (Gupta, 2014: 138). Gupta further 
elaborated that “choices about radicalisation must be filtered through organizational 
structures where the demands of a group’s members and allies have to be weighed against 
the strategic merits of radicalization” (ibid: 140). The PKK astutely navigated the problematic 
balance of harnessing individual radicalisation and the need to channel it to where it was 
most needed without dissipating it, by failing to take advantage of it immediately. The PKK 
was helped in this restrained approach to striking back against the state by the absence of 
other rival groups which could have provided an outlet for a less cautious violent response. 
In the late 1970s the violent outbidding (de Fazio, 2014) by the PKK of rival Kurdish groups 
had led to a general escalation in the scale and extent of violence. In the 1990s, given the 
absence of other armed options, the PKK successfully managed the popular radicalisation 
generated by state violence through its multiple layered networks in high schools and 
universities, directing it to its areas of greatest impact in the rural insurgency.  
 
The State and the Urban Environment 
 This chapter has purposefully presented the forced evacuations of rural Kurdish 
areas in the context of their impact on the urban centres in the region, in order to highlight 
the rural-urban imbrication of the conflict. It is not an attempt to downplay the dramatic 
and arguably decisive impact the reconfiguration of rural demographic patterns had on the 
military decline of the PKK. It is rather an effort to overcome the perception of the PKK as 
simply a rural guerrilla organisation which overlooks the radical impact developments in 
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rural areas had on the urban centres and vice versa. It must be acknowledged that armed 
movements and states are both constrained and enabled in various manners in relation to 
the practises of violence which can be deployed in urban and rural contexts. Both the PKK 
and the forces of the state were represented by often distinct structural elements in urban 
and rural areas. The Turkish police force is divided on a geo-spatial basis between the 
gendarmerie which polices the rural areas and the national police which is responsible for 
security in urban centres (Jongerden, 2007: 64). The PKK’s active guerrilla forces were 
almost exclusively based in the mountains or outside of the Turkish borders and its urban 
presence consisted of milis members, ERNK militants and the extensive gamut of subsidiary 
organisations (see Özcan, 2006:172). Therefore, although these different actors were 
occasionally deployed in other spatial contexts, there is a significant difference in their 
respective presences and as a corollary, the practises of violence to which they sought 
recourse.   
 As has been discussed above, the Turkish state can be understood as a “constrained 
state” (Staniland, 2010) which limited the practises of violence it was able to employ. 
Accordingly Hezbollah, an Islamist paramilitary movement, was overwhelmingly utilised in 
urban contexts, whereas “in rural areas, hundreds of extrajudicial executions were carried 
out by gendarmes, village guards paid by the government, and ‘special teams159’” (HRW, 
2000 and see Yavuz, 2001: 14). The calculated constraining of the full extent of the state’s 
violent capacity was clear in the declaration by the head of MIT (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı/ 
National Intelligence Agency) Altan Tokat in 1989 that "the State applies the same law in 
Istanbul and [in the Kurdish areas].160 We could have exterminated them in a short time if 
we [applied] my system. [...] Our southern neighbour [Iraq] has exterminated the people 
who fought it for fifty years. We can exterminate them in a similar way if we wish so” (in 
Bozarslan, 2001: 50). When elements of the state developed the view that it was necessary 
to ratchet up the campaign against both the PKK and the broader Kurdish movement, they 
preferred an external agent with which any institutional links could be plausibly denied to 
carry out murderous campaigns in urban areas on their behalf. To this end, a relationship (as 
                                                        
159 The special teams alone were thought to number up to 23,000 members (Bozarslan, 2001:48). 
160 This is patently untrue as the OHAL region was governed by a different legal system to the rest of the 
country. 
219 
 
of yet contested and unclear) with a pre-existing Islamist group known as Hezbollah was 
established.  
 
The Deep State 
 
 The shadowy nature of Hezbollah’s links to the state is related to the fact that this 
relationship was mediated by elements of the army which existed outside of the control and 
often even the knowledge of the civilian government. In the wake of World War II, NATO 
organised a trans-continental network of ‘stay behind armies’ in order to serve as guerrilla 
forces against a potential Soviet invasion, “as well as the coming to power of communist 
parties” (Ganser, 2005:69). In Turkey this force was founded in 1952 (Bovenkerk and 
Yeşilgöz, 2005:594), and it underwent periodic changes of names (see Çelik, 1994) but is 
widely referred to as the counter-guerrilla. “In order to guarantee a solid anti-communist 
ideology of its recruits, the CIA and MI6 generally relied on men of the conservative political 
right” (Ganser, 2005:70); accordingly, the Turkish counter-guerrilla strongly relied on 
authoritarian tendencies within the armed forces and developed an organic relationship 
with the MHP and its Grey Wolves youth wing  (see Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz, 2005:591). The 
existence of this counter-guerrilla force was only officially acknowledged after its 
counterpart became public knowledge in Italy in 1990. General Kemal Yilmaz, the then Chief 
of Staff of the Turkish special forces admitted the force came under his command and that 
its purpose was "to organise resistance in the case of a communist occupation”(Ganser: 73). 
The secrecy of the unit was such that Prime Minister Ecevit claims that he first heard of it 
when he was approached in 1974 by a general, Semih Sancar, who requested funding for it. 
Ecevit was quoted in Milliyet (28 November 1990) as saying that “up until then I had never 
heard of any such organisation when I was Prime Minister or Minister [...] or party 
chairman,” (in Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz, 2004:596).161  
                                                        
161 It is possible that Ecevit’s claims of ignorance are false and a means to distance himself from any 
recriminations of involvement with it. 
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It was explained to Ecevit by a military briefer that "there are a certain number of volunteer 
patriots whose names are kept secret and are engaged for life in this special department," 
[...] "They have hidden arms caches in various parts of the country" (in Komisar, 1997). The 
counter-guerrilla had been active in Turkey at the time of the 1971 coup. Journalist Uğur 
Mumcu, who was subsequently killed by suspected counter-guerrillas in 1993, was openly 
told by his torturers that they belonged to the force and that “even the President of the 
Republic cannot touch us” (in Komisar, 1997). The counter-guerrilla also played a central 
role in the 1980 coup and was deeply engaged in the state’s counter-insurgency against the 
PKK. It was through this matrix of illegality underpinned by an uncompromising right wing 
ideology, as well as an immense criminal network with massive profits at stake, that the 
murkier and more nefarious counter-insurgency practises were organised. The Susurluk 
scandal in 1996 (see Bozarslan, 1999 and Bovenkerk & Yeşilgöz, 2005) revealed the full 
extent and reach of the so-called Turkish ‘deep state’ but its precise details have yet to be 
ascertained and the responsible parties have yet to face justice. The exposure of these 
secret armies across Europe in 1990 provoked a clamour for a full and thorough 
investigation but only Italy, Switzerland and Belgium of the implicated countries162 actually 
attempted to hold judicial proceedings to further investigate the affair (Ganser, 2005:69). It 
is therefore of little surprise that Turkey, a state in thrall to the military, has refused to 
engage with calls for greater transparency. The boundaries between the counter-guerrilla 
and Hezbollah and the killings they carried out are in many cases indistinguishable and are 
likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, it is clear that Hezbollah existed 
as a separate organisation and that its own objectives often differed from the wider 
counter-guerrilla complex - but our capacity to attain a greater empirical understanding of it 
is restricted by its overlap with the classified and sensitive information pertaining to the 
wider counter-guerrilla. 
                                                        
162 The other countries were Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden. (Ganser, 2005:69). 
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Hezbollah and the State  
 
Although the precise nature of the relationship between Hezbollah and elements of 
the state remains to be clarified, there is overwhelming and publicly available material as to 
its existence. Accordingly, the sub-conflict between the PKK and Hezbollah, contrary to the 
narrative espoused in many articles on them (Nugent, 2004, Uslu 2007, Ozeren and Van de 
Voorde, 2011), is best understood not as a self-contained intra-Kurdish issue but rather a 
proxy campaign co-ordinated by the state to carry out specific violent acts which it did not 
want to carry out itself.  “The Commission on Unsolved Murders of the Turkish Parliament” 
revealed that a Hezbollah training camp [close to Batman] had been operated with Turkish 
military assistance” (HRW, 2000). It has also been confirmed that the governor of Batman 
imported $2.8 million of arms which subsequently disappeared and are widely thought to 
have ended up in the hands of Hezbollah (HRW, 2000 and Aris & Bacik, 2002:153). The 
relationship was regularly exposed in independent media outlets, however a number of the 
journalists which dared to publicise it, such as Halit Güngen who worked for 2000'e Doğru 
and Hafız Akdemir who wrote for Özgür Gündem, were subsequently assassinated in 1992 
(HRW, 2000 and HRW 1992:15-17). It was also openly discussed, even by parliamentary 
deputies who could not be described as being well-disposed to the Kurdish struggle. In 2000 
Eyup Asik, an ANAP deputy, stated “previously the state denied its [Hezbollah’s] existence 
because it was using this group against the PKK. During this period the Hizbollah did a great 
deal of damage to the PKK” (in Aris & Bacik, 2002:154). In conclusion, the ties binding 
Hezbollah to elements within the state were an open secret, justified by Hezbollah’s utility 
in combating the PKK and the wider Kurdish movement (see Mango, 2005:64). 
 
 Before discussing Hezbollah in greater detail, it is necessary to call into question how 
the Turkish state and its forces should be understood in the context of the war in Kurdistan. 
It has been suggested that it is mistaken to discuss a singular Turkish state when referring to 
the region under OHAL administration because for its duration (1987-2002), the rule of law 
which pertained there was of a different order to that of the wider Turkish state. “OHAL 
regions [...] [were] subject to special decrees of the government and these decrees [...] 
[were] not subject to the supervision of the Constitutional Court. The OHAL region has been 
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subjected to a different legal and administrative rule from the rest of the country” (Yavuz, 
2001:13). Accordingly, two notably different legal regimes pertained for most of the conflict. 
“The modern state is an amorphous complex of agencies with ill-defined boundaries, 
performing a great variety of not very distinctive functions” (Schmitter in Mitchell, 1991:77), 
a situation undoubtedly exacerbated in a fragmented and war-torn country such as Turkey. 
It has been proposed by Mitchell that former understandings of the state as a unitary set of 
institutions distinct from a non-state sector represented by civil society are an illusion. He 
suggested that “the distinction must be taken not as the boundary between two discrete 
entities but as a line drawn internally within the mechanisms through which a social and 
political order is maintained” (ibid, 1991:78).  
 
Furthermore, the Turkish state in the period under study can be arguably best 
understood as a form of weak democracy (Bozarslan, 2001:49), where the remit of the army 
undermined any efforts at government accountability or democratic legitimacy. The army 
via its control of the MGK (National Security Council/Millî Güvenlik Konseyi)163  and the 
extended powers afforded it to it in the 1982 constitution formulated by the military junta, 
has become “the most decisive leg of a dual system of executive decision making, the other 
leg being the council of ministers” (Sakallioğlu, 1997:158). Upon its original establishment in 
1961 the MGK “was designed to serve as a platform for the military to voice its opinion on 
matters of national security” (ibid: 157). However since 1982 its jurisdiction has extended 
far beyond what could be reasonably understood as matters of national security and has 
reached into sectors as varied as the formulation of school curricula and the closing of 
particular television stations (ibid: 158), as well as deposing the Islamist government of 
Necmettin Erbakan in the so called ‘soft coup’ of 1997 (see Narlı, 2003). The state was 
accordingly shrouded in secrecy164 and completely opaque. The Turkish state and how its 
presence materialised in the Kurdish region closely fits the state model advanced by 
Aretxaga, as “an all-pervasive ghostly presence, a threatening force shaped by the collective 
experience of being overshadowed by an unfathomable power which can shape social life as 
a dangerous universe of surfaces and disguise” (2000:43). 
                                                        
163
 For a description of the component members of the MGK, see Heper (2002:138-139). 
164
See Taussig (1997) regarding the role of secrecy in bestowing a form of sacredness on the state and thus 
augmenting its power.   
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Hezbollah - the Movement 
 
The theoretical focus of this research project lies on the relationship between the 
PKK and its supporters and sympathisers rather than alternative, more comprehensively 
studied aspects of the PKK. The following section will be dedicated to Hezbollah as it was of 
central significance to how the conflict developed in urban environments in the early part of 
the 1990s, and hence important to the ways in which the relationship between the PKK and 
its constituency developed in these areas.  
 
Hezbollah’s particular selection of targets marked a diffusion of practices of violence 
not only spatially, in urban areas, but also in terms of class as it often targeted members of 
the middle classes and Kurdish intellectuals. Hezbollah focused its violence, especially from 
the early 1990s, predominantly on alleged PKK supporters and prominent Kurdish public 
figures.165 Human Rights Watch affirmed that more than a thousand people were killed 
between 1992 and 1995 alone (HRW, 2000), while other sources cite figures of at least five 
hundred killings of suspected PKK or Kurdish movement activists (Aris & Bacik, 2002:150). 
Given the nature of the violence and the ambiguous divisions between Hezbollah and 
ulterior state-supported counter-guerrilla forces, it is unlikely that any accurate statistics will 
be confirmed. In cities where Hezbollah was particularly active, such as Batman, Diyarbakir, 
Silwan and Nusaybin (Özdağ, 2003:40) all of my interviewees referred to the fear evoked by 
the brutality of Hezbollah’s actions and its almost complete liberty of operation free from 
any police or army interference, if not enjoying the active collaboration of the security 
forces. The liberty to mobilise enjoyed by Hezbollah was in part derived from the 
“penetration of pro-Islamic elements” of the state security apparatus under the auspices of 
Interior Minister Abdulkadir Aksu from 1989-91 (Karmon, 2003:47 and see Imset, 1992:125) 
and the multiplicity of often rival state security forces based in Kurdistan.166  
                                                        
165
 Mango describes Hezbollah’s violence as targeting four distinct categories: internecine killings of other 
Islamists, contract killings (including Iranian dissidents at the behest of Tehran), people associated with the 
PKK and secularists (2005:62). 
166 Çelik lists six different secret services organisation (1994). 
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Existing academic research on the group in English is for the most part confined to a 
handful of counter-terrorism articles (Nugent, 2004, Uslu 2007, Ozeren and Van de Voorde, 
2011). As is often the case with the wider counter-terrorism literature, these articles 
uncritically reference police sources and largely study the movement in a socially de-
contextualised or overly simplified fashion. They thus, intentionally or not, reproduce the 
state narrative of Hezbollah and its relations with the state and fail to recognise the role of 
the state in engineering and facilitating Hezbollah’s murderous campaign. Other sources 
deal more creditably with the group, such as Cinoğlu (2008), Mango (2005), Aydıntaşbaş 
(2000), Aras and Bacik (2002) and Karmon (1998 and 2003), and Hezbollah’s activities were 
also documented in human rights organisations’ reports (HRW, 2000).167 
 
  A number of contradictory explanations have been put forward regarding the origins 
of Hezbollah. It first came to public attention in the early 1980s but occupied a very low 
profile as it took the form of discussion groups centred around a number of publication 
houses and book shops. Karsaz, a Kurdish Islamist currently active in the Azadi168 movement 
who lived and studied at a Hezbollah mosque in Diyarbakir in the early 1990s, explained that 
after the 1980 coup the Kurdish youth wing of Erbakan’s MSP went underground after 
becoming convinced that party politics was pointless (Interview 26, 2012). Its numbers were 
swelled upon the arrival of former militants of the MHP who had been incarcerated in 1980 
(see Karmon, 1998:104). Many of the MHP recruits had felt betrayed by the state after 
having militated on its behalf against leftist movements in the street violence of the late 
1970s. They “were already professionals in the field of terrorism and street fighting and 
represented significant operational support” (Karmon, 2003: 43) for the emergent 
movement. The group split into two distinct factions, Menzil and Ilim. The latter was led by 
Hüseyin Velioğlu who had been active in right-wing circles in Batman prior to the coup. 
Tensions between the two tendencies led to widespread violence resulting in hundreds of 
deaths169 and culminating in Ilim becoming the predominant of the two groups.  
                                                        
167 A series of journalistic reports on their activities also exist, notably Huggler (2000) and Mater (2000). 
168 Azadi are a legal Islamo-Kurdish nationalist movement. 
169 Four hundred deaths according to Aras & Bacik, (2002: 151) and more than three hundred according to 
Mango (2005:62). 
225 
 
Ideologically speaking, Hezbollah was, notwithstanding the Sunni-Shi’a divide, sympathetic 
to the regime in Iran and there is also some evidence that they received material support 
and military training from it (see Aras & Bacik 2002, Aydıntaşbaş 2000 and Karmon, 1998). 
Karsaz explained that Hezbollah’s primary objective was the foundation of an Islamic state 
regardless of its ethnic character but given the prevailing circumstances of an apparently 
weakened Turkish state, they believed that a Kurdish Islamist state was a more feasible 
option in the short term than an Islamist takeover of the entire Turkish state. They were 
thus Islamists from Kurdistan rather than Kurdish Islamists (Interview 26, 2012).  
 
 At some point in the early 1990s open conflict erupted between Hezbollah and the 
PKK. Karsaz described it as taking the shape of a blood feud that arose from the PKK’s 
determination to exert control over all groups in Kurdish territory. He did however question 
why only Hezbollah’s Ilim faction clashed violently with the PKK, as numerous other Islamist 
groups, including the Menzil faction, successfully co-existed with the PKK without recourse 
to violence. An attempt at reconciliation between the groups in 1991 failed when the PKK’s 
Garzan commander pistol-whipped the Hezbollah representative and presented the group 
with three options: join the PKK, exile or death (ibid); instead Hezbollah chose to fight the 
PKK. The conflict subsequently escalated, resulting in hundreds of deaths on both sides. It 
seems most probable that it was at this point that the relationship between Hezbollah and 
the state was strengthened so that the vastly weaker Islamist group could wage war against 
the PKK. Karsaz estimated that in that period Hezbollah could boast around 8,000 
supporters but with no more than fifty of them actively involved in the armed campaign 
(ibid). The Islamist narrative of a tit-for-tat series of murders is undermined by the fact that 
its targets were for the most part not PKK cadres, consisting rather of “pro-PKK political 
parties, newspapers, and leading Kurdish nationalist political figures” (Aydıntaşbaş, 2000).  
 
As previously affirmed, Hezbollah was primarily urban-based and its presence was 
most keenly noted in cities such as Diyarbakir, Batman, Nusaybin, and Silwan. Silwan was a 
PKK stronghold in the early 1990s, to such an extent that the Tekel district of the town was 
completely out of bounds for the security forces due to the presence of PKK armed patrols. 
Nonetheless according to Welat, a school teacher from the town, Hezbollah also had a 
considerable presence in Silwan. It was reported that in 1992 Hezbollah killed thirty people 
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in Silwan in only four months (Imset, 1992:124), which gives an idea of its operational 
capacity in the city in that period. Welat recalled that the town was strongly polarised into 
PKK and Hezbollah sympathisers, to such an evident extent that rival karate courses were 
organised by the respective movements. Even wedding parties were popularly understood 
to belonging to one camp or the other (Interview 11, 2012). In a similar fashion to the PKK, 
Hezbollah utilised the dramatic socio-spatial and economic re-structuring of society to 
bolster its ranks. The masses of impoverished rural migrants, often from religiously 
conservative families, living in often desperate conditions in the peripheries of Kurdish cities 
served as an ideal structural environment for recruitment.  
 
Rasul, the brother of a Hezbollah prisoner convicted of numerous murders, 
explained his brother’s gradual immersion in the movement. As a young child Rasul and his 
family moved to Nusaybin in the mid-1970s from the adjoining countryside due to some 
killings that arose from a family feud. Separated from their land, Rasul’s father undertook 
the same journey as countless other rural Kurds and migrated to the cities of Western 
Turkey and Lebanon to work in construction. When Rasul was thirteen he took a similar 
path along with his older brothers and sisters, leaving his mother, younger sisters and 
youngest brother behind in Nusaybin. His family by chance lived close to a renowned 
Hezbollah170 member. In addition, some of his brother’s friends were also linked to 
Hezbollah and overtime he got sucked into the circles of the movement when he was about 
thirteen or fourteen years old. Rasul pointed out that his brother was in fact the least 
religious of the family and rarely prayed. Rasul’s family strongly opposed this development 
because they, although not being politically active, viewed themselves as waled pares. They 
tried to distance his brother from Hezbollah by forcing him to live in the west with older 
family members, but he simply ran away back to Nusaybin. On one occasion, the elder 
brothers beat him severely but to no avail, and he subsequently abandoned his family to 
stay with the movement. Rasul explained that he went on to commit several murders of 
“other poor Kurds” and is currently imprisoned (Interview 33, 2013). The profile of Rasul’s 
brother can be considered fairly typical of many Hezbollah recruits, usually young, poorly 
                                                        
170
 Interestingly Rasul did not use the term Hezbollah to describe the movement, referring to them as either 
the Sufis or the Muslims. It was only upon the subsequent clarification by his neighbour who was present 
during the interview that it became clear that he was referring to Hezbollah. 
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educated and from an impoverished background (see Karmon, 1998:104). The structural 
conditions of poverty, societal and familial disintegration due to migration both forced and 
economic, and the lack of a father figure rendered many youths particularly vulnerable to 
the manipulation of movements like Hezbollah. 
 
The killings occurred in urban contexts, which had hitherto escaped the diffuse 
violence and brutality present in the rural areas and smaller towns. Violence had until that 
point not been a quotidian reality in the bigger cities. Furthermore, the killings were not just 
carried out in the gecekondu neighbourhoods of the periphery but also in the heart of 
middle class neighbourhoods and city centres. The presence of such violence in urban 
environments highlights the futility of an overly rigid urban-rural compartmentalisation of 
the conflict. In light of the fact that many of its targets were middle class intellectuals, 
journalists, members of HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi/People’s Labour Party) and its successor 
parties, and women dressed in what Hezbollah deemed inappropriate attire, the immediate 
reality of violence was brought home to elements of Kurdish society which would have been 
relatively unaffected by it at that point. Hezbollah particularly targeted journalists who 
worked for newspapers close to the Kurdish movement, in particular Ozgur Gundem, Yeni 
Ülke, Yeni Politika, Ozgur Halk and the leftist 2000'e Doğru.171 A Human Rights Watch report 
in 1993 cited a figure of eleven journalists and four newspaper distributors suspected to 
have been killed by Hezbollah (1993: 6).  According to the anecdotal impression of many of 
my interviewees, the number of street sellers of the above newspapers assassinated was 
indeed much higher than even that reported by human rights organisations. 
 
Hezbollah assassinations were often carried out in broad daylight, when individuals 
or pairs of generally young men calmly approached their targets before shooting them dead. 
Welat lived in a somewhat more affluent neighbourhood of Silwan, in comparison to others 
which contained many displaced Kurds from the neighbouring villages. He personally was in 
the immediate proximity of six or seven killings and he believed that the reluctant police 
response to the crimes was confirmation of the fact that the police and Hezbollah were 
                                                        
171
 See the Committee to Protect Journalist’s website, available at : http://cpj.org/killed/europe/turkey/ 
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“fighting shoulder to shoulder” (Interview 22, 2012).172 The extent of collaboration between 
Hezbollah and the security forces led many to simply refer to it as Hizbol-Contra (Karmon, 
1998:107). 
 
Aside from its targeting of the Kurdish movement, Hezbollah also killed women 
because they were dressed in an apparently immodest fashion and there were also 
numerous reports of acid being thrown on such women (Interview 26 & 22, 2012). 
Hezbollah were also reputed to engage in kidnapping simply to obtain ransom. Rasul 
recounted that in Nusaybin they kidnapped an elderly man he knew named Hajji Şemso. 
Şemso’s family were convinced that the Nusaybin police were in cahoots with local 
Hezbollah militants, so they travelled the considerable distance to Mardin to report the 
kidnap to the police there, who eventually managed to locate the man. The anecdote, 
serves to highlight the localised nature of the links between the police and Hezbollah 
(Interview 22, 2012). Hezbollah’s campaign had little or no impact on the functioning of the 
PKK, as its guerrillas were in the relative safety of the mountains and its more important 
functionaries were either abroad or living in clandestinity. Their campaign resulted in the 
extension of the war to realms of Kurdish society which had been hitherto affected to a 
lesser degree. It created a generalised context of fear, a belief that death was possible 
whether you were politically active or not. Almost every Kurdish person with whom I 
discussed Hezbollah listed politically inactive family members assassinated by them and 
there was a widespread belief that some of the killings were subject to financial reward.  
 
It is most probable that these wider array of family narratives have become 
somewhat distorted over time as it is highly unlikely that I could possibly have encountered 
such a large proportion of Hezbollah’s victims’ families. Nonetheless, the diffusion of the 
Hezbollah narrative indicates the enormous collective fear that their campaign provoked. It 
might seem unusual in the wider context of violence which beset the Kurdish region that a 
comparatively minor sub-conflict could generate so much fear. Wright’s notion of 
representative violence is specifically formulated for communal tensions with clearly 
defined inter-communal boundaries (in Wilson, 2013:65) which were not present in the 
                                                        
172 Collaboration between Hezbollah and the state in Silwan in particular is covered in HRW (1992:14). 
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Hezbollah and PKK sub-conflict. Wright understood representative violence as based on the 
premise that “anyone of a great number of people can be “punished” for something done 
by the community they come from” (ibid). Such a fear prevailed amongst those elements of 
Kurdish society which self-identified as waled pares/yurtsever, but it was not only restricted 
to them. Precisely because the targeting criteria were not as clearly identifiable as the 
historically rooted boundaries detailed in either Wright’s (1987) or Wilson’s (2013) cases, 
the sense of fear was multiplied as there were no means to establish how to navigate the 
dangerous waters of avoiding becoming a target. It was this ambiguity in Hezbollah’s target 
selection and the belief that they were motivated less by political criteria than by financial 
rewards or particular religious understandings which generated the most fear.  
 
However, this collective anxiety did not simply result in a marked retreat from 
political life. In the case of the aforementioned interviewee who attended one of 
Diyarbakir’s most prestigious lise, amongst her classmates it did indeed lead to flight in 
several cases but also to mass recruitment to the guerrillas (Interview 22, 2012). Hezbollah’s 
armed campaign continued until the mid 1990s where it appears that some kind of accord 
was reached with the PKK. This agreement was signed according to some sources in 1993 
(Karmon, 1998:108 and Mango, 2005:65), or as late as 1997 (Interview 22, 2013). Hezbollah 
subsequently extended its activities to the west of Turkey before being targeted by the very 
state that once supported it, which resulted in the almost complete dismantlement of the 
group’s armed element in 2000 and the death of its leader Velioğlu (Aydıntaşbaş, 2000, Aras 
& Bacik, 2002 & Mater, 2000).  
 
In conclusion to this section, Hezbollah’s armed campaign, which lasted for only a 
few years, had deep consequences on the Kurdish political struggle. It brought the conflict 
to big cities; furthermore it brought it to parts of the city which had been less affected by 
violence, to the Kurdish middle classes and to the intellectuals. It paradoxically consolidated 
a waled pares/yurtsever Kurdish identity by rendering it as dangerous, or perhaps more 
dangerous, to be active in cultural campaigns or in democratic politics as it was to be 
directly engaged in the armed campaigns of the PKK. The state’s blatant utilisation of such a 
brutal proxy force to achieve its objectives in urban settings highlights the imbrication of the 
rural and the urban in understanding how the conflict developed.  
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PKK Activities within the Urban Confines 
 
 The PKK guerrillas never exerted sufficient control to hold sizeable cities for any 
duration of time. They did temporarily seize some smaller towns such as Lice, Cizre, Şırnak 
and Çukurca (Jongerden, 2007:62) and even exerted considerable control over specific 
districts within larger cities for certain periods such as Tekel in Silwan. However, the PKK’s 
urban territorial presence functioned, as Perwer explained, not as a question of where in 
the city but with whom. PKK influence spiralled outwards from initial contacts that the PKK 
trusted and spread not in terms of spatial but through social geography, along ever 
expanding networks of trusted sympathisers (Interview 33, 2013).173   Nonetheless, it 
orchestrated a series of displays of strength though serhildans, Newroz celebrations, 
funerals of guerrillas and party militants and repeated urban strikes or kepenks, particularly 
in the early 1990s. These actions generally provoked a harsh clampdown by the security 
forces which almost inevitably resulted in deaths, thus ensuring further cycles of violence 
centred on the victims’ funerals.  
 
In contrast to its success in the countryside, it was much more challenging for the 
PKK to provide counter-state services to its supporters in urban environments. There are 
known cases of insurgent groups having successfully established themselves in this way, 
such as the case of the militant Islamic group al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya in the Imbaba 
neighbourhood in Cairo, which although it did not have territorial control in a conventional 
sense was sufficiently spatially and socially entrenched in the neighbourhood to establish a 
counter-state, the Islamic Republic of Imbaba, replete with a broad range of social services 
(Malthaner, 2011a:127-130). The PKK was unable to provide counter-state services in urban 
areas in such a systematic fashion due to a stronger state presence in the cities. Yet it 
attained certain spatially and chronologically limited achievements, particularly in relation 
to its revolutionary courts system.  
                                                        
173 I originally interviewed Perwer in 2012 (Interview 32) but he was also present at my interview with Rasul 
and occasionally interjected with observations, such as this one. 
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A Nusaybin store owner reckoned that “between 1989 and 1993, the region was under the 
complete control of the PKK. For instance, if there was an incident that required a judicial 
process, the parties had to first see the regional administrator of the PKK. If they went 
directly to the official court, then the PKK punished them for that wrongdoing” (in Kalyoncu 
2007:600 and see Marcus, 1994:19). Furthermore, it also managed to operate a 
revolutionary taxation regime (see Marcus, 2007:182), provided after-school services to 
help children with their studies (Interview 33, 2013) and policed common criminality, which 
decreased dramatically (Imset, 1992:270).  
 
It was these encounters with the PKK, as well as the radicalising impact of the rural 
influx, that gradually led to the emergence of an urban PKK constituency. The repeated 
brutality of the security forces also served as a reminder of what was perceived as the 
state’s engrained hostility to the Kurdish people. Subsequently, the network of PKK sub-
organisations and thickening inter-familial relationships with the movement acted as 
efficient conduits to direct new urban recruits to the guerrilla organisation in the mountains. 
 
Serhildan 
 
Serhildan is the term given to a popular uprising in Kurdish and can be reasonably 
compared to the Arabic term intifada (Özcan, 2006:237). The first serhildan occurred in the 
town of Nusaybin in the early spring of 1990. Guerrilla funerals had yet to become the 
popular emotive focal point into which they latterly evolved. There were a number of 
reasons for this; in many cases family members were simply too afraid to claim their dead 
guerrillas for fear of attracting the attention of the Turkish army (Marcus, 2007:141). The 
other issue was that the PKK did not have a sufficiently sophisticated system for tracking 
their dead. The widespread adaption of nom de guerres ensured that in many cases the 
guerrillas’ immediate comrades or commanders did not even know their real names (ibid). 
The problem has persisted in the organisation; Berfin, the father of a guerrilla who was 
killed in 2005, only discovered his son’s death via a public announcement on Roj-TV 
(Interview 20, 2012).  
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The trigger of the serhildan was the ambush of a guerrilla unit and the deaths of 
thirteen guerrillas after it crossed the border from Syria. One of the slain guerrillas, Kamuran 
Dundar was from a noted waled pares family from Nusaybin. His family went to reclaim the 
body but because they needed to wait for Dundar’s mother to return from Izmir prior to the 
burial, word about the impending funeral had spread throughout the city (Marcus, 
2007:141). Perwer, who was present at the events that subsequently unfolded, explained 
the guerrillas had been killed by chemical weapons (Interview 33, 2013)174 thus perhaps 
adding to the sentiments of collective outrage. Marcus also reports an account of the event 
wherein the guerrillas drank some drugged ayran that rendered them unconscious but 
surmises that they were most likely killed in a conventional armed clash (Marcus, 2007:140). 
It was the conjuncture of the death of an identifiable guerrilla of a patriotic family, the delay 
in the funeral, the outrage over such a large number of dead guerrillas, the date’s proximity 
to Newroz and its location in the heartland of PKK support that led to the serhildan. The 
family chose to bring the body to a more distant mosque across the town thus giving the 
chance for thousands to row in behind the mourners. At a certain point the mourners 
clashed with the police and the violence escalated to such an extent that a curfew was 
imposed on the town. It was promptly ignored by all and sundry (ibid: 42-43), leading to the 
deaths of four civilians and 149 arrests (Aydin, 2005:86 and see White, 1997:232). The PKK 
then called for mass participation in a ‘Week of National Heroism’ to commemorate the 
deaths of two renowned heroes of the movement, Mazlum Doğan and Mahsun Korkmaz 
from the 21st (Newroz) to the 28th of March (Gunes, 2012:111).175 This led to the violence 
spreading to other neighbouring cities, notably Cizre, and as Marcus affirmed “it seemed 
like the PKK’s war had finally come down from the mountains and entered the cities” 
(2007:1142). It was a significant moment in the struggle because it was the first occasion 
when the urban masses publicly and violently asserted their solidarity with the PKK. It 
marked a decisive point of cognitive liberation when in a Turkish Daily News report in 
December 1991, Imset commented that “only a year ago, not even the strongest of tribal 
families could dare to claim the body of a member accused of being a terrorist and killed 
during a clash. Today, the people act en mass” (in Imset, 1992:254). Street clashes between 
                                                        
174
 See footnote 22.  
175
 The anniversary of Korkmaz’s death in 1986. 
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for the most part unarmed demonstrators and the security forces became henceforth 
commonplace throughout the 1990s, particularly centred on Newroz celebrations and 
funerals. 
 
Newroz  
 
Newroz176 is a celebration of the spring equinox on the 21st of March and has been 
widely celebrated in parts of the Middle East for three thousand years. It combines pre-
Islamic elements heavily influenced by Zoroastrianism with certain Islamic aspects (see 
Aydin, 2005:45-49 & 2014:71). Newroz is celebrated by many nations with historic Iranian 
influences across central Asia and it is accepted by Kurds across Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq 
as a common national festival (Bozarslan in Aydin, 2005:45). Twentieth century Kurdish 
nationalist movements and intellectuals merged the more widely diffused Newroz 
celebrations with the specific Kurdish founding myth of Kawa the blacksmith and his historic 
resistance to the Assyrian king Dahhak and how his bravery liberated the Medes, who are 
widely considered as the ancestors of the Kurdish people (Aydin, 2005:59). Newroz was 
thereby consecrated as “an ethno-genesis and resistance myth for the Kurds” (ibid: 57). It 
was given further contemporary resonance by the resistance of Kurdish prisoners in 
Diyarbakir prison after 1980. The PKK prisoner Mazlum Doğan specifically chose March the 
21st 1982 to commit suicide. The subsequent self-immolation of four other prisoners177 in 
May of that year bore a symbolic relevance because the decision to die by flames held deep 
resonation with the massive bonfires lit to celebrate Newroz (see Bozarslan, 2003:25). These 
deaths helped “the movement [PKK] to establish itself as the contemporary representative 
of the Kurdish struggle from the ancient past to the present and to make calls for self-
sacrifice” (Çağlayan, 2012:15). Accordingly, public celebrations of Newroz became highly 
politicised affairs, were often violent and utilised by the PKK as opportunities to test its 
popular support. 
                                                        
176  The spelling of Newroz is subject to much politicised debate; see Yanik (2006) for an analysis of some of 
these arguments. I have chosen to use Newroz because it is simply the spelling which I feel is the mostly widely 
accepted. 
177 The names of the four dead were Mahmut Zengin, Esref Anyık, Ferhat Kurtay and Necmi Öner (see 
Zeydanlioğlu, 2009:11).   
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The serhildan triggered by Dundar’s funeral in Nusaybin overlapped with that year’s 
Newroz celebrations and led to demonstrations and outbreaks of violence across Kurdistan 
and even in western cities such as Ankara and Istanbul. Political prisoners in Diyarbakir and 
Antep prisons went on hunger strike and cities like Idil and Silopi engaged in kepenkler  
which closed the vast majority of business in those towns (Aydin, 2005:86). Newroz 
celebrations proved a repeated site of contention and political socialisation for many young 
Kurds, particularly in urban environments. Aram, a former PKK guerrilla and political 
prisoner, recalled that at the Diyarbakir Newroz celebrations in 1990 he and his friends 
erected barricades and threw stones at the police. He described the experience as a key to 
the growth of a kind of “infantile political consciousness”. They did not even know any PKK 
slogans so they invented their own “varimiz yogumuz apo abimiz” which roughly translates 
as ‘oh brother Apo, you are all we have’ (Interview 27, 2012).  
 
The most violent Newroz occurred in 1992 after the PKK called for mass public 
participation. Huge clashes broke out across Kurdistan and according to a SHP report led to 
the deaths of twenty nine protestors in Cizre, twenty six in Şırnak and fourteen in Nusaybin, 
and hundreds more injured and arrested (in ibid: 88); while a Helsinki Watch report into the 
killings cited a figure of around eighty dead across Kurdistan, including fatalities in the cities 
of Van and Yuksekova (1992:3). The same report detailed that the PKK managed to mobilise 
hundreds of armed milis members in the cities, pointedly not guerrillas from the mountains, 
thus giving an impression of the PKK’s urban mobilisational capacity at the time (ibid). 
Nevertheless, it suggested that in the cases of Cizre and Nusaybin “all or nearly all of the 
casualties resulted from unprovoked, unnecessary and unjustified attacks by Turkish 
security forces against peaceful Kurdish civilian demonstrators” (ibid).  
 
One of the outcomes of these serhildans was that they “prompted an influx of new 
recruits into the organization. Thousands of men and women from the rural and urban 
populace, particularly from among the high school (lycée) and university students of both 
Kurdish cities and Turkish metropolises, joined the party’s frontal and military bodies” 
(Özcan, 2006: 175). The consolidation of links with high schools was particularly noteworthy, 
as only 9% of children in the South East completed their second level education (Robins, 
1993:663); it is implicit that many of these recruits were from higher social strata. It was 
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therefore clear that the PKK had consolidated its presence in many cities across Kurdistan 
and although incomparable in terms of numbers to the deaths in the countryside, clashes 
between its supporters and militants with the state resulted in significant numbers of 
casualties. Casualties which in turn generated stronger emotional bonds with the movement 
and motivated many Kurdish youths to join the guerrillas.  
 
Funerals 
 
  Once the stigma and fear surrounding political funerals had been broken, they 
became key sites of political and often violent confrontation between the wider Kurdish 
movement and the forces of the state. The PKK’s mobilisation strategies prior to 1980 and 
its utilisation of funerals as opportunities to mobilise huge swathes of society has already 
been discussed in Chapter III. Khalili described how various Palestinian factions’ 
transformation of funerals into major political events was predicated on borrowing non-
political ritual elements from quotidian [...] lives and transforming these elements into 
symbolically loaded political practices which resonated with a wide public (2007:125). Thus, 
Kurdish political funerals, aside from the personal suffering of grieving family members also 
became occasions of political theatre. Mass funeral processions “acted as both mobilizing 
and pedagogic tools” (ibid: 124). They functioned as mobilisations tools by “disseminating a 
unified nationalist narrative” (ibid) and by physically bringing Kurds who had not been 
hitherto mobilised or were less involved into a shared space of great collective emotional 
intensity. The PKK recognised the huge mobilisational potential of funerals and began to use 
them as platforms for political propaganda and recruitment.178 
 
Farhad explained the process through which the first politicised funeral in Malazgirt 
took place. A guerrilla from the local area was killed and the PKK publicly announced his 
funeral and demanded that people attend.  
                                                        
178 Interestingly, Hezbollah (Lebanese version) was also using funerals as opportunities for mobilisation at the 
same time; most notably the funeral of its then secretary general Abas al-Mussawi in 1992 (Malthaner, 
2011a:216). 
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Subsequently thousands of mourners gathered, many of whom attending out of a sense of 
solidarity but many more participating only due to pressure exerted by the PKK. They 
marched to the local military base to reclaim the corpse of the guerrilla. At a certain point 
the military opened fire, wounding a number of the cortège but the sheer mass of people 
forced the army to give the body to the mourners. After such a display of PKK popular 
support, all further funerals in the area passed off without incident (Interview 44, 2013). 
Accordingly, it is clear that the PKK recognised the importance of funerals as occasions of 
political theatre and demonstrations of force, and that it was willing when necessary to 
coerce reluctant supporters to attend them. 
 
 Politicised funerals were not necessarily just the preserve of fallen guerrillas but also 
of others involved in the broader the movement. Vedat Aydin was the chairman of the 
Diyarbakir branch of DEP and the head of a local human rights organisation. He was 
abducted from his home on the 5th of July 1991 by men claiming to be police officers and his 
bullet-ridden corpse was found in Elâzığ province and hastily buried179. His body was 
exhumed on the demand of his family and his subsequent funeral in Diyarbakir attracted a 
huge crowd of up to 150,000 people. His political sympathies were a matter of public 
knowledge and pro-Kurdish graveside orations were made which denounced state abuses of 
civilians, while his coffin was wrapped in an ERNK flag (Gunes, 2012:111).  After the burial 
the remaining mourners, which numbered in the tens of thousands, had gathered around 
the Mardinkapi in the historic town walls close to the city centre (Interview 24, 2012). At 
that point they were attacked by “heavily armed security forces, supported by armoured 
vehicles and helicopters, leaving 21 dead and hundreds wounded” (Özcan, 2006:14).  
 
 Aydin’s funeral was a turning point in a number of ways. It was the first such mass 
killing in Diyarbakir and it also marked the point where civil society actors began to be 
frequently assassinated (Interview 24, 2012). His funeral serves as a perfect example of the 
mobilisational potency of such occasions. Aram, who lived with his widowed father in the 
city, was only fourteen at the time of the funeral and he describes it as the turning point in 
                                                        
179
 Şükran Aydin and Others v. Turkey (Application no. 46231/99) ECHR 26 May 2005. Available at: 
http://echr.ketse.com/doc/46231.99-en-20050526/view/ 
 
237 
 
his political development. Until then he had never knowingly met anyone from the PKK and 
his political consciousness, as has been discussed above, was a “spontaneous” one; he only 
heard the PKK slogans of “Biji Öcalan” and “Biji Kurdistan” for the first time during the 
cortege. The morning of the funeral he had wandered aimlessly around the city for a while 
before encountering some of the mourners gathering at Çift Kapi, another city entrance. He 
went to the funeral as if it were a game of some sort and only realised the seriousness of it 
once he was there. Aram was towards the front of the masses180 when the police opened 
fire and he recalls immediately throwing himself to the ground to take cover. He witnessed 
several people, including a child even younger than himself at the time, bleeding from 
gunshot wounds. In the aftermath of the shooting he was seized by the police and severely 
beaten and after returning home he discovered a bullet hole in the sole of his shoe. His 
cousin, with whom he ran a small shoe repairs outlet, had also attended the funeral and left 
shortly afterwards to join the guerrillas. Notwithstanding his age, he began to search out a 
contact in the movement so that he too could enrol in the guerrillas, which he managed to 
do in May 1992, after some reluctance on the PKK’s behalf because of his age (Interview 27, 
2012). Aram’s unthinking attendance at the funeral brought him in physical proximity to the 
movement for the first time and led to his subsequent radicalisation. This almost casual drift 
into the movement is representative of the narratives of many militants, whereby a 
conjuncture of a number of elements such as sharing a physical space with the movement, 
collectively experiencing a moment of emotional intensity and exposure to the brute face of 
the state can lead to irrevocable radicalisation. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
180
 His photograph close to the front was in some of the following day’s newspaper coverage of the massacre. 
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Non-escalation to Urban Uprising 
 
The motivations as to why the PKK did not seize on what seemed like a propitious 
moment to escalate the conflict during the serhildans by ordering a mass uprising remains a 
matter of great contention. Certain authors are of the view that Öcalan opposed a mass, 
locally controlled mobilisation because “a sustained uprising, whether violent or not, could 
cause new actors and interest groups to emerge, challenging [...] [his] authority and the 
PKK’s hegemony” (Marcus, 2007:181). It is a view that attributes the priority given to the 
continued focus on the organised armed guerrilla campaign in the mountains as derived 
from Öcalan’s own egoism. Marcus contends that Öcalan “refused to let PKK guerrillas 
direct the demonstrations and turn them into a mass uprising” (ibid: 180) comparable to the 
Palestinian intifada. It is indeed true that the guerrillas never took a lead in co-ordinating 
the serhildans but that is not to confirm that the PKK as a wider organisation was not behind 
their emergence.  
 
The first serhildan in Nusaybin was characterised by a generous dose of 
happenstance and it was understood by many of its participants as a spontaneous event. 
The tendency to retrospectively interpret political actions as spontaneous is widespread, as 
seen in Polletta’s work on the American civil rights campaign (2006:42). It is likely derived 
from a desire to project political actions as authentic, as opposed to it being the fruit of 
strategic instrumentalisation by political organisations. Rasul, who participated in the first 
serhildan, described his memory of it as people just starting to walk in the funeral cortege 
and others joining them, without any specific instructions or co-ordination by any external 
actors (Interview 33, 2013). There is no reason to doubt his recollection but it does not 
countenance the importance of the preceding socialisation and organisational efforts of the 
PKK. The killing of Dundar was clearly an unanticipated event but it occurred in a context of 
fervent PKK mobilisation in the cities. The PKK’s broader efforts resulted in increased 
recruitment to the guerrillas and fostered a form of impatience in those sympathetic or 
mobilised in the non-guerrilla ranks of the movement to be active or participate in the 
struggle in some fashion. It was a situation of smouldering tension which was going to be 
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inevitably ignited by a particular event, which was in this case the death of a guerrilla well-
respected in his home area.  
 
 It is clear that the first serhildan was not ordered by the PKK but it immediately 
seized the opportunity to guide the events that followed it. After the outbreak of 
disturbances, the PKK called for a ‘Week of National Heroism’ (Gunes, 2012:111). Ahmet, a 
self-declared second generation PKK supporter, explained that the social space that the PKK 
had carved out in the cities with their burgeoning networks of contacts were the underlying 
mobilising structures of the serhildans in the early 1990s. He boldly states that they had 
been long-planned and organised by the movement and were not in any way spontaneous 
(Interview 18, 2012). Local knowledge of impending clashes was available on the ground 
thus again disproving the spontaneity hypothesis. Omar, the nephew of a prominent Kurdish 
politician, recalls that in the lead-up to the serhildan of the 15th of August181 1992 in 
Kiziltepe, his mother sent him away to stay in the safety of relatives living in Western 
Turkey, precisely in the knowledge that clashes would have erupted that day (Interview 18, 
2012). The orchestrated nature of the serhildans is also evident in the manner in which after 
three successive extremely bloody Newroz celebrations from 1990 to 1992, the one of 1993 
after Öcalan called for a peaceful celebration as befitting the PKK’s ongoing ceasefire passed 
with little incident. It unfolded peacefully with only one recorded death in Adana, in 
comparison to the tens of deaths of the previous years (Aydin, 2006: 102). The experience 
was repeated the following year, when Öcalan called on Kurds to celebrate Newroz inside 
their homes rather than with public demonstrations (ibid). It seems illogical to deduce that 
the violence of the preceding years was unrelated to any commands given by the PKK, when 
its explicit plea for calm in the following years was almost impeccably observed.  
 
 It can be tempting to retrospectively interpret events in light of subsequent 
revelations. However, in the early 1990s the PKK and many of its supporters were convinced 
of their imminent victory. The PKK’s confidence and self-belief was such that in late 1993, 
                                                        
181 The 15th of August, the date of the launch of the insurgency in 1984, had become a day laden with symbolic 
significance for PKK supporters and sympathisers and has been publicly celebrated in Turkish and Kurdish 
cities, as well as in Europe. 
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ironically just after its power had begun to decline, it released the following audacious 
announcement in its publication Berxwedan: 
 
The resolutions adopted by the PKK, which are formed in concrete proposals such as ‘political 
parties will shut [their offices in Kurdistan], all their administrators and members will resign, 
the newspapers serving the Turkish special war will not be distributed, TVs will not be 
watched, the schools serving as colonialist assimilation institutions will be shut down, 
teachers will resign, gambling will not be allowed, all the officers of the TC [Turkish Republic] 
will leave Kurdistan, no one will attend the courts of the TC, no one will join the Turkish 
military service, taxes will not be paid to the TC, journalists will be allowed to come to 
Kurdistan only with permission’ are implemented in perfect order. Our people have been 
devoting all their efforts towards implementing these resolutions (Berxwedan, 15 November 
1993 in Özcan 2006:176). 
 
It was clear that the PKK had complete faith in its prevailing approach. It would have 
been perceived as an unnecessary risk to potentially weaken its successful guerrilla 
campaign by launching an urban uprising which would have mostly likely resulted in an 
unprecedented military crackdown and the displacement of the supply chains to the 
guerrillas in the mountains. As it was, the urban centres were a source of recruits, material 
resources and the terrain of an emerging legal Kurdish movement centred on the Kurdish 
political party. It must also be recognised that the PKK’s external leadership was not in 
everyday contact with its guerrilla units (see Chapter IV) and that such an extensive co-
ordination between semi-autonomous forces in the mountains and urban militia would have 
presented significant logistical challenges.  
 
Finally, it is indeed tempting to attribute the decision to the boundless ego of 
Öcalan, whose determination to preserve his role as the messiah-leader of the movement 
was evident in the brutality with which he dealt with internal challengers (Imset, 1992: 77-
78, Marcus, 2007: 134-140, and Akçam, 2012). Yet it must be acknowledged that Öcalan was 
perceptive enough to recognise on occasion that when unauthorised initiatives of others 
within the PKK proved popular with the broader PKK universe of supporters, he was not 
hesitant to re-adjust his position to that of the masses. An example of this was when in May 
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1993 a commander, Şemdin Sakık broke the PKK ceasefire in direct opposition to the party 
line by assassinating thirty three unarmed Turkish soldiers and four school teachers on a bus 
in Bingöl (Özcan, 2006: 179). Shortly afterwards Öcalan, fearing a split between the external 
leadership and the commanders in the mountains, formally announced the end of the 
ceasefire. Therefore, it is clear that Öcalan’s alleged megalomaniacal tendencies were often 
checked by the realities on the ground. In addition, instances of urban insurgency in 
Turkey’s recent past by the radical left had been a decisive failure and the bloody fates of 
Çayan, Gezmis and their cohort served as a reminder of it (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011:127). 
Plus, if one considers Öcalan’s political socialisation in the era of successful national 
liberation struggles and its veneration of the practise of rural insurgency, his reluctance to 
rush into urban rebellion is understandable. In light of this, the attribution of what was at 
the time a military coherent decision to Öcalan’s vainglorious personality does not seem 
convincing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The common misconception that the PKK had little or no presence in the cities of 
Kurdistan and that it was a rural phenomenon has been dismantled in this chapter. 
Admittedly certain cities underwent periods of greater conflict than others; cities like 
Diyarbakir were notably stable until the 1990s, whereas cities in the Botan area were 
beleaguered by almost constant violence. It should be recognised that the PKK made use of 
the cities in a different manner to that in which they utilised the rural areas. Cognisant of 
the logistical difficulties of urban-based insurgency, they channelled urban resources to the 
insurgency in the countryside where the guerrillas suffered a lesser comparative 
disadvantage.182 
 
Notwithstanding the greater state presence in urban centres, there were certain 
elements which favoured the formation of an urban based constituency. Violent acts of 
state repression in the countryside attracted lesser media attention and the putative PKK 
                                                        
182
 See Vargas (2009:113) for an analysis of similar patterns of violence in Barrancabermeja in Columbia in the 
early 1990s. 
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support triggered by acts of state violence in the countryside, in particular the forcible 
evacuations, was often dissipated by the fragmentation of familial and village networks 
inherent in relocation. However, state atrocities in urban areas resonated with the larger 
numbers of city residents and their relative spatial stability rendered it easier for the PKK to 
systematically recruit from them. The spatial concentration of military attacks, as in the case 
of Şırnak in August 1993 (White, 1997:238) or Hezbollah assassinations, led certain cities to 
become furnaces of resentment and resistance; furnaces that were repeatedly fuelled by 
the incessant flow of horrors that accompanied many of the displaced rural families.  
The PKK’s mobilisational repertoire should not be analysed as occurring in different, 
disconnected universes. In structural terms, the boundaries between the cities and the 
countryside had already been weakened due to increased urbanisation, seasonal migration 
and the decline of traditional agricultural practises. The onset of forced migration further 
hastened the undermining of this distinction; the majority of urban dwellers had personal or 
close family roots in the countryside. The dividing line between the PKK’s urban and rural 
activities reflects this and they should be seen as amorphous and complementary, ensuring 
that developments in one realm had formative consequences in the other. The PKK’s 
primary concern was to forge and protect a consistent flow of young militants to serve as 
guerrillas. In this regard it was extremely successful, to the extent that its obligatory military 
service law patchily applied in rural areas was eventually abandoned. Following the 
serhildan of March 1990, the PKK periodically began to use occasions such Newroz and the 
funerals of guerrillas to ascertain the extent of its urban support. Mass gatherings of their 
supporters confirmed their popular legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of the international 
public. Cities served as platforms to address the wider world in a way that rural villages and 
towns never could.  
In conclusion, the PKK’s armed campaign was mostly fought in the countryside, but 
the struggle there only endured due to the mass support of its urban constituency. Upon 
the forced migration of millions of peasants to the cities the divisions between the urban 
and the rural became increasingly blurred and the rural peasants were transformed into an 
urban proletariat. The PKK harnessed its urban support and re-directed to where it was 
deemed to be most likely successful, the mountains. In the course of the conflict the cities 
were politicised in an unprecedented fashion by the influx of internally displaced Kurds, the 
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calculated mobilisation strategies of the PKK and the atrocities of the state and its proxies. 
Nowadays, the rural zones are largely in the maw of the Village Guards and it is primarily the 
cities that serve as the strongholds of the Kurdish movement. This turnaround is arguably 
due to the politicisation of the urban centres in the period discussed in this chapter.  
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Chapter VI: The PKK in Western Turkey 
 
Introduction 
 
 The PKK has always been present wherever Kurdish communities are to be found. 
Naturally, their strongest support base has always been in Kurdistan but the PKK established 
connections with Kurdish migrant communities in Lebanon and Libya in the early 1980s and 
has taken advantage of the burgeoning Kurdish diaspora in Europe. Unsurprisingly, it has 
also actively mobilised amongst Kurds resident outside of Kurdistan in western Turkey. As 
has been discussed in the preceding chapters, the PKK has over time constantly adapted and 
re-adjusted its repertoire of contention according to its immediate socio-spatial context, as 
well as its long term priorities and objectives.  
 
 Its efforts to establish and subsequently consolidate a constituency in western 
Turkey presented it with a number of challenges distinct from those in Kurdistan. A first 
factor was that the Kurds which had immigrated to the west of the country were 
overwhelmingly resident in urban areas; urban mobilisation entails both difficulties and 
advantages in comparison to rural mobilisation (see Le Blanc, 2013 & Chapter V). In an even 
more pronounced fashion than in Kurdish urban centres, the PKK had no territorial control, 
thus rendering it reliant on social control and legitimacy to mobilise popular consensus. In 
an ulterior contrast to its mobilisation in Kurdistan, Kurds in western Turkey form a sizeable 
(albeit discriminated) minority amongst a majority Turkish population. Additionally, the 
Kurdish community resident in the west was spatially fragmented and for the most part 
socio-economically marginalised, thus rendering its mobilisation even more difficult. A final 
difference was that unlike in Kurdistan where the PKK enjoyed a monopoly on revolutionary 
politics, in western Turkey a number of radical left-wing groups also sought to channel 
Kurdish resentment into their own revolutionary projects. Notwithstanding the competition 
these rivals posed - in terms of accessing resources and popular legitimacy - the PKK for the 
most part utilised a less confrontational strategy in their regards than the one it adopted in 
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respect of its Kurdish contemporaries in the 1970s. Accordingly, it is clear that in western 
Turkey the PKK was obliged to mobilise in a very different environment demanding 
alternative approaches and strategies to those used with success in Kurdistan. 
 
 Kurdish migration to western Turkey has been the subject of significant research in 
regards to the socio-economic challenges of rural migrants, issues of integration and 
assimilation. It has however, been rather understudied from the point of view of political 
participation, with some notable exceptions (Doğan & Yılmaz, 2011 and Darıcı, 2011). 
However, any analysis of Kurdish political participation beyond their homeland in the south 
east of the country is conceptually challenging. It is, in fact, much too broad a phenomenon 
to broach within a single chapter. The Kurdish community in western Turkey is not 
homogenous; it is comprised of multiple generations of historic labour migrants, distributed 
across many different districts and class positions. It is divided linguistically and religiously 
and riven with localised sub-Kurdish identities that have been reproduced in the west. Over 
time this amorphous mass rapidly expanded to include a large proportion of forcibly 
displaced Kurds following the violent expulsion of millions of rural Kurds (see chapter V). As 
a means to conceptually organise this heterogenous community, this chapter will put forth 
the argument that a large portion of the Kurdish population can be understood as a form of 
internal diaspora. Although conventional understandings of diaspora usually emphasise its 
international dimensions, the lived experience of many Kurds corresponds with the 
experiences of transnational diasporas in terms of socio-cultural marginalisation, 
displacement from a homeland and the maintenance of boundaries vis-á-vis the majority 
community (Brubaker, 2005).  
 
As has been elaborated in the previous chapters, the PKK made use of different 
organisational structures according to the context of their deployment. In western Turkey, 
the movement was present in the form of the ERNK and its subsidiary movements, with 
extremely rare deployment of its guerrilla units. Accordingly, it engaged in rather different 
contentious practises than it did in Kurdistan. Notwithstanding the preponderance of 
Turkish state institutions, such as the army and police, all of which were considered as 
legitimate targets in Kurdistan, the PKK did not systematically deploy violence against them 
in the west. In fact the PKK deployed a range of violence that was well beneath its armed 
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capability. Violence in western Turkey increased for a brief period following Öcalan’s arrest 
in 1999, but for the most part it was restricted to bombing campaigns focusing on Turkey’s 
tourist industry (Lakmi, 1993), a short lived suicide bombing campaign (Ergil, 2000:51) and 
light or unarmed clashes arising from the escalation of small demonstrations. Two of the 
most notorious violent PKK incidents were fire bombings of shopping centres in 1991183 and 
1999184 which ignited fires, resulting in mass civilian casualties rather than targeted bomb 
attacks.   
 
 Similarly to the preceding chapters, there will be a significant configurative-
ideographic element to this chapter due to the limited research on militant political 
participation in western Turkey. It has proven necessary to critically engage with the 
prevailing statistical sources regarding the dimensions of the Kurdish community beyond 
Kurdistan in Turkey. The chapter will then lay out the argument that there is a distinction 
within this broader community between a politically engaged internal diaspora and a 
broader migrant Kurdish community. In order to supplement some of the rich research done 
on the socio-economic challenges of Kurdish migrants in western Turkey, it will incorporate 
a number of qualitative personal narratives as means to explain how these existent socio-
economic structures influenced individual political trajectories. It is worth recalling the 
eloquent observations of Amartya Sen that poverty in itself does not necessarily lead to 
violence and that it often leads to mass inertia (2008:11 and see Trotsky, 2008). It is 
therefore important to consider how the PKK succeeded - while other radical movements 
failed - to generate a popular understanding that the Turkish state was the cause of the 
collective grievances of the Kurdish people and how it directed this discontent into 
participation in the movement.  
 
This chapter will discuss how the PKK managed to forge a rearticulated revolutionary 
Kurdish identity, which was cross-class in composition and traversed the array of Kurdish 
sub-identities, and awakened Kurdish sentiments in younger generations of assimilated 
                                                        
183 A small demonstration of around fifty people targeted a shopping centre owned by the OHAL governor 
Necati Çetinkaya’s brother in Istanbul’s Bakırköy neighbourhood. In the resulting fire, fourteen people burned 
to death.   
184In the wake of Öcalan’s arrest, a shopping centre in Göztepe was set alight and thirteen shoppers were killed 
(BBC, 1999).  
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families. Its success is even more notable if one considers that it occurred as the PKK’s 
better established leftist revolutionary rivals were slipping into decline. The last part of the 
chapter will explain the concrete processes and mechanisms involved in the establishment 
of the PKK’s constituency in western Turkey. It will examine the agency of the PKK and its 
selection of contextually informed recruitment strategies and modes of interaction with 
potential supporters and sympathisers and how incipient sympathies were converted into 
actual support.  
 
Note on Kurdish Migration Statistics 
 
 There is a glaring dearth of reliable statistics on the ethnic composition of the 
Turkish state. Kurdish movements tend to exaggerate the Kurdish population, while the 
contrary is true for Turkish nationalists. The lack of credible data can be attributed to a 
number of reasons. Many Kurds are reluctant to publically assert their Kurdish identity to 
official bodies because of lingering fears and past memories of discrimination. The 
internalisation of the state-promoted Turkish nationalist discourse that holds Kurdishness as 
the epitome of backwardness and ignorance (Zeydanlioğlu, 2008) has led many Kurdish 
people to disavow their own ethnic origins. In other cases Kurds of certain generations 
scarred by the horrors of state repression, most strikingly in the Dersim massacres, have 
tended to actively project an exaggerated sense of Turkishness on subsequent generations 
as a form of protection. Accordingly, there are intergenerational discrepancies in the 
recognition of Kurdishness and differences exist even within families regarding their ethnic 
identity.   
 
For many Kurds, particularly those born in the West, the capacity to speak Kurdish 
has ceased to be the definitive marker of Kurdishness.  The 1965 census, which is itself 
considered highly deficient (Mutlu, 1996:520), was the last census to enquire as to the 
population’s mother tongue. The utilisation of a rudimental linguistic proxy to determine 
identity is itself fraught with many difficulties (ibid: 1996:518-519), but it remains in this 
case the most useful, if imperfect indicator of ethnicity. Mutlu calculates that, due to a 
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higher birth rate185, the Kurds grew from 9.98% of the population in 1965 to 12.6% in 1990. 
In terms of geographical distribution, he contends that while only one fifth of Kurds lived 
outside their historical Southeastern homeland in 1965, that figure had risen to one third by 
1990 (ibid: 532-533). In the particular case of Istanbul, Mutlu asserts that its Kurdish 
population grew from 2.77% to 8.16% in 1990 (ibid: 526 & 540). Sirkeci provides a detailed 
table from a variety of different sources and estimates of the Kurdish population in Turkey 
in the 1990s, ranging from 6.2% to 22% (2000: 155). Using data gathered from a 1992 
Turkish Demographic Health Survey (TDHS), which estimates ethnic identity by a series of 
mother tongue questions, he concludes that the Kurdish population as a percentage of the 
overall state population was 15.8%, of which 70% resided in the southeast (ibid:155-156). 
He also observed growth of the Kurdish population in all Turkey’s geographic regions (ibid: 
156). The TDHS figures are from 1993, prior to the campaign of forcible evacuation in 
Kurdistan which was at its most intense between 1991 and 1995, reaching a peak in 1994 
(Gambetti & Jongerden, 2011:384); therefore one can reasonably conclude that these 
numbers have further increased in the ensuing years. This is a proposition which seems to 
be supported by Wedel’s 1997 estimate that between half and two thirds of the Kurdish 
population was to be found in the west of the country (in Grabolle-Çeliker, 2012:15). 
 
 Notwithstanding the difficulties in obtaining empirically certifiable statistics, for the 
purposes of this project it is important to note the ever increasing proportion of Kurds living 
outside of the traditionally Kurdish region. As stated before, this project is not an analysis of 
the wider Kurdish population but rather a study on a precise subset of it, those that 
supported or sympathised with the PKK. The statistics outlined above merely give an idea of 
the structural demography within which these support networks were established. Finally, 
this chapter will also engage with the non-Kurdish supporters of the PKK, who were 
understandably, disproportionately present in non-Kurdish majority areas.  
                                                        
185
 The higher Kurdish birth rate is in spite of the Kurdish population’s higher rates of infant and child mortality 
and an all around inferior performance in all socioeconomic indicators in respect of the Turkish population 
(Icduygu et al, 1999). 
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Kurds in Western Turkey – an Internal Diaspora? 
 
It must be acknowledged that population mobility and dramatic urbanisation has 
affected Turkey as a whole and is not confined to the Kurds (Karpat, 1976). The huge 
outflow of internally displaced people due to the conflict and forcible village evacuation in 
Kurdistan has simply added to a pre-existing urban to rural population re-organisation in 
Turkey. Turkey’s urban population grew from 8.8 million (32% of the total population) in 
1960 to 26.8 million (54%) in 1985 (Balaban, 2011: 2164 and see Yılmaz, 2003:2). 
Accordingly, the conflict should not be mistakenly understood as the principal agent of 
demographic transformation across Turkey but rather an ulterior element exclusively 
affecting the Kurdish region186.  
 
The figures vary as to the dimensions of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe but a 
generally accepted estimate is around 850,000, although numerous Kurdish associations 
assert much higher numbers (see Baser, 2011:8). Eccarius-Kelly cited a figure from the 
Kurdish Institute in Paris which suggests that there are one million Kurds in Europe, of 
whom 85% have a Turkish passport (2002:115). Immigrants on arrival in Europe are 
registered by the relevant European authorities according to their passport and not 
according to ethnic affiliation, so Kurds from Turkey are recorded as Turks. Furthermore, 
there is the issue of second and third generation Kurds who have European citizenship (see 
Baser, 2011:8) and there is also the thorny issue of multiple identities even within the same 
family. A German born YXK (Yekîtiya Xwendekarên Kurdistan/ Kurdish Student Association) 
activist explained to me that he had no idea that he was Kurdish until he was sixteen years 
old. He further affirmed that he had never knowingly met a Kurd until that time. Yet he now 
describes himself as being from Erzincan even though he has never been there and his 
parents identify themselves as Alevis and Turkish Kemalists, thus highlighting the 
complications surrounding the quantification of the Kurdish population (Interview 7, 2012).  
                                                        
186Forced evacuations occurred almost exclusively in the Kurdish provinces with the exception of Sivas which 
has a mixed Alevi, Kurdish and Turkish population and would usually not be considered part of Kurdistan 
(Leezenberg, 2003:207).  
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This politically important Kurdish diaspora in Europe has been the subject of much academic 
analysis (Baser, 2011& 2012, Alinia 2004, Leggewie 1996, Lyon & Uçarer 2001, Sirkeci, 2003 
and Van Bruinessen, 1998 inter alios). Yet, even if one were to accept the larger estimates of 
the Kurdish diaspora, it remains much smaller than the Kurdish population living in Turkey 
outside of the traditional Kurdish homeland, dispersed across the cities of Western and 
Southern Anatolia. If we accept Sirkeci’s (2000) estimate that thirty percent of Turkey’s 
Kurdish population lived outside of its tradition homeland in the southeast in 2000 and that 
the Kurdish population as a whole numbered twenty million (Icduygu et al, 1999), it 
confirms that around six million Kurds live in predominantly Turkish – from a cultural and a 
linguistic perspective – areas. It is a number which dwarfs the wildest estimate of the 
Kurdish diaspora across Europe but receives a disproportionately smaller proportion of the 
academic attention.187 
 
 Gambetti and Jongerden’s affirmation that until relatively recently space was largely 
ignored as a concept in social theory (2011:375) is largely correct but with one notable 
exception; the notion of diaspora.  Spatial dislocation is the very essence of the condition of 
diaspora. The three main criteria for a community to qualify as a diaspora as per Brubaker’s 
understanding are all undeniably spatially delineated qualities: dispersion in space, 
orientation to another homeland and boundary maintenance (2005:5). However, the 
concept of diaspora has proven resilient to any attempts to authoritatively define it. Clifford 
has “suggested that it is not possible to define diaspora sharply, either by recourse to 
essential features or to privative oppositions” (1994: 310) but this ambiguity has resulted in 
a proliferation of ill-defined uses of diaspora and to it becoming a glaring example of 
“concept stretching” (see Sartori, 1970). If “everybody is diasporic, then no one is 
distinctively so. The term loses its discriminatory power” (Brubaker, 2005:3). 
 
Notwithstanding, the danger of over-extending the concept of diaspora, the Kurdish 
population dispersed across western Turkey has many of the qualities of a diaspora. Indeed, 
                                                        
187 I would suggest that the preponderance of studies on Kurdish immigrant communities is due to the 
disproportionate number of Kurdish intellectuals in exile and the academic freedom and safety present for the 
most part across Europe and the US. The feared dangers and alleged criminality thought present in the Kurdish 
migrant community has also captured the attention of other European scholars.  
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the notion of the Kurds as an “internal diaspora” has emerged in certain academic circles 
(Ahmetbeyzade, 2007 and Gunter, 2004:42). Many Kurds have begun to appropriate the 
term diaspora to describe their condition. Baran, an academic in his thirties born in western 
Turkey whose family hail from Dersim, described himself as living in the diaspora. An 
additional factor which betrays the nuances of the back and forth between western Turkey 
and Kurdistan, he does not even speak Kurdish, yet it is only during his trips to Kurdistan 
that the uneasiness he experiences as a Kurd in Turkey is temporarily alleviated (Interview 8, 
2012). This orientation toward an often idealised Kurdish homeland – as opposed to having 
a different place of origin - distinguishes Kurds in the west of Turkey from other rural-urban 
migrants with whom they share many of the same socio-economic challenges inherent in 
migration.  
 
Earlier classifications of diaspora “usually presuppose[d] long [...] distances and a 
separation more like exile: a constitutive taboo on return, or its postponement to a remote 
future” (Clifford, 1994:304), and were centred on the telos of return, a physical reunification 
of a land and its people (see Safran in Clifford, 1994: 304). Diasporas dispersed from 
stateless nations present further conceptual confusion as “the category of diaspora is an 
extension of the nation-state model, in that it assumes a congruence between the territorial 
state and the national community” (Soysal, 2000:4). In the absence of a defined state or at 
least a collectively recognised demarcated territory as a destination of return, the 
amorphous homeland is cited as the locus of return. The notion of homeland is “imbued 
with an emotional, almost reverential dimension” (Conner, 1986: 16) and defies “exposition 
in rational terms” (ibid: 18). There appears to be no academic consensus on how a 
‘homeland’ can actually be defined. Conner lists a number of different types of homeland: 
homeland states, multi-homeland states, immigrant states and sub-homeland states (1986), 
conceptualising the homeland in conjunction to how it relates, positively or negatively, to 
the existence of the state. On the other hand, Alinia in a more nuanced approach suggests 
that the homeland can be understood in an individual sense, as one’s place of birth or an 
area to which one bears particular emotive bonds and personal memories, as well as in a 
wider political sense. As it is understood subjectively, it generates an array of different 
constructions and notions of where and of what the homeland is actually composed 
(2004:212). 
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In the Kurdish case, there is a strong longing for return to an understanding of 
Kurdistan; however it is not so straightforward as to suggest that this is the aspect which 
confirms the diasporic condition of Kurds in western Turkey. Ahmetbeyzade cites at length a 
Kurdish woman living in Istanbul: 
 
[...] we always think of going back to Kurdistan. Our roots are in Kurdistan. We will go back. 
We will all go back. The Mother Soil calls us. I don’t know when, but I know we will. I am now 
looking for brides for my sons, not from the city but from our villages, so that I can take our 
sons and brides back to our land (2007: 166). 
 
Yet many Kurds, especially Kurdish youths, are distinctly ambivalent about any 
possible return to Kurdistan. As one youth in Adana explained, “there are too many old 
people there. To be honest, I can’t go and live there. I can’t go and settle down in the 
countryside; I can’t live in a village” (in Darıcı, 2011:474). Ambiguous feelings in relation to 
returning to Kurdistan exist even amongst those involved in the PKK; an ERNK cadre Sefer, 
admitted that as a Kurd raised in western Turkey, he found it difficult to fully internalise the 
notion of an independent Kurdistan (Interview 9, 2012). The myth of return for many Kurds 
takes on the qualities of “an eschatological identity” (Falzon, 2003:664) rather than a 
concrete personal objective.  Therefore, although the notion of a return to a liberated 
Kurdistan is central to many Kurds’ identity and self-perception, it varies across generations 
and individual experiences and cannot be considered as a definitive aspect of their identity 
as a diaspora within Turkey. 
 A defining characteristic of Kurds living in western Turkey is that “they experience 
living in two separate spaces simultaneously; because they are spatially away from their 
homeland, [and] they bring their old place to the new one” (Ahmetbeyzade, 2007:164). This 
duality of experience correlates to Brubaker’s understanding that boundary maintenance is 
crucial to the status of diaspora. He explains that “boundaries can be maintained by 
deliberate resistance to assimilation by self enforced endogamy or as other forms of self-
segregation or as an unintended consequence of social exclusion” (Brubaker, 2005: 6 
drawing on Armstrong 1976, Smith 1986 and Laitin 1995). Furthermore, these boundaries 
must necessarily endure over an extended period of time (Brubaker, 2005:7 and see 
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Bauböck, 2010:315). In the Kurdish case, these inter-communal boundaries were buttressed 
by repeated waves of migrants relocating - forcibly or otherwise - to western Turkey, thus 
providing a tangible reinforcement of ties with the homeland.  
An ulterior aspect of diaspora is put forth in the suggestion that “decentered, lateral 
connections may be as important as those formed around teleology of origin/return. And a 
shared, ongoing history of displacement, suffering, adaptation, or resistance may be as 
important as the projection of a specific origin” (Clifford, 1994: 306). These ties and 
connections emerge and are consolidated in specific spatial and cultural environments 
within western cities; environments which have served as the spaces wherein collective 
memories are formed and constantly reformulated. The collective memory of the conflicts 
dating back generations serves as a form of epistemic basis which “constitutes exiled Kurds 
as a political collectivity with a differentiated historical experience and voice, a collectivity 
that has been excluded from majority  discourses through various government practices” 
(Ahmetbeyzade, 2007, 177-178).  
The maintenance of a Kurdish identity is bolstered by housing practises; in many 
western Turkish cities it is common to find neighbourhoods populated by migrants from 
specific areas of Kurdistan, such as the neighbourhoods of Kasımpaşa and Tarlabaşı in 
Istanbul which host large populations from Mardin (Interview 50 and Yılmaz, 2003:14 and 
Secor, 2004:358). Kurdish residential patterns in a certain fashion bring the village and its 
attendant socio-cultural bonds and reciprocal norms to the city (Wedel, 2001:60). In 
addition, there are a number of social institutions called hemşehri or hometown 
associations, which serve as a fulcrum around which the coherence of many migrant 
communities, not exclusively Kurdish ones, is maintained. Hemşehrilik is a sense of shared 
solidarity derived from people originating from the same village, city or region (Betül Çelik, 
2003:141). In simple terms these hemşehri associations “unite immigrants from the same 
territory in their place of immigration” (Toumarkine & Hersant, 2005:3). These associations 
serve as sources of mutual solidarity and collectively render access to housing and labour 
market easier (see Grabolle-Çeliker, 2012: 117-216 and Betül Çelik, 2003:144). Furthermore, 
linguistic barriers, particularly amongst Kurdish women, many of whom speak little Turkish, 
do not facilitate integration or even sustained mixing with non-Kurdish people (see Betül 
Çelik, 2005 and Wedel, 2000). Finally, the boundaries of the Kurds in the west are reinforced 
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by endogamous marital patterns wherein spouses are sought within kin networks or at least 
from their areas of origin. It is true that the greater possibility of interaction with Kurds from 
different regions or indeed Turks has led to a decline in endogamous marriage amongst 
Kurds in the west. Nonetheless marriage and the social intrigues and gossip surrounding it, 
remains a unifying feature of Kurdish life. It should be noted though, that although inter-
communal marriages have increased, marriages usually remain within confessional confines 
(Grabolle-Çeliker, 2012: 160 and Seufert, 1997:160). 
 
 Arguably the most definitive aspect of Kurdish identity in western Turkey is the 
shared experiences of communal exclusion or feeling of extraneousness from the Turkish 
majority (Secor, 2004:359). Ethnic or national identity construction and maintenance are 
undoubtedly of a “deeply relational nature” (Harrison, 2003:343), but mutually formative 
identities can co-exist with limited tangible or interpersonal reactions between them. Many 
Turks lived in blissful ignorance of the realities of a sizeable Kurdish co-presence in the 
country, until the vast waves of migration from the post-war period onwards brought 
masses of Kurds to the urban centres of the west. Although Kurds had always been present 
in western Turkey, their identity was most often concealed or downplayed, and accordingly 
large numbers of Turks had never, at least knowingly, encountered Kurdish people. The 
same cannot be said for the overwhelming majority of Kurds even in Kurdistan who have 
always been confronted on a daily basis with state institutions such as schools, the army and 
the police and thus possessed an awareness of the ‘other’ and all its symbolic and practical 
implications. By the 1990s, a perception emerged among Turks that the waves of “ignorant” 
Kurdish migrants unversed in the ways of the city, constituted a Kurdish invasion of Turkish 
cities (see Saraçoğlu, 2009: 648). A spatial division of residential quarters usually distanced 
recently arrived migrants – with the exception of the wealthier ones – who lived in 
peripheral or marginal neighbourhoods, particularly gecekondu ones and inner city slums188, 
from established urban neighbourhoods (see Karpat, 1977 & 2004 and Pérouse, 2004, & 
2006). 
                                                        
188 Bediz  Yılmaz explains that “slums differ from the shantytowns [which is what essentially gecekondu are] in 
that they are spaces of poverty in the city centers where the type of habitat is not a self-help construction but 
an apartment in a degraded old building, mostly portioned into many rooms/flats so as to acquire the 
maximum number of dwellers” (2003:13). 
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However, inter-communal encounters did occur in shared public spaces. Turkish fears were 
rooted in their hitherto unprecedented, quotidian encounters with Kurds in public spaces 
like “cheap vegetable and fruit markets, discount supermarkets and public transportation” 
(Saraçoğlu, 2010:245) wherein they witnessed firsthand the poverty of many of the Kurdish 
migrants. The migrants’ indigence was evident in their impoverished living quarters, 
particularly notable in the central neighbourhoods of Istanbul such as Tarlabaşı in Beyoğlu 
(Bediz  Yılmaz, 2003), and by the very visible presence of Kurdish children as seemingly 
unsupervised street vendors of tissues or bottles of water (Bediz  Yılmaz, 2006:33 and 
Müderrisoğlu, 2006). This perception was exacerbated by the hysteria generated by the 
media in relation to the criminality associated with the Kurdish migrants (Saraçoğlu, 
2009:653 & 2010: 255; Yılmaz, 2006:34 and Sumer, 2003:50). Additionally, these diffuse 
socio-cultural prejudices were bolstered by opportunistic political discourses which 
collectively relegated the Kurdish population at large to the status of pseudo-citizens 
(Yeğen, 2009 and Saraçoğlu, 2010) or even characterised them as terrorist supporters189. A 
conclusion that was seemingly validated by the public displays of support for the PKK, which 
began to impact on Turkish popular opinion in the wake of sizeable Newroz celebrations and 
other Kurdish demonstrations from the early 1990s (Saraçoğlu, 2009: 648-649). These types 
of encounters were compounded by the fact that many Turks, dependent on a heavily 
censored and partisan media and drip-fed calculated nationalist propaganda, were 
completely unaware of the extent of the suffering of the Kurds during the conflict 
(Müderrisoğlu, 2006:60). One could argue that Turkish society in general terms constituted 
a form of counter-epistemic community to the Kurdish one, as described by Ahmetbeyzade 
(2007, 177-178); one based on total ignorance or misinformation about the ongoing conflict. 
Unsurprisingly, these factors rendered the cities of western Turkey, hostile environments for 
Kurdish migrants. 
                                                        
189 See for example the recent pronouncements of the ostensibly leftist İşçi Partisi/Workers party 
http://www.turksolu.com.tr/sehit/16.htm 
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Internal Diaspora and Political Participation 
 
Much of the literature on diasporas has pointed to their malign influence on conflicts 
in their homelands as proponents of “long distance nationalism” (Anderson, 1991 and 
Demmers, 2002). It has been asserted that “some of the most violent articulations of purity 
and racial exclusivism come from diaspora populations” (Clifford, 1994; 307). Kaldor has 
described diasporas as “disaffected groups living far away [...], who find solace in the 
fantasies about their origins which are often far-removed from reality” (1999:85).  The 
radical underpinnings of diaspora are facilitated by the fact its members live far removed 
from the remit of the state to which they are opposed. This freedom is thought to embolden 
them to make unrealistic demands free from their possible deleterious consequences 
(Anderson, 1992:11). This is of course, not the case for the Kurdish internal diaspora. It is 
equally, if not more exposed to state repression than Kurds in their homeland. Even legal 
activism in institutional political parties, human rights organisations and media outlets has 
resulted in massive state repression, torture and imprisonment. As the internal diaspora is 
as likely to suffer from any escalation in the conflict and is perhaps more vulnerable as an 
ethnic minority surrounded by an at times hostile local population and a suspicious state, it 
is unlikely to put forward demands more radical than their compatriots in Kurdistan. One 
could therefore legitimately expect that internal diaspora demands would reflect those of 
the community at large in its homelands, which appears to be the case with Kurds in 
western Turkey.  
 
The Kurdish internal diaspora bears two similarities with the classic international 
diaspora. Collier and Hoeffler have argued that diasporas serve as “potentially important 
source of start-up finance for rebellion” (2000:11). This is not the case in terms of providing 
start-up capital because, as will be explained later in the chapter, the PKK did not mobilise 
amongst the Kurds in western Turkey in any concerted fashion until the conflict was well 
consolidated in Kurdistan. Nevertheless, once the decision was taken to fully harness the 
support of Kurds all over Turkey, particularly middle class and wealthier Kurds did become 
an important source of finance for the movement which undoubtedly facilitated the 
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protraction of the conflict. It is also true that international diasporas can serve as “free 
spaces” (Polletta, 1999) which can be used as international platforms to launch publicity and 
propaganda campaigns, as well as loci of cultural renewal free from the strictures of an 
oppressive state. The Kurdish diaspora in Sweden for example has been to the forefront of 
the revival and standardisation of the Kurdish language and book publishing (see Baser, 
2012 & van Bruinessen, 1998). In the case of the internal diaspora, this “free space” does 
not exist. It is bound by more or less the same legal restrictions as if it were in Kurdistan and 
at the everyday level it is perhaps even further limited. One can at least speak Kurdish with 
one’s neighbours in Kurdistan whereas any public utterance in Kurdish in Istanbul, 
contingent on who is in earshot, can lead to confrontation and violence. Nonetheless Kurds 
in the west played an important role in bringing knowledge of the conflict to the national 
level. Their very presence as internally displaced people attested that something was 
happening in the east of Turkey. Their political campaigns served to chip away at the 
hegemonic discourse of the conflict as being a clash between terrorists in the pay of 
Turkey’s historic enemies and the good offices of the state. Public campaigns by groups such 
as the ‘Saturday mothers’ (see Baydar & Ivegen, 2011), undermined state efforts to depict 
all voices of Kurdish opposition as gun-toting, baby-killing monsters.  
 
These aspects of the internal diaspora exist alongside similar political engagement by 
the international Kurdish diaspora. It should be recalled that internal diasporas are perhaps 
less virulent in their claim-making precisely because many of the more radical voices have 
sought refuge abroad. The Kurdish diaspora(s) should not be considered as some collective 
of different Kurds distinct to those in Kurdistan but rather as part of a continuum of Kurdish 
migrants, some of which have migrated for economic purposes while others were forced to 
migrate by the state. Almost without exception, Kurds departing their villages, whether for 
Bochum or Bursa, did it on a step by step basis, leaving first for a Kurdish city, then Istanbul 
or Ankara, and then Western Europe. The duration of these stops varies from hours to 
years. The boundaries between the categories of diasporas and migrants blend into each 
other, given that some migration is permanent, some temporary and some more seasonal. 
One must remain cognisant of these differences and the varying political repertoires 
advanced by Kurds in their differing socio-spatial environments, but it would be mistaken to 
conceptualise them in an overly rigid or determinative fashion. 
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Practises of Exclusion 
 
A universal thread that united all my Kurdish interviewees resident in western 
Turkey was their shared experience of discrimination, from casual racism on the streets to 
experiencing the brunt of institutionalised discrimination, particularly in school. Indeed, 
notwithstanding the ongoing ceasefire, hostility toward Kurds in Turkey is reported to be 
increasing (Scarboro & Yiğit, 2014: 4). Although many of the specific incidents could be 
interpreted as casual racism that occurs in some form or other across all societies, their 
cumulative effect consolidated the sense of social exclusion of Kurdish migrants. In addition 
to the hugely traumatic experience of relocating from a rural village to a global metropolis 
such as Istanbul, many of the migrants had firsthand experience of the ravages of the war 
and bore the attendant psychological damage. In such a context, the daily insults and 
exclusion took on an even greater significance. The speaking of Kurdish on the street often 
provoked angry responses from passers-by, which not infrequently would lead to scuffles. 
Mehmet recalls that on occasion when he would speak Kurdish in the dolmuş,190 he would 
be abused by Turkish fellow passengers. However, he smilingly explained that as the dolmuş 
drivers were usually themselves Kurdish they would simply turn the music up to defuse the 
situation. He also explained that exponents of the MHP used to round up gangs to attack 
Kurdish workers that lived in the bekar evi191 situated in Eminönü, until they organised 
themselves and fought back and eventually physically drove off their attackers. (Interview 
48, 2013).    
Many children suffered extensively at school as a result of the inherent challenges of 
changing schools, linguistic issues and the often sub-standard of the education they had 
received in schools in Kurdistan (see Müderrisoğlu, 2006: 64). Secor reported that many of 
the participants in her focus group recounted that they personally or their children first 
encountered “Kurdishness as a label and social position in Turkish society in school” (2004: 
360). As a young child Arjen migrated from Muş to the Sariyer district – a rather well to do 
neighbourhood - of Istanbul in the early 1980s so that his mother could receive medical 
                                                        
190
 Private mini-buses that function as collective taxis and typically carry passengers only for short trips. 
191
 Bekar evi were shared dormitories usually occupied by single male workers recently migrated from rural 
areas. 
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treatment. He described how before he even opened his mouth he was identified as Kurdish 
by his classmates due to his physical appearance. Given the socio-economic demographic of 
that neighbourhood, there were very few Kurds in his school and he was bullied 
consistently. He recalls speaking Turkish relatively well but imperfectly, so that when his 
teacher utilised more elaborate terms for simple objects such as folders, he did not 
understand. The only classmate that did not ridicule him and used to explain in a form of 
Turkish that he understood was the daughter of an African diplomat.  
 Kurdish students were also among the preferred targets of right-wing groups and 
depending on one’s school they were subject to regular beatings and humiliations. Arjen’s 
family decided to move to Istanbul’s Gaziosmanpaşa district so they would feel less socially 
isolated because there were more Kurds and Alevis living there. Arjen however attended 
school in Küçükköy close to Gazi where, along with other Kurdish and Alevi colleagues, he 
was subjected to continuous bullying and assaults by right-wing students. The violence only 
declined in 1986 after around two hundred Kurdish youths from the nearby Barbaros 
Hayrettin Paşa district came to defend the Kurdish and Alevi students and physically 
confronted the right-wing aggressors (Interview 40, 2013). In another seemingly mundane 
example, a middle class Kurd born in Ankara was berated by his physical education teacher 
as a “separatist” (Interview 8, 2012).  
At university level such violence against Kurdish students continued. Kazaw, a Kurd 
from Kars, recalled that when he was studying at the University of Bursa, Grey Wolves active 
on the campus used to enter their dormitories at night and oblige the Kurdish students to go 
to the canteen where they were beaten and humiliated for hours and forced to parrot 
Turkish nationalist sayings, behaviour which was completely ignored by the university 
authorities (Interview 12, 2012).   
It should be noted that not all Kurds in Istanbul would identify as part of a Kurdish 
diaspora. Certain swathes of Kurdish society prefer to emphasise their Islamic identity and 
its shared features with religiously minded Turks. Similarly, many Alevi Kurds concede 
greater importance to their shared religious bonds with Alevi Turks than they do with fellow 
Kurds. Others have integrated into Turkish society by negating their Kurdishness. 
Assimilation and self-denial has usually remained the prerogative of Kurds with significant 
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degrees of social capital in terms of education and socio-economic stability, which was 
unavailable to many of the economic migrants and most certainly the conflict-generated 
migrants. One could recount examples of Kurds who identify as Turkish ad infinitum192, but 
even for them the shameful shadow of their Kurdish origins lingers like a menacing family 
spectre with the potential to undermine their Turkish credentials. Yet the fact remains that 
millions of Kurds have rejected such potential identitarian trajectories and identify primarily 
as Kurds, and they accordingly constitute an internal Kurdish diaspora within Turkey. Such 
divergent developments within a wider community are of course not unusual “because the 
formation of a diasporic community depends on the acceptance and elaboration of this 
connecting and disconnecting [between the here and the there, the past and the present], 
the community of diaspora is always less than the population of the group declared in 
official censuses (if declared)” (Houston, 2004:403).  
In summary, many of the Kurds dispersed across western Turkey can be considered 
as a form of internal diaspora. The concept of diaspora as described by Houston in relation 
to Kurds in western Turkey is a constant process of self-articulation rather than an 
established social category. He explains that it “requires the self-constitution and self-
representation of subjects as a group in connection to a place, mapped or imagined. It is 
both the active constituting of that connection as well as the narrativization of its rending 
that create a diaspora” (2004:403). It echoes Brubaker’s assertion that “we should not think 
of diaspora in substantialist terms as a bounded entity, but rather as an idiom, a stance, a 
claim” and as a “category of practise” (2005:12). These processes of self-realisation 
reinforce the structural and cultural boundaries elaborated by the Turkish state which have 
rendered Kurdish migrants’ access to the labour market, educational resources and housing 
extremely difficult. The Kurdish diaspora in Turkey should not, however, be considered as a 
unified actor. Social and political realities within it vary according to one’s gender, class 
position, the timing of one’s migration from Kurdistan and whether it was as part of a stable 
pattern of economic chain migration or as a forcibly displaced migrant, socio-economic 
background and social standing in Kurdistan, previous political engagement, ethno-religious 
identity and the cities and neighbourhood where one finds oneself living. Finally, as diaspora 
                                                        
192
 To give but one contemporary example, the leader of the CHP Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is believed to be of 
Kurdish origin and his father was deported from Dersim in the wake of the rebellion there in the 1930s. 
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is a relational phenomenon and not a “bounded entity”, the Kurdish diaspora within Turkey 
has ebbed and flowed over time, experiencing moments of greater coherence and intensity 
on certain occasions such as the arrest of Öcalan in 1999.   
 
Waves of Kurdish Migration  
 
The mass migration of Kurds westwards beyond the confines of Kurdistan dates to 
the labour migration of the mid-twentieth century. This wave was later supplemented with 
the forced migration of the 1990s. However, the presence of Kurds beyond Kurdistan dates 
back into the history of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman documents regarding concerns over 
internal migration within the Empire cite fears over Kurds resident in the city as far back as 
1826 (Herzog, 2011:130). Registers from 1849/1850 attest to the strong presence of poor 
Kurdish labourers from Bitlis and Kiğı in the district of Kasımpaşa in Istanbul (Riedler, 
2011:65). In addition to these poorer classes of Kurds, many of the ruling Kurdish families of 
the semi-independent emirates which were defeated by the centralising Ottoman state in 
the mid-nineteenth century fled into exile in Istanbul (Klein, 2007:137 and Van Bruinessen, 
1992:180). Indeed it was many of these Kurdish notables who were to establish the first 
Kurdish national movement in Istanbul in 1908/1909, the Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and 
Progress/Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti (KTTC) (Klein, 2007:139 and see McDowall, 
1996:90). In 1908 the KTTC also established a Kurdish school in Istanbul to serve the 
estimated 30,000 Kurds resident there (Olson, 1991: 398) and numerous Kurdish nationalist 
publications were also published there (Aras, 2013: 44).  
 The number of Kurds displaced from Kurdistan rapidly increased following the 
suppression of the Kurdish revolts of the early Republican period. After the Sheikh Said 
revolt of 1925 was crushed militarily, 500,000 Kurds were deported to the west of Turkey 
(Jwaideh, 2006:206) and entire districts were summarily de-populated (Van Bruinessen, 
1992:291 and Andrews, 1989: 111-112). A British army officer travelling in Kurdistan in 1930 
reported that the population of Bitlis had been reduced from 40,000 to 5,000 inhabitants 
and that of Muş from 30,000 to 3,000 (ibid, 2000:99). In 1934, the state passed the 
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Settlement Act No 2510, which gave legislative form and ideological legitimation to 
practises of deportation and exile which had been ongoing for a decade or more (see 
Jongerden, 2007:174-177). The most notorious example of deportation is associated with 
the Dersim revolt in 1936-38. A special law, known as the Tunceli Law 2884/Tunceli Kanunu, 
was passed in 1935 to finally quell the residual autonomy of the province. The law conceded 
“extraordinary powers to deport and arrest people, and explicitly stated that the accused 
would have no right of appeal or even the right to know the charges against them” (Watts, 
2000:15). The exact figure of deportees remains unknown, but considering that the death 
toll is estimated at around 40,000 (White, 2000:88), it is most likely that the figure cited by a 
retired General Kenan Esengin of 3,470 people is a  blatant mistruth (in Van Bruinessen,  
2000: 11). 
In any case, bald statistics cannot portray the immense impact the deportations have 
had on the collective memory of the people of Dersim in particular, and the wider Kurdish 
population in general. Innumerable Dersimli families bear the inherited narrative of the 
deportations and it is surely not too great a leap to suggest that this traumatic past is a 
partial explanation for Dersim’s radical political character. Houston’s suggestion (2004:403) 
that the narrativisation of one’s diasporic condition is a central characteristic of diaspora can 
be clearly seen in the familial memory of the Koçuşağı tribe. Bejan, the granddaughter of the 
tribe’s head Seyitan at the time of the rebellion, which had actively sided with Seyt Riza in 
the rebellion, recounted that after the revolt was suppressed Seyitan and his brothers Lillo 
and Cemşi and their families were sent into ten year exile in Bursa, Manisa and Bolu 
respectively. In the confusion during the deportation, three of Seyitan’s daughters went 
missing. Unbeknownst to their parents, the three had been assigned by the state to a 
Turkish family in Bursa for seven years. Bejan recalled that her grandparents and her three 
aunts themselves constantly re-told the story of their childhood separation and demanded 
that she never forget their family’s past. One of the women taken, now in her eighties, 
confessed to Bejan that even now, many decades later, she cannot forget the trauma of that 
period (Interview 51, 2013). The case of this one particular family highlights how the 
narrative of suffering and exclusion takes on a trans-generational quality and over time 
becomes an integral part of its identity. This instance is but a single thread of the vast 
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collective Kurdish narrative of suffering, wherein it would be almost impossible to find a 
Kurdish family without a corresponding tale of misfortune.  
Thus, Kurds in the diaspora live their Kurdishness through their direct and inherited 
experiences with an almost fetishised sense of suffering endured in Kurdistan. As 
Ahmetbeyzade remarks “the bodies of Kurdish youth, flesh and blood, torn apart by the war 
waged against the Kurds in Turkey, become significant for exiled Kurdish mothers [...] who 
are waging a counter hegemonic resistance to state violence” (2007:176).  Although 
Ahmetbeyzade restricts these processes to Kurdish mothers in a gendered understanding, 
the cult of martyrdom and a type of discreet pride at ‘successfully’ enduring generations of 
state brutality is shared by both men and women. The narrative of pain and suffering 
thereby confounds spatial relocation and the passing of time by remaining a constant factor 
in Kurdish self-identification. As a final remark, forced exile remained a much utilised tactic 
for the Turkish state from the Kemalist period right through until it once again became an 
integral part of the state’s counter-insurgency strategy in the 1990s. Therefore, the 
presence of a large swathe of Kurds in the western parts of Turkey as a result of punitive 
state measures and the collective upheaval of these relocations remains a traumatic fulcrum 
in Kurdish identity in the diaspora. 
 
Second Wave Migration – Labour Migration 
 
The largest proportion of Kurds or people of Kurdish origin in western Turkey arrived 
as economic migrants between the 1950s and the 1980s. As outlined more extensively in 
Chapter II, the Turkish state underwent enormous social change from the late 1940s 
onwards, upon its incorporation to the global market and its industrialisation. These 
processes affected all of Turkey; both the rural areas as sites of emigration and the urban 
centres which received these waves of migrants. One should not conclude that rural-urban 
migration was exclusively or even predominantly a Kurdish phenomenon. Indeed, until the 
1970s immigration was more extensive from the Black Sea region than from Kurdistan, but 
by 1990 around 15% of Istanbul’s population had been born in the east or south-east 
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(Wedel, 2001: 116). Turkey’s urban population in 1945 was 4.7 million, whereas by 2000 it 
was 44.1 million or some 65% of the population (Yılmaz, 2003:2).Like many other countries, 
Turkey’s social geography was resoundingly reconfigured in the post-war period.  
 Since Istanbul has become the most popular location for Kurdish migrants, most of 
the field work for this project was completed there. Accordingly, the following section will 
reflect a certain Istanbul bias, and although developments in Istanbul shared the broader 
patterns of migration and integration observed elsewhere in Turkey, each city and region 
possess their own peculiarities and this should be borne in mind. Abu-Lughod’s article on 
upper Egyptian migrants in Cairo highlights the commonality of much rural-urban migration 
in the post-war period at the global level. Her description of “the typical migrant, here as 
elsewhere, is a young man whose first contact in the city is often with a friend or relative 
from his original village” (1961:25). This was indeed the case for the first wave of Kurdish 
labour migrants. 
 Initially many migrated on a seasonal basis to the industrial cities and returned to 
their villages of origin to participate in the harvest of their family crops. These seasonal 
migrants were known as gurbetçiler and they worked in menial and physically demanding 
jobs, for example as porters or on the construction of the railroads (Karpat, 1976:54). They 
lived in pitiful conditions in overcrowded male dormitories or bekar evi. Gradually, the 
original migrants arranged for close family members or hemşehri to follow them to the 
cities. They were carefully selected as the work was hard and necessitated able-bodied 
young men, so bachelor brothers and eldest sons were usually the first summoned 
(ibid:86).  Over time, as more stable employment was found in the cities, visits to their 
villages of origin became ever less frequent and it became necessary to reunite families by 
bringing the wives and children to the city. Work was increasingly found in the expanding 
textile, chemical and food industries (Saraçoğlu, 2010:253). Generally, wives and children 
were only brought after there was an “assurance of housing and continuous employment to 
sustain the whole family” (Karpat, 1976:54). The migration process of labour migrants was 
minutely managed. Importantly, relationships were maintained with their villages of origin 
which served as a “psychological safeguard against alienation and a practical guarantee that 
if economic conditions in the city deteriorated the migrant had a place to return to” (ibid).  
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It is at this stage that the gurbetçiler began to establish what became known as gecekondu 
neighbourhoods as a means to re-unify their families. 
 
 As mentioned in relation to diaspora, the danger of concept overstretching has led 
to the term gecekondu being understood and used in a number of different fashions (see 
Pérouse, 2004). An early definition from 1953 describes them as “hastily erected buildings, 
lacking most of the times elementary comfort conditions, not conforming to construction 
regulations and being developed regardless the land owner’s rights” (Yavuz in Pérouse, 
2004:4). It should be noted that the transition to the gecekondu generally marked an 
improvement in living conditions for the migrants who had lived in the city centres and 
often even for their families arriving directly from the villages. They usually consisted of 
single storey dwellings occasionally with a small patch of ground around them. As they were 
in the periphery where space was at the time plentiful, they were not crowded as closely 
together as other residences in central parts of the cities. They were usually constructed by 
the people who were to live in them, little by little, in the evenings after a day’s labour had 
already been completed. Rooms were added as families expanded and houses were subject 
to constant improvements according to the availability of financial resources (Karpat, 1976: 
92). The first gecekondu settlement was established in Zeytinburnu in 1947. Gecekondu 
areas then quickly sprouted up all over the urban periphery of Istanbul to such an extent 
that by 1999 it was estimated that 65% of all housing in Istanbul was characterised as such  
(Bediz  Yılmaz, 2003:3).  
 
Until the 1980s Turkey’s economy enjoyed almost constant growth and industry 
appeared to have an inexhaustible demand for workers. Thus the emergent residential 
patterns were the concrete manifestation of the social mobility of the Kurdish workers. 
Although gecekondu settlements were built without permission and often on state owned 
land, they rapidly became normalised and integrated into political patronage networks. In 
exchange for political support, legal title to the properties was retrospectively conceded and 
they were furnished with municipal services such as sewerage and electricity. Ahmet İsvan, 
the Mayor of Istanbul from 1973-77, publically lauded the gecekondu dwellers declaring 
that: “Each year 120,000 new compatriots immigrate to our city, full of admirable faith and 
courage. These people with a big heart create neighbourhoods without roads or water or 
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light on the margins of our beautiful Istanbul. It is them who, by transgressing our urbanism 
documents, show the inadequacy of some of our laws” (in Pérouse, 2010:5). Accordingly, 
although a certain stigma associated with living in gecekondu neighbourhoods lingered, 
living conditions, employment and educational possibilities were likely an improvement on 
the previous standard of living in the city centre or the countryside. Plus, the enduring links 
with the rural villages brought material support and emotional solace to the challenges of 
settling in the radically different socio-cultural universe of the city.  
 
The importance of the enduring links with villages of origin is clear in Seufert’s (1997) 
work on the Saran clan of the Koçkiri tribe and their chain migration to Istanbul from Sivas. 
As per the classic model, the early pioneers of migration were single men who resided in 
bekar evi of the city centre before gathering sufficient savings and, in the first sign of 
upward social mobility, migrated toward the gecekondu. Initially they had to buy land on the 
informal land market. However, with the consistent arrival of more clansmen they “became 
powerful enough to occupy new land and defend it against competing immigrant groups”, 
meaning that the next waves of migrants of their clan “no longer had to pay for building 
sites” (Seufert. 1997:158). In addition to securing accommodation, a system of internal 
loans or private credit permitted them “one by one to buy lorries and work as motorized 
carriers” (ibid:159). Provision was also made for health care for the sick (1997:160). This 
brief example illustrates the immense value of the back and forth between the city and the 
village, especially in the early phases of migration, whereby migrants in the city could rely 
on manpower from the village needed to carve out and defend their own territory for 
building houses and for financial capital to invest in business in the cities. These types of 
supports were almost totally absent for the subsequent wave of forced migrants. 
 
 In addition to the political repression of the post coup period, the Turkish economy 
underwent significant re-structuring at the macro-level in the 1980s. A structural 
adjustment policy under the auspices of the IMF was implemented in 1980 which had a 
direct impact on the gecekondu dwellers. The Turkish lira was devalued by almost 50% and a 
whole raft of other reforms that disproportionately impacted on the urban poor were 
implemented (Zürcher, 2004:268). It marked a move away from industries which had 
hitherto been subsidised by the Turkish state as part of a general programme of Import 
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Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) and resulted in industrial decline and concomitant job 
losses. It also had a significant impact in terms of urban planning and the housing market it 
had also had a significant impact. Neo-liberal incentives encouraged “the entry of large-
scale private construction firms into the housing market and the emergence of large-scale 
housing projects constructed in urban fringe areas” (UNDP-Ministry of Environment, 2002: 
6/13 in Bediz Yılmaz, 2003:4). In short, the gecekondu became increasingly commercialised 
and lucrative sites for profiteering and investment. It led to the verticalisation of housing 
stock in gecekondu neighbourhoods, wherein modern apartment buildings replaced the 
cottage style houses of the early period. It also led to a reconfiguration of the gecekondu 
demographic. Previously, the vast majority of residents had built (or their families had built), 
their own houses, but it became the case that now the neighbourhoods contained 
“gecekondu renters, gecekondu owners, owners of multiple gecekondus, those who had title 
deeds, those who did not, etc” (UNDP-ME, 2002: 6/14 in ibid). Consequently, due to the 
commercialisation of the sector newly arrived immigrants could not easily afford to access 
housing in the established gecekondu (Bediz Yılmaz, 2003:3). The increasingly competitive 
labour market and the hollowing out of government social welfare programmes rendered 
the city which had seemed such an auspicious destination only years before, a much more 
inhospitable environment (Betül Çelik, 2005:141); an environment that was becoming even 
more hostile due to the worsening ethnic tensions provoked by the insurgency in Kurdistan 
(ibid). Such was the backdrop to the waves of Kurds forced to flee their villages and towns 
during the conflict in the late 1980s and the 1990s. 
 
Third Wave of Migration – Conflict-Generated Migrants 
 
It has never been possible to draw a rigid distinction between economic migration 
and migration derived from concerns over security (see Foster, 2007). As the conflict 
intensified the wider economic conditions deteriorated, thus obliging many Kurds to seek 
employment outside of Kurdistan. The economy and the conflict are so intrinsically linked, 
that even some Kurds’ own personal narratives regarding their decision to flee reflect both 
economic and security concerns. Houston cites a letter from the Beritan tribe to the Yeni 
Safak newspaper which explained that military restrictions on access to pasture and the 
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closure of certain roads needed to transport cattle had ruined a previously wealthy tribe 
(2001:20). Should Beritan tribe members have migrated to the west, could they be classified 
as economic or conflict-generated migrants? In other cases, many Kurdish migrants in the 
west who had departed for economic motivations and maintained an indeterminate interest 
in returning to their villages were prevented from doing so by the destruction of said 
villages. It is also true that, particularly for certain tribes, the conflict provided economic 
opportunities to serve as Village Guards, in the service industries centred on the huge 
number of Turkish troops in the region and in the construction of military infrastructure 
such as bases and roads for the army, not to mention the burgeoning illicit economy. 
However, as has been discussed in chapters IV and V, there is incontrovertible evidence that 
it was deliberate government policy to forcibly evacuate thousands of Kurdish villages and 
towns, thus obliging them to flee to larger cities in Kurdistan and the west Turkey. Their 
coerced departure led to their transition from “rural poor to rootless destitute city dwellers” 
(Zucconi, 1999:27). 
 
 The migration patterns of these migrants were in stark contrast to the earlier waves 
of economic migration. Erder observed in 1997 that this wave of migration operated 
“without the slightest institutional organization, completely through an informal process 
and under the pressure of extraordinary conditions. This forced migration is highly dissimilar 
to the voluntary migration even though the places of departure are the same” (in Bediz 
Yılmaz, 2003:9).  Firstly, by virtue of the fact that these new migrants had been forced to 
leave, it is likely that their places of origin were located in areas where the conflict had been 
active. Thereby, many of these Kurds had first hand experiences, as participants, witnesses 
or victims of the conflict. As their villages had been destroyed they lacked the fallback 
option of return to the village and the material support inherent in the extended support 
networks of village life. In many cases, all of their wealth and possessions were destroyed in 
the evacuations, leaving them literally with only the clothes on their back. Herro193, a 
Kurdish migrant resident in Istanbul, recalled that his family and neighbours in a village near 
Malazgirt were roused from bed before dawn at the height of winter and forced to abandon 
their houses without the opportunity to even put on their shoes. His family’s migration 
                                                        
193 As previously cited in Chapter V 
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began literally barefoot (Interview 10, 2012). Most damagingly, forced migrants had not 
prepared to emigrate; the painstaking groundwork carried out by male members of the 
family as in the cases of the chain-migration of previous generations did not take place, so 
no provisions had been arranged in terms of work or housing. Many of those who had not 
already migrated had been active primarily in the agricultural sector, and were extremely 
unsuited to the job-market in western Turkey, particularly with the decline in demand for 
manual labour. And tragically, entire families moved together ranging from the elderly to 
newborn infants, increasing the hardship of the experience (see Betül Çelik, 2005 and Bediz 
Yılmaz, 2003). 
 
 The enormous social challenges faced by forced migrants were detailed in a 2002 
Göç-Der report. Firstly, the overwhelming majority of displaced persons were of Kurdish 
origin and had migrated between 1989 and 1999, directly correlating to the period of the 
conflict’s greatest intensity. In distinction to economic motivations of previous Kurdish 
migrants to western Turkey, “practices within the emergency rule (sic), namely 
depopulation of villages, forcing to become village-guards, closing of pasture lands” were 
given as the main motivation for migration (in Bediz  Yılmaz, 2003:11). The denial of pasture 
neatly demonstrates the difficulties in extricating economic from security related concerns. 
41% of the surveyed migrants left en masse with the entirety of theirs village, thereby 
cutting them off from any possibility of return or ongoing material support. A quarter of 
them spoke only Kurdish and 42.3% were illiterate. 43.4% had children of school-going age 
who were not in education. 91.3% had experienced unemployment and 88% were not 
covered by social security (ibid). The only factor in the forced migrants’ favour was that 
there were large established Kurdish communities in western Turkey from previous waves 
of migration. Accordingly, almost half of the migrants chose their destination on the basis of 
the fact that kin or hemşehri members were present there (ibid).  A large number of my 
interviewees reported that they initially moved to stay with relatives, however given that 
entire families moved as one, it was seldom satisfactory as a long-term solution and 
generated much inter-familial pressures and tensions (see Wedel, 2001:121). 
 
 Two of the greatest challenges confronting conflict-generated migrants were 
accommodation and employment. Even for those who had a certain amount of savings, the 
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increased prejudices against recently arrived immigrants rendered it almost impossible for 
Kurds to rent apartments from Turkish landlords (Betül Çelik, 2005:142 and Secor, 
2004:361). Thereby increasing the importance of the primordial support systems of the 
migrants through hemşehri, tribal and kin networks and producing a de facto ghettoisation 
of recently arrived Kurds.  
 
 The preceding generations of migrants had undergone an admittedly arduous, but 
viable transition from temporary city centre accommodation to the gecekondu 
neighbourhoods. This was not the case in the 1990s; the gecekondu had become 
commercialised spaces which were spatially saturated and it was no longer feasible to 
construct one’s own dwelling. Gecekondu houses were “no longer a barrack[s] built by its 
inhabitants but a multi-storey building constructed by specialised firms” (Yılmaz, 2004:142). 
The director of the Beyoğlu Child Centre described the situation as that “the new poor are 
not rich enough to inhabit the gecekondus” (in Yılmaz, 2004:143). Many migrants did 
however succeed in living in gecekondu areas, but importantly as tenants or hosted by 
extended family or hemşehri. The remaining migrants who were unable to find such a 
solution were forced to seek shelter in the crowded inner city slums such as Tarlabaşı in 
Istanbul. Conditions in neighbourhoods like Tarlabaşı were wretched. The assignation of a 
historical protected status to the neighbourhood in 1993194 has ensured its structural 
decrepitude, as it is no longer permitted to make the necessary improvements to buildings 
to render them even close to a standard fit for human habitation (see Bediz Yılmaz, 
2003:14). Accordingly, its residents have reported startling levels of physical ailments and 
disease, particularly tuberculosis, pneumonia and orthopaedic complications (ibid, 2004: 
134). 
 
 Beyond these inner city areas, the only alternative possible way to get housing was 
to attempt to construct entirely new gecekondu in the extreme outskirts of the city which 
were uninhabited or even practically uninhabitable because they were located on steep hills 
or in marshy land.  
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 It is now subject to major renovations by the Istanbul municipality and a number of its residents have been 
yet again displaced. http://www.tarlabasiistanbul.com/ 
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However, the times of the past where squatting of public land was tolerated if not implicitly 
encouraged were over and public opinion was firmly against ulterior gecekondu 
developments (see Saraçoğlu, 2010). By the 1990s, the municipality actively contested any 
efforts to construct gecekondu neighbourhoods, as evident in the destruction and 
subsequent rebuilding of a family home four times in succession in the new gecekondu 
district of Ayazma (Pérouse, 2006:5). Ayazma is a neighbourhood of around 15,000 mostly 
Kurdish inhabitants that lies in the  north of Istanbul. It is characterised by an almost 
complete lack of municipal services; there is no sewage system and electricity is pirated 
from overhead power lines. It is poorly connected by a number of outward leading roads 
and “internal communications are done on foot, by crossroads and primitive trails, 
especially on steep slopes” (ibid: 4). All of which is exacerbated by the insufficiency of 
running water and its poor quality (ibid). In short, life in a contemporary gecekondu is 
miserable and moreover hugely insecure with the risk of imminent destruction by the 
authorities and vulnerable to the vagaries of nature such as floods or mudslides. 
Large numbers of Kurds fleeing the conflict thereby ended up living in three distinct 
situations: overcrowded rented accommodation or hosted by family in established 
gecekondu areas; dilapidated inner city slums or precarious newer gecekondu on the 
extreme outskirts of the cities. However, regardless of where they lived Kurds tended to 
face similar social and economic challenges. Adaman and Çağlar (2006) listed five 
overlapping types of exclusion: economic; social; political; spatial and discursive. All of which 
were experienced to differing extents according to one’s particular socio-economic and 
residential situation. As previously mentioned, competition in the labour market was much 
more acute in the 1990s and Kurds were, accordingly, for the most part active in the 
informal economy. A female migrant pithily summed up the situation by remarking that 
back in Kurdistan “one person worked and fed many people; here many people work and 
cannot feed even one person” (in Yükseker, 2006:45). Men generally found work in the 
construction industry, the recycling business and in particular areas such as the dolmuş 
sector. Interestingly, migrants from Mardin, although it is miles from the sea, have 
established an almost complete monopoly on the sale of stuffed mussels in Istanbul (Bediz 
Yılmaz, 2003:18). They are prepared by women in the basements of dilapidated buildings in 
Tarlabaşı, before being sold on the streets of Beyoğlu by adult men and children. Women, 
273 
 
particularly those limited by their linguistic capacities often work in the textile industry (see 
Betül Çelik, 2005:146). As one, or even two, wage-earners was no longer enough to support 
a family, children were forced, often at the expense of their schooling, to work part or full 
time to supplement the family income. Children worked as street vendors and shoe shiners 
but they also worked in demanding jobs in the textile sector. This often required those 
fortunate enough to still attend school to have to travel directly to work after attending 
school in the morning and do an exhausting eight hour shift, which of course left little time 
for homework or any typical childhood activities. (Müderrisoğlu, 2006: 61).  
Families often had to sacrifice some of their children’s education in order to 
subsidise the schooling of others. Herro, a middle child in a family of eight children, which 
moved from Malazgirt to Istanbul when he was eleven, explained that he was the only one 
of his family to continue with his education. In fact, he recalls being the only child in his 
neighbourhood in Sultanbeyli to actually finish his schooling (Interview 10, 2012). Zeynel, 
originally from Erzurum, was resident in Gaziosmanpaşa. His father failed to find a job for 
almost two years and it was his responsibility, as a ten year old, to financially maintain the 
family. He combined school and various jobs – in the textile sector, in a shoe factory and as 
a waiter – for three years by attending school in the morning and working in the afternoons 
until he was thirteen and it became no longer possible to combine the two and he 
abandoned education. All of his siblings education was similarly truncated (Interview 48, 
2013). These narratives are representative of many Kurdish families. The overarching 
poverty soldered families together as single economic units, and consequently children’s 
education was subordinated to economic necessity because notwithstanding their youth, 
they were often more employable than their parents.  
The difficulties in the labour market were compounded by the almost complete 
absence of state support for impoverished families. Firstly, there is an enormous dearth of 
reliable information regarding the number of inhabitants in Istanbul. Pérouse cites a 
Gaziosmanpaşa district official who admitted that the 1990 census potentially 
underestimated the district’s population by up to two thirds (1997:5). In the absence of 
reliable statistics, the successful operation of any form of social welfare programme, even if 
the political desire existed to create one, would be impossible. In Turkey one is obliged to 
officially register one’s place of residence, but an unknown number of migrants have not 
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done so. Many Kurds, given their experiences with the Turkish state and security forces in 
Kurdistan, are reluctant to engage with the state. Many also lack the linguistic skills or 
knowledge to navigate the labyrinthine bureaucracy of the Turkish civil service and because 
many of the villages whence they departed no longer exist, it generates further bureaucratic 
challenges in terms of sourcing relevant documents. Many Kurdish migrants live in dwellings 
that are not recognised by the state or in properties for which they have no formal 
documentation as regards ownership, which further complicates all bureaucratic interaction 
with the state. In addition - notwithstanding all evidence which points to the contrary- many 
Kurds continue to view their current displacement as but a temporary aberration and are 
convinced that they will sooner or later return to Kurdistan195.  
As unregistered citizens, Kurdish migrants are mostly limited to seeking employment 
in the informal economy, but in Turkey one can only access the public health services by 
working in the formal economy. Therefore, huge numbers are compelled to rely on the 
means tested, ‘Green Card’ which guarantees basic health care to the poorest strata of 
Turkish society (Adaman & Çağlar, 2006:17). In a perversely cruel scenario, many Kurds who 
still own property in Kurdistan, which they can no longer access and which generates no 
income because state forces have driven them from their land, are denied the Green Card 
because of this very property (Müderrisoğlu, 2006: 48). Aside from health care, other state 
support systems for the impoverished are equally insufficient (Adaman & Çağlar, 2006:31) 
and open to political manipulation and corruption. In such a context of a deficient state, 
with inadequate support for the internally displaced people, the importance of hemşehri 
associations, family and kinship support networks has become even more pointed. The 
more powerful hemşehri associations have struck up political relationships with the 
mainstream Turkish parties; particularly the AKP and the CHP, which provided social services 
in return for their bloc votes (see Grabolle-Çeliker, 2012, 117-126 and Zürcher, 2004: 270). 
This aspect of hemşehri politics can partially explain the poor electoral performance of the 
successive Kurdish parties in districts in western Turkey overwhelmingly populated by Kurds. 
Many PKK supporting Kurds strategically vote for Turkish parties rather than Kurdish ones in 
order to procure local services.  
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 The 2002 GÖÇ-DER report stated that 93.7% of Kurds surveyed wish to return to their villages (in Bediz 
Yılmaz, 2003:11). 
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The Kurdish population in western Turkey is not homogenous and is trans-
generational in character. It is marked by linguistic differences (Kurmanji, Zaza and Turkish) 
and characterised by strong sub-regional identities as exemplified by the importance of 
hemşehri associations. Religious divisions between Alevi and Sunni Kurds and the intensity 
of religious belief within them are also relevant features. The communities are also diffused 
spatially in different cities and neighbourhoods according to class divisions, regional 
provenance and the period of migration. Indeed, many people from Kurdistan or with recent 
origins there do not even identify as Kurdish, preferring  to present themselves as Turkish, 
which entails not only abandoning Kurdish as a language but also speaking Turkish with a 
good accent, meaning a feigned Istanbul accent with no hint of Eastern pronunciation (Betul 
Celik, 2005:144). Others still advanced their religious identity before their ethnic one. The 
arrival of the masses of forced migrants acted as a catalyst for a wider re-consideration of 
Kurdish identity in the diaspora and reversed certain assimilationist tendencies (ibid: 153). 
Their “sense of deprivation, disempowerment, and material loss in many cases, reinforced 
their ethnic consciousness since many believed that it was solely because of their ethnic 
backgrounds that they had to live through such traumas” (ibid: 149). This daily evidence of 
this ethnic discrimination and marginalisation, had a radicalising effect across the Kurds in 
the west, which led it to become an area where the PKK rapidly expanded its networks 
beyond Kurdistan.  
 
PKK Mobilisation in the West 
 
As has been discussed in Chapter III, the PKK’s origins were in Ankara in the 1970s 
(Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011) but by the mid-1980s almost the entirety of its mobilisational 
efforts was concentrated in Kurdistan as the PKK considered it “the most appropriate area 
to start a political and armed struggle for revolutionary change in Turkey” (ibid: 129). In the 
1980s the PKK did not have an extensive organised presence in the cities of western Turkey. 
However, one should not conclude that the PKK’s organisational weakness in the West 
meant that it did not have any supporters or sympathisers in western Turkey. As previously 
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explained, Kurdish migrants maintained strong links with their villages of origin; knowledge 
of the conflict was acquired during holidays back in Kurdistan, seasonal migration and 
through family networks. Della Porta has explained that one’s immediate social networks 
are the “main source of political information” (1988:159), a tendency that was heightened 
due to the heavily censored Turkish media and the limited literary skills of many Kurdish 
migrants. Accordingly, it is clear that through interpersonal and kin networks, the PKK’s 
struggle was well known in the west and one can logically presume that it had a certain 
degree of support. As the PKK expanded and consolidated its presence in Kurdistan and the 
conflict intensified, so too did its need for material support in terms of fighters and money. 
It was at this point in the late 1980s that it actively started to build clandestine networks of 
support in areas with large Kurdish populations. In a relatively brief period of time, the cities 
of western Turkey became areas of massive PKK support. The following section will 
elaborate how these networks were established and how the PKK interacted with its 
intermittent allies in the Turkish radical left. 
 The 1980 coup d’état devastated the Turkish left. It shattered its organisational 
structures, imprisoned thousands of its militants, forced thousands more to flee into exile 
and intimidated its former sympathisers into desisting from any expression of support. It led 
to further fragmentation of the already splintered radical left landscape. However, 
irrespective of how repressive a regime or how calculated its brutality, it is not easy to 
eradicate social movements which are deeply embedded in their immediate social 
environments. As discussed in Chapter III, the radical Turkish left had enjoyed tremendous 
support in the late 1970s. It is worth recalling that the infamous 1977 Mayday 
demonstration witnessed 200,000 leftists in the streets, with the radical Dev-Yol’s 
supporters196 numbering 40,000 (Samim, 1981: 60). In addition to the left being able to 
count upon huge numbers of militants or active supporters, they enjoyed passive and 
territorialised support in certain gecekondu neighbourhoods with large Alevi and Kurdish 
populations. 
 Support for radical armed groups was derived from their efforts to give material 
legitimacy to their leftist rhetoric by engaging in projects of immediate collective social 
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 This was before the 1978 split which led to the establishment of Dev-Sol (Samim, 1981:77). 
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utility. Wedel, in her article on one particular neighbourhood197, explains the process by 
which six radical leftist groups, in spring 1977198, expelled the mafia-style figures who 
controlled the informal housing economy from the neighbourhood and established People’s 
Committees to co-ordinate the assignation of housing (Wedel, 2002:58). In the course of a 
number of fierce battles with the police in autumn 1977, in which twelve activists and 
residents lost their lives, the leftists managed to defend the territorial integrity of the 
neighbourhood and re-build the areas which had been destroyed in the clashes. The 
neighbourhood then became a de facto autonomous zone where the police could not 
readily enter and which was protected by armed guards at night to ward off fascist attacks 
(ibid, 58-59). Therefore, a well defined radical left social environment developed, 
characterised by a density of political and social ties. Interpersonal relations were defined as 
“warm and inclusive” (ibid: 59) and a social revolutionary morality was enforced under 
threat of expulsion from the neighbourhood. The neighbourhood had its own judicial 
system, established a “people’s room” for communal activities, offered evening classes on 
political matters and regular sub-neighbourhood assemblies took place to discuss matters of 
importance (ibid). This island of subaltern solidarity was crushed by the coup. Party cadres 
were arrested or disappeared into clandestinity and “nearly every family in the 
neighbourhood experienced raids in the middle of the night, arrests, torture and 
imprisonment of their loved ones” (ibid:62). However, the strong, inter-personal bonds 
established and the sense of gratitude felt toward to leftists for preserving the 
neighbourhood did not simply disappear with the advent of state repression. It remained an 
overwhelmingly leftwing neighbourhood and the former head of a People’s Committee was 
elected muhtar in the 1990s (ibid: 61). Vast neighbourhoods with large Kurdish and Alevi 
populations such as Gaziosmanpaşa, Mayis Mahallesi, Sultanbeyli and others all boasted 
similar revolutionary heritage. Accordingly, pockets with a strong radical leftist outlook 
existed around Istanbul and in other western cities; however, Turkish leftist organisations 
had been enormously weakened and were not able to capitalise on their radical potential. 
                                                        
197 She declines to actually name the neighbourhood but it follows a quite typical trajectory of political 
mobilisation for any number of marginal neighbourhoods. 
198 The groups listed were THKP-C, Dev-Yol, Dev-Sol, TKP-ML-TIKKO, Halkin Kurtulusu and Halkin Yolu (Wedel, 
2002: 58). 
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The PKK, to paraphrase Akkaya and Jongerden (2011), was “born from the left” and 
from its very foundation always had close relations and ideological solidarity with the 
Turkish radical left. It is worth recalling that the PKK declaration marking the start of the 
insurgency declared that it “is not a war of liberation for the Kurds. The day the Kurds will be 
free, the Turks will be free too [...]. The national liberation struggle is also the liberation 
struggle of the Turkish people” (in ibid: 132). Aside from rhetorical declarations of solidarity, 
in the immediate aftermath of the coup the PKK’s early efforts at regrouping in the diaspora 
were launched in conjunction with groups such as Dev Yol (see chapter III and Interview 34, 
2013). The PKK’s first effort at forging a broad alliance with other Kurdish and radical Turkish 
groups, such as the FKBDC, petered out in 1986 (ibid: 133 and Marcus, 2007:65). This did 
not discourage the PKK from launching further such initiatives, including a brief armed 
campaign with the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party–Front/Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş 
Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C)199 in the Tokat region in 1996 (see Akkaya and Jongerden, 
2011:133). However, with such strong leftist credentials, the PKK took advantage of the 
organisational feebleness of its allies to attract many militants that had been active in the 
plethora of other leftist groups into its own ranks. By the late 1990s it was unquestionably 
the strongest oppositional underground movement in Istanbul and, with the possible 
exception of Dersim, all across Turkey. 
 
The PKK’s Initial Steps in Istanbul 
 
Individual trajectories to activism or personal radicalisation are an important 
element in the wider political violence literature. The ‘moment of encounter’ (O Connor and 
Oikonomakis, forthcoming) when civilians make initial contact with insurgent organisations 
is of particular relevance as it reflects two important features of mobilisation: spatial 
considerations and pre-existing or emergent social networks (see ibid). As discussed in 
chapter I, patterns of recruitment can vary according to a vast array of conditions. The 
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 The DHKP-C was the successor to Dev-Sol after the breakup of the group in 1992. However, it is still 
commonly referred to as Dev-Sol. 
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preceding chapters (III, IV, and V) have focused on chronologically and spatially contrasting 
settings for PKK recruitment, while the following section will detail how recruitment 
practises differed in the cities of western Turkey in comparison to Kurdistan, but it also 
differentiate between the heterogenous Kurdish communities in the internal diaspora.  
Thereby, reflecting Viterna’s concern that the search for uniform recruitment narratives can 
lead to misleading conclusions (2006: 40).  
The following sections will draw heavily on interviews with two senior ERNK cadres 
active in the Marmara region. Sezer (Interview 50, 2013) was in the very first wave of PKK 
activists in Istanbul from 1989 and the other, Daham became active three years later in 
1992 (Interview 9, 2012). Interestingly, neither came from a politicised Kurdish background, 
highlighting the diversified nature of the PKK’s recruits in Western Turkey. Sezer is of non-
Kurdish origin, from central Anatolia. His family had strong leftist sympathies and his father 
had been in the radical teachers union TÖB-DER. Given his family’s leftist renown, his father 
was taken into custody following the coup in 1980. Even though he was only eight years old 
Sezer was also detained and tortured. After he finished high school he left to study law at 
Istanbul University in 1989, determined to embrace radical politics. He was most interested 
in the PKK because of its rural guerrilla forces and Dev Sol because its “Marighella” style 
urban guerrillas. Sezer scorned the legal leftist movements, as he believed them to be 
infiltrated by the police and that they served simply to draw leftists into the public eye 
where they could be repressed easier. He struck up a friendship with a Kurdish student one 
day in the student canteen who had connections with the PKK and henceforth abandoned 
any interest he had in Dev Sol. As a non-Kurd in an ostensibly Kurdish movement, his views 
were very much from a socialist internationalist perspective. He felt that if the PKK were 
successful it would trigger a revolutionary wave, something of which he viewed the Turkish 
radical left as being simply incapable of realising. He served as an ERNK cadre in Istanbul 
before joining a guerrilla unit in Kurdistan. He was active until 1993 when he was captured 
and imprisoned for thirteen years.  
 Daham, on the other hand, was born in Istanbul to a politically uninvolved family 
which self-identified primarily as Alevi and then as Turkish. In secondary school he had been 
active in wider Turkish left politics. Upon starting university in 1992, he decided that he 
wanted to join the PKK. He described it as a conscious decision motivated by the reports of 
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the conflict emanating from Kurdistan, which at the time was at its nadir; he was also aware 
of its likely personal consequences. Within a month of starting university he had joined the 
PKK’s clandestine university movement YCK and within a few months he had risen to an 
executive position of his faculty. Daham admits that he learned more about his Kurdishness 
and actually became more Kurdish due to his participation in the PKK. He was captured 
before he had the chance to join the guerrillas in Kurdistan and he eventually served eleven 
years in prison. He retained his ERNK position in the movement in prison and was a 
commander in charge of organising PKK prisoners. Such a trajectory into the PKK by an Alevi 
Kurd from a non politicised background was not unusual and is replicated in many other 
cases.  
Sezer and Daham’s militant trajectories combine elements of many of both Viterna 
and, Bosi and della Porta’s ideal type recruits: combining structural, personal, interactive 
elements as well as a degree of coincidence.  Sezer could be considered as an ideological 
recruit heavily influenced by “deeply rooted family and/or local traditions of counter-
hegemonic consciousness” (Bosi & della Porta, 2012: 362).However, he also seemed to 
follow an instrumental path as he had become convinced that “armed activism would lead 
to concrete results” (ibid); while Daham could be classified as a politicised recruit due to his 
former militancy in leftist organisations (Viterna, 2006:20). Yet they were also both driven 
by individual motivations. Daham saw the PKK as a means to realise his Kurdishness and, 
most likely, as a form of rebellion vis-á-vis his politically quiescent and assimilationist family.  
While Sezer’s determination to participate in a guerrilla movement, any guerrilla movement, 
betrays a youthful enthusiasm for the lure of excitement and danger. Yet Sezer was also a 
deeply politically motivated and very knowledgeable militant, thus highlighting the fact that 
rigid categorisation of motivations is not entirely useful as multiple motivations inevitably 
overlap. It is perhaps rather more worthwhile to closely integrate understandings of 
personal trajectories with the chronological and spatial contexts in which they emerge and 
focus on the relational dynamic between the individual and one’s immediate social 
environment. 
 At the macro level, as the PKK expanded as a movement, it underwent a significant 
structural re-organisation in 1987 with the founding of a number of sub-organisations under 
the command of the ERNK, so as to “organize its various social strata individually” (Özcan, 
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2006: 172 and see Gunes, 2012:110, Gunter, 1997:31-32 and Chapter IV). It was at this point 
that the student movement YCK was established. Even though the decision had been made 
to create a youth and student movement, the PKK’s greatest focus was on consolidating the 
insurgency in Kurdistan. Therefore, politically minded Kurdish students in the west had 
begun to inform themselves about the conflict in an autonomous fashion (Marcus, 
2007:133) but remained a non-mobilised segment of PKK support. It should be reiterated 
that the PKK did have a presence in western Turkey. Marcus reports on a PKK presence in 
the Aegean as early as 1986 (ibid: 133) and claims that they were “well established” in 1988 
(ibid: 132). This presence was, however, strongest amongst recent immigrants and was 
linked back to Kurdistan. Strong distinct structures in the west for the most part began to 
emerge following the consolidation of the student movement as an organisational hub.  
 As Sezer explained, when he started university in 1989 there was essentially no 
organised PKK presence within the universities, so he and his friend from the cafeteria went 
about establishing it. They began to sound out like-minded colleagues and organising 
themselves. They had limited contacts with the PKK so they acted for the most part in a 
completely autonomous fashion. They occasionally received minutely printed copies of 
Serxwebûn that had been smuggled in from Europe, the print of which was so small that 
they had to read it with a magnifying glass. Sezer’s emerging PKK cell expanded slowly but 
because it had limited contact with the PKK itself it remained completely off the authorities’ 
radar. Unbeknownst to them, similarly disconnected groups had been forming across many 
of Istanbul’s universities. In March 1990 to mark the serhildan in Kurdistan, the PKK 
leadership made a call for a Newroz demonstration at Istanbul University’s Beyazit campus, 
thus leading to the first mass PKK mobilisation in Istanbul. Unexpectedly, around 2,500 
students turned up; the vast majority were Kurdish but there was also a sizeable percentage 
of Turkish leftists. There were some minor clashes with the police and a number of 
demonstrators were briefly detained (Interview 50, 2013). This was the watershed in the 
PKK’s emergence in Istanbul. Henceforth, the autonomous and disconnected student 
organisations which were also present in Yildiz, Marmara and Istanbul Technical Universities 
amongst others were linked vertically to the movement and horizontally between each 
other.  
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Networks were quickly established by the PKK’s student activists and sympathisers in 
the collective dormitories which were shared by students attending different universities. 
These shared spaces permitted them to overcome the segmentation of having separate 
organisations for the various universities. The role of collective dormitories is redolent of 
the early phase PKK mobilisation in the 1970s in teachers’ training colleges. The majority of 
those involved at this stage were Kurds who had come directly from Kurdistan to attend 
university and not second generation Kurds who lived with their immediate families in 
Istanbul. Sezer describes the initial phase of mobilisation as very emotional and a direct 
response to what the students knew was occurring in their hometowns and villages back in 
Kurdistan. He claims that his Kurdish comrades quickly became fixated with the conflict, it 
was like a “chronic disease” for them and they suffered from a sense of impotence as there 
was very little they could do from Istanbul. However, they quickly became organised and 
channelled their collective energies into consolidating the emerging PKK network in 
Istanbul. Kurds who had been active in Turkish leftist groups flooded into the PKK, dismayed 
and detached from what were seen as the mundane and everyday concerns of the Turkish 
left. It is also worth pointing out that the other Kurdish groups active prior to the coup had 
failed to re-establish any presence in the universities, rendering the PKK the only vehicle 
suited to engaging with the conflict (Interview 50, 2013). The PKK’s consolidation in western 
Turkey incorporates a number of diffusion processes, including both relational and non-
relational ties (McAdam & Rucht, 1993:60). Initially, as illustrated in the discussed cases, 
there was a degree of non-relational diffusion (Soule, 2004: 295) whereby the shared 
revolutionary and/or Kurdish identity of the two militants led them to actively seek out the 
movement. Subsequent to this direct links were created with the movement and horizontal 
ones were forged with likeminded youths around the movement, particularly in student 
dormitories. All of which led to the formation of personal networks and “systems of 
meaning” (della Porta & Diani, 2006: 119) which were strengthened over time and 
facilitated radical political commitment and the growth of the PKK. 
The movement rapidly spread outside of the universities and Sezer explained that 
the early student organisers became the ERNK branch of the PKK in Istanbul. By June 1990, 
only three months after the Newroz demonstration, the PKK students were assigned by the 
movement to relocate to the peripheral neighbourhoods across the city to set up branches 
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of the organisation there. Students recruited in the universities did not stay within the 
university environs for very long. They underwent political training given by visiting senior 
ERNK cadres, at secret locations in Istanbul for fifteen days or so and were then sent out to 
the neighbourhoods. The movement classified recruits according to their personal 
characteristics and accordingly assigned them to activism in Istanbul or sent them directly to 
the mountains as guerrillas. One’s own personal preference was not taken into account 
(Interview 50, 2013).  
Marcus details the difficulties faced by many of the university students who joined 
the guerrillas. Some suffered from the physical rigours of life in the mountains and had 
difficulties adapting to the military discipline of life as a guerrilla. Others were taken aback 
by the “intolerance toward debate or free discussion” and the excessive deference toward 
Öcalan (2007:134-135). The young recruits’ lot was worsened by a directive apparently sent 
by Öcalan that warned of infiltrators and spies in their ranks, fostering an atmosphere of 
paranoia and suspicion towards them. Marcus reports that at least twenty four of these 
recruits and maybe even up to one hundred were executed by the PKK in 1989 and 1990. In 
one particularly egregious incident in 1989 around a dozen students recruited from the city 
of Eskişehir were reported to have been executed shortly after reaching the guerrilla units 
(2007:135).  
Sezer, however, paints a slightly more nuanced picture of these early waves of 
recruits. He explained that although some were recruited from the universities, these were 
usually Kurds from the most directly affected conflict areas such as Mardin and Hakkari. 
Marcus’ depiction of them as cosmopolitan, critical minded city youths is misleading. They 
were Kurds born and raised in Kurdistan and would have been politically socialised and 
informed of the conflict through their family networks and thus not as naive as Marcus 
portrayed them. Also, in the very late 1980s and early 1990s students did not compose the 
majority of recruits sent back to fight as guerrillas. Nevertheless, that is not to dispute that 
such brutal excesses occurred. Although none of my interviewees had any such 
recollections, it seems probable that those that had decisively broken from the movement 
like Marcus’ interviewees would likely be far more forthcoming in that regard. Moreover, in 
addition to the rapid expansion of its ranks at this time, there were also internal challenges 
to Öcalan’s leadership, which would have exacerbated paranoia regarding infiltrators and 
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facilitated an environment wherein the execution of handfuls of new recruits would have 
not seemed excessive.  
The nascent ERNK structure in western Turkey was divided into a Marmara 
command, then an Istanbul division and finally sub-divided into neighbourhood units 
(Interview 9, 2012). A strategic decision was taken by the PKK to initially focus on the poor 
and disadvantaged neighbourhoods, which had the largest number of migrants from areas 
where the conflict was most intense and latterly home to the many internally displaced 
Kurds. These neighbourhoods were characterised by huge unemployment and 
underemployment. As the insurgency expanded in Kurdistan and with the growing 
unpopularity, or indeed failure, of PKK conscription (see Marcus, 2007:117 and Gunes, 
2012:105), the PKK needed fighters. One of the few things which these neighbourhoods had 
in abundance was young people with little or no life prospects, thereby rendering them 
biographically available for recruitment (Viterna, 2006: 15). Daham was in command of two 
neighbourhoods which had a large percentage of Kurds and a revolutionary heritage dating 
back to the 1970s. He was in charge of recruitment – both for the guerrillas and the local 
PKK organisation - and of obtaining logistical resources. In a recurrent overlap of the private 
and the political, he listed three main reasons why it was relatively easy to recruit people 
from such districts. Firstly, the standard of living for young people was pitiful. They lived in 
either overcrowded bekar evi or in cramped accommodation with their families and were 
thus deprived of even a modicum of privacy. They barely had enough money for material 
exigencies and the possibilities of personal betterment through education were essentially 
nonexistent. Secondly, this individual frustration occurred in an imposing atmosphere of 
conflict. Daham described it as a pervasive politicisation parallel to the war in Kurdistan, and 
that many families radicalised together. And finally, there was a strong organisational 
impetus from the PKK to promote the movement and entice new recruits (Interview 9, 
2012). Sefer, a former PKK prisoner, opined that many of these poor recruits joined the 
guerrillas as an emotional reaction to reports on the conflict from their home regions and 
that the emerging ERNK structures served to channel this emotional outflow into the PKK 
(ibid). The speed at which recruitment occurred was notable. The expected minimum was 
that every new member would recruit at least three further people but Sezer recounted 
how in one single neighbourhood he managed to personally recruit ninety five new 
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militants. This accelerated chain recruitment also made use of tribal networks, so that if a 
number of any one particular tribe joined, then the rest would automatically be obliged by 
custom, if not by conviction, to support it (Interview 50, 2013). A typical recruit in Istanbul, 
therefore, combined elements of Viterna’s militant categorisation (2006); some came from 
politicised – Kurdish or leftist – families or backgrounds,  others joined, consciously or not, 
as a means to escape the drudgery of their own lives, but there was little presence of 
“reluctant recruits”, coerced either directly or by force of circumstances into the movement. 
Returning to the notion of the ‘moment of encounter’; as the moment when 
movement activists first interact with potential sympathisers and supporters. Mobilisation 
and recruitment are quite macro terms and often taken as self-explanatory, which 
obfuscates what are in essence inter-personal exchanges that occur in concrete socio-spatial 
environments. It is not uncommon that the minutiae of these interactions are not afforded 
sufficient academic attention. The PKK has a long history, dating back to its first mobilisation 
in the 1970s, of fully immersing itself in the social environment of its putative supporters200. 
Accordingly, the newly recruited students moved on a full time basis to the impoverished 
neighbourhoods. The new cadres received specific instructions regarding how they were 
expected to behave in relation to the residents. They stayed with families that were willing 
to host them or alternatively squatted in unfinished building sites and lived “hand in hand” 
with the people. They attended weddings and funerals, accompanied young children to the 
dentist, washed the dishes of their hosts. They spoke to everyone, advising Kurdish school 
children to be proud of their background and to never deny their Kurdishness and asking 
elderly Kurds to remember them in their prayers (Interview 50, 2013). Conditions in these 
neighbourhoods were tough and Daham recalls often spending weeks at a time without 
ever having the chance of taking a bath (Interview 9, 2012). It was thus from a position of 
intimate familiarity that political issues were broached. As in Kurdistan, they focused on the 
Kurdish aspect of the struggle and accorded a much lesser attention to issues of left-wing 
politics. When people appeared receptive to their political message they engineered ways in 
which they could contribute to the movement, ranging from directly recruiting them to 
financial contributions and the occasional hosting of militants. As analysed in previous 
chapters, the PKK was extremely reflexive in its dealings with its constituency. Although they 
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usually introduced politics into their interactions with the Kurdish public by discussing the 
nationalist aspects of the struggle, they were cognisant of the embedded leftist heritage of 
certain Kurdish regions. To give a concrete example of such reflexivity, when the PKK 
assigned cadres to neighbourhoods such as Yakacık and İdealtepe largely populated by 
Kurds and Alevis from Erzincan and Sivas, they were encouraged to focus on the leftist 
aspects of the struggle given the political outlook of these regions. On the other hand, when 
dealing with the Kurds from Mardin resident in Kasımpaşa and Tarlabaşı, they pointedly 
focused on nationalist themes (Interview 50, 2013).   
This first wave of mobilisation in Istanbul was focused on facilitating the recruitment 
of young men and women of fighting age to fill the ranks of the guerrillas, which they found 
predominantly amongst the poor rural migrants. As the guerrilla army expanded its material 
demands simultaneously grew; the PKK recognised that it needed to take advantage of its 
potential support amongst the Kurdish middle classes. Accordingly, contacts were actively 
sought in middle class neighbourhoods. Daham was active in two specific neighbourhoods; 
the first was a ‘classic’ subaltern Kurdish migrant one in Mayis Mahallesi, whereas the other, 
Ataşehir, had a mixture of Turks and Kurds and was composed of a more middle class 
demographic. Daham’s contrasting experience in the two neighbourhoods highlights the 
heterogenous character of the Kurdish migrant population. He described the relationship 
between the neighbourhoods as being love-hate in nature. They shared a common 
Kurdishness but were deeply divided by their class positions. As a conduit between the two, 
Daham was viewed as a bridge between otherwise very different worlds and a means for 
both communities to sate their curiosity about lives on the other side of the class divide. At 
this stage, there was a noted rise in previously non-politicised Kurds actively engaging with 
the movement. This popular reaching out to the movement was present in both the poor 
and the better off neighbourhoods. Daham recalls that they had access to safe houses even 
within highly exclusive gated communities in Ataşehir. Families contributed proportionate 
according to their means, be that in financial or other forms of support. The routinised 
gathering of money served as a pretext for organising encounters with PKK supporters, thus 
reinforcing bonds which might otherwise fallen into abeyance. In contradiction to 
established rational choice theories of individualism, these families’ contribution and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
200 See Chapter III and the Siverek resistance. 
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association with the movement carried grave risks. Anyone suspected of supporting the 
movement could be detained before any charges were levelled by the state for fifteen days. 
Over the course of this period, it was commonplace to be systematically tortured by the 
authorities searching for any shred of intelligence. Another tactic of the state was to secretly 
detain suspects, because if they remained off official records they could be held on an 
indefinite basis. Anyone convicted of supporting the PKK was guaranteed a minimum three 
year prison sentence. Notwithstanding the grave risks, many Kurds collaborated with the 
PKK, most probably because of inter-familial links with it and because the pervasive feeling 
of collective oppression weighing heavily on many Kurds, encouraged them to offer at least 
occasional support to the movement (Interview 9, 2012).  
 
Gaziosmanpaşa – Leftist Stronghold 
 
Of all Istanbul’s neighbourhoods Gaziosmanpaşa, commonly known simply as Gazi, 
perhaps bears the most noted revolutionary heritage. It is often given as ‘the’ example of a 
gecekondu neighbourhood and it bears a reputation in wider Istanbul as a hotbed of 
political radicalism and criminality. It lies to the north east of Istanbul’s Golden Horn and 
although considered a peripheral neighbourhood of Istanbul, it is easily reachable by a 
number of public buses201 in under an hour. Its population was estimated to be around 
700,000 in 1997 (Pérouse, 1997: 2). It was successively populated by Turks displaced from 
Thrace in the 1920s, by immigrants from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in the 1950s, by Black Sea 
and Sivas migrants in the 1970s, then by Alevis from central Anatolia (ibid:10) and finally by 
Kurds, particularly from Dersim, through the 1980s and 1990s. The latter waves had 
significant numbers of Alevis and the neighbourhood is considered an Alevi stronghold. 
                                                        
201 As of 2013, when I conducted a series of interviews there. 
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In the early and mid nineties, three leftist groups were particularly strong in Gazi: the 
DHKP-C; MLKP (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party/Marksist-Leninist Komünist Partisi)202; 
and TIKKO (Interview 45, 2013). TIKKO drew heavily on the support of Kurds with origins in 
Dersim, the MLKP was a smaller organisation and it was almost exclusively concentrated in 
Gazi while the DHKP-C was the strongest of all the leftist groups and was active across 
Istanbul and in many other cities. One could conceivably imagine that, given such an 
underlying revolutionary character, the PKK would have immediately honed in on Gazi as a 
source of recruits and support. In fact they did the very opposite and it was not until late 
1993 and 1994 that it made its first tentative efforts to mobilise there (Interview, 42, 2013). 
The relative strength of other groups in Gazi was evidenced in the events surrounding the 
March 1995 Gazi massacre (see Jongerden, 2003, Marcus 1996, & Leezenberg 2003). The 
Doğu teahouse frequented by Alevis was strafed with gunfire by a passing car, killing two 
people. Outraged by the event and convinced of police collusion, thousands of residents 
gathered around the local police station, which was staffed by officers known to have right-
wing political sympathies and notorious as a site of torture. The police then opened fire on 
the demonstrators, killing a further fifteen. In the aftermath of the massacre fourteen 
alleged MLKP militants were tried and sentenced to substantial prison sentences.203 Shortly 
afterwards, the body of Hasan Ocak, a founding MKLP member was found with visible signs 
of torture dumped in a nearby forest (Jongerden, 2003: 86-87).  
The fact that the PKK was not a leading actor in such a seminal event in Gazi, 
highlights that even by 1995, its presence there was weak.  Indeed Rang, a former PKK 
prisoner from Gazi, recalled that the first major PKK demonstration that he saw in Gazi itself 
was as late as 1998 at the funeral of a local guerrilla, Adnan Seker (Interview 45). Sezer 
explained that the PKK made no effort to organise there for two main reasons. Firstly the 
other established leftist groups were strong, so they would have faced substantial 
competition for new recruits.  
                                                        
202
 The MKLP was founded in 1994 by the union of a number of Maoist, pro - Albanian communist movements 
see http://www.mlkp.info/index.php?kategori=1012&Who_we_are? 
203
 A number of police officers were also tried for the killings. One officer condemned to twenty four years 
imprisonment later had his sentence reduced to one year and one month. The Gazi police chief Necdet Menzir 
was sacked by Tansu Çiller for his management of the episode but was subsequently included in the DYP party 
list for the 1996 election and elected to parliament (Jongerden, 2003: 86). 
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Tarrow has explained that “a common outcome of competition is radicalization: a shift in 
ideological commitments toward the extremes and/or the adoption of more disruptive and 
violent forms of contention204” (2011:207). By avoiding competitive escalation with leftist 
groups in Istanbul, the PKK was able to preempt energy and resource sapping feuds and 
concentrate on its principle objective of supporting the insurgency in Kurdistan.  Secondly, 
in any area where the radical left was strong there was heavy police infiltration. In the early 
1990s the PKK was determined to remain off the authorities’ radar as much as possible to 
avoid imperilling the flow off recruits and resources back to Kurdistan. The PKK’s strategy 
thereby resembles the fashion – as discussed in Chapter V – in which it used a limited 
repertoire of contention in order to channel resources to where they felt they were best 
utilised, in the rural insurgency. They did, however, recruit some people from Gazi but this 
was on the basis of individual contacts and family links rather than as part of a 
comprehensive strategy (Interview 50, 2013).  
 Over time, as the PKK grew in strength in Istanbul the Turkish left began to contract. 
The Turkish left remained relatively strong in certain areas until the late 1990s205 but it was 
fractured and badly disorientated at the ideological level by the collapse of the USSR. Its 
orthodox rhetoric was offputting for many youths (Interview 45 & 42, 2013). On the other 
hand, for Kurds with strong leftist convictions the PKK advanced very similar arguments to 
the leftist organisations, as well as advocating for the independence of Kurdistan (Interview 
42, 2013). The PKK’s success in Kurdistan granted it a strong credibility amongst many 
Kurdish youths, but also Turks and other minorities, as can be evidenced in the case of 
Sezer. In simple terms, the PKK seemed more likely to bring about radical change than its 
leftist counterparts. Disappointment with the limitations of the radical left led many of its 
militants to flock to the PKK, thus changing its ethnic composition dramatically and its ranks 
expanded to include many Turks, Turcomans, Arabs, Pomaks, and Assyrians among others 
(Interview 9, 2012).  
                                                        
204
 Italics in the original quotation 
205
 Even today, leftist groups the DHKP/C in particular command significant support in certain neighbourhoods 
such as Gülsuyu, as observed at the huge attendance at the funeral of one of its militants Hasan Ferit Gedik in 
October 2013 (Sunday’s Zaman, 2013). 
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The mid 1990s brought about a phase of what Bosi and della Porta would classify as 
solidaristic recruitment, which occurs in the latter stages of conflict and is triggered by 
developments in one’s immediate social environment due to an escalation of the conflict 
(2012:362). In the case of Kurds in Istanbul, one cannot observe an urgent need to mobilise 
in order to defend one’s community, as was witnessed in places like Northern Ireland (Bosi, 
2012), in Kurdistan proper or indeed even in leftist and Kurdish enclaves in western Turkey 
in the immediate pre-coup period. Rather, one can note a steady escalation in political 
activity in Kurdish neighbourhoods which inevitably drew youths into the movement. Youths 
became ever more receptive to the PKK’s political message, given the reports of the 
depredations of the ongoing conflict in Kurdistan, as well as the general excitement inherent 
in political demonstrations and low intensity clashes with the police.  
The recruitment in this period emphasises the importance of spatial dynamics and 
proximity. Many youths got in contact with and were latterly mobilised by the PKK simply 
because, in simple terms, it was there. It was on the streets, at celebrations, in the schools 
and universities. Celebrations were organised to commemorate special occasions such as 
the 15th of August (launch of the insurgency in 1984), Newroz or to mark the Hallabja 
massacre. The events were held in public squares, rented rooms such as cinemas or even in 
the street. Occasionally, room bookings were disguised as weddings in order to not arouse 
the suspicions of its owners. These celebrations were attended by hundreds of people, 
where pro-PKK music groups such as Koma Mezrabotan played Kurdish music (Interview 38, 
2013). Gatherings like this were festive occasions, but also served to familiarise the locals 
with the movement and vice versa. People close to the PKK even operated a number of 
dershane or private pre-university preparatory schools which offered evening courses. 
Baran attended such an institute in the outskirts of Istanbul in the late 1990s where he was 
approached by PKK activists who attempted to enlist him (Interview 8, 2012). The PKK also 
directly approached individuals that they felt had the appropriate political sympathies. 
Zeynel’s father established a little grocery store for him to run in the Karayolları area of Gazi. 
PKK militants used to call by and leave him party literature to read. A cousin of Zeynel who 
had become active in the ERNK used to drop off pro-Kurdish newspapers such as Özgür 
Gundem and Özgür Ülke, and then he began to take extra copies for his friends (Interview 
42, 2013). Herro explained that as a child, he also used to do little jobs for the movement. 
291 
 
He used to spray party graffiti around his neighbourhood in Sultanbeyli, stick up posters and 
help deliver papers. When demonstrations and gatherings were held, he used to attend and 
round up others to also participate (Interview 10, 2012). It was thus in such a gradual 
process that youngsters became incrementally mobilised.  
Often the final step to greater commitment was the encounter between such semi-
engaged youths and the police. The ERNK was aware that police violence was the most 
direct means of radicalisation (Interview 9, 2012). Demonstrations often degenerated into 
physical confrontations and it was almost certain that anyone detained after such clashes 
would be tortured to some degree, thus triggering further hatred of the regime and 
integration into the movement as means of obtaining revenge. Rang had been active on the 
periphery of the movement in Gazi but after he attended a YCK gathering in Saraçhane in 
1998 to mark Öcalan’s forced departure from Syria, he was one of three hundred arrests. He 
was beaten, verbally abused and humiliated. Immediately upon his release he dedicated 
himself to the PKK, stopped attending school and sought out clashes with fascists and the 
police until he was arrested and sentenced to prison shortly afterwards (Interview 45, 
2013). 
 The PKK shared two of its principal recruitment areas with the radical left; the 
universities and those predominantly Alevi neighbourhoods with a recent history of political 
radicalism. It seems likely that the PKK had realised the inherent risks of an overly 
antagonistic relationship with its erstwhile or potential Kurdish or leftist allies, as a result of 
the self-destructive campaigns of violence in the late 1970s. Aside from tensions with TIKKO, 
after the PKK had started to edge into its Dersim stronghold which, led to four deaths 
(Leezenberg, 2003:205); relations were relatively amicable with the movements of radical 
left. In the cities of western Turkey, the transition from the wider leftist milieu to the PKK 
was a common trajectory. Several of my interviewees raised in the west reported such paths 
to their adherence to the PKK. Rojan explained that after he moved to Istanbul from Izmir, 
he was determined to link up with the PKK and that it was through friends of his in Halkin 
Kurtuluş that the initial contacts were established (Interview 38, 2013); while numerous 
other interviewees reported similar radical left to PKK trajectories (Interviews 9, 38, 40, 45, 
42).  
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Daham explained that the YCK co-operated with the wider projects of the student 
left and co-operated in the organisation of campus boycotts and student campaigns. He 
recounted that the YCK participated indiscriminately with the Turkish left and not just 
specific elements of it; an arrangement he described as a “unity of action” between the PKK 
and the left. On commemorative occasions or in response to specifc atrocities in Kurdistan, 
they collectively attacked state institutions and banks with Molotov cocktails. The 
imbrication between the left and the PKK was such that when Daham was first arrested it 
was on the suspicion that he was a Dev Sol rather than a PKK militant (Interview 9, 2012). 
Bahoz recalled that in around 1997, when he was actively considering going to the 
mountains, a platform of radical groups including the PKK and TIKKO had co-organised a 
form of revolutionary picnic in the outskirts of Istanbul. A festive revolutionary atmosphere 
reigned there, revolutionary songs were sung and food was shared. Each group presented 
themselves as if in a radical recruitment fair to their prospective members, explaining their 
party positions and objectives (Interview 23, 2012). Zeynel explained that in 1996, an 
alliance was struck up with TIKKO to co-ordinate their activities in Gazi and demonstrations 
were, if not co-organised, then at least co-ordinated with the different groups. As the PKK 
expanded exponentially and cut into Dev Sol’s traditional constituency, the latter became 
somewhat defensive and relations between them cooled through 1997 and 1998 but they 
were limited to ideological disagreements and never resulted in deadly violence (Interview 
42, 2013). 
 
Constitutional Kurdish Politics 
 
 The other significant development in the 1990s was the establishment of a legal 
Kurdish political party, HEP in 1990. It was banned and it was succeeded by DEP (Democracy 
Party/Demokrasi Partisi) in May 1993, which was in turn banned and replaced by HADEP 
(People’s Democracy Party/Halkın Demokrasi Partisi) in 1994 (Watts, 2010:69). The legal 
political parties have been the focus of numerous works (Watts, 1999, 2006 & 2010, Barkey 
1998, Bozarslan 1996b & 2008 inter alios). Space does not permit to engage in a detailed 
discussion of their fortunes here, aside from elaborating on how the legal party institutions 
and networks served as an ulterior environment from wherein the PKK reinforced bonds 
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with its constituency. The relationship between the PKK and the legal parties remains a 
topic of great controversy, which has led to the party’s numerous iterations being shut 
down under the accusation of serving as a PKK mouthpiece or as supporters of terrorism.  
 
The legal party has naturally been most successful and active in Kurdistan itself, but 
it is also mobilised and has branches across Turkey. It has even achieved some notable 
success at the municipal level, such as when HADEP won control of the Akdeniz district of 
Mersin in 1999 (Doğan & Yılmaz, 2011:475). Others have highlighted the poor performance 
of the party in areas heavily populated by Kurds, suggesting that the PKK and the movement 
[Kurdish in a wider sense] “were unrepresentative of many ordinary Kurds” (Watts, 
2010:169). Such a view seems rather dismissive of the enormous logistical challenges of 
maintaining the party infrastructure in cities where Kurds are a minority. It underestimates 
the impact of the constant imprisonment and banning of hundreds of party activists, the 
convoluted procedures for transferring one’s vote from one city to the next (especially in 
the case of forced migrants), the fear many migrants have of publicly expressing their 
support for the party (Wedel, 2001:64) and the deeply embedded nature of patronage bloc 
voting in marginal migrant neighbourhoods (Grabolle-Çeliker, 2012:117 and Zürcher, 
2004:270).  
 
The first pro-Kurdish party was not designed as a political front for the PKK but 
rather emerged from “within the Turkish political system itself” (Watts, 2006: 133). This is a 
significant distinction between them and the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Féin 
with which it has been tenuously compared. A number of the SHP’s Kurdish deputies were 
expelled from the party for attending a conference at the Kurdish Institute in Paris 
(ibid:2010:62). These deputies then went on to found HEP. The relationship between the 
legal party and the PKK has fluctuated over time but the two arguably grew closer due to 
the continuous legal obstacles with which the party was confronted and the murderous 
violence that the state exercised against its members. HEP, DEP and HADEP had by 1996 
already suffered the killing of ninety two of its members (Barkey, 1998: 135, White, 
1997:243 and Bozarslan, 1996: 17), which is not to mention the countless other supporters 
and sympathisers who met similarly violent ends. Even high profile members were not 
immune from the violence of the state; Batman’s DEP deputy, Mehmet Sincar was killed in 
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mysterious circumstances after he had begun to investigate the killings of his party 
comrades (van Bruinessen, 1996:21). The election of Hatip Dicle as party (DEP) president in 
1993 marked a turning point as he sought to “publically align the party with the PKK” (ibid: 
69 and see Barkey, 1998:130).  
 
The debate on the relationship between the PKK and the legal Kurdish parties is a 
topic of furious legal and political dispute. A reasonable conclusion would be that upon 
HEP’s foundation it emerged from the same political milieu as the PKK and that they broadly 
shared the same goals, thus guaranteeing a degree of political coherence. Arguments about 
the vertical control of the party by the PKK, and Öcalan in particular, remain 
unsubstantiated. It is however, undeniable that the two are tightly bound by horizontal ties 
and interpersonal relationships. To give but one example, Şemdin Sakık, the controversial 
former PKK commander who broke the 1993 ceasefire, is the brother of current BDP deputy 
and founding DEP member Sırrı Sakık. There are thus strong emotional commitments 
between them. Undoubtedly, at the local level the PKK has on occasion used its power to 
force decisions upon the legal party. In 1998 in Kahta, the PKK demanded the party run the 
highly respected Mehmet Polat in the national election, which he had no possibility of 
winning, rather than the municipal election, which he would have almost certainly won due 
to his local popularity because it reportedly had qualms about his past as a Kawa militant 
(Interview 23, 2012). However, in a reverse of the scenario in the 2004 mayoral election in 
Diyarbakir, the candidate proposed by DEHAP, Osman Baydemir, prevailed over the PKK’s 
preferred candidate, outgoing mayor Feridun Çelik who subsequently withdrew from the 
race (Watts, 2010: 88 and Mango, 2005:50).   
 
 The PKK leadership did not establish HEP, but once it had been founded it 
considered it as a positive step for the wider Kurdish movement. It immediately offered the 
party its substantial material support (van Bruinessen, 2000a:6 and White, 1997:225). It was 
viewed as a potential way to mobilise those who were unlikely to be mobilised by the 
clandestine PKK. Sezer recalls that ERNK militants in Istanbul were ordered to physically 
assist with the opening of neighbourhood branches. He viewed it as a waste of time and a 
distraction from the PKK’s own responsibilities so he and a few colleagues rushed around 
the city and haphazardly opened three branch offices in a single morning (Interview 50, 
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2013). As a generalisation, the party catered to the middle classes and bridged social 
divisions that the PKK could not. It raised the level of popular consciousness of the Kurdish 
struggle and once individuals started to engage at any level with Kurdish politics they were 
consequently easier to mobilise than politically inactive Kurds. A female senior BDP 
representative in Europe and her brother from Izmir, were working on their family tree as 
teenagers when they discovered that they were in fact Kurdish. They subsequently joined 
HEP in 1990. She remains active in legal politics but her brother went onto become a noted 
PKK commander (Interview 5, 2011)206. As previously mentioned, legal activists suffered 
greatly from state repression and their unwarranted persecution led many of their family 
members to become active in a more radical fashion. The best known, most contemporary 
example is the case of the mayor of Sur municipality in Diyarbakir Abdullah Demirbaş, who 
has been repeatedly incarcerated on a series of preposterous charges. His teenage son is 
currently in the mountains as a guerrilla as he had become dismayed at what he evidently 
considered was the futility of institutional politics (Interview 13, 2012 and see Toumani 
2008). The legal party offices sometimes represented the first port of call for Kurds 
interested in politics; although Mehmet had attempted to join the guerrillas in Adiyaman 
when he first arrived in Istanbul, he simply did not know where or to whom he should go to 
reintegrate himself into the movement. Accordingly, he started to frequent the HADEP 
offices in Gazi and subsequently began to re-associate himself with the clandestine aspects 
of the movement (Interview 48, 2013).  
 
The expected duration of an ERNK career in Istanbul was short, no more than two 
years. There were a number of possible exits: death; exile; imprisonment; the mountains or 
a withdrawal from underground PKK politics and into the legal elements of the movement, 
in the pro-Kurdish media in newspapers such as Özgür Gündem or Özgür Ülke, and the legal 
party. It thus served as a multi-directional conduit between the militant end of the PKK 
spectrum and sympathetic but inactive supporters. In a way, one could describe it as 
composing the outer layers of the PKK’s constituency, linked by its personnel’s past or 
future experiences in the PKK and the strong interfamilial overlap between them. However, 
perhaps its greatest contribution to the Kurdish cause, and consequently to the PKK, has 
                                                        
206 I only discovered about the role of her brother in the PKK in 2013 on a subsequent field work trip. 
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been the manner in which its violent repression by the state has thoroughly delegitimised 
the Turkish government in the eyes of huge swathes of Kurds; leading to the belief of the 
“impossibility of conducting legal opposition” (Bozarslan, 2000:25) which has led many to 
embrace the radical approach of the PKK. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As discussed in chapter V, the divisions between the rural and the urban were 
diminished by patterns of urban migration and the forced displacement of millions of Kurds 
from their homes in the countryside to the urban periphery. A large, if as of yet still 
unknown number of these uprooted Kurds relocated to the cities of western Turkey, thus 
leading to an intrinsic imbrication of the Kurdish rural and the Turkish urban. The PKK’s 
constituency was geographically dispersed throughout the Turkish state and beyond, 
rendering it necessary to also analyse how the PKK mobilised in the urban environments in 
western Turkey if one is to ascertain a comprehensive understanding of the movement. The 
PKK enjoyed minimal territorial control in the western Turkey. Although it enjoyed strong 
support in certain neighbourhoods, it never compared to the territorial presence it enjoyed 
at stages in rural Kurdistan or even in certain Kurdish cities where it operated parallel 
judicial systems and a range of other pseudo-state activities. It could therefore not mobilise 
support by the provision of social services, nor could it systematically coerce Kurds in the 
west to contribute resources or join as guerrillas. It did enjoy strong legitimacy and 
recognition from swathes of the Kurdish internal diaspora, which facilitated a strong degree 
of social control. The PKK’s successful mobilisation therefore contradicts approaches which 
prioritise territorial control. Its presence and the consolidation of its constituency long 
distant from the mountains of Kurdistan was not derived from its coercive power “but 
rather the result of support relationships with local communities and their own 
enforcement of norms of loyalty and non-betrayal through mechanisms of social control” 
(Malthaner, 2011a:253). 
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The PKK in western Turkey accordingly mobilised under radically different socio-
spatial and structural conditions. This paper argues that the Kurds in western Turkey meet 
all of the criteria barring the international aspects of a diaspora (Brubaker, 2005 and Baser & 
Swain, 2010). The importance of boundary maintenance in the Kurdish internal diaspora 
proved to be of immense utility to the PKK. Practises of social exclusion and state neglect 
strengthened Kurdish identity in spite of migration and exile, leading to resilient communal 
structures and networks which were utilised by the PKK as channels to consolidate and 
expand its support. As previously discussed, the Kurdish community in western Turkey is 
trans-generational and is composed of varying social strata and not all of it can be 
considered as part of the internal diaspora. Yet, the dimensions of the Kurdish internal 
diaspora were sufficiently extensive to allow rapid PKK expansion from a small number of 
mostly student activists to include huge numbers of youths from the urban periphery and to 
build up a vast constituency around the movement.  
The PKK’s mobilisation in western Turkey was strategic and thoroughly calculated. It 
resisted the temptation to launch military campaigns at state targets in western Turkey and 
remained focused on its principal objective, which was to not imperil supply routes of 
materials and new guerrillas to the insurgency in the Kurdistan. Concomitantly to the 
expansion of the insurgency, the demand for material resources, financial support and 
fighters also expanded thus increasing the importance of the PKK’s support networks in 
western Turkey. Accordingly, the PKK concentrated on broadening its constituency to also 
encompass somewhat better off Kurds with disposable income to finance the campaign 
while also maintaining its recruitment amongst the poorer elements of Kurdish society to 
serve as guerrillas. The PKK’s success was due to its strategic malleability; it avoided clashes 
with other leftist groups and thus limited unnecessary spirals of violent escalation and the 
attention of the authorities. It remained cognisant of the different social and cultural 
orientations of its sympathisers and thus adapted its rhetoric accordingly. It deployed a 
more leftist rhetoric when engaging Alevi Kurds with a strong leftist background and it 
applied a more nationalist hue in its dealings with sympathisers whose origins were from 
the heartland of Kurdish nationalism, Mardin and Şırnak. It recognised that bonds of 
reciprocal trust were not generated by radical speeches or party publications but by shared 
inter-personal experiences and bolstered by bonds of affection. It accordingly dispersed its 
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young militants to the impoverished neighbourhoods where they integrated themselves 
into the daily lives of its sympathisers. The PKK was also sufficiently confident to realise that 
the emergence of a Kurdish parliamentary party was not a threat to its hegemonic position 
in the Kurdish struggle but rather a further resource that could be utilised in parallel to its 
own armed campaign. It utilised the political space opened by HEP and its successors, in 
terms of political consciousness and the manner it undermined the Turkish state to access 
middle class and intellectual Kurds which might have otherwise remained outside the fold of 
the movement.  
The PKK’s success was such that it integrated itself in the radical political texture of 
cities like Istanbul. It mobilised internally displaced Kurds, poverty stricken migrants, 
assimilated Kurds and even won over large amounts of support in neighbourhoods like Gazi, 
which had long been strongholds of the Turkish revolutionary left. Its adoption of the 
mantle of the foremost leftist revolutionary group in Turkey also permitted it to acquire a 
multi-ethnic membership composition. In a brief period of time, starting from scratch the 
PKK established robust local structures that served as the framework around which its de-
territorialised constituency emerged. The quantifiable contribution the PKK’s mobilisation in 
the West had on its war effort can never be known. However if one is to accept sources 
close to the PKK, which claim that the largest number of PKK recruits in 2010, were from 
Istanbul (Interview 6, 2012); it shows that the state’s policy of draining the sea to isolate fish 
was an utter failure. It simply relocated the fish into the far more dangerous position of 
Turkey urban heart. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The PKK evolved from being a small group of student radicals in Ankara in the mid 
1970s to a mass guerrilla army with tens of thousands of supporters dispersed across 
Kurdistan, western Turkey and across Europe less than twenty years later. As well as 
traversing vastly different spatial environments, in the period of this research the PKK 
witnessed great changes from the last years of the grand epoch of national liberation 
movements in the 1970s,  the brutality of the 1980 coup d’état and the successive years of 
military rule, to the global decline of Communism. This thesis does not however, attempt to 
elaborate any grand narratives, neither of recent Kurdish history nor of the PKK as a 
movement in the period concerned. It rather concentrates on one dimension of the PKK’s 
emergence and consolidation as an insurgent organisation; its relationship with its 
supporters and how this has progressed over time and space and the impact it has had on 
the PKK’s repertoire of contention.  
 
 In order to achieve this challenging objective, use has been made of the concept of 
constituency as initially developed by Malthaner (2011a, 2011b & 2014). Although it has 
little “real world” application or popular recognition, the notion of constituency serves to 
conceptually organise and clarify the complex array of relations between armed groups and 
their supporters. The constituency is the main analytical paradigm in the thesis but its 
underlying relational premise also extends beyond the armed group-supporters binary. The 
constituency does not emerge in a socio-spatial vacuum; armed groups and their supporters 
are also engaged in formative interactions with a wide spectrum of institutions and actors 
such as the state, as well as rival and allied movements present in their immediate social 
environment. Therefore while remaining cognisant of the principle theoretical focus of the 
project, the relational impact of these other forces on both the armed group and its 
supporters was also considered.  
 
In this concluding chapter, the implementation of the concept of constituency will be 
summarised. Additionally two analytical aspects key to the emergence of the constituency 
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will also be discussed; the formative impact of the state (Goodwin, 2001) and interactions 
with other political actors; be they adversaries or allies. The strategies adopted by the 
movement in response to environmental developments, normative limits and interactions 
with other social and political actors, i.e. the processes of movement agency which were 
central to the establishment of its constituency will then be briefly summarised. This 
concluding chapter will then address the principal theoretical question of the project: in 
what fashion did the PKK’s relationship with its constituency impact its patterns of 
mobilisation and the types of violence it deployed. It will draw a number of tentative 
conclusions in this regard and discuss the challenges in identifying causual relationships. It 
will finally outline a number of areas from whence this project can lead to projects of 
further empirical and theoretical research. 
 
Constituency 
 
 Malthaner has explained that “a relational perspective on violent insurgencies seeks to 
understand how the actors’ interactions shape the way they act, and how these interactions 
evolve over time” (2011a: 256). A relational perspective is central to the concept of 
constituency. A constituency is not an inherent social category itself, by which it can be 
understood that individuals do not self identify as part of an armed group’s constituency. A 
constituency is rather a hermeneutic category of social relations which for the purpose of 
social science analysis, orders the interactions between armed groups and their supporters 
and sympathisers. It is thus a highly contingent and dynamic concept because although an 
individual might consistently interact with a movement over time, it is certain that the 
nature of the interactions change. Heraclitus’ metaphor, “one cannot step twice into the 
same river” (in Stern, 1991: 581) can be applied to the nature of armed movements’ 
interactions with their supporters. It can be interpreted as meaning that the experience of 
the act of stepping in the water changes both the person and the river and, as a 
consequence, it also the relationship between them. Heraclitus was speaking in relation to 
the fluidity of broader human phenomena which is even more intensified in the context of 
armed conflicts. The social processes of war, “the transformation of social actors, structures, 
norms, and practices at the local level […] sometimes leave profound social changes in their 
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wake” (Wood, 2008:540). Violence changes individuals; it provokes strong emotional 
reactions and can consolidate sympathies or enmities. Furthermore violence in conflict 
situations is multitudinous; it arrives not only from insurgents and incumbents but also 
revives pre-existing feuds and facilitates ulterior and opportunistic violence (Kalyvas, 2003). 
Not to mention, the impact of quotidian biographical developments such as growing older, 
marriage and family dynamics which, notwithstanding the dramatic circumstances of armed 
conflict, continue to occur. 
 
  On the other hand, armed groups themselves are in the permanent throes of change 
and evolution. Firstly, at the micro-level the high attrition rate ensures that the actors on 
the ground – if not necessarily more senior figures – are always changing due to death and 
injury and also at a psychological level by the horrors of witnessing, enduring and inflicting 
violence (Kalyvas, 2006: 56). At a more macro-level, armed movements evolve according to 
changes in relative strength in relation to the state and other armed and unarmed actors, 
degrees of territorial control, their access to resources and also in relation to developments 
completely outside of their import such as commodity prices and rise and fall of global 
powers. Importantly armed groups and their constituencies, as this project has shown 
change by interacting with one another by processes of mutual learning wherein normative 
limits and thresholds of tolerance are clarified and acknowledged. It must be noted though, 
that these processes of interaction can both erode and consolidate insurgent support 
(Malthaner, 2014). The concept of constituency is a means to simplify ever fluid patterns of 
interactions between actors who by virtue of those very same interactions are also 
undergoing constant change.  
 
 Armed group–constituency relations have been categorised into four distinct 
groupings: relations of utilitarian social exchange; bonds of kinship; patron-client 
relationships and friendships; communal identity and lastly relations forged by the 
processes of mobilisation itself (Malthaner, 2014). Of course, these are ideal types and in 
reality there is much overlap between them.  The concrete realisation of these relations is 
conditioned by the socio-spatial environment, recalling Waldmann’s observation of the 
necessity of a “minimum of spatial concentration” (2005:242) for the foundation of a radical 
community. Indeed, it is true that the provision of social services such as schools and 
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medical centres demands a strong territorial domination if not outright control by insurgent 
organisations. Furthermore, kinship and communal relations are more easily consolidated in 
spatial contexts under the influence of insurgents. Yet, armed movements can maintain 
constituencies in the absence of territorial control such as in diaspora communities by 
means of social control.  
 
Following Malthaner’s work (2011a, 2011b & 2014), this thesis has acknowledged 
that armed groups and constituencies interact in given territorial contexts. It has however 
further elaborated that these bonds are not determined territorially rather influenced by it. 
Accordingly, when patterns of territorial control are adjusted, the relations between armed 
movement and constituencies do not simply cease but that they rather take on new forms. 
Indeed, they can even slip into abeyance only to re-emerge at a subsequent time and even 
in a different location. Incumbent oppression can in fact consolidate the bonds between 
them by provoking moral outrage (Wood, 2008: 542) and insurgent acts of violence often 
become interpreted as ever more legitimate (Malthaner, 2011b:193). Armed group–
constituency relations can be described as spatially conditioned but sufficiently flexible to 
be reconfigured in even vastly different contexts. All of which has to be heavily qualified by 
the recognition that if armed groups adopt different practises of violence or disregard the 
normative limits and expectations of their constituencies that relations can deteriorate if 
not completely rupture as in the case of Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya in Egypt in the 1990s 
(Malthaner, 2011b).It is also plausible that an armed group’s orientation toward its 
constituency can be diluted if it becomes less dependent on its constituency for material 
and other resources. Armed movements which acquire access to marketable resources and 
thus consolidate their financial security or gain external backing could conceivably concede 
less importance to their support networks.  In addition, armed groups can become 
physically separated from their constituencies as was the case with a number of Turkish 
leftist and Kurdish movements when they fled into exile in Europe thus diminishing the 
importance of its territorially rooted constituencies inside Turkey. Accordingly, armed 
group–constituency relationships should not be considered in a teleological way, relations 
between them can decline as well as be consolidated. And they should be viewed as 
relationally constituted rather than territorially defined. 
303 
 
Factors Influencing Constituency Formation 
 
Armed group–constituency relations are not simply a naturally occurring result of 
particular structural features or an inevitable product of historical processes but forged by 
the respective orientation and interaction between both relevant parties. Armed groups 
possess agency, meaning that they make choices as regards how to interact with their 
potential supporters. As of course do non-militants who can choose, albeit in a more 
circumscribed fashion, how to engage or not engage with armed groups. The fashion in 
which movements make use of their agentive capacity in relation to supporters and 
sympathisers is key to the consolidation of a militant constituency. Although armed group–
constituency relations are established by mutually constitutive interactions, they are also 
conditioned by their socio-spatial environment. Relations between them are influenced by 
specific instances and practises of movement agency, the nature of the state, and how they 
engage with other political actors; these three factors will be briefly recapped in this 
section. 
 
Movement Agency  
 
Movements are consistently faced with decisions in relation to how they interact 
with external actors, contingencies and structural developments (see Jasper, 2004). In the 
PKK’s case, these interactions have been composed of mechanisms of competitive 
escalation with its Kurdish and Turkish leftist counterparts (della Porta, 2013); polarisation 
with right wing movements in the 1970s (McAdam et al, 2001); diffusion in terms of 
geography and of mobilisational repertoires (Alper, 2014 & Soule, 2004) and emotional 
mechanisms such as fear and fear abatement (Johnston, 2014) and pride (Wood, 2001). In 
the wider literature there is much focus on insurgent decisions as to whether to escalate 
campaigns of violence, to seek external allies or to sue for peace; while strategic choices in 
relation to insurgent support networks are the subject of less analysis.  Invariably, 
movements make decisions which are unpopular and lose them support or even consolidate 
support for their opponents. However, the manner in which movements reflect upon the 
popular impact of their strategies varies widely. Attempts to forcibly implement insurgent 
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imperatives can result in movements becoming detached from their constituency and 
strengthen opposition to them. Alternatively, movements can reconsider their strategies 
and frame their demands in different way, subtly adjust them or even completely abandon 
certain policies.  
 
 The PKK adopted a reflexive position in relation to a number of its policies. In terms of 
its general framing, once it became clear that its overtly Marxist focus was somewhat 
unintelligible if not objectionable to large swathes of Kurdish society; it re-framed it in more 
Nationalist terms. The PKK similarly discarded any public repudiation of religion in order to 
not dissuade religiously minded Kurds from mobilising. When it became clear that forced 
conscription was generating discontent, it completely abandoned it as a policy. Although, it 
did not entirely cease attacks on Village Guards in the wake of popular concerns, it 
drastically reduced such attacks and open massacres of civilians associated with Village 
Guards were halted. These are some brief examples of strategic decisions taken by the PKK 
which were undoubtedly informed by the reaction and/or expectations of its constituency. 
This is not to suggest that the PKK pursued only policies which were supported by its 
constituency but rather that it factored its constituency’s response into its strategic 
calculations and on occasion sacrificed short term objectives to the long term necessity of 
maintaining popular support. 
 
The State 
 
 As more structurally minded theorists such as Goodwin (2001) and Wickham-Crowley 
(1993) have proposed, the state does bear a huge impact on the emergence and 
development of armed groups. The state should of course not be reified or viewed as a 
homogenous coherent institution but rather as a “significantly unbounded terrain of powers 
and techniques, an ensemble of discourses, rules and practices cohabiting in limiting, 
tension ridden, often contradictory relation to each other” (Brown in Aretxaga, 2003:398). 
The Turkish state has played a central if not always consistent role in the PKK’s mobilisation. 
The state, its practises of repression and assimilation and even its efforts to obtain Kurdish 
support are present in all the socio-spatial contexts discussed in this thesis. Historic Turkish 
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repression and neglect of Kurds and Kurdistan resulted in a trans-generational narrative of 
Kurdish suffering; a narrative which was easily incorporated into the discourse of the PKK. 
The PKK’s initial mobilisation in the late 1970s, took place in a context of a reduced state 
presence, it was thus able to construct networks of supporters and sympathisers with 
relative ease in comparison to later periods. The 1980 coup d’état radically rearticulated 
relations between Kurdish society and the state. State brutality and mass torture re-
invigorated the narrative of Kurdish victimhood rendering it of immediate physical and 
emotional importance. It no longer consisted of stories of historic betrayals and periodic 
violence in remote mountain villages which characterised relations between Kurds and the 
state but direct personal experiences of torture, humiliation and death. The 1980 military 
takeover not only popularly confirmed the PKK’s view that the state could not be reformed 
but also generated renewed and intense personal grievance against the state, thus 
facilitating the expansion of PKK support.  
 
 In subsequent periods, the state provided incentives to potential PKK supporters to 
remain loyal to the state through the Village Guard system. The system did in fact hinder the 
PKK’s efforts but in the long run Village Guard’s violent excesses alienated many non-aligned 
Kurds. It also furnished the PKK with proximate military attainable targets thereby 
increasing its military coherence which was put to subsequent use against the state forces. 
Counter-insurgent policies of the late 1990s, including targeted assassinations and torture 
did successfully inhibit the PKK’s armed campaign and ultimately led to its ceasefire but at a 
huge human and political price. The forced deportation of millions of Kurds further de-
legitimised the state and engendered such bitterness that the PKK’s campaign of violence 
was condoned and lionised by huge numbers of Kurds. Accordingly, the Turkish state’s 
tactical measures did indeed militarily weaken the PKK but favoured the consolidation of its 
support. Remarkably the PKK’s constituency expanded even after its military decline and the 
unprecedented demographic re-organisation of the Kurdish people, highlighting the 
resilience of armed group–constituency relations.  
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Rival and/or Allied Movements 
 
 The presence of ulterior movements can impinge on the consolidation of armed 
movement–constituency relations. Interactions between movements targeting the same 
reservoir of supporters and resources can lead to competition and processes of violent 
outbidding (De Fazio, 2014). It can lead to radicalisation as movements adopt ever more 
radical stances to distinguish themselves from others, the hardening of movement 
boundaries and an end to multiple memberships which often serve as a de-escalating 
measure. As per the logic of the so-called “strategy of tension” (della Porta, 1995:60-61), 
inter-movement violence can be also used by the state as a pretext for repression. While 
hostile interactions with adversarial movements often lead to spirals of escalation, tit-for-tat 
campaigns of mutual violence and radicalisation. This can result in deterring moderate 
engagement and simultaneously consolidating the resolve of more committed militants.  
 
 In the case at hand, the presence of alternative revolutionary or Kurdish groups 
occurred in two geographically and chronologically distinct contexts. In the mid 1970s, the 
PKK relocated to Kurdistan in part because of the preponderance of rival left wing 
movements and limited scope for expansion in Ankara. Upon returning to Kurdistan, they 
discovered that the political scene was also populated by a number of other Kurdish 
movements. It would be overly simplistic to categorise the PKK as having had poor relations 
with all of them but relations with some, most notably KUK, were characterised by bloody 
violence. Interactions between the Kurdish groups were a catalyst for the PKK’s evolution to 
an armed movement. These bitter clashes created lingering enmities within the Kurdish 
community and most likely restricted the PKK’s mobilisational capacity in subsequent 
periods. After the 1980 coup, the PKK emerged as the only significant revolutionary group as 
its erstwhile rivals demobilised, merged on an individual basis with the PKK or operated 
exclusively in exile.  The only other period where the PKK was forced to engage with 
significant competition from other groups was in the course of its mobilisation in the 1990s 
in the cities of western Turkey. However, unlike the 1970s it adopted a compromising 
attitude in toward them. This is likely also because the PKK was initially rather weak and the 
leftist groups were also in relative decline and neither could thus afford debilitating 
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conflicts. The PKK even conceded the traditional revolutionary stronghold Gaziosmanpaşa, 
heavily populated with Kurds, to its rivals and avoided any concerted mobilisation there 
until the late 1990s. This less antagonistic approach proved fruitful for the PKK and it 
eventually surpassed its left wing counterparts as the strongest armed organisation in the 
cities of Turkey. In the absence of reciprocal campaigns of violence many leftist militants 
drifted into the PKK. The PKK’s constituency thus expanded to encompass many traditional 
sympathisers of leftist organisations. 
 
The Causal Argument 
 
 The principal question of this thesis queries if the PKK’s relationship with its 
constituency influenced its mobilisation and the patterns of violence it deployed. This 
question was premised on its grounding in the empirical clarification of a number of 
elements: the manner in which the PKK developed its constituency; how the constituency 
changed over time and the space; and changes in the PKK’s repertoire of contention. Thus it 
is in fact an explicitly causal analysis; in what way did one aspect of the PKK mobilisation – 
its relationship with its supporters – impinge on another, its repertoire of contention. Causal 
analysis proposes that “the cause of event X is the minimum set of antecedents that [1] 
actually occurred, [2] is generally sufficient to produce events of type X, and [3] without 
which X would not have occurred in this setting” (Tilly drawing on Stinchcombe 1993: 1602). 
However, the case under analysis is conceptually much more complicated. The ‘event’ to be 
explained is not in fact an ‘event’ but a broad movement repertoire differentiated between 
how it is formally stabilised by the vertices of the PKK and actually realised on the ground by 
its militants. As has been detailed in the preceding chapters, patterns of PKK violence and 
contestation also varied across spatial contexts and according to a range of factors not 
connected to its relations with its constituency. It is therefore extremely difficult to 
exclusively argue at a general level that X demands by its constituency led to Y changes in 
behaviour by the PKK.  
 
 To recap, causal mechanisms are predicted to “recur in different combinations with 
different aggregate consequences in varying historical settings” (McAdam et al, 2001:24), 
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There is intense debate and many varying definitions of casual mechanisms questioning if 
they can be analysed at the individual, structural or collective levels (Mahoney, 2001: 581). 
Neither has any consensus been reached whether causal mechanisms are directly 
observable or if their presence can be merely inferred (Gerring, 2008:166). It has been 
affirmed that “causal relations must be inferred because, following Hume, [...] causality can 
never be directly observed” (Kiser & Hechter, 1991:4). Other authors have explained that 
casual mechanisms are “ultimately unobservable physical, social or psychological processes 
through which agents with casual capacities operate” (George & Bennett, 2005:137). 
Unsurprisingly, this has also proved to be the case in this project. The challenge of 
identifying casual relationships in relation to the PKK is particularly difficult because of its 
structure and the role played by its charismatic and unimpeachable leader. The PKK leader 
Öcalan was based in Syria while its guerrillas were located inside the borders of Turkey in 
often isolated rural areas. Until the 1990s, communication with the fighting units was erratic 
and there was little or no direct control by the movement’s upper echelons on 
developments on the ground. Guerrilla commanders were made aware of movement 
objectives but not given precise instructions on how to realise them. This form of localised 
autonomy ensured that movement directives such as conscription and the campaign against 
Village Guards were complied with inconsistently across Kurdistan as per how each 
individual unit decided to pursue them.  
 
 Over time it became clear that certain PKK policies were unpopular with its 
constituency and they were subsequently abandoned. If one takes for example the issue of 
conscription; it could ordinarily be offered as relatively straightforward proof of the causal 
influence of its constituency on the PKK’s repertoire of contention. However, it is not quite 
as simple as that. Decisions taken by a spatially distant and disconnected leadership 
generated difficulties on the ground for its fighting units. Once it became clear to the 
leadership that policies such as conscription were deeply unpopular they were formally 
renounced by the movement in 1990. However, the leadership shifted responsibility for the 
failure of some of its policies on the shoulders of local commanders, such as PKK 
commander Halil (Cemal) Kaya who was executed in 1988 reputedly for his efforts to 
implement official movement policy (Marcus, 2007: 144). Credit for the revision of PKK 
strategies is popularly afforded to the same leadership which designed them, most notably 
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Abdullah Öcalan. As discussed in Chapter 4, Öcalan is a charismatic leader and in simple 
terms, it seems that all the movement’s achievements are attributed to his leadership while 
any of its failings are imputed to the rank and file. In circles sympathetic to the PKK, the 
rearticulation of movement strategies is not understood as a result of pressure from below 
but rather derived from the foresight of its leader. In a similar fashion, the PKK’s drift away 
from Marxism is attributed to Öcalan’s insights when in practice the cautious deployment of 
leftist rhetoric was a de facto movement practise on the ground from the 1980s. However, 
the absence of public declarations by the PKK similar to that issued by Sheikh Fadlallah – a 
high ranking cleric associated with Hezbollah - in relation to the unpopularity of suicide 
attacks and large scale assaults which resulted in many local  casualties in south Lebanon 
amongst its constituency (Malthaner, 2011b: 206), does not necessarily invalidate the 
findings.   
  
 The combination of the dynamic and fragmented nature of the relationship between 
the movement and its constituency and the nature of the PKK as a movement headed by a 
charismatic leader has rendered it arguably impossible to outline robust causal mechanisms. 
Yet, there is a strong relationship between popular discontent and subsequent 
modifications of PKK policy. Two of the most pronounced instances of PKK changes in 
strategy were the abandonment of conscription and the more selective targeting of Village 
Guards. In addition, although not in response to specific discontent but rather in relation to 
a disjunction with prevailing social norms and expectations, the manner in which the PKK 
softened its position in relation to religion and made nuanced use of nationalist or leftist 
frames according to its audience also bolsters the findings of this thesis. However, that is 
not to argue that the PKK simply re-adjusted its positions to correspond with those of the 
Kurdish masses. It has been outlined that the relationship between armed groups and their 
constituencies is mutually constitutive and characterised by a form of dialogue 
notwithstanding evolving power discrepancies. It is important not to over-compensate for 
the prevailing academic approaches which neglect civilian agency and power by affording 
the constituency excessive attention, at the expense of the agency of armed groups. The 
PKK has successfully revolutionised social relations in Kurdistan and diffused a re-defined 
understanding of Kurdish identity. It has managed to introduce a radical reordering of the 
role of women in Kurdish society. It has overthrown prevailing social hierarchies and forged 
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entirely different expectations of horizontal political mobilisation in contrast to the vertically 
organised mobilisations of the past. And arguably, most significantly it has created a 
horizontal understanding of Kurdish identity which traverses religio-sectarian divisions, 
linguistic differences and has overcome tribal fragmentation.  
 
How then can changes in PKK behaviour be imputed to the preferences of its 
constituency? It has been suggested that in the absence of directly observable mechanisms 
that in order to distinguish between rival causal explanations there are three necessary 
elements: plausibility, limited time lag between cause and effect, and empirical implications 
(Kiser & Hechter, 1991:6). Firstly, in terms of plausibility, it is entirely plausible that an 
armed group heavily dependent on its constituency for material resources and political 
legitimacy would re-calibrate its strategies according to the normative limits of its 
constituency. The PKK is just one of many armed groups which have incorporated the 
expectations of its supporters into its strategic decisions; as attested by examples such as 
the indigenisation of the EZLN (see O’Connor and Oikonomakis, forthcoming) and the IRA 
(Collins, 1997). Additionally there was also a limited time lag between constituency 
discontent and strategic adjustment of movement policy in relation to the practise of forced 
recruitment to the PKK. Shortly after opposition to conscription became apparent, it was 
abandoned as a practise. Although, it took longer for this decision to be formally sanctified 
at its Second National Conference and Fourth General Congress in 1990, this was related to 
the logistical challenges of safely gathering the requisite insurgent leaders together for the 
assembly. Furthermore, the practise was never rigorously implemented to begin with by 
commanders involved in the fighting, which were aware that this policy would harm their 
relations with their immediate constituency. Finally, if one considers the empirical 
implications of why the PKK ceased military conscription, the explanation that it was due to 
its constituency’s concerns is convincing. Although, as discussed in chapter IV, many forced 
recruits were simply ill suited to the insurgent life, Marcus’ argument that PKK was willing 
“to take into account the demands and criticisms of the people it wanted to represent” 
(2007:119) is persuasive. Potential alternative explanations could argue that by the time the 
PKK abandoned conscription it was attracting sufficient numbers of motivated volunteers so 
as to not require conscripted ones. Yet, it seems improbable that were it not for the wider 
unpopularity of the policy, the PKK would have dismissed the possibility of a guaranteed 
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stream of fighters. Even reluctant recruits can be trained into becoming good fighters and 
the PKK possessed the means to provide such training in its camps across the Iraqi border. 
Conscription to the ranks of the PKK also precluded conscription (for males) into the Turkish 
army thus strengthening its own ranks while simultaneously weakening those of its 
adversary. In addition, the emergence of a Kurdish army in opposition to the Turkish one 
also furnished the movement with a degree of ‘state like’ legitimacy and was laden with 
symbolic importance. Nonetheless, the PKK abandoned the strategy.  Forced recruitment 
was a counter-productive strategy when the alternative possibility was the short term 
sacrifice of the number of militants which it could put in the field in exchange for the long 
term support of its constituency.  
 
This project is sufficiently modest in scope to recognise that the PKK’s relationship 
with its constituency has not been the exclusive determinant of its strategic choices. 
Alternative aspects such as the relative balances of forces and international developments 
have also weighed upon the PKK’s strategic decision-making. This thesis has simply argued 
that the considerations of its constituency and the PKK’s intent to maintain good relations 
with it were also part of the strategic equation. A definitive causal relationship linking the 
expectations and normative limits of the constituency and the PKK’s repertoire of 
contention has not proved possible to find. However, a strong relationship linking strategic 
changes in the PKK’s repertoire of contention and the demands and expectations of its 
constituency has been outlined. The detailed evidence produced in the course of this thesis 
has provided a sufficient basis to conclude that its constituency did indeed have an impact 
on how the PKK mobilised. 
 
Avenues for Further Study 
 
 The project opens up a huge number of possibilities for further research. As 
mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, currently the field of Kurdish studies is 
flourishing across a range of subject matters. Research focusing on the PKK and the ongoing 
conflict which was a topic long neglected is enjoying a period of unprecedented academic 
interest (Romano & Gurses, 2014, Baser 2014 and Gunes & Zeydanlioğlu, 2014). This project 
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has focused on but one element of the PKK’s mobilisation which can be expanded on in a 
number of fashions. The PKK’s relationship with its constituency could be spatially 
disaggregated whereby the manner in which the PKK operated in specific locations could be 
analysed in detail. As was heretofore mentioned on numerous occasions, the spatial 
environments where the PKK mobilised were hugely contrasting. Undoubtedly, interesting 
internal or external comparisons or even single case anthropological projects on the various 
locations - specific towns or provinces - of the PKK’s mobilisation would generate a huge 
amount of empirical data that could be used to verify the hypothetical arguments advanced 
in this thesis. Such a spatially concentrated analysis would most likely provide sufficient 
empirical data to develop robust causal mechanisms at the micro-level. Alternatively instead 
of a spatial analysis, an organisational focus on different elements of the movement itself 
could serve as a means to investigate how the PKK interacted with its constituency. One 
could focus on the ERNK’s sub-organisations such as the Kurdish Alevi Foundation and 
examine in detail its campaign to mobilise Kurdish Alevis and assemble a more inclusive 
vision of “Kurdishness”. This project is also chronologically delimited and any analysis of the 
maintenance of its consitutuency since Öcalan’s capture and the revival of the armed 
struggle in the 2000s would be extremely worthwhile. A more intensive analysis of the 
movement over briefer periods of the movement’s existence, such as the years between the 
coup and the launch of the insurgency in 1984 would also likely prove interesting.  
 
 At a theoretical level this project offers an immense array of possibilities for future 
research. An obvious direction would be to analyse the notion of constituency in the case of 
armed groups with lesser dependency on its supporters as a result of enjoying external 
backing of a neighbouring power or access to marketable resources. Comparative analyses 
would also facilitate a thorough examination of the concept’s rigour. The period analysed in 
this project with the exception of the pre-coup years and to a lesser degree in western 
Turkey in the 1990s and the area of Dersim, was characterised by the PKK enjoying a form of 
revolutionary monopoly in the absence of rival movements.  It would prove most interesting 
to analyse the emergence of armed movement–constituency relations in a context with a 
plurality of revolutionary groups to analyse how the processes of constituency building 
interact with escalatory spirals with rivals and opponents. The late 1970s in Turkey provides 
the perfect exemplar of a political environment populated by multiple armed actors and has 
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been hitherto remarkably understudied. Research focusing on multiple competing 
movements would extend the relational basis of this approach beyond the armed 
movement-constituency dyad. It would also be interesting to analyse the processes 
whereby successful revolutionary movements such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua 
institutionalise (or not) their relations with the constituency. A final other element of 
potential relevance would be to analyse the consolidation of armed group constituency 
relations in either more authoritarian or more democratic states. How the formation of an 
insurgent constituency affected by contexts where there are no legal opportunities for 
political expression or where there are numerous institutional options for expressing 
political dissent?  
 
 Future research could be also improved by a greater engagement with primary source 
material produced by the PKK itself. For a variety of reasons ranging from time to linguistic 
capacities, it has not been possible to access much of the PKK’s primary literature for this 
thesis. An astute parsing of the digital archives of PKK newspapers such as Serxwebûn and 
even newspapers sympathetic to the Kurdish cause such as Azadiya Welat and Özgür 
Gündem would likely furnish some insights on the PKK’s internal decision making processes. 
Another rich source would be the movement’s own archives. However, negotiating access 
to them is difficult if not impossible for researchers unaffiliated to the movement. An 
alternative remedy to the absence of archival sources would be to interview high level 
relevant figures within the movement. This is again a logistically challenging task as many of 
these senior members are deceased, imprisoned or scattered across the world. As past 
interviews with high ranking PKK members have shown, it also might not necessarily prove a 
fruitful way to gain insights into the decision making processes of the movement207. 
Experienced militants are usually very disciplined from an ideological perspective and 
unlikely to stray from the party line. Furthermore, insurgent primary sources whether oral 
or written, are notoriously self serving - although interesting in their own right - they do not 
automatically facilitate a more accurate understanding of the relationship between armed 
movements and their constituencies.  
                                                        
207
 A number of interviews have been conducted with Abdullah Öcalan prior to his arrest by Gunter (1998), 
Kutschera (1999b) as well as by an array of Turkish reporters compiled in Seçme Röportajlar (1994). 
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Nonetheless, the incorporation of such material would bolster any future research. 
 
 This project has embraced the relational and spatially contextualised approach 
pioneered and adopted by Malthaner (2011a&b), della Porta (2013), Bosi, Demetriou & 
Malthaner (2014) which has proposed to focus on civilians and their interactions with armed 
groups, beyond the conventional understanding of civilians as passive victims of insurgent 
violence. This school of thinking remains in its early stages and undoubtedly the concept of 
constituency and its underlying relational premises will be vigorously examined and 
ultimately refined as it is more widely applied. Accordingly, the application of this broad 
approach to future research in place of more structurally or rational choice oriented 
methods whether in a comparative format or with new case studies already indicates an 
extensive programme of research. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 The thesis has not sought to legitimise or downplay the PKK’s practices of violence but 
rather to contextualise it. The PKK is responsible for the deaths of thousands and it is 
notable for the imposition of a cruel disciplinary regime within the movement which has led 
to an unknown number of executed militants. The PKK’s repertoire of contention is 
extremely nuanced, reflecting prevailing balances of power, changing socio-spatial 
environments and its interactions with its constituency. In addition, while its violent actions 
understandably attract a disproportionate share of attention, the PKK’s engagement with its 
constituency was largely characterised by the absence of violence. Nonetheless, the PKK has 
not realised any of its revolutionary objectives; it has however succeeded in avoiding defeat 
and consolidated itself as a “persistent insurgent group” (Goodwin, 2001:219).  Its longevity 
is remarkable if one considers the diverging fates of its leftist revolutionary counterparts of 
the 1970s. Those that have achieved success such as the ANC (African National Congress) in 
South Africa or the Sandinistas in Nicaragua (particularly in its current period in 
government) have sullied their emancipatory credentials by their subsequent behaviour in 
power. Other insurgencies such as the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo/Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army) in 
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Colombia have become marginalised in both a political and geographic sense, capable of 
surviving but with little hope of enacting societal change. Many others such as the Tamil 
Tigers and the plethora of Turkish and Kurdish groups discussed in chapter III, were 
destroyed or currently exist in name only. The PKK has avoided the destiny of its erstwhile 
contemporaries, not by detaching itself from broader society or retreating into Kurdistan’s 
impregnable mountains but by integrating itself ever closer with Kurdish society. It has done 
so by wedding a resolute guerrilla army with a broad political mobilisation which has 
embraced much of Kurdish society thus providing the social support necessary to ensure its 
continued existence in the face of ever present state repression. This paper suggests that 
the PKK’s ‘success’ is a result, less of the qualities and steadfastness of its inner cadres but 
rather how the PKK’s core incorporated and utilised the strength of its periphery.  
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Appendix I: Interview Index 
 
Interview 1: 2 February 2011, Germany (unrecorded) – Karan & Xanem, two German 
based Kurdish student activists.  
Interview 2: 16 July 2011, Germany, (unrecorded) – Karan and Kurdish female XYK 
member. 
Interview 3: 13 July 2011, Germany, (unrecorded) - German member of the Freedom for 
Öcalan Initiative. 
Interview 4: 25 August 2011, Germany, (recorded) – German based KOMKAR 
representative. 
Interview 5: 25 August 2011, Germany (recorded) – Two German based KOMCIWAN 
activists.  
Interview 6: 3 September 2011, Belgium (recorded) - Female European based, senior BDP 
representative.  
Interview 7: January 6 2012, Germany (recorded) – German born XYK activist. 
Interview 8: 27 March 2012, Istanbul (unrecorded) – Baran, Kurdish academic of Dersim 
origins. 
Interview 9: 30 March 2012, Istanbul (recorded) – Daham, ERNK commander and political 
prisoner of eleven years and Sefer, YCK activist and political prisoner of four years.  
Interview 10: 31 March 2012, Istanbul (recorded) – Herro originally from Malazgirt, son of 
PKK militia member and victim of forced migration. 
Interview 11: 3 April 2012, Istanbul (recorded) – Welat, teacher from Silwan. 
Interview 12: 3 April 2012, Istanbul (recorded) – Kazaw student from Kars. 
*Interview 13: 7 April 2012, Istanbul (unrecorded) - Bejan Matur, Kurdish poet and writer 
and Abdullah Demirbas, Mayor of Sur, Diyarbakir. 
Interview 14: May 15 2012, Germany (unrecorded) – Abdullah originally from Bingöl, 
German based PKK sympathiser. 
Interview 15: 15 September 2012, Ankara (unrecorded) – Renas, civil servant of Kurdish-
Arab background, originally from Kiziltepe. 
Interview 16: 12 September 2012, Kiziltepe (unrecorded) – Four men in late twenties and 
early thirties. 
Interview 17: 12 September 2012, Kiziltepe (unrecorded) – Ciya, victim of forced migration. 
Interview 18: 13 September 2012, Mardin (unrecorded) – Ahmet, PKK sympathiser from 
Mardin. 
Interview 19: 13 September 2012, Mardin (unrecorded) – Botan, father of a number of PKK 
guerrillas and a victim of forced migration. 
Interview 20: 14 September 2012, Mardin (unrecorded) – Berfin, father of PKK guerrilla 
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from Mardin. 
*Interview 21: 17 September 2012, Diyarbakir (recorded) – Salih Sezgin, PKK political 
prisoner and author. 
Interview 22:  18 September 2012, Diyarbakir (unrecorded) – two females from Diyarbakir 
and Bingöl. 
Interview 23: 19 September 2012, Diyarbakir (unrecorded) – Bahoz from Adiyaman. 
Interview 24: 20 & 21 September 2012 Diyarbakir (unrecorded) – Mazlum from Mardin, 
former political prisoner and TKSP activist. 
Interview 25: 21 September 2012, Diyarbakir (unrecorded) – Suran from Kulp, victim of 
forced migration. 
Interview 26: 22 September 2012, Diyarbakir (unrecorded) – Karsaz an Islamist from Siirt.  
Interview 27: 24 September 2012, Diyarbakir (unrecorded) – Aram a guerrilla and former 
political prisoner from Diyarbakir. 
Interview 28: 25 September 2012, Diyarbakir (unrecorded) – Mazlumder activist from 
Mardin. 
*Interview 29: 25 September 2012, Diyarbakir (unrecorded) - Zübeyde Zümrüt, BDP 
Diyarbakir. 
Interview 30: 26 London (unrecorded) – PSK/Komkar activist from Silwan. 
Interview 31: 21 September 2012, Diyarbakir (unrecorded) – former political prisoner. 
Interview 32: 13 December 2012, Germany (recorded) – Perwer, PKK sympathiser from 
Cizre. 
Interview 33: 10 January 2013, Germany (recorded) – Rasul from Nusaybin. 
Interview 34: 13 February 2013, Germany (recorded) – Zar from Dersim, founder member 
of Kurdish Alevi Federation. 
Interview 35: 18 February 2013, Belgium (recorded) – Two former guerrillas, Azad from 
Bismil and Faqi from Dersim. 
Interview 36: 19 February 2013, Belgium (recorded) – Serdar a former political prisoner 
from Urfa and current KNK member.  
Interview 37: 20 February 2013, Belgium (recorded) – Former political prisoner and 
academic. 
Interview 38: 22 February 2013, Belgium (recorded) – Rojan, a former guerrilla from Izmir. 
Interview 39: 26 July 2013, Germany (recorded) – Karker, a Yezidi former guerrilla. 
Interview 40: 25 October 2013, Istanbul (recorded) – Arjen, a former PKK political prisoner 
from Muş. 
Interview 41: 25 October 2013, Istanbul (recorded) – Mervan from a Kawa supporting 
family from Çatak.  
Interview 42: 26 October 2013, Istanbul (recorded) – Zeynel from Erzurum and a former 
PKK prisoner. 
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Interview 43: 28 October 2013, Istanbul (unrecorded) – a former Kawa supporter from 
Adiyaman. 
Interview 44: 28 October 2013, Istanbul (recorded) – Farhad a former PKK political prisoner 
from Malazgirt. 
Interview 45: 28 October 2013, Istanbul (recorded) – Rang former PKK political prisoner 
originally from Sivas. 
Interview 46: 28 October 2013, Istanbul (recorded) – Jiloan a former guerrilla from Bismil. 
Interview 47: 30 October 2013, Istanbul (recorded) – Darin a former Halkin Kurtulus activist 
from Varto. 
Interview 48: 30 October 2013, Istanbul (recorded) – Mehmed a PKK supporter from 
Adiyaman. 
Interview 49: 30 October 2013, Istanbul (recorded) – Besna a female PKK supporter from 
Kulp. 
Interview 50: 1 November 2013, Istanbul (unrecorded) – Sezer a former ERNK organiser, 
guerrilla and political prisoner. 
Interview 51: 3 November 2013, Istanbul (recorded) – Bejan the daughter of a tribal leader 
involved in the Dersim rebellion. 
 
All names with the exception of those with an asterisk* have been changed to pseudonyms.  
364 
 
Appendix II: Glossary 
 
Acronym Original Name English Translation 
   
ADYÖD Ankara Demokratik Yüksek Öğretim 
Derneği 
Ankara Democratic Higher Education 
Association  
ANAP 
 
ANC 
Anavatan Partisi 
 
African National Congress 
 
Motherland Party 
AP 
 
ARGK 
 
Adalet Partisi  
 
Artêşa Rizgariya Gelê Kurdistan 
Justice Party (Est. 1961) 
 
People’s Liberation Army of Kurdistan 
AYÖD 
 
BDP 
 
Bir-Kom 
Ankara Yüksek Öğretim Derneği 
 
Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi 
 
Birlik Komitesi 
 
Association for Higher Education in 
Ankara 
Peace and Democracy Party 
 
Common Committee 
 
CHP 
 
CKMP 
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi  
  
Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi 
The Republican People’s Party 
 
Republican Peasants' Nation Party 
 
DDGB 
 
DDKD  
Devrimci Demokratik Güç Birliği 
 
Devrimci Demokratik Kültür 
Dernekleri 
 
Revolutionary Democratic United 
Force 
Revolutionary Democratic Culture 
Association 
DDKO Devrimci Dogu Kultur Ocaklari Revolutionary Eastern Cultural 
Hearths (Est. 1969) 
 
DEV-GENC Devrimci Gençlik Federation of Revolutionary Youth 
DEV-YOL  Devrimci Yol Hareketi  Revolutionary Path/Revolutionary 
People’s Liberation Party/Front 
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DEV-SOL 
 
DFLP 
 
 
DHKP-C 
Devrimci Sol 
 
Al-Jabha al-Dimuqratiya Li-Tahrir 
Filastin 
 
Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-
Cephesi 
Revolutionary Left     
 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine 
 
Revolutionary People's Liberation 
Party–Front 
DISK 
 
 
DYÖKD 
 
Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları 
Konfederasyonu 
 
Diyarbakır Yüksek Öğrenim Kültür 
Derneği 
Confederation of Revolutionary 
Workers Unions 
 
The Cultural Higher Education 
Association of Diyarbakır 
 
DP Demokrat Parti Democrat Party (Est. 2007, ANAP+ 
DYP) 
--- Demokrat Parti Democrat Party (Est. 1930) 
DYP Doğru Yol Partisi True Path Party (Est. 1983)    
ERNK Eniye Rizgariye Navata Kurdistan National Liberation Front of Kurdistan 
ETA 
 
EZLN 
 
 
FARC 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación 
Nacional 
 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo 
 
Basque Homeland and Freedom 
 
Zapatista Army of National Liberation 
 
 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia—People's Army 
FKBDC Faşizme Karşı Birleşik Direniş 
Cephesi 
Unified Resistance Front against 
Fascism 
 
FLN  
 
FMLN 
Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional 
 
Frente Farabundo Martí para la  
Liberación Nacional  
National Liberation Forces 
 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front 
 
GIA Groupe Islamique Armé Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha 
HRK Hazen Rizgariya Kurdistan Kurdistan Freedom Brigades 
IRA 
 
IP 
 
Óglaigh na hÉireann 
 
İşçi Partisi 
Irish Republican Army     
 
Workers Party 
KDP Partîya Demokrata Kurdistanê Kurdistan Democratic Party (Est. 
1946)       
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KIP 
 
KNK 
Kürdistan Işçi Partisi    
  
Kongra Netewiya Kurdistan                    
 
 
Kurdish National Congress 
 
--- KOMCIWAN Youth Wing of KOMKAR 
KOMKAR 
 
KTTC 
 
Yekitiya Komelên Kurdistan 
 
Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti 
 
 
 Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and 
Progress 
KUK Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari National Liberation of Kurdistan         
--- 
 
MGK 
Kawa  
 
Millî Güvenlik Konseyi 
Kurdish Proletarian Union  
 
National Security Council 
 
MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi   Nationalist Action Party    
MIT 
 
MLKP 
 
Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı 
 
Marksist-Leninist Komünist Partisi  
Turkish National Intelligence Unit 
 
Marxist-Leninist Communist Party 
MSP 
 
ORK 
 
PAIGC 
Millî Selâmet Partisi 
 
Ordiya Rizgariya Kurdistanê 
 
Partido Africano da Independência 
da Guiné e Cabo Verde 
 
 
National Salvation Party 
 
 
 
African Party for the Independence of 
Guinea and Cape Verde 
PKK 
 
PRK 
 
Partîya Karkaren-i Kurdistan 
 
Rizgari 
Kurdistan Workers Party     
 
Liberation 
PLO  Palestinian Liberation Organisation   
PPKK Partiya Pêsenga Karkerên Kurdistan 
or Sivancilar 
 
Kurdish Vanguard Workers Party 
PSK Partiya Sosyalîst a Kurdistan Kurdish Socialist Party           
 Rizgari Liberation  
RP 
 
SHP 
 
Refah Partisi 
 
Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti 
The Welfare Party 
 
Social Democratic People’s Party  
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--- Stêrka Sor/ Beş Parçacılar Red Star 
THKO 
 
 
TIKKO 
Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu  
 
 
Türkiye İşci ve Köylü Kurtuluş 
Ordusu 
People's Liberation Army of Turkey 
 
 
Workers’ Peasants Liberation Army of 
Turkey  
 
TİP 
 
TKP 
 
TKP-ML 
 
Türkiye İşçi Partisi 
 
Türkiye Komünist Partisi 
 
Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-
Leninist 
Workers Party of Turkey  
 
Turkish Communist Party  
 
Turkish Communist Party Marxist-
Leninist 
   
TKDP  Turkey Kurdistan Democratic Party            
TKSP Türkiye Kürdistanı Sosyalist Partisi / 
Özgürlük Yolu 
Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan 
 
 
 
TÖB-DER 
 
 
TMMOB  
 
Têkoşîn 
 
Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve 
Dayanışma Derneği 
 
Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları 
Birliği 
 
 
 
Association of All Teachers 
Unity and Solidarity 
 
Union of Chambers of Turkish 
Engineers and Architects 
 
UKO 
 
YCK 
 
YJA-Star 
 
YJWK 
 
 
YKWK 
 
Ulusal Kurtuluş Ordusu 
 
Yekîtiya Ciwanên Kurdistan 
 
Yekiniya Jinên Azad-Star 
 
Yekîtiya Jinên Welatparêzên 
Kurdistan 
 
Yekîtiya Karkerên Welatparêzên 
Kurdistan 
 
National Liberation Army 
 
The Union of Kurdish Youth 
 
Free Women’s Units 
 
Union of Patriotic Women of 
Kurdistan 
 
Union of Patriotic Workers of 
Kurdistan 
 
 
 
 
